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Erie Pennsylvania

quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XVII Fall 1973 Number 3

Special Issue

The United States and the Communist World: Power and Conflict in Transition

dedicated to Robert Strausz-Hupé

with articles by

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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
in association with
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
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ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

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ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

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ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is located in Medford, Massachusetts 02155. Subscription rates: one year, $9.00; two years, $16.50; three years, $23.00. Single copy, $3.00. Student rates: $7.00, $13.00, $18.00; single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

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
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David C. Schwartz is presently Associate Professor of Political Science at Livingston College and the Graduate Faculty of Rutgers University. He is an Associate Editor of SOCIETY magazine and a consultant in research to several public institutions, foundations, and agencies. 386pp. $9.95. 1973.

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Reflections on the Quarter

Negotiating European Security

THE fall of 1973 saw three conferences of considerable significance for European security in progress simultaneously: the MBFR in Vienna and the CSCE and SALT II in Geneva. At this point it is too early to discern clearly the final shape of SALT II, or the numerical values to be assigned to parity when the Interim Agreement is converted into a permanent agreement, or what kind of qualitative constraints might be imposed, or even whether there will be a precise outcome comparable to that from SALT I. Western analysts are increasingly dissatisfied with the strategic implications of SALT I. In evaluating the agreements of May 1972 many West Europeans wonder what they portend for the future of NATO, especially in light of the Nixon-Brezhnev statement of June 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war. It is in a climate not of fear but of vague apprehension, born of uncertainty, that the West Europeans approach CSCE and MBFR.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe entered its second phase in mid-September after more than nine months of agenda preparations in Helsinki, capped by the meeting of Foreign Ministers in July. The Conference on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE) got under way in Vienna at the end of October, following nearly five months of exploratory talks in the same capital earlier in the year to select the *dramatis personae.* NATO diplomats still use "mutual and balanced force reductions" in all public references to this conference and in communications with allies and neutrals (but not with Warsaw Pact members). At Soviet insistence during Brezhnev's visit to San Clemente in June the word "balanced" was dropped from the agreed title.

These two sets of negotiations have gone forward serenely unmarred by reactions to the anti-Allende coup in Chile; bitter attacks by Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the suppression of individual human rights within the USSR; warnings delivered to the West by Andrei Sakharov and spokesmen in Peking against making too much of détente; the refusal of the U.S. Congress to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union until it gives guarantees on Jewish rights to emigrate; growing Western concern about the terms of SALT I, about Soviet MIRV development and about the Soviet naval buildup; a major war in the Middle East for which the earlier ostentatious Soviet withdrawal from Egypt may have been a mere prelude; an oil shortage which is expected to have serious repercussions on virtually all Free World economies; a mid-range nuclear confrontation between the superpowers and perhaps the worst *crise de confiance* that NATO has experienced since the Suez intervention of 1956. The two superpowers refused to allow any of the foregoing aberrations to deflect them for one moment from the path of negotiated détente. In the course of the diplomatic discussions, the principals on each side politely refrained from mentioning such thorny problems.

The Soviets have been trying for many years to convene the Europeans in a security conference. The West takes comfort in the idea that it has made certain gains by exploiting this Soviet desire: the Soviets have (1) dropped their earlier opposition to U.S. and Canadian participation; (2) agreed to broaden the scope of the conference to include cooperation; (3) consented to a Berlin Accord, the achievement of which was a precondition to Western acquiescence in CSCE; and (4) agreed to enter into MBFR negotiations. In the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting of June 1973 the Soviets dropped their demand that CSCE must be brought to a successful conclusion before MBFR could begin.

In the meantime, the Soviets have found history rather kind to them in overtaking planned events, as it were. Even before the CSCE got into high gear, they were granted two of their most cherished goals in originally calling for such a conference: recognition of the inviolability of Germany's eastern boundaries as established at the end of World War II, which was accomplished in the conclusion of the Bonn treaties with the USSR and Poland; and the status of diplomatic respectability for the German Democratic Republic as a separate state, which was accomplished through the Intra-German Treaty, the admission of the two German states to the United Nations, and the expectation that the establishment of diplomatic ties by the Western powers was only a matter of time.

Thirty-three European states (including the Holy See, Lichtenstein, San Marino and Monaco—i.e., all except recalcitrant Albania), plus the United States and Canada, have sent representatives to the CSCE in Geneva. The United States delegation, pursuing the style it had earlier adopted at Helsinki, is adhering to a "low key, low profile" approach. The Soviets, in sharp contrast, had leaned rather hard to obtain their own way in the agenda-formulating phase at Helsinki, and as a consequence had alienated several of the European neutrals. They have since realized that their methods were counterproductive, and thus have eased off somewhat at Geneva. Both superpowers, without overtly coordinating their efforts, have sought to avoid giving the impression that they wish to establish a world condominium—a goal sometimes attributed to them.

U.S. diplomatic personnel, however, have become sensitive to another subtle problem, namely, that the Soviet Union and the East European governments may be trying slowly to sow the seeds of a dangerous idea: We are Europeans, they intimate, gathered here to discuss matters of European security; the Americans and the Canadians are present as our "invited guests," and so we must treat them with the greatest courtesy; but the time is coming when we Europeans will want to talk about our common concerns without having "outsiders" at the table. If this is an element of Soviet political strategy, it has thus far not visibly influenced the West Europeans. But it is noteworthy that such a possibility is on the minds of American "observers."

Diplomats in Geneva speak of three "baskets" around which the substantive content of the conference is organized: I, Questions Relating to Security in Europe; II, Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment; and III, Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields. Procedurally, the Conference Coordinating Committee is also supposed to consider such follow-up matters as may be required (including proposals of an organizational nature) to give effect to whatever decisions are reached. Most of the political gains the Soviets want to extract from CSCE are to be found in Basket I. The Western states are primarily interested in Basket III. Basket II, filled with *quid pro quos,* is the least controversial of the three.

Essentially, what the Soviets seek is general recognition by the West of an irreversible territorial *status quo* in Eastern Europe based on the post-World War II frontiers, a pledge of nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states, and a promise to settle disputes peaceably and to refrain from the threat or use of force. Principles which are plainly unexceptionable in themselves are being set forth to obscure the historic fact that there is a fundamental political asymmetry between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was ratified by freely elected parliaments in all the principal member states of Western Europe, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was imposed on the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of a political process made possible only by Soviet military occupation. It is one thing for the Federal Republic of Germany to declare solemnly that the existing eastern boundaries are inviolable. It is quite another for all the democratically organized states of the West to give their political blessing, *per omnia saecula saeculorum,* to the forceful intrusion of Soviet communist power into East-Central Europe as a permanent political fact which the West should no longer try to think about changing, even by peaceful persuasion—i.e., through that dialectic of free traffic in the market place of ideas of which John Stuart Mill once wrote so eloquently.

Nowhere do the Soviets show more clearly what they mean by "European security" than in their approach to the subject matter of Basket III, which the West originally wanted to label "Free Flow of Ideas and Information," until the communist states balked and finally obtained a more innocuous designation. For months, the government-controlled radios of Eastern Europe have been warning that the West is now relaxing military-diplomatic pressure on the communist countries so that it can subvert them and wage psychological warfare on their territory under the guise of the "free exchange of ideas." The people are told that what the West seeks by means of newspapers and anti-communist books is to misinform the working people, to implant a nonsocialist model of man and of individualistic morals, and to promote dissatisfaction with communist policies. The socialist states, declare their radios over and over, have no objection to a "fair ideological struggle," but obviously the truth cannot grow when one country is trying to subvert another, and this is really what "the free movement of ideas" means.

According to the communists, therefore, the expansion of cultural relations, contacts and information must be based on the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the laws and customs of the various countries. The communist world is thus free to propagate its ideas in the Western democratic countries, because their laws permit it, but the Western countries must not propagate their ideas in the communist countries, because the laws of the latter do not permit it. That is what "a fair ideological struggle" involves: only one side is free to subvert by advocacy of a cause. When the Western press focuses on the complaints and warnings of a few "ingrates," "malcontents" or "unbalanced minds" within the Soviet Union (such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn), this demonstrates that the West is determined to sabotage "peaceful coexistence" and the European security conference. All of which serves to validate an intuition long held by Western political scientists—that during a period of international détente, when the foreign enemy appears less menacing, authoritarian regimes must worry more about the dangers of internal unrest. In any event, "cultural and information exchange" still has strikingly dissimilar meanings in East and West.

In October 1973, some two dozen prominent European intellectuals, including Raymond Aron, Denis de Rougement, C. A. Doxiadis, Bernard Lewis, Golo Mann, Ignazio Silone and Germaine Tillion, signed a statement declaring that vital principles of intellectual freedom were in danger of being neglected at the CSCE. Governmental agreements on scientific and cultural exchanges, they said, can do little good if they by-pass the principles of "freedom of thought and expression, of publication and criticism, unimpeded contacts between scholars, scientists, artists and writers, and the free flow of knowledge, ideas and research." The statement went on to charge that attempts to achieve détente thus far have "been accompanied by a worsening in the cultural situation both within the countries of Eastern Europe and in their relations with the West."

To return to the problem of secure frontiers, if the Soviets continue to insist that existing European boundaries must be ratified by all conference participants not merely as "inviolable" but as permanent and unchangeable, they will encounter opposition from several quarters in noncommunist Europe. Spain would like someday to alter the status of Gibraltar; many Irishmen look to a single Irish state; some Greeks and some Cypriots are not ready formally to renounce *enosis* forever; the West Germans have made it officially clear that the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR does not preclude the possibility of eventual reunification; as the EEC Nine move, however haltingly, toward the goal of political unity proclaimed at Paris in October 1972 and at Copenhagen in September 1973, they will probably wish to alter the significance of national borders, and they are unwilling to give the Soviets a legal handle for questioning developments within the European Community. The USSR, on its part, fears that if boundary guarantees can become unstuck in Western Europe, even by consent among all parties concerned, dangerous ideas might thereby be implanted in the heads of East Germans.

Ever since the CSCE preliminaries got under way more than a year ago in Helsinki, a question has recurred as to the relationship between security in this forum and security as understood in the Vienna MBFR negotiations. The two conferences are to be conducted in parallel; they are not expected to converge, but obviously they are related, and in either forum the participants can and will take into account the progress or lack thereof in the other forum. CSCE is primarily a political-diplomatic forum, with little precise content in the military area. Some smaller European states, both East and West, have asked how an international conference can deal effectively with security matters while excluding from its scope most of the serious questions concerning military forces and weapons, which are being treated either in SALT or in MBFR. It is not an unreasonable question, but there is a good answer: a forum of thirty-five states including several neutrals, which frowns upon the exposition of alliance positions as such, and which proceeds according to the principle of unanimous consent, is hardly an appropriate mechanism for serious and sustained negotiations on force reductions in the Central Front sector between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The SALT I negotiations, conducted between only two parties, turned out to be immensely complex from both the political and technical standpoints, and lasted for two and a half years. But in some respects SALT I was a game of tick-tack-toe compared with MBFR, in which there are eleven participants (United States, USSR, Canada, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Benelux states) plus eight observers (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece and Turkey). The exploratory sessions that took place in Vienna from the end of January until mid-June were devoted to questions of participant states and procedures.

The principal issue was whether

Hungary should be a participant (whose territory or forces would be subject to negotiation) or merely an observer. The Soviets argued that if Hungary were to be included as a full participant then all Soviet foreign-based forces in Europe would be subject to negotiation, whereas the same would not hold true for the United States (whose forces and bases in Italy and Spain would not be included). If Hungary should be brought in later, the Soviets insisted, so must Italy. The United States wishes to confine the talks to the Central Front; it does not want them expanded to encompass Italy and, by a corollary process, the Sixth Fleet with its headquarters at Naples. The Soviets sought to reassure the West that it need not be greatly worried over the exclusion of Hungary, since Soviet forces based in that country are not oriented toward the Central Front. If NATO was reassured, Rumania and Yugoslavia were not.

There is an inevitable political coupling between CSCE and MBFR. Rumania, Yugoslavia and other middle or smaller European states, frustrated by the separation between the security conference and the force reduction conference, have tried frequently to raise arms limitation and disarmament issues at Geneva. Rumania, for example, has often called for guarantees against the "massing of military forces on national borders." It would be logical to interpret this, as many observers have done, as a warning against future Soviet applications of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," except for the fact that for many years there has been an element of "contrived Gaullism" in the foreign policy statements of the Rumanian government. (Actually, there has been no evidence of any breaking of the ranks among the East European participants in the various ongoing East-West negotiations.)

The CSCE agenda contains two provisions under which military matters might be raised, directly or indirectly. The first pertains to "confidence-building measures such as the prior notification of major military maneuvers . . . and the exchange of observers by invitation at military maneuvers under mutually acceptable conditions." (Prior notification of major military movements is also to be studied.) It is doubtful whether most European states will be satisfied with a concept of confidence-building measures so narrowly defined as scarcely to touch upon their genuine security concerns. But it is only fair to add that measures that would really enhance confidence in specific critical situations are extremely difficult to define with precision in advance. Measures calculated to increase mutual confidence and reduce tensions in one set of circumstances may have quite the opposite effect in another set of circumstances.

The other clause of potential military significance is the one concerning "the relationship between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean area." At Helsinki Dom Mintoff of Malta startled the conference by demanding that non-European states from the southern littoral of the Mediterranean be allowed to present their views on security matters to the second phase of the CSCE. There was little enthusiasm for his suggestion, but rather than let him dampen the prospects for the conference by vetoing its proceedings under the unanimity rule, the participants submitted to Mintoff's not-too-subtle blackmail after agreeing, at the insistence of The Netherlands, Denmark and other Western governments, that Israel also be invited to present her views, along with Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria.

Five southern European states, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia, were not disturbed at such a development. They were of the opinion that one could not speak realistically of security in Europe without some reference to the Mediterranean area. The Middle East war of October 1973 strengthened this view among West Europeans generally, since they expected to feel the effects of an Arab oil embargo earlier and more severely than the American people. Actually the non-European spokesmen who came to Geneva spoke in a lower key than might have been expected while a war was going on. But perhaps such was the nature of that most ambiguous crisis. In any event, over a period of time the Geneva conference may be used to build political support in Europe for the expansion of the scope of the Vienna conference in the direction of the Mediterranean.

Whatever pledges of security may eventually issue from CSCE will probably not go much beyond the level of semantics; they will be nonquantifiable, nonverifiable (except for the possible exchange of observers during maneuvers) and nonenforceable. CSCE, in other words, is designed to produce a mood, an atmosphere. If MBFR, on the other hand, is to be successful, it will have to produce a schedule of carefully phased moves and measures that would make the political-military balance in Europe more stable. Such moves and measures must lead to "undiminished security" (or better still, enhanced security) at lower force levels. They must compensate for the geographic and military asymmetries that favor the Soviets by moving the two alliances toward greater "parity" or "comparability" of deterrence/defense capabilities than now obtains—a goal which Soviet writers reject, since it implies that the USSR must give up certain currently held advantages. Finally, the MBFR measures must lend themselves to satisfactory verification and provide for sanctions in the form of military adjustments if the agreements should be violated.

As the Vienna negotiations got under way, it was difficult for Western analysts to overcome the uneasy feeling that the better cards were in the hands of the Warsaw Pact countries. NATO was divided over the merits of MBFR. The French remained adamantly opposed; the British have always been skeptical at best; and the West Germans, who had been among the earliest to agree with the United States on the need for MBFR negotiations following the introduction of additional Soviet strength into

Czechoslovakia in 1968, have become more cautious during the last two years.

The Soviets certainly stand to benefit from what will be a unidirectional flow of political-military intelligence from the NATO area. The NATO participants, of course, are supposed to present a unified position at Vienna, but it will not be easy for the Western allies to develop and sustain unified positions for prolonged negotiations, especially in the wake of the Middle East crisis and the strains to which it gave rise within NATO. Given the number of participants, no one can expect the confidentiality of MBFR talks to be observed. As various proposals are leaked to and commented on by the Western press, the Soviets will be quick to discern small fissures within the Western alliance which can be exploited and aggravated during the years ahead. This, to be sure, is not a new asymmetry in Soviet-Western relations, but it must give pause to friends of NATO at a time when an unprecedented petulance is beginning to characterize transatlantic communications.

The United States could derive some reassurance from the knowledge that the anticipated improvement in its 1973 trade and payments accounts would strengthen its negotiating position by removing some of the Congressional pressure for unilateral troop reductions abroad as a means of coping with the international financial imbalance. At the same time the Nixon Administration was determined to keep pressing for greater burden sharing within NATO in order to eliminate any deficit attributable to the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe.* There were signs that these efforts would succeed, and even the French hinted in their draft declaration of NATO principles that they would support equitable cost-sharing in the alliance as a means of retaining the indispensable U.S. commitment to European defense.

On the whole, however, these are trying times in the history of transatlantic relations. U.S. policymakers and diplomats have been prodding the Europeans to play a larger political role in the "emerging multipolar world." The United States has allowed the initiative in CSCE to pass to the West Europeans and the latter have performed creditably in discussions on cultural and information exchange, as well as human contacts, between East and West. But the Europeans become understandably confused when the leading U.S. foreign affairs official questions "whether it should be the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal"—as Dr. Kissinger queried during the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his confirmation as Secretary af State.

The Europeans realize that Mill and Metternich have always been hard to reconcile and that they must be kept in some sort of balance in a nuclearized world. But as the "Year of Europe" ended on a disappointing note, they were disturbed by gnawing uncertainties. For more than two decades, they looked to the United States for leadership. The entire present generation of European politicians has come to maturity in a protected environment in which Europe did not need, and did not have, a unified foreign policy or a defense policy of its own. Within the last few years, the United States has been engaged in a hectic and at times brilliant effort to hasten the birth of a new international system—about the reality of which many Europeans remain unconvinced. Even if the Europeans knew and understood what the United States is trying to get them to do, they would have great difficulty in uniting to do it, but there would be a chance that they could pull it off. As things now stand, however, they are basically puzzled as to the priorities and the general direction of American foreign policy. At the least they deserve a clarification from the premier ally.

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*The Administration was aided by the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the military procurement bill, requiring that U.S. troops be withdrawn in proportion to that part of the balance of payments deficit due to the stationing of forces abroad which the allies fail to offset.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Fourth Round

THE sudden renewal of fighting in the Middle East on October 6 not only ended the no war, no peace deadlock, but also provided a severe test of the recently forged U.S.-Soviet relationship, strained the U.S.-West European alliance, and precipitated a major energy problem for the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

The war set in motion intricate political maneuvers among the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, the Arab oil-producing states, and the immediate combatants. The superpowers' commitments to their local "clients" impelled them toward confrontation at the same time that their interest in avoiding a direct clash spurred U.S. efforts to promote a lasting settlement in the region. President Nixon stressed on October 26, "we have agreed . . . that if we are to avoid [a superpower confrontation] it is necessary for us to use our influence more than we have in the past to get the negotiating track moving again, but this time moving to a conclusion—not simply a temporary truce but a permanent peace."

The war also exacerbated tensions between the United States and Western Europe concerning the future of American troops stationed in Europe and the need for consultation between Washington and its allies on major issues of mutual interest. Moreover, dependence on Arab oil led West European nations, with the notable exceptions of Portugal and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands to emphasize their neutrality in the regional conflict and to dissociate themselves from American efforts to resupply Israel militarily.

As the fighting persisted for seventeen days, Secretary of State Kissinger engaged in intensive rounds of negotiations in order to achieve a cease-fire and initiate steps toward peace talks. He asserted in a major policy statement on October 25, ". . . our position is that . . . the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations . . . . The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for . . . sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure borders. . . . [We] will make a major effort to bring about a solution that is considered just by all parties." In Washington, Kissinger shuttled between meetings with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Israeli Premier Golda Meir and the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, while maintaining close contact with Soviet officials.

All these urgent consultations and Nixon's emphasis on the "enormous incentives" to find a solution to the Middle East conflict stood in sharp contrast to the diplomatic picture of the preceding year. At that time, there were few incentives for outside powers to involve themselves in the conflict and the status quo appeared to be virtually unchallengeable. The prospect for immediate, direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East had waned after President Sadat of Egypt expelled Soviet advisers and pilots in July 1972. The Soviet withdrawal seemed to foreclose for Egypt the option of military action, despite Sadat's continued threats to reconquer territory lost in the war in June 1967. So long as Israel appeared dominant militarily, its government could reject any offers of outside mediation and continue to insist on a choice between the status quo and direct bilateral negotiations leading to a peace treaty and partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. Neither option was acceptable to Egypt.

While continuing to support Israel, the United States strengthened its economic relationships in the Arab world. Petroleum agreements were signed with such politically hostile states as Algeria and Egypt. Washington re-established diplomatic relations with North Yemen and the Sudan in 1972. The American diplomatic initiatives undertaken in 1970 and 1971 by Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco had faded away by 1972. After Sadat's ouster of Soviet personnel, the United States had not pressed for a diplomatic settlement. It did express interest in an interim settlement along the Suez Canal, but it did not urge either Egypt or Israel to begin negotiations. The American Presidential elections in November 1972, U.S. preoccupation with reaching an accord in Viet Nam, preparations for the security talks in Europe, the negotiation of trade agreements between Washington and Moscow, and the assumption that further Middle East efforts must await the 1973 Israeli national elections, reinforced the pervasive feeling that the Middle East conflict had come to have no great urgency. As Egyptian columnist Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal warned his readers, the Arab-Israeli conflict was receding from a "crisis" to a "problem," one with which outside powers and Israel could live indefinitely.

Sadat, however, believed that Egypt could not live indefinitely with the status quo and refused to accept the options offered by Israel. Once he realized that Washington was not going to exert pressure on Israel for a settlement, he concluded that Egypt had to resort to war, which could be used effectively in concert with the establishment of a broad Arab front, the mobilization of world public opinion behind the Arab cause, and the threat of an oil boycott against states that supported Israel.

On the Arab front, Sadat succeeded in maintaining relations not only with volatile Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi of Libya but with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil-producing state in the region. Unlike Nasser, he did not threaten Faysal and the Persian Gulf sheikhs with socialist revolutions. Instead, he cultivated their personal support and reduced their fears by rescinding many of Nasser's socialist measures. By mid-1973 Sadat had even rescued King Hussein of Jordan from political isolation, in return for only token gestures of reconciliation between Hussein and the Palestinian resistance movement. Finally, Iraq re-established relations with neighboring Iran in late September, after two years of bitter animosity. Thus, by October 1973, Sadat had reduced Jordanian-Syrian tensions on the "eastern front" with Israel, helped to end Iraq's preoccupation with potential conflict with Iran, and built up solid ties with the oil-rich states. These arrangements would prove useful to Egypt in the event of renewed fighting.

Sadat's efforts to win international support for his position included active diplomacy in the Third World and in Western Europe. The sub-Saharan African states were encouraged to break diplomatic relations with Israel in return for promises of financial aid from Libya or Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Israel's image as a struggling "new nation" had been tarnished since the 1967 war and the African regimes were more receptive to Arab arguments than they had been in the early 1960's. Egypt secured the diplomatic support of the non-aligned nations at the Algiers conference in early September 1973 and the impact of these efforts was clearly seen in voting patterns in the United Nations.

The Arab states tempted Western Europe with lucrative technical and military contracts, simultaneously reminding the Europeans that their overwhelming dependence on Arab oil would make it advantageous for them to assume a neutral or pro-Arab position on Middle East issues. Egypt re-established diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic in June 1972, after a seven-year hiatus, and Sadat sent his most skillful diplomats to European posts.

These efforts were jeopardized by the Black September carnage at Munich in September 1972, which temporarily upset Sadat's plans for a major diplomatic offensive in Europe and the United Nations. But by the spring of 1973 European governments appeared as alienated by Israeli security forces' operations in their countries and against Lebanon as they were by the *fedayeen* themselves; violent actions on either side only served to reinforce their propensity toward "neutrality."

The oil weapon was recognized

to be double-edged: if applied indiscriminately, it could hurt the Arab countries and alienate friends. Therefore, the Arab leaders emphasized that only supporters of Israel would be affected by any oil "squeeze." By the spring of 1973, Kuwaiti leaders were warning that the renewal of fighting would result in an oil boycott, adding that the Arab states could use this weapon much more effectively in 1973 than they could in 1967, as a result of the change from a buyers' to a sellers' market in petroleum. Saudi leaders even informed Washington that Saudi oil production would not increase if the United States did not rethink its commitments in the Middle East. Since the United States had been counting on sizeable increases in Saudi production to meet growing American energy requirements, this was King Faysal's means of attempting to exert pressure on Washington.

These initiatives would bolster Sadat's diplomatic efforts if he could first establish Egypt's military credibility in battle with Israel. But this was a most difficult operation, not only because Egypt held awkward military positions and because Israel had threatened deep penetration raids and a canal crossing in the event that fighting resumed, but because the Egyptians themselves did not believe they had the capacity to mount an offensive against the "invincible"' Israelis. For Sadat's diplomatic purposes, the act of challenging Israel by crossing the Suez Canal and gaining even a temporary foothold on the east bank might provide a psychological victory of sufficient weight to open the way for negotiations. The Egyptians would cross "the wall of fear," as Haykal expressed it, and rid themselves of their collective inferiority complex. Moreover, if Egypt could retain a bridgehead on the east bank and engage Israel in a protracted war, it could shatter "the myth of Israeli invincibility" and show the world that force alone would not guarantee Israel's security. This military action might bring into play European and Third World diplomacy, force the superpowers into action, and, through a selective Arab oil boycott, force Washington to choose between all-out support for Israel and support for Arab demands.

Initiating a military confrontation, however, might also entail enormous risks for Sadat. If Israel were able to push the Egyptian forces back across the canal and then seize the west bank, Egypt would lose all control over the canal and Sadat would be placed in a politically untenable position. If the war were brief and decisive, as in 1967, there would be little opportunity for the Arab oil weapon to come into play or for Moscow to take diplomatic action to bail out Sadat. Furthermore, Sadat could not be certain of the responses of either Moscow or Washington—Moscow might welcome the demise of his regime and Washington might decide to back Israel at all cost.

Thus the war set in play a scenario only partly under Sadat's control. The ability of the Egyptian forces to hold a band of territory across the canal gained time for the Arab oil states to mobilize their support and for the Soviet Union to send additional military supplies to Egypt and Syria. Moreover, the resupply operations provided tangible evidence of Israel's heavy dependence on the United States and of its diplomatic isolation, particularly from Western Europe.

In order to encourage the United States to separate itself politically from Israel, Sadat and other Arab leaders emphasized the war's limited diplomatic and military aims. As Sadat stressed in his October 16 speech, the first aim was to prove that "the peace of *faits accompli* cannot exist and cannot last" and then to seek "to restore our territory which was occupied in 1967" and "to find ways and means to restore and obtain respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine." His "open letter" to President Nixon coupled Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and other territories, under "international supervision," with Egyptian attendance at "an international peace conference at the United Nations" which would lay "down the rules and regulations for a peace in the area based on respect for the legitimate rights of all the peoples of the area."

The prior mobilization of Arab support paid off in Arab pledges of men, material and particularly financial aid to support the war effort. The selective oil boycott came into play as soon as the United States began resupplying Israel with Phantom jets, ammunition and electronic equipment. African states, including even Ethiopia and Ghana, which had maintained friendly ties with Israel, rushed to break off relations. West European states would not permit U.S. planes to overfly their territories with supplies for Israel and only Portugal allowed these planes to refuel on its military bases. Only the Dutch government issued statements sympathetic to Israel, and paid for it with an oil embargo.

The most important and complex linkages were those involving Washington and Moscow. In order to restore its credibility before the Arabs, the Soviet Union resupplied Egypt and Syria with military hardware. President Nixon warned Moscow that direct superpower involvement could jeopardize efforts toward détente in Europe, as well as Soviet-American trade agreements, but he felt that American credibility with the Israelis was also at stake and therefore hastened to resupply Israel. This action, in turn, angered King Faysal and helped to activate the Arab oil weapon, which began with an across-the-board 5 per cent cut in production every month until Israel returned the territories captured in 1967 and emphasized a selective embargo against pro-Israeli states, which, in practice, meant the United States, Portugal and the Netherlands. The oil embargo increased U.S.-European tensions and also fortuitously aided Moscow, by threatening the NATO forces' fuel supply. Thus the oil weapon damaged U.S.-European relations and made more difficult the Nixon Administration's task in convincing Congress to continue to support U.S. troops at their current levels in Western Europe.

Twice during the fighting, the United States and the Soviet Union were deeply at odds. First, because the resupply efforts threatened to involve them in a major weapons contest over a protracted period, both states sought to persuade their "clients" to accept a standstill cease-fire, even though the local powers were still anxious to fight toward a more definitive military conclusion. The result was a particularly unstable cease-fire line on the Egypt-Israel front. This situation propelled the two superpowers toward additional commitments in order to maintain the line effectively and to induce the local states to engage in serious peace negotiations.

The second point of deep superpower division occurred over the issues connected with an effective cease-fire. Israeli pressures on the Egyptian army's Third Corps, trapped on the east bank of the Suez and cut off from its supply lines, prompted Moscow to threaten unilateral intervention on Egypt's behalf unless the Israelis pulled back to the initial cease-fire line. Nixon ordered a precautionary military alert in order to signal to Moscow that the United States would react strongly against such a Soviet move, but Washington simultaneously proposed a compromise by which a United Nations emergency force would patrol the cease-fire line and insure that food and medical supplies reached the trapped Egyptian forces. The implementation of this compromise also required decisive American pressure on Israel to allow the supplies to pass through.

The cease-fire lines between Egypt and Israel remained highly unstable, with Israel holding a bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal and Egypt retaining two areas east of the canal in Sinai. This tenuous situation produced strong pressures toward either the resumption of fighting or serious negotiations. Without outside mediation, Egypt and Israel are more apt to revert to fighting than to reach a diplomatic settlement.

In the short run, U.S. prestige in the Middle East has been considerably enhanced by Dr. Kissinger's success in persuading Israel and Egypt to accept a six-point agreement that may defuse the tensions along the canal and open the way to full-scale peace negotiations. The Egyptian Third Corps and Suez town began to receive non-military supplies through UN-supervised checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road. As soon as these checkpoints were established, all prisoners of war were exchanged. Egyptian and Israeli officers also began to discuss the question of returning to their positions at the time of the first cease-fire. Two important provisions which were not mentioned explicitly in the agreement, but which were tacitly recognized by both parties, were the lifting of the Egyptian blockade at Bab el Mandeb, at the southern end of the Red Sea, and the rapid opening of a peace conference.

In the long run, however, the interaction of Washington and Moscow in the Middle East becomes crucial, not only in strengthening détente, but in persuading the local parties to use their military stalemate as a first step toward serious diplomacy, rather than yet another round of warfare. The willingness of the Soviet Union to work with the United States in promoting a more durable settlement will provide an important indication of the prospects for, or the severe limitations inherent in, the relationship established by President Nixon with Soviet leaders in intensive diplomacy over the past two years.

The Failure of Chile's Marxist Experiment

CHILE'S Marxist experiment came to an abrupt end on September 11, 1973, when the Chilean armed forces overthrew President Salvador Allende Gossens. Although the Allende regime had accomplished some needed social reforms, three years of rule by the Unidad Popular coalition had severely disrupted the economy and sharply polarized Chilean political life. The armed forces acted, amid threats of a Marxist coup and civil war, to bring to an end a period of paralyzing social, economic and political crisis.

The military promptly established a junta under army commander General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. Other members of the governing body were General Jorge Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, the air force chief, Vice Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro, commander of the navy, and César Mendoza Durán, head of the national police. The armed forces maintained a high degree of unity during and after the coup, despite widespread predictions that substantial elements would remain loyal to Allende.

The character of the new administration soon became apparent. Its leadership shares a basically conservative, middle-class background and a nationalistic and vehemently anti-Marxist outlook. Within the junta there is evidence of some difference in policy emphasis, with General Pinochet taking a more moderate line than the air force and naval chiefs. Fundamentally, however, the political orientation of the regime undoubtedly portends a dramatic alteration of Chile's domestic and foreign policies away from trends established by Allende.

On the domestic front the junta appears to be pursuing three major goals: the restoration of civil order, the revival of the economy, and the creation of a new political structure. The first concern was, of course, to establish effective control of the nation. In the wake of the coup stern measures limited organized resistance to the junta and halted the violent social conflict which had gripped Chile. The armed forces declared a state of siege, established a strict curfew and forbade public demonstrations. Armed opposition was met with immediate and overwhelming force.

Parties belonging to, or sympathizing with, Allende's Unidad Popular coalition were outlawed. Marxist propaganda was seized and numerous leftists were interned. More than a score of ministers and other high officials of the Allende regime were confined indefinitely on inhospitable Dawson Island, at Chile's southern tip. About eighty militant Chilean leftists were executed during the first six weeks of military rule. The military government also dealt severely with foreigners believed to be Marxist extremists. Over 10,000 Latin American political exiles had been welcomed by Allende. After the coup, thousands of these foreign leftists were put in prisons and detention camps and over one thousand of them sought refuge in foreign embassies in Santiago.

Resuscitation of Chile's ruined economy is obviously one of the priorities of the new national leadership, and from the beginning it became clear that the junta was committed to fundamentally orthodox economic solutions. Efforts have been directed toward curbing inflation, effectively managing the foreign debt and restoring the confidence of local private investors. Many of Allende's nationalization measures have been repealed and the government is actively seeking foreign aid and investment from the Western world. A particularly delicate economic situation exists with regard to the position of the "rotos"—the Chilean lower classes. Favored under the Allende regime, this social group fears that the triumph of the military may lead to a repeal of their economic and social advances. The junta claims a commitment to the welfare of all Chileans and has dealt gingerly with the principal elements of Allende's former constituency. It is too early to assess the likelihood of success for the junta in the economic realm. The skill with which it manages the economy will play an important part in future Chilean politics.

Another major goal appears to be the definitive reorientation of the political system to preclude a repetition of the experiences of the past three years. The junta seeks to eliminate all Marxist influence and to ensure that power is exercised in consonance with the basic orientation of the current regime. All Marxist groups have been proscribed, other parties temporarily suspended, and the processes of parliamentary democracy halted.

The junta has given vague hints that it may be planning a fundamental reorganization of the Chilean political system, with a "Brazilian" or some corporativist system as the final result. Whatever the choice, the road will be difficult. Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democrats, the leading non-Marxist party, has already expressed dissatisfaction at the indefinite suspension of all political parties. The junta also has had to contend with the sullen followers of Allende, who was supported by some 40 per cent of the electorate. Many feel that the leftists have not really been defeated but are only awaiting a favorable opportunity to strike. Under certain circumstances the martyred Allende could prove more powerful dead than alive. Thus it is clear that the creation of a political system acceptable to the entire nation will be a formidable, if not impossible, task.

Chile has been added to the growing list of South American military or military-backed governments—Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. In none of these countries does an early and complete return of civilian rule appear probable. In the cases of Brazil and Peru, and now apparently Chile, the military's inclination is toward political control of national economic development and social order. The Chilean armed forces had traditionally kept out of politics but this new orientation may fundamentally alter the nature of Chilean political life.

The coup has profound foreign policy implications. Events in Chile obviously intrude into the complex international rivalries of the South American continent. Recent years have seen an increasingly vigorous Brazil steadily augmenting its international influence. Chilean-Brazilian relations remained correct but distant during Allende's tenure in office in spite of the Brazilian military's aversion to Marxism and the Castro-Allende entente. With both states now headed by anti-communist military governments, the outlook is for improved relations between them.

Argentine aspirations to contain the expansion of Brazilian influence are likely to be even more difficult with the new regime in power in Santiago. With Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay already within the Brazilian orbit, closer Chilean-Brazilian relations would dim the prospects for forging an effective anti-Brazilian "Spanish-American" alliance under Argentina's leadership. Chile is traditionally hostile to Argentina and is particularly wary of leftist influences in the Peronist movement and of Argentina's potential as a source of political "subversion."

The emergence of a strongly anti-communist military government also has profound implications for future Marxist activity in Latin America. Even though Allende was unable to achieve an elective majority or complete implementation of his program, the Chilean experiment was presented as an example to the entire region. Chile's failure to reconcile Marxism and democracy will undoubtedly strengthen the hand of those who argue that violent revolution is preferable to the parliamentary road to communism. At the same time Chile's position as a gathering place for extremist groups and a potential base for exporting revolution was ended with the coup. The junta accused Cuba and the Soviet Union of conspiring to impose a Marxist dictatorship in Chile and promptly severed diplomatic relations with both states.

The United States has attempted to maintain a low profile with regard to Chile's internal difficulties, but clearly welcomed the change in government. Although Washington may have learned in advance that a coup was imminent, charges of U.S. complicity appear unfounded. The United States moved to rebuild relations with Chile through prompt diplomatic recognition of the new regime and the extension of a $24 million credit to allow critical short-term purchases of wheat. The junta's new economic policies will contribute to closer ties. The Allende government had expropriated some $600 million of U.S. investment—principally the holdings of Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies. Negotiations are now under way for the return of companies to their previous owners or the payment of adequate compensation. The copper industry is to remain under government control and negotiations will be undertaken with American concerns to assure their satisfaction with the arrangements. The austerity program of the current government provides evidence of its intention to avoid further loan defaults to the United States—which amounted to some $100 million during the period of Allende's rule.

While a domestic austerity program, a more hospitable investment climate and greater access to international financial aid institutions are likely to revive the Chilean economy, the nation's political future is less certain. Hopefully Chile's traditional devotion to democracy will reassert itself and ease the difficult transition from Marxism to a new political order.

The Tenth Chinese Party Congress and the Succession Problem

THE Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met in Peking from August 24 through August 28, 1973. It was followed on August 30 by the first plenary session of the new Party Central Committee. The congress was attended by 1,249 delegates, including—for the first time—a delegation of ethnic Taiwanese communists to emphasize China's continuing claim to that territory. There were three items on the agenda: (1) the presentation of a "political report" on foreign and domestic affairs by Premier Chou En-lai; (2) a discussion of the provisions of the revised party constitution by Wang Hung-wen, the third-ranked official in the CCP; and (3) the "selection" of a Tenth CCP Central Committee. Business at the Central Committee's plenary session included the ratification of a list of twenty-one regular and four alternate members of the Politburo, and the unanimous reconfirmation of Mao Tse-tung as Chairman.

The Western policy community had been awaiting the convening of the Tenth CCP Congress with considerable interest, since these congresses have often provided outside observers with useful insights into the distribution of political power within China, as well as information about the general policy orientation of the leadership which otherwise would probably not be available.

More than four years had passed since the Ninth Party Congress met in April 1969. At that time, Lin Piao had been designated Mao Tse-tung's heir-apparent and it was assumed that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) held a near-monopoly on *de facto* power in China. Moreover, the faction that had identified itself with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—the so-called "Maoist" or "militant" group—was in disfavor as a consequence of the disruption it had caused throughout the country. Subsequently, however, in the fall of 1971, Lin Piao and a number of senior military commanders who had been associated with him disappeared and were rumored dead following an attempted coup against Mao. The influence of the PLA in the central government was then markedly reduced, although it still dominated the "three-in-one" coalitions (of professional party cadres, Red Guard militants, and the military) in many regional and district party committees. For the past year or so, it has been generally thought that China was being led by a relatively moderate, "centrist" group headed by Chou with Mao's tacit approval.

As events developed, the Tenth CCP Congress did provide Western observers with some novel insights into the Chinese political power structure. One of the more immediate points of interest was the appearance of Wang Hung-wen, a young man probably under forty years of age, in the number three position in the party hierarchy behind the elderly veterans, Mao and Chou. Wang had been a leading member of the Red Guard movement in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, and had only recently begun to be mentioned in national affairs. During the congress, he presented one of the two published speeches noted on the agenda and was "elected" a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In contrast to Chou's comparatively moderate speech—though it was hardly the model of restraint—Wang reflected his Red Guard orientation. The general tone of many of his comments, particularly concerning the Cultural Revolution, proclaimed the polemics characteristic of the radical "Maoist" faction. It is still too soon to ascertain the degree of influence he will exercise over Chinese policy, but there is little doubt that his position in the Tenth Congress signals a success for the more militant elements in the CCP.

In addition, the published reports delivered by Chou and Wang and the factional representation on the Politburo and its Standing Committee suggest several influences bearing on Chinese affairs. First, it seems that the existence of a "moderate" coalition under Chou may well conceal factional conflict within the party. Second, China's overriding foreign policy concern is the dispute with the Soviet Union. Third, there are indications that the successors to Mao and Chou will be part of the "Maoist" faction, which could signify important implications for China's internal stability and external relations in the near future.

One sign of continuing factional conflict is the emphasis the published reports of the congress placed on the need for party unity and doctrinal agreement. Both Chou and Wang noted that the dangers to the CCP which had been posed by the "Lin Piao antiparty clique" had not been eradicated. Deviationist and revisionist tendencies, they warned, are inherent in all aspects of society. However, these could be used positively to strengthen the sense of unity of the party membership. Chou stressed the need to avoid becoming so absorbed in bureaucratic processes that the major tenets of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought would be overlooked or ignored. Wang was far more critical of the activities of some "leading cadres" which had resulted in the unwarranted suppression of mass actions, such as those that had taken place during the Cultural Revolution. Further, whereas Chou accepted the possibility that there might be additional upheavals similar to the Cultural Revolution, Wang gave every indication of looking forward to those revolutions. According to Wang, that type of perpetual change is both necessary and desirable to ensure a continuation and a strengthening of the proper revolutionary spirit.

A somewhat clearer perception of this conflict among political factions in the CCP emerges from an examination of the composition of the Politburo, and especially its Standing Committee. The latter functions as a *de facto* government for China, and includes those considered to be closest to the center of power. The present Standing Committee has nine members, seven of whom are officers of the Central Committee and served as officers of the Presidium of the Tenth CCP Congress. Of these nine men, seven have substantial followings and relatively greater influence than the others. Mao's position, of course, is well known. But the "moderate" faction of professional cadres includes only Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying, a military man who is associated with Chou. The "radical" faction has four members: Wang Hung-wen, K'ang Sheng, Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. All four are associated with Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, who is a regular member of the Politburo but not of its Standing Committee. Thus the different power bases and policy orientations of members of the Standing Committee and the larger Politburo suggest that China's present government reflects a number of conflicting interests. Perhaps the governing coalition represents simply a temporary compromise awaiting final resolution after Mao's death or incapacitation.

In foreign policy, however, there is apparently a general consensus among Chinese leadership groups. The USSR is clearly regarded as the major external problem with which China must deal. From Peking's perspective, the Soviet Union has "degenerated" from a "socialist country" into a "social-imperialist country" under its "revisionist" leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Among Soviet transgressions noted by Chou in his report to the Tenth Party Congress were the restoration of capitalism and the enforcement of a "fascist dictatorship" in the USSR, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the dispatch of troops to the Chinese border and into the People's Republic of Mongolia, and concurrence in the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Yet the Soviet Union is not the only power which China views as a threat. Although Chou mentioned briefly that relations between China and the United States "have been improved to some extent," he argued that the United States is also trying to achieve global domination. In fact, according to Chou, the two superpowers are acting in collusion, either explicitly or implicitly, to achieve this end. A major objective of Chinese policy is to oppose any attempt by the "imperialist" and "social-imperialist" superpowers to subjugate China, the Third World, and other nations.

In the Tenth Party Congress the option was left open for agreement between China and the Soviet Union. A state of "peaceful coexistence" between them is considered to be possible, provided their major boundary disputes can be resolved without conflict. Since the Chinese appear to view the USSR as more dangerous than the United States, it is only prudent policy for China to emphasize its own position and its willingness to fight if attacked, while simultaneously demonstrating its reasonableness on issues that could lead to conflict.

The Tenth Party Congress did little to resolve the Chinese succession problem. Even if Chou remains in power after Mao's demise, he is—at seventy-five—nearly as old as Mao. There is no certainty that he would be able to cling to his position for any period of time without Mao. The distribution of power in the current Politburo thus provides some indication of the type of leadership waiting in the wings. There are two basic options for the future. Either there will be a continuation of collective leadership, perhaps along the lines of North Viet Nam's after the death of Ho Chi Minh; or one faction will become predominant. Many observers believe that the former outcome will obtain, and that the foundation for it is being laid at the present time. This assumes that none of the major contending factions—the People's Liberation Army, the "Maoists," the professional cadres—is likely to be in a position to dominate the others. From the standpoint of the United States a post-Mao government in Peking headed by the professional cadres would probably be preferable to either of the others, since it would imply a continuation of current Chinese policies.

The purges of recent years removed many key figures with factional ties. Chiang Ching (Madame Mao), who had been a major advocate of the Red Guard movement, and one of her protégés, Yao Wen-yuan, are not now on the Standing Committee. All three factions appear to be represented throughout the Politburo. Yet there are some indications, both in the membership of the Politburo and in the prominence given to reports dealing with recruiting and training successors to continue the revolution, that the "Maoist" faction may have acquired a somewhat more advantageous position than either the PLA or the party professional cadres. The appointment of Wang Hung-wen, a leader of this faction, to the third highest post in the party hierarchy is suggestive of such a trend, as is the placement of other Red Guard leaders from Wang's area on the

Politburo. It was Wang who presented the revised party constitution to the congress and emphasized the need to train successors from all age groups to continue the policies and the program of the revolution.

While the PLA and the professional cadres recognize the possibility of another "cultural revolution" or something similar to it, neither faction would welcome such an event. The Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960's left China with a fragmented domestic power base, while reducing the regime's capacity to deal effectively with major foreign policy issues. Another such campaign might inflict even greater damage on the polity, in view of these two factions, and thus should be avoided if at all possible.

To the members of the "Maoist" group, however, the Cultural Revolution *must* be repeated if China is to avoid losing her revolutionary élan and sliding into a "reactionary" stance. Wang emphasized this point repeatedly in his speech, referring to the recurrence of such revolutions "every seven or eight years" as a manifestation of an "objective law as revealed by Chairman Mao."

Thus, China's succession problem remains unresolved. There is no certainty that, upon the demise of Mao, the country can move easily to a new generation of leaders. The difficulty such a transition would create may be the most important message that emerged from the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1973 **ISSUE NO. 56**

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For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00 a year
Individual copies: £1 or U.S. $2.50

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ'S WORLDVIEW: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY*

OVER the years the present editors of ORBIS have enjoyed close and stimulating intellectual association with Robert Strausz-Hupé. We were his closest colleagues in the Foreign Policy Research Institute, an organization he created in the mid-1950's for the analysis of problems confronting the United States in its foreign policy. Ambassador Strausz-Hupé was the founding editor of ORBIS. As his associates we were the inhabitants of a small but intellectually vigorous and rewarding think tank. Not surprisingly, we exchanged ideas in many and varied discussions, both in formal sessions held in the Institute and amid the spontaneity of luncheon talk.

Born in Vienna in the twilight of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Robert Strausz-Hupé spent his early years in a Europe being transformed by nationalism, war, defeat, revolution and counterrevolution. He observed the disintegration of the multi-national state over which the Habsburgs had presided, as well as the upheavals that accompanied the birth of the Weimar Republic in post-imperial Germany. As he later wrote:

> My generation was the last whose childhood was cradled by the certainties of the Long Peace and the Gold Standard. We had been raised as little gentlemen; circumstance drove us into the street to measure ourselves with the sons of the great migration, uninhibited by, and hilariously contemptuous of, our code and, more often than not, more nimble than we.[1]

He witnessed at first hand the end of the old order and the emergence of the new in the aftermath of World War I.

In 1923, Strausz-Hupé came to the United States. He soon embarked on a career in banking. As an adviser on foreign investment to American financial houses, he frequently traveled abroad. When the Great Depression of the 1930's spread across the United States and Europe, he again witnessed at first hand a turn

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*This essay is adapted from the editors' introduction to *Strategy and Values: Selections from the Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupé*, co-edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.; to be published in 1974 by D. C. Heath, Lexington Books.

[1] *In My Time* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 42.

of events that not only changed the face of Western capitalism, but also, as we now can see, transformed international politics.

The rise of totalitarianism in Europe, the breakdown of the post-World War I international system, and the outbreak of World War II led Strausz-Hupé to an intense interest in world affairs. In the 1930's he began to lecture, and then to write, on the international issues of the day and the major forces shaping the world. He spoke before a variety of groups in many sections of the United States, and by the end of the 1930's he had begun to teach at the university level.

In his first major book, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*, published in 1942, he sought not only to analyze the relationship between geographic factors and national power, but also to acquaint Americans with the expansionist aims of Nazi German foreign policy as set forth in the influential German school of thought represented by Karl Haushofer and his followers at his Institut fuer Geopolitik in Munich. This book, written on the eve of America's entry into World War II and containing an implicit case for U.S. entry on the side of the Western democracies — Britain and France — quickly attracted widespread attention and became a minor bestseller.

During World War II Strausz-Hupé participated in a research project under the supervision of Isaiah Bowman, one of the leading geographers of his time and adviser to President Roosevelt. Bowman's guidance led him to a study of the problems in political and economic geography that a settlement of the global conflict would pose. He set himself the task of analyzing the factors that would determine the shape of the emerging order. In *The Balance of Tomorrow*, Strausz-Hupé focused specifically on population, natural resources, technology and geography as elements of national power. From his analysis he projected with uncanny accuracy the power centers of the future international system. With this book, which served also as his doctoral dissertation, together with his return to the university at the end of the Second World War, he had completed a long and remarkable transition from the world of business to academia.

Robert Strausz-Hupé, in another phase of his zestful life, is now serving his country as United States Ambassador to Belgium. The office precludes his presenting in this special issue of ORBIS his own personal assessment of international affairs and the position of the United States in the world of the 1970's. Therefore, we have undertaken to offer in this introduction a distillation of his views as we have understood them over the years — trying, as best we can, to convey the inwardness of his rich and lucid thought. Only our friend can judge how well we have reflected his ideas. But whatever deficiencies may mar our analysis of his thought, these rest upon us and not upon him.

II

For well over thirty years, Robert Strausz-Hupé has devoted his eclectic mind to the study of international politics. His lifelong avocation became his major professional interest on the eve of and during World War II. He was fully aware that the United States emerged from that was as the leading world power, and he believed U.S. leadership could shape a new world order. It was within the power of the United States to unite the democratic peoples of the globe and to ensure that — within another generation — the Union of the Free could no longer be challenged by any or all of the totalitarian powers. Beyond this outcome, Strausz-Hupé saw the shadowy shape of the more distant future. Having calculated the resources available to the Western alliance and the communist bloc respectively, he concluded that all we needed to do was to maintain our unquestioned supremacy and to create a political structure that would unite in common purpose peoples united in a community of fate. He assumed that, if we made good use of the time our initial advantages allowed us, time would be on our side — the time necessary for the forces of reason and freedom to sweep the lands under communist rule and to move their peoples, with or without their rulers' assent, into the camp of freedom and diversity.

These expectations were based on ideas which, over the years, had crystallized from his studies. Among these, the most important were: (1) that the West's dominance had been reinforced rather than shaken by the dissolution of Europe's colonial empires; (2) that the inherent contradictions of communism could not fail but culminate in the break-up of the communist system; (3) that the strategy of dynamic containment would bar the communist regimes from masking the inequity and inefficiency of their system by expansionist successes abroad; (4) that the West's superiority would deter the communist rulers from going to war against us; (5) that these rulers, thus dissuaded from launching a general war, would fall back on revolutionary warfare below the level of all-out war — "protracted conflict"; and (6) that the West, by dint of superior material and spiritual resources and alertness to the nature of the communists' residual strategy, could cope with the tactics of revolutionary warfare. Of course, at the heart of all these assumptions was Strausz-Hupé's belief that the United States could forge the unity of the West, would invest its resources in this endeavor, and would be prepared to bear the necessary political sacrifices.

Were these beliefs and the assumptions sustaining them unwarranted? Did the objective conditions obtaining after World War II vitiate these projections? Looking back, they appear to have been justified. Certainly, up to 1955 (and probably until 1962, if the Cuban crisis supplied a measure of the existing power relationships) the Soviets could not have risked a showdown, nuclear or "conventional," with the United States. Certainly, the total economic resources of the West sufficed to maintain its military superiority over the Soviet Union by a wide margin. Certainly, first Hungary in 1956 and then Czechoslovakia in 1968 revealed the inequity and inefficiency of the communist system. Certainly, the defection of Yugoslavia and Albania, and then the conflict between Moscow and Peking bore out the contention that the communist system, once its expansionist (external) momentum had been blocked by Western containment, would founder on its own inherent (internal) contradictions. Certainly, until at least 1960, the ideas of Atlantic and West European integration powerfully appealed to millions of people here and in Western Europe, notably the young, and were publicly and fervently embraced by all the leading Western statesmen — save de Gaulle.

In the 1970's, the West has not been united. The exit of France from NATO's command structure has gravely weakened the alliance and barred, with considerable finality, the road to an Atlantic federation, the creation of which Strausz-Hupé long advocated. The vigor of the Atlantic idea has been spent, and the new generation appears to have never heard of it. The European idea has been reduced to a matter of economic jockeying, and its political connotations rarely elicit any audible public response. Those who now most vocally dwell on the political consequences of European integration do not hold — and but for a few exceptions have never held — with the concept of a united Western Europe, not to speak of Atlantic unity. To them, European integration signifies the convergence of the states of Western Europe under representative governments and the states of Eastern Europe under communist governments into an as yet undefined association — presumably by leave of the Soviet Union. Their purpose is not so much the creation of a united Europe as the termination of the East-West confrontation in Europe and thus of Western Europe's commitment to the Western alliance. Implicit in this scheme is not only the removal of U.S. military forces from Europe, but also the isolation of Europe from U.S. influence. All kinds of other considerations have helped to bring about this shift of emphasis in the formulation of the European idea — a shift away from Europe's Atlantic relationship and, *pace* de Gaulle, toward the Urals. Suffice that none of these considerations redounds to the advantage of the United States as a world power or as the leader of the West.

The debate over U.S. military defense revolves on whether the arsenal of the United States still equals that of the Soviet Union, or whether it needs a sizeable R&D program as a bargaining chip in negotiations. But no one debates whether the maintenance of U.S. strategic superiority is desirable or feasible. In any case, the reduction of U.S. budgetary resources allocated to the procurement of military matériel and to weapons research precludes, for the time being, the return to a posture of superiority. Even were such a return technically feasible, the definition of the meaning of strategic superiority has become increasingly fraught with ambiguity.

While the United States is diminishing the share of defense expenditure in its budget and, incidentally, the ratio of defense spending to gross national product, its allies have not only *not* increased their defense outlay, but — following the U.S. example — have reduced it. Thus, the Western allies have slackened their collective as well as individual defense efforts. The information available to the public points to an increase in military spending by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. One basic condition of dynamic containment has therefore been altered, if not negated altogether.

III

What has changed the American outlook on foreign policy in the 1970's from that of the postwar period? The answer lies in the realm of philosophy rather than in approaches to diplomacy and military strategy. The problem, as Henry Kissinger is wont to say, *is* philosophical. Strausz-Hupé had assumed that, in the 1960's, our policymakers would remain as alert as they had been in the 1950's to communist strategy — a strategy designed to make up by ingenuity and maneuverability for material inferiority. In the 1950's our policymakers must have known what the communists were up to, for Khrushchev, proclaiming the coming of "wars of liberation," told them so. In 1961, Khrushchev, in a speech reported by our press, dwelt on the strategy of the indirect approach as the alternative to nuclear war. Thus, our policymakers knew what they needed to know about the true nature of communist strategy. But did they understand what they knew? The answer must be that they did not, for had they understood, they either would not have joined the issue in Viet Nam or, if they thought that war worth fighting, would have fought it in a way quite different from the one they selected.

The war in Viet Nam was the second installment of a story that began in Cuba: the confrontation of two proxies, the one backed by us and the other backed by the Soviets. Why this simple plot went undetected in our response to the Soviet challenge in Viet Nam is a question for which there is no better explanation than that men are prone to mistake appearance for reality. Because of differences in the respective environments, our policymakers failed to perceive the similarity of the problem posed by Viet Nam to the one they had just dealt with in Cuba: the challenge by proxy of the Soviet Union. In Cuba, the Soviets sought to outflank U.S. power. Then, having benefited from the lesson of their failures, they took advantage of Ho Chi Minh's determination to seize South Viet Nam and shifted their challenge-by-proxy to Southeast Asia. In Viet Nam, geographical and political conditions greatly enhanced the prospects of success and diminished the likelihood of a U.S. strategic response as forthright as that triggered by the gambit in Cuba. At a fraction of the cost incurred by the United States in the South, and without the overt deployment of combat forces, the Soviets contributed greatly to maintaining the effectives of the North in the field.

It is not our purpose here to refight the Viet Nam war in a sandbox. In 1964, Strausz-Hupé stated publicly that it could be won only by blockading all Southeast Asian ports through which Soviet supplies flowed to the North Vietnamese armies and guerrillas. Such a counter to Soviet intervention in Viet Nam might have escalated into a confrontation of Cuban dimensions. It can be argued that for the United States victory in Viet Nam was not worth this risk. But then it can be argued with equal cogency that the United States, if it deemed this risk unacceptable, should not have gone into Viet Nam in the first place.

It is worth reiterating that Strausz-Hupé always viewed our Viet Nam venture from the perspective of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

This confrontation was and still is global; it cannot be contained by national and regional boundaries. The setting might be changing; the plot is always the same. Furthermore, Strausz-Hupé has always been an Atlantic-firster: what is good for the unity and strength of the Atlantic Community is good for us; what is not good for it is not good for us, no matter how great the prize we might be tempted to win by unilateral action.

Not being versed in Southeast Asian affairs, not having steeped himself in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, Strausz-Hupé did not try to answer the question: Why did we march 500,000 men up the hill and then down again? He frequently, however, attempted to assess some of the global consequences of our Viet Nam venture. To him the most important and certainly the most widely noted consequence flowing from our inconclusive performance in Viet Nam has been the decline of U.S. prestige throughout the world. Our enemies hate us just as much as ever; they fear us less. Our friends, whatever the degree of their affection for us, consider that the United States has become a less effective and hence less reliable friend. Obviously this raises again the question of what is appearance and what is reality. We still might be as capable and as willing as we have ever been to deter our enemies from attacking not only us but our friends. But the world perceives the war in Viet Nam as having inflicted on us a military setback in the field and a painful trauma at home. Viet Nam or no Viet Nam, we might have been heading anyway for a domestic economic depression and a payment crisis abroad. But our friends and foes alike view our economic enfeeblement as being inextricably linked to the drain upon our resources by foreign commitments, notably that to Viet Nam. In brief, the American giant is seen as reeling under its global burdens.

Our domestic problems have been building up for a long time. Because they erupted spectacularly during the last few years, they appear to have been generated by the frustrations of Viet Nam. This view might be a gross oversimplification of our social crisis. Yet it is widely held abroad. It suggests the conclusion that American society is not cohesive enough to stand up under the pressure of world politics — that America is not made of the stuff of a Great Power.

Despite his erudition Strausz-Hupé has always had a practical turn of mind; he has regarded prestige as intangible, and world opinion as fluid. Though we might now appear internationally off balance, we might console ourselves with the fact that we are still the richest among all nations, and potentially still the mightiest. Most statistics bear this out, but not all. The comparative statistics of the international armament effort — weapons systems developed and deployed — raised for Strausz-Hupé grave doubts about the U.S. position. He rarely probed the inwardness of such arcane concepts as "parity" or "sufficiency," but for him one fact stood out: the United States expended some $100 billion on the Viet Nam war, and very little of this spending went into the development and deployment of weapons systems essential to strategic deterrence and the conduct of general war. The Soviet Union spent a great deal less on supporting North Viet Nam and thus was able to channel its defense expenditures into what has been the first priority of its military policy ever since the 1940's: the acquisition of weaponry suitable for a contest with the United States.

Furthermore, Viet Nam frustrations have so changed the American political climate that, for the foreseeable future, the American voter will be unlikely to approve the allocation of "savings" from a wind-down in Viet Nam to the national defense budget. It is highly probable that future defense outlays will represent a gradually decreasing portion of the federal budget as well as of the gross national product. Future agreements on arms limitations, such as SALT, might succeed in freezing the U.S.-Soviet force relationship. They cannot be expected to return it to the status before Viet Nam. To that extent, the slippage in the U.S. defense effort has become irremediable. The likelihood of such a reversal in force relationships was clearly visible during the McNamara era of American defense policy. This is why Strausz-Hupé frequently urged the speedy liquidation — one way or the other ("he who runs away lives to fight another day") — of the Viet Nam venture. In brief, he felt that we could suffer and survive a reverse in Viet Nam, but that we could never afford the loss of what, by any name, constituted our strategic edge over the Soviet Union.

IV

Drawing the balance sheet of our foreign policies over the last twenty-five years, the entries show how great our achievements have been. The greatest was to provide, after World War II, that climate of security and confidence which fostered the fabulous economic growth of Western Europe and Japan. But Robert Strausz-Hupé would argue that our failures now threaten to undo what we have wrought and even turn what we counted as assets into liabilities. We failed to forge Western unity. Despite all the rhetoric about international interdependence and mankind's common concerns, the nation state, xenophobic and protectionist at heart, still remains the basic unit of international relations. Not even in the economic realm has American leadership managed to bring about that minimal integration of the West's advanced industrial nations which could have provided them with a common unit of exchange and a common market.

Frequently, Strausz-Hupé would explore with us his views on what had caused the ebbtide of American power. Didactically, he would begin by discounting the explanation now commonly given for our loosening grip on world events, namely, that we attempted too much — that we were and are "over-committed." The heart of the matter — his view of why America, despite its fabulous riches, chafes and stumbles under its global commitments — is that the American giant is stumbling because he is hobbled. He has hobbled himself.

Strausz-Hupé would place the American giant on the couch and begin his diagnosis. He would first address the opinion widely held, especially in democracies, that autocratic government can conduct foreign policy more effectively and make war more ruthlessly than democracies can. This view is not borne out by history, notably the history of the last two world wars and the events leading up to them. It is necessary to point out its fallacy, for it compounds the confusion about the causes that underlie the decline of the United States as a world power. These causes must be sought in men's attitudes to the society in which they live, and hence in their individual life style.

Throughout history, the life style of the great mass of men and women has oscillated between two extremes: asceticism and hedonism. It is the predominance of one or the other of these metaphysical conceptions of man's purpose upon this earth which determines the conduct of a people at home and abroad. No social structure is a seamless whole, and few men and women have ever attained the absolute. The absolute ascetic is a saint; the absolute hedonist is a monster. In any real society not all people hold to the dominant norm. No doubt, in Sparta, the Roman republic and Frederickan Prussia some men preferred the soft life to austerity and death for one's country. No doubt, in the third century after Christ a few Romans still clung to the stern values of their ancestors; but most Romans looked to the state to sustain them in their pleasurable indolence and preferred to expose their bodies to the gentle ministrations of bath attendants rather than the rigors of Parthian wars.

No civilization has fostered hedonism as blatantly and deliberately as has that of contemporary America. Its symbolic figure is the consumer, enlivened by unlimited appetites and passionately determined to prolong his life, for to die means to stop doing the consumer's duty, namely, acquiring the things that hard cash or installment credit puts within one's reach. American sales promotion is but an endless litany on how good life can be upon this earth – as long as it is lived pleasurably and free of any restrictions except those placed upon it by the limits of one's pocketbook. Paradoxically, our society, which prides itself so much on planning grandly for the future – the exploration of the universe and the building of cities without smog and ghettos – is doing its utmost to center men's minds on the here and now *and on themselves.*

The fact is that, during the last twenty years, only the bravest of our public men have dared to call on the American people to make sacrifices for the public good, except for those redounding in the short run to the public's more plentiful material satisfaction. The war in Viet Nam was fought on the black market, so to speak. It was never a *national* war; it was not declared. To declare it would have meant openly to suspend consumption-as-usual. To curb consumption, i.e., the enjoyment of material things in the here-and-now, would have signified a fall from hedonistic grace.

The question arises, whether a hedonistic society can endow its government with the material and moral means needed for the making of foreign policy and thus for assuring its own survival. A philosophy of individual survival is the philosophy least apt to ensure collective survival. Yet survival ethics has been leaching out all those traditional ethical systems which, only a generation ago, governed our civic behavior, honored as their rules may have been by frequent and shocking breach. Permissiveness is but a weasel word for hedonism.

V

The only conclusion we would venture to draw from Strausz-Hupé's philosophy of history is that, in order to ensure the defense of any society, there must be enough men willing to do and die for it, and that society as a whole must honor their purpose. If there are not enough of these men, and if the society as a whole does not share or even mocks their patriotic purpose, then even those who still aspire to the conduct of rational policies — rational because they embrace the interests of the collectivity, rather than of any of its parts — must ultimately yield to frustration and, at best, settle for shoddy compromise between the calculus of international risk and the calculus of electoral probability.

The ability to solve foreign problems and the ability to solve domestic problems are the two sides of the same coin. A nation sure of itself and moving confidently forward derives strength for doing the one from doing the other. A people that seeks to cut its effort abroad in order to save enough for efforts at home, will be meagerly rewarded at home and exposed to mounting risk abroad as well as division at home. Power needs to be evenly deployed across the whole spectrum of a Great Power's concern. The one sin that history will not forgive the possessor of great power is not to use it for creative and constructive purposes while he has it. Today, a part of the rich field of our power is going to seed. Letting themselves be pushed by the hedonistic rush to the trough, our leaders are yielding, bit by bit, the terrain which, with little thought of the cost, we occupied at the high noon of our might.

As this summation of his thought has shown, Strausz-Hupé would conclude that there are no *objective* reasons, economic, geopolitical or technological, why this should be so. The real reasons are psychological and, in the depth of the national psyche, moral. It seems that we have entered the same twilight which fell over Britain at the time of the Boer War — a war which, militarily and politically, so closely resembled the Viet Nam war. English society, its traditional devotions not quite eroded, managed to overcome the deep malaise into which this ill-prepared, costly and increasingly unpopular venture had plunged it, and, later, to fight victoriously two wars for national survival. But British power is now a mere shadow of its former Victorian and Edwardian self. Fortunately for Britain, there has been the "special relationship" with the United States, and now there is membership in the European Economic Community. But where is there for us a "special relationship" and a new association which could give us shelter against the ambitions of rising powers? If there is now any nation in this world which cannot entrust its security to others and must rely upon its own strength to secure its possessions to put muscle into what is left of that lawful international order which it led in creating, it is the United States.

To be sure, despite much fumbling, we still have friends throughout the globe. But their strength cannot make up for the strength we lose. They will be the stronger, the stronger we make ourselves. This is the first condition of a wider union in which the members equitably share the burden of common defense in war and economic-social progress in peaceful international competition. We can travel this road if we wish. But we must wish it with our whole heart. A hedonistic society can only wish its own death. It is only by staking our life in a great cause that we can retrieve it from the savage netherworld in which each man is an ape to the other.

VI

As best we can, we have presented the reasons why Robert Strausz-Hupé believes the West in general and the United States in particular are in such disarray in the face of the long and steady offensive against the devotees of freedom. We seem to have forgotten that the preservation of Western civilization against its foes without as well as within should have been the first order of our affairs.

It is well that we take heed of these "reasons why," for they have been expressed in various forms and many conversations by a man who has demonstrated an uncanny knack of identifying the main forces shaping our ever-changing and turbulent world. In most of his articles and in all of his books, especially in *The Balance of Tomorrow,* Strausz-Hupé has been concerned with prediction. International relations theory cannot help but be predictive, and all theory must be verified empirically, i.e., by events. Hardly anything can be called "scientific" that does not meet this test. In our judgment, a good deal of Strausz-Hupé's work meets this test. Beginning with *Geopolitics* and *The Balance of Tomorrow,* he has managed to forecast the major trends that have shaped our world. The contributors to this special issue of ORBIS have written on themes that have been the object of analysis in Strausz-Hupé's own writings. In doing so, they not only pay him tribute, but also provide evidence of the continuing importance of many of the problems he has dealt with during the past three decades.

The Editors of ORBIS

THE U.S. AND THE USSR: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION*

by William R. Kintner

THE Moscow and Washington summit meetings between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev promise a less conflictual world order, which will be determined in large part by the durability of the present U.S.-Soviet détente. Will it lead to a web of interlocking accords? Or will it turn out to be as ephemeral as previous false dawns in the many years of East-West confrontation?

THE KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD

The present period contrasts sharply with the closing years of the 1950's. Within a year of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the launching of Sputnik in September 1957 initiated a worldwide Soviet offensive that reached its culmination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Soviet leaders often articulated with unusual candor both their rationale for the conflict and their strategy for its conduct.

The militancy and braggadocio of the Soviet leadership in those days was exemplified by Nikita Khrushchev's challenge to the United States: "I have told Americans: you have missiles that can send up oranges. We have missiles that can send up tons. Imagine the kind of bombs that could be contained in our missiles compared with . . . yours."[1] Later in the same year, Khrushchev expanded on this theme in still more ominous terms:

> Let those people abroad learn that I am not hiding anything. In one year the factory we visited made 250 hydrogen rockets on the production line. That is many millions of tons, if we figure in terms of ordinary explosives. You can see that if such deadly weapons were to be exploded over a country, there would not be anything left there at all.[2]

The consequences of such a war, he had previously declared, would not be without a "progressive" aspect:

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*This article was written while the author was the Editor of ORBIS. He has since resigned and become the United States Ambassador to Thailand. The views expressed in the article are the author's, and not necessarily those of the Department of State.

[1] Khrushchev, speech in Poland, *New York Times*, July 19, 1959.

[2] *Pravda*, November 18, 1959.

> As a result of World War I, Soviet Russia became a socialist country. As a result of World War II, twelve other countries became socialist countries. As a result of a third world war, should it ever be launched by the imperialists, capitalism will be eliminated.[3]

Soviet strategy was ratified by representatives of eighty-one workers and communist parties at a conference held in Moscow in November and December 1960. Khrushchev reported that at the conference:

> . . . representatives of Communist and Workers' parties . . . figuratively . . . synchronized their watches. When someone's clock is fast or slow, it is regulated so that it shows the correct time. Similarly, it is necessary to check the time of the Communist movement so that our powerful army keeps in step and makes confident steps toward communism. . . .[4]

At the end of the landmark meeting a Declaration was issued which proclaimed:

> Our epoch, the main content of which is the transition from capitalism to socialism begun by the Great October Revolution, is . . . an epoch . . . of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale.[5]

Premier Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, delivered a chilling programmatic statement of the strategy the Soviet Union would pursue in the 1960's. He informed his audience, composed of party members from the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, that:

> In recent years, the initiative in the international arena has been in the hands of the Soviet Union, the Socialist countries, while the Imperialist states and their governments defend themselves with their backs to the wall; their prestige and foreign political stock have never been so low.[6]

He continued:

> The slogan of the struggle for peace does not contradict the slogan of the struggle for communism. Those two slogans harmonize with each other . . .

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[3] Radio Moscow, July 30, 1959, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

[4] See Hearings before the U.S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee of the Judiciary, *Communist and Workers' Parties' Manifesto Adopted November-December, 1960, Interpretation and Analysis* (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 2.

[5] Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties (*Pravda*, December 6, 1960), translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), Vol. XII, No. 48, 1960.

[6] Speech of Nikita Khrushchev, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," in Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, *Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961* (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 66.

the slogan of the struggle for peace appears as a satellite of the slogan of the struggle for communism.[7]

Today it is sometimes forgotten that it was Soviet statements such as these, and corresponding actions (e.g., the Berlin ultimatums), that aroused Western anxieties in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Khrushchev's foreign policy initiatives form the indispensable context for understanding the anti-communist rhetoric of many U.S. policy statements made at the time. President Kennedy's Inaugural Address in 1961 was in part a response to the Soviet challenge. Kennedy, it will be recalled, declared: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[8]

At about the same time a widely discussed book, *Protracted Conflict,*[9] was published by members of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The authors noted that since World War II peace, to adapt Clausewitz's celebrated dictum, had been little more than the continuation of war by other means. Peace was a phase of — or a variation on — the power struggle waged by the Kremlin with nonviolent means. "Within this overall category of 'peace,' there has been a series of propaganda campaigns, political warfare operations and economic wars which impinged and fed upon each other, and which themselves were meshed with the chain of military and violent conflicts."[10]

These conflicts were symptomatic of two phenomena. The first, called "the systemic revolution," was the alteration of the international political system in the wake of the Second World War, especially caused by the creation of new states out of the former European empires and the impact of technology. The second, called "protracted conflict," was the strategy of the communist powers, chiefly the Soviet Union, for taking advantage of the systemic revolution in a long-range plan to turn the balance of power against the Western democracies. The main principles of the communists' protracted conflict were to: (1) avoid a direct clash with the West unless certain of victory; (2) husband economic and military strength; (3) coordinate political, diplomatic, economic, psychological and military strategy — conflict "technology"; (4) create a "peace zone" (areas of communist influence impervious to Western pressure) and a "war zone" (areas of Western influence subject to communist pressure).

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[8] As quoted in Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 245-246.

[9] Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

To these principles the authors added an epilogue in the revised 1963 version of the book. As a forecast of the next decade of protracted conflict, it was bold indeed. The main "future" issues would be these:

(1) The major target of Soviet strategy would be U.S.-allied cohesion in building a world order based upon the Atlantic Alliance and West European unity.[11]
(2) The Sino-Soviet dispute would be of less significance to the United States than problems of the Western alliance, "so long as both of these powers are fundamentally committed to the political (if not the physical) annihilation of the West. . . ."[12]
(3) The Soviet industrial system would be plagued by increasingly serious technological difficulties.
(4) The major strategic question would be whether the United States would permit Moscow a respite in the arms competition, enabling the Soviet Union to build its arsenal despite economic difficulties.[13]

In posing this catalogue of possibilities, it is important to note, the authors disavowed several notions often attributed to *Protracted Conflict*: the communists were *not* invincible or superhuman; protracted conflict was not inevitable or eternal; and international relations were not a grim chronicle of defeats for the West.[14] At the same time, the Western democracies needed to understand that their communist opponents did not view conflict and cooperation as *separate* categories. Soviet policy was informed by a view of conflict as an "organic whole," deeply rooted in the philosophical bases of Marxism-Leninism.

TOWARD DÉTENTE

Less than a decade and a half separates the optimistic utterances of the present from the ominous writings that ushered in the 1960's in both the Soviet Union and the United States. The conflict then encompassed stabilization of the East-West dividing line in Central Europe; competing interests in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa; and basic ideological divergencies regarding the nature of social and political organization, the role of the individual in the state, and the shaping of the future international order. In the climate of probing and testing, mutual fears and suspicions were readily magnified.

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[11] *Ibid.* (1963 edition), p. 178.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 172.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 169 *et passim*.

The 1960's witnessed the rapid growth of Soviet military-technological capabilities. While those of the United States also grew, the American strategic buildup tapered off by 1967, at the very time the Soviet Union's accelerated. Simultaneously, the United States, largely as a result of the Viet Nam conflict, came to question the premises, goals and priorities of its foreign policy.

With the advent of the 1970's both superpowers began to face increased domestic constraints, but of a highly different kind. In the USSR the communist government operated an archaic economic system; it had failed to create an efficient agricultural sector and had not produced advanced technologies adequate to create fully modern industry. The persistent problem is that the heavy concentration of Soviet technological resources on military and strategic forces has contributed to industrial-technological deficiencies in other areas. Meanwhile, in the United States the Viet Nam war and the disturbing domestic factors it brought to the fore introduced a new set of national priorities which have limited the scope of U.S. foreign policy.

For both the United States and the USSR the external world of the 1970's differs from previous periods because of three major developments: the deepening and continuing nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the expanding economic strength of Western Europe and Japan, and the emergence of certain global problems that may not be solved by any one state, i.e., energy and ecology. As the decade began, both powers, for a number of reasons, sought a détente in their relationships with each other in order to focus on other problems. However, both have different conceptions of the nature of détente.

Against this general background one may probe the long-term vitality of commitments made in 1972 and 1973 to furthering U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

THE MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SUMMITS

Ten years after the Cuban missile crisis, President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party leader, signed the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The first principle reads:

> They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the

> basis of *peaceful coexistence.* Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.[15]

Recent years have wrought significant changes in the farthest reaches of the international environment, which both the United States and the Soviet Union have recognized. The major, unanswered question is whether the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," when translated into practice, is akin to the concept of "protracted conflict" or to the international cooperation Westerners hope will come to dominate the approach of Soviet leaders to the major global issues of the day.

Since peaceful coexistence now guides Soviet action under contemporary conditions, what is its character? Most Westerners tend to see in it a general moderation of conflict and competition. Many believe the present détente truly indicates that Soviet slogans have been transformed into Soviet goals, that "peaceful coexistence" reflects a mellowing of Soviet objectives rather than a strategy of means. Thus, the *New York Times* editorially described the "Rules of Coexistence" to which President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev had agreed in their Declaration of General Principles as "an approximation to a set of Marquis of Queensbury rules for peaceful coexistence in an era of mixed cooperation and competition."[16]

The University of Miami analysis, *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence,* takes a contrary view.[17] The authors hold that the Soviets think of peaceful coexistence as a struggle with unlimited objectives in which no holds are barred, at least on the Soviet side, short of antagonists' attempts to shoot each other down. This vital point is emphasized by Soviet writers. Typical is a statement in the authoritative treatise, *Leninism Today*:

> Peaceful coexistence does not extinguish or cancel out class struggle — it is a new form of class struggle employed by the working class and the

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[15] *New York Times*, May 30, 1972, p. 13. (Emphasis added.) Prior to the signing of these principles the phrase "peaceful coexistence" was eschewed by U.S. policymakers as a communist slogan evolved by Lenin to describe a form of conflict short of a shooting war. It is interesting to speculate why it has become an acceptable term today.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[17] Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Richard S. Soll, *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence* (Washington: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Monograph in International Affairs, 1973), p. 8.

socialist countries in the world arena. It "cancels" only one type of struggle — war as a means of settling international issues.[18]

Aware of this definition, President Nixon on June 1, 1972 gave a realistic report to the U.S. Congress and the American people of his visit to the Soviet Union:

> We do not bring back from Moscow the promise of instant peace; but we do bring the beginning of a process that can lead to a lasting peace. . . . We must remember that Soviet ideology still proclaims hostility to some of America's most basic values. The Soviet leaders remain committed to that ideology. Like the nation they lead, they are, and they will continue to be, totally dedicated competitors of the United States of America.[19]

THE IMPERATIVES OF COOPERATION

The maneuvers of the great powers are being conducted amid a dawning perception of man's increasingly precarious relations with his environment. This situation will soon present a series of problems that may dwarf the issues of the past. The fantastic growth and interlocking of worldwide economic activity, particularly in the last two decades in the wake of a rampaging industrial-scientific revolution, has created sharp challenges to the well-being of the human race.

The technological revolution is generating problems of resource scarcity, environmental pollution and social justice on a global scale. On all sides, the unfolding panorama discloses diminishing resources, impure water and foul air, toxic effects from chemical fertilizers and insecticides, the possibility of major famines, dwindling ocean fisheries, chronic unemployment, persistent inflation, unstable currencies, sprawling urban problems, and a widening rich nation-poor nation gap. These may be symptoms of a fundamental dysfunction in the world system. If so, systemic change may be needed to bring them to a satisfactory state of resolution. What is the nature of that change? Basically, it is a recognition by all contemporary states, but particularly by the more powerful ones, that none of the important problems confronting mankind can be solved unilaterally. Yet few nations, large or small, are willing to concede the obvious.

Finding answers to these questions will not be easy. Theoretically, it should be possible to balance national interests and international cooperation in all these arenas. The pending energy crisis, for example, suggests the necessity of international collaboration. Tackled with imagination and mutual tolerance, it may provide the impetus needed to move the world into an era of cooperation. But for this to happen, people must see greater advantage in working with each other than in trying to manipulate affairs on the old pattern of national gain.

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[18] M. Sidorov, "Lenin on the Irreconcilability of Socialism and Bourgeois Ideologies," in *Leninism Today* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1970), p. 28. Quoted in Kohler, *et al., op. cit.,* p. 3.

[19] *New York Times,* June 2, 1972, p. 1.

Despite many reasons why the energy crisis may engender a spirit of cooperation, caution must temper our expectations. Mutual benefits may not be sufficient to overcome the forces that move men and nations to pursue economic nationalism, intolerant ideologies and racism. Such obstacles cannot be ignored.

In this context the communist-led countries may be more intransigent than many other "less progressive" nations. The Soviet leaders assert that regardless of improved relations between capitalist and socialist states, ideological peace — and hence genuine cooperation — is impossible. "Marxist-Leninists do not entertain any illusions in relation to the anti-people's essence of imperialism and its aggressive aspirations," Brezhnev declared in June 1972, following President Nixon's journey to Moscow. He added that successes with respect to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence "in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle." Instead, it is necessary "to be prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still sharper form of the antagonism between the two social systems."[20]

THE PROCESS AND AREAS OF COOPERATION

The underlying assumption of functionalist theories is that international behavior involving cooperative interaction will necessitate the formation of institutions and the creation of mutual interdependence of such a kind that conflict would be dysfunctional. In short,

> The realization and perception of common needs and interests, or superordinate goals, puts a damper on antagonisms between parties in dispute, for the dispute prejudices their common but separately perceived welfare.[21]

This rationalist approach further assumes that all sides will perceive costs and benefits in roughly the same terms and that beneficial spin-offs from technical and economic matters to politics are automatic. To put it differently, transnational forces are presenting challenges that may ultimately require the nation-state system to transform itself. A paradox is clear: through the technological revolution the power of the nation-state has vastly increased, but the state's *sovereign* capacity to deal with the problems created by the possession of increased power is *lessened.* The nation-state may thus be hastening its own obsolescence. Moreover, the ideologies advanced by nation-states, *in whose name power is exerted,* tend to become anachronisms as the vehicle of their implementation — the state — loses its capacity to deal unilaterally with a wide range of novel transnational problems.

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[20] *Pravda*, June 28, 1972.

[21] A.J.R. Groom, "Functionalist Theory and East/West Cooperation," unpublished paper, London, 1973.

In recent years these tendencies have led many distinguished people to argue that the nation-state system is no longer adequate to secure peace and prosperity; that the state system is at a historic period of transformation; and that mankind needs a universal organization for peace to supplant the old relationships of sovereign states.

Without doubt numerous forces are at work changing the global system. These include worldwide trade and economic modernization, the disappearance of distinctions between domestic and foreign policies, the advent of weapons restricting the use of force, changes in the basis of sovereignty, changes in international norms and values, and the emergence of communications infrastructures which have the possibility of greatly reducing the distances between various sections of the globe.

Admittedly, many of these factors appear to be technical. Yet technical matters can be resolved only on technical grounds, where "there is a consensus on values which renders a technical matter 'technical' and not 'political'."[22] A *political* decision must be taken in support of the functionalist approach if functionalism is to work. Or, as President Nixon suggested in reporting on the Moscow summit, "as political relations with the Soviet Union improved, it became possible to initiate discussions on a wide range of projects for bilateral cooperation" and "I linked the expansion of economic relations with improved political relations."[23]

The current American approach in dealing with the USSR has been premised on the notion of a many-stranded web of interdependence. The assumption is that with the creation of functional interdependence between ideological rivals, the likelihood of conflict will be muted if not eliminated altogether. This was apparent as Dr. Henry Kissinger remarked:

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[23] *New York Times*, June 2, 1972, pp. 31-33.

> We have . . . sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas. We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.[24]

Technological and economic cooperation has been central to the development of a network of interdependence between the superpowers. President Nixon has categorized these ventures as embracing (1) outer space, (2) problems of the environment, (3) medical science and public health, (4) science and technology, and (5) reduction of the chances of dangerous incidents between ships and aircraft at sea.

Moscow's goal in cooperating with Washington is to reap the economic and technological advantages inherent in such cooperation, and at this the Soviets have been adroit and successful. According to G. A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA of the Soviet Academy of Sciences:

> The changes that are taking place in Soviet-American relations reflect the objective fact that the two states, despite all the fundamental differences in their class nature and social systems, despite the profundity of the political contradictions between them on many major problems, *have found spheres of parallel or coincident interest.*
>
> One such sphere is the prevention of a thermonuclear war.

To this he added:

> Another such sphere is the expansion of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and the development of cultural ties. The very size of the economic, scientific and technical potential of the two powers bespeaks the presence of enormous possibilities here.[25]

Educational and cultural exchanges have been taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union since the mid-1950's. Primarily these have been used by Moscow to bridge the technological gap between the two countries. While greater international contact may serve to erode popular and elite commitment to some tenets of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviets have sought to exploit the exchanges in their own, rather narrow interest. As one analyst of Soviet policy has written:

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[24] White House Press Release, June 15, 1972.

[25] G. A. Arbatov, "On Soviet-American Relations," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1973, pp. 101-113. (Emphasis added.) Complete text in *CDSP*, Vol. XXV, No. 15, May 9, 1973.

> . . . growing needs of borrowing Western technology . . . [have] been the chief reason for cultural exchanges with the U.S.; four-fifths of Soviet participants in scholarly exchanges have been physical scientists or engineers, while less than a tenth on the American side have been in these categories.[26]

Exchanges may eventually create common interests in spheres where ideology dictates conflict. But this will not be automatic.[27] The Soviets are fully aware that a large expansion of commercial relations with the West could cause an influx of Western ideas. The Kremlin seeks, therefore, to prevent the penetration of non-Marxist-Leninist thoughts into the Soviet Union. Whether through worldwide satellite television or through forms of cultural cooperation discussed in Helsinki in preparation for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviets wish to preserve a mode of ideological competition which leaves them free to attack "Western capitalist imperialism" while insulating their own system from "subversive criticism."

Yet mankind now shares a number of new and urgent problems stemming from the contrast between man's progress in technology and his shortcomings in making a livable society. Wrestling with these problems may frustrate endeavors to build impenetrable walls between countries.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 23, 1970, President Nixon suggested that approaches to protecting the environment need to be coordinated, since "pollution knows no national or ideological boundaries."[28] Cooperation in dealing with such matters as oil spills should in no way jeopardize security.

Another area of future cooperation may be population control, which is linked to the energy crisis and raises the possibility of cooperation in both spheres. There is also the need for international cooperation against crime, in which the President included the narcotics problem, hijacking and terrorism. Assisting the victims of natural disasters and protecting wildlife threatened with extinction are still other matters that call for cooperation and hardly impinge on national security.

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[26] Robert Wesson, "Viability of the Leninist Thesis," (Santa Barbara, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1973), pp. 29-30.

[27] The moment the general atmospherics of "détente" were disseminated by Soviet leaders, there was a crackdown on any manifestation of dissidence, however mild, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Soviet statements have stressed that otherwise the "class enemy" will utilize cooperation to "infiltrate" his insidious ideas. At *all* times of apparent international détente, the Soviet regime has been at its harshest in dealing with internal opposition; for instance, the Popular Front policy of the mid-1930's coincided with the bloodiest peaks of the Great Purge in Moscow. Unless this practice is discarded, exchanges will *not* create "common interests" but instead will strengthen the most repressive aspects of the Soviet regime.

[28] Address, "The World Interest: A Generation of Peace," *Department of State Bulletin,* November 16, 1970, p. 604.

The area of science and technology, as pointed out earlier, presents a problem for functional cooperation between sovereign states because it is central to perceptions of national defense. Nevertheless, the President observed:

> For we, more than most, are able to absorb and make use of new knowledge. Obviously, there will be some areas where restrictions are essential. Our policy, however, is to keep those areas as circumscribed as possible, and to take the leadership in encouraging the exchange of scientific and technological information.[29]

Above all, the exchange of information and technology should be mutually beneficial if it provides the opportunity for the United States to keep abreast of scientific developments within the USSR, and vice versa.

One "functional" sphere that demands special caution has to do with commercial transactions, trade and the extension of credit. Brezhnev's visit to the United States was intended to promote cooperation and commerce between the two superpowers. Although the Soviet leadership has invested heavily in industrialization, Soviet technological innovation has generally lagged notably behind Western standards.

> Now the Soviet leaders have discovered that while their country has recorded impressive economic growth, the West has been racing ahead in technology. Instead of boasting of "burying capitalism," as the late Nikita S. Khrushchev did, Mr. Brezhnev is going to seek the help of capitalism and buy Western technology wholesale — ranging from steel plants and fertilizer factories to computer and gasoline liquefication plants — to modernize his country.[30]

To obtain what they need in sufficient quantity the Soviets will require large-scale long-term credits. They will seek to justify these credits with the argument that long-term economic deals will assure increasingly peaceful U.S.-Soviet relations.

The one vested interest we now have in common with the USSR is the avoidance of nuclear war: we certainly do not want to fight one, and we assume that the Soviets are convinced they cannot win such a war. This does not tell us much about the relationship the Soviets might wish to achieve through "peaceful coexistence," however, or about new technologies that might give one side a decisive military edge over the other.

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[29] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace.* A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 221.

[30] *New York Times*, June 17, 1973, p. 26.

Men can live at peace though they trade not a penny's worth of goods with one another. Conversely, they can exchange all of their goods and still covet each other's possessions and seek to control or destroy their rivals. The question of peace, domestic or international, has little to do with commerce, joint ventures and scientific cooperation; in almost every respect, peace is a matter of ethics. And the ethics of the continuing class struggle do not augur well for permanent peace based on genuine tolerance between fundamentally different systems.

In brief, neither mutual fear of war nor mutual desire for trade suffices to engender mutual love of peace — not to speak of creating a moral consensus that washes away the antagonisms of political systems as long as these systems remain wholly incompatible with one another.

Yet we are told that the humanizing power of commerce and trade will be the primary instrument promoting a more peaceful relationship. In Brezhnev's words: "The development of long-term economic cooperation will also have very beneficial political consequences. It will consolidate the present trend toward better Soviet-American relations generally."[31]

In Washington, Brezhnev and Nixon signed agreements dealing with oceanography, agricultural research, transportation, cultural exchanges, income-tax accommodation, nuclear arms talks, and atomic energy research as well as "Agreements on the Prevention of Nuclear War." Even though these outcomes may not be overly impressive, their significance lies in the expectation that yet more agreements with better results can be achieved. These prospects notwithstanding, however, the conflictual relationship remains.

Despite superficial similarity, the heart of the matter is that the Soviet and U.S. approaches toward establishing a new relationship are different and for the most part mutually exclusive. The United States is willing to aid the Soviets in return for a less tense, apparently less ideological, less conflictual relationship. In addition, it clings to the lingering hope that the Soviet system may be transformed by "functional" penetration. But the Soviets refuse to abandon their crusading "mission," although their tactics have been toned down somewhat. Further, they are striving to

[31] *Ibid.,* June 25, 1973, p. 18.

tighten their grip on their own citizens and on their East European empire.

The action taken to denigrate the famous writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and the distinguished physicist, Andrei Sakharov, is illustrative. A government campaign against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn gained momentum with the publication on August 30, 1973 of open letters condemning the two men, by thirty-one prominent Soviet writers, including Nobel prize winner Mikhail Sholokhov and Nikolai Fedorenko, former Soviet ambassador to the United Nations.[32] The *New York Times* Moscow correspondent, Theodore Shabad, suggested that "a broader aim of the Soviet authorities may be to discourage contacts between Russians and foreigners at a time when the Kremlin expects a growing influx of Western businessmen and engineers to help build up the Soviet economy."[33]

The relationship between heightened internal repression and more cordial external relations warrants giving special attention to the Soviet approach to U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

THE SOVIET APPROACH

An overall view of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations by Georgy A. Arbatov was published in February 1973.[34] Arbatov, who accompanied Brezhnev on his visit to the United States and can be presumed to be writing authoritatively, concedes the global "tendency toward the easing of tensions and the strengthening of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems." He then asserts that "The predominance of this tendency in the development of international relations has become possible thanks to the growing might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist commonwealth."

While admitting that prior thaws have been transitory, he implies that the present détente is far more permanent and important. The new

> change in direction has been registered not only in the form of a document dealing with general principles but also in a whole series of practical agreements on specific problems. Among these agreements, those on strategic arms limitation are especially important.

Further, compared with past arms control agreements, "the

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[32] Theodore Shabad, "Trial Links Solzhenitsyn to Dissident Newsletter," *New York Times*, August 31, 1973.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Arbatov, *op. cit.*

[ABM] Treaty and the Interim Agreement, on the other hand, limit the arms race in its most important, truly central areas." Elaborating, Arbatov properly asserts that:

> The very possibility of preventing war and of preserving and consolidating peace on our planet depends in large part on how relations between the two largest powers of the socialist and capitalist systems develop.

It is when we come to the analysis of *why* the changes in U.S.-Soviet relations have taken place that certain differences in perspective arise. As one might expect, Arbatov concludes that "changes in Soviet-American relations are the logical result of the major objective changes that have taken place in the world recently." These changes, he maintains, have resulted from the strengthening of the socialist camp, particularly the "defense might" of the Soviet Union, and the accompanying weakening of the imperialist camp, particularly the United States. With respect to the future, he adds:

> There can be no doubt that any change in the alignment of forces in favor of imperialism would entail not the easing of tension but increased tensions, would whip up imperialism's aggressive aspirations.

In short, things are more peaceful now because the United States allegedly is weaker — although the fundamental nature of the struggle remains the same.

> If many of the imperialist powers are becoming acceptable partners in efforts aimed at lessening the threat of war and normalizing the international situation, this does not at all indicate that the class nature of their policies has changed — this has not happened and could not have happened.

According to Arbatov, the United States in the past had placed

> reliance on military power as the main instrument of foreign policy. Inasmuch as the U.S.A. was unable to consolidate its monopoly over this power and the restraining defense might of the Soviet Union was created as a counterbalance to it, a very peculiar situation came about, one in which the buildup of military might was not accompanied by an increase in political might.

After suggesting that divisions exist within American ruling circles, he mentions other factors influencing U.S. policies:

> inflation and unemployment, the balance of payments deficit, the undermining of the position of the dollar and the difficulties in the world market, the problem of poverty in the richest capitalist country, the problem of the black population of America, the crisis and decay of the big cities, the monstrous crime rate, the decline in morals, the growing hostility of the younger generation to traditional bourgeois "values."

Then he raises an interesting question: "Why are American leaders, in search of popularity and support from the voters, now turning to a policy of the normalization of relations with the U.S.S.R. and the easing of international tension?" His answer to whether these changes may be lasting and viable is affirmative:

> It is precisely the fact that long-term objective factors are the main causes of the changes that makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the tendency toward normalization of Soviet-American relations, like the broader tendency toward the easing of tension and the development of cooperation in the international situation as a whole, has a solid objective foundation and hence has a future.

Following this assertion, Arbatov reviews those areas of parallel or coincidental interests he considers uppermost, including avoidance of nuclear war, arms limitations and technological collaboration. But despite the objective factors making for long-term "easing of tension" and "cooperation," he believes nonetheless that Soviet-American relations will necessarily "remain relations of struggle." Because the struggle is "historically inevitable," the détente must affect primarily the "forms" of the struggle. In fact, he says, the forms of the struggle

> may signify the difference between war and peace, between the pointless wasting of enormous material values in the arms race and military conflicts, on the one hand, and, on the other, constructive competition that in the long run is advantageous to all peoples.

In moving toward his conclusion, Arbatov indulges in an almost perfunctory review of the American obstacles confronting a normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations:

> These forces and groupings that have a stake in increasing tension and stepping up the arms race — the military-industrial complex, extreme right-wing elements, Zionist circles, etc. — have by no means laid down their arms.

Future developments, he declares, "will be determined largely by how fast and how consistently the foundations and positions of the 'cold war' are eroded in the U.S.A." Obviously there is no doubt in his mind that "the Soviet state will continue to facilitate the easing of tensions and the strengthening of peace and the security of the peoples in the interests of the Soviet people and in the interest of all mankind."

In Gilbert and Sullivan's *Pinafore* we are told that "Things are seldom what they seem. Skim milk masquerades as cream." One should read Arbatov's hopeful conclusions in the light of his own writings and of general Soviet defense and political literature, which stresses that the present détente is a *tactic* employed to enable the Soviets to achieve a hegemony that will be *permanent*. Lasting cooperation with the United States is *conditional* on the sustained growth of the Soviet Union's military and political power; détente perforce entails the weakening of the Western alliance system as a whole, and the U.S. military position and political will in particular.

A U.S. APPRAISAL

Despite these tendencies, the improving superpower relationship appears to be far more permanent than some of the transitory détentes of years past. The nontactical factors that led Moscow to seek better relations with the United States are substantial. Internally, Soviet industry lags considerably behind in the advanced technologies achieved by the United States. Similarly, Soviet agriculture is primitive by comparison with ours and chronically inefficient. The constantly increasing allocation to defense cannot be sustained without outside help to bolster the many backward areas of the Soviet economy.

Externally, deteriorating relations with the People's Republic of China have forced the Soviet Union to make costly deployments of large military forces to its eastern frontiers. Worried about the nightmare of simultaneous trouble on their eastern and western borders, the Soviets have built up the forces threatening China and launched a détente diplomacy toward the West which presumably will be capped by a successful conclusion — from the Soviet viewpoint — to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In his August 24, 1973 report to the Tenth Chinese Party Congress, Premier Chou En-lai accused Brezhnev and the "Soviet revisionists" of "making a feint to the East while attacking the West."[35] But regardless of the main direction of the Soviet effort, Moscow would like to see the CSCE bestow the seal of legitimacy on its East European empire and lead to further weakening in the NATO defense effort. These diplomatic desiderata cannot be obtained unless it manifests — at least for the short term — an overall conciliatory policy toward the West.

Nevertheless, "objective factors" are not the only influences on policy. An American could also find disquieting factors within the Soviet system suggesting a reversal of the current disposition toward détente at some time in the future, perhaps with little warning. The 1973 shake-up in the Politburo, as a result of which Shelest was ousted and the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and head of the KGB were elevated to full membership, may be a tip-off to a broad factional dispute within the ruling bodies of the Soviet hierarchy. Although these changes probably reinforce Brezhnev's détente policy, factional disputes have produced dramatic reversals in the past and might do so in the future.

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[35] *New York Times*, September 1, 1973, p. 6.

Quite aside from the fluctuating political fortunes of national leaders, other "subjective factors" suggest the fragility of U.S.-Soviet relations. Arbatov alluded to his concern about American military operations in Southeast Asia as well as U.S. support for Israeli operations in the Middle East. An American observer could recount the coincidence between the large-scale shipment of Soviet arms and the subsequent outbreak of war or intensified military operations in many areas of the world. Whether or not a causal relationship can be demonstrated, such shipments to Egypt preceded the 1967 June war with Israel, delivery of military equipment to India preceded the 1971 Indian war against Pakistan over Bangladesh, Soviet arms shipments to Hanoi preceded North Viet Nam's 1972 Easter offensive against South Viet Nam, and shipments of SAM-6's preceded the 1973 Egyptian cross-canal assault on Israeli forces deployed in the Sinai. At the least the impartial observer has to assign responsibility to both superpowers in these areas of contention. In fact, a mutual willingness to recognize some responsibility for conflict eruptions rather than the constant justification of respective national behavior on ideological grounds may be the fundamental prerequisite for U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

THE BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DÉTENTE

In Moscow on March 20, 1972, while addressing the Fifteenth Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, Secretary Brezhnev said:

> Official Chinese representatives tell us that relations between the USSR and the PRC should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if the people in Peking are not prepared *for more* in relations with a socialist state, we are ready to develop Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis, too.[36]

Moscow's relations with its bitter ideological rival and its imperialist-capitalist adversary are often characterized in the same noncomradely terms. It is interesting to note, however, that while the Soviets evidently consider "the principles of peaceful coexistence" to be the minimal basis for relations with China, those same principles are said to be the maximum that can be expected in Soviet relations with the United States.

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[36] Press Release, "News and Views from the USSR" (Washington: Soviet Embassy, Information Department, March 20, 1972), p. 7. (Emphasis added.)

In respect to the West, Brezhnev candidly referred to the tactical advantages of a détente policy at the Conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary on April 24, 1967:

> [Experience] teaches, in particular, that the "cold war" climate, the confrontation of military blocs and the atmosphere of war threats seriously handicaps the activity of revolutionary, democratic forces. In conditions of international tension reactionary elements in the bourgeois countries step up their activity, the military rear their heads and anti-democratic tendencies and anti-communism become more pronounced.[37]

A détente atmosphere threatens the security of both the United States and the USSR, but in distinctly different fashions. The major adverse by-product of détente in the West is that it affects defense. It implies a decrease in the Soviet threat and hence reduces the willingness of democratic societies to maintain the military forces which provide the indispensable foundation for peaceful coexistence.

There is cause for serious misgivings in U.S. intelligence reports that Brezhnev last spring assured East European leaders that his policy of détente was a tactic designed to permit Moscow to achieve economic and military superiority over the West in the next decade.[38] Although the reported assurances may themselves have been a tactic to win hard-line communist leaders over to his policy, Brezhnev's use of them underscores the obvious: there is no guarantee that either he or his successor will forswear the advantages of economic and military superiority which waning Western vigilance would accord them.

For the Soviet Union, a more subtle danger in pursuing détente, particularly over a long period of time, is associated with the fundamental insecurity of the government, whose power rests ultimately on coercion rather than the consent of the governed. Consequently, nearly sixty years after the October Revolution, Soviet rulers still insulate their subjects from foreign ideas and uncontrolled contact with foreigners. Both modern communications technology and the exchanges introduced by détente make it increasingly difficult to prevent the exposure of Soviet citizens to foreigners and their ideas. So far in the present détente, Soviet leaders have not been pressed with sufficient vigor to permit even a modest measure of relaxation. Moscow's hard-line posture in this connection may result from the fear that a détente policy may erode both internal stability in Eastern Europe and the area's external loyalty to the Soviet Union as tensions in Europe lessen.

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[37] *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 1041.

[38] *New York Times,* September 17, 1973.

Thus, both sides encounter security risks in the mutual pursuit of détente. The risk to the West is more immediate and tangible. The potential problem for the USSR is more ambiguous and uncertain, and its seriousness is apt to be overestimated by Soviet leaders, who have tended to equate Soviet security in Europe with rigid domination of Eastern Europe. If Western governments insist on some opening of the Soviet and East European systems as a *quid pro quo* for granting the Soviets the credits and technological advances they so avidly seek, the Kremlin leadership may learn that the Soviet Union's security is not as endangered by a genuine relaxation of tension as it has supposed. Whether Soviet leaders are prepared to take the modest risk that internal relaxation poses, however, is far from clear. Immediately prior to the opening, in Washington, of Congressional debate on trade concessions for Moscow, Brezhnev indirectly referred to Western proposals for the freer exchange of ideas and people as "naive, unseemly and, I would say, mercantile."[39] His remarks, delivered in Sofia, were a restrained iteration of harsher criticism published four days earlier in *Pravda*. A commentator in the Soviet newspaper accused Western proponents of freer exchange of using the second stage of the European security conference to "conduct anti-Communist propaganda in the countries of socialism on a legal basis under the guise of the unimpeded exchange of information."[40] In Cold War rhetoric, *Pravda* denounced these Westerners as rabid anti-Soviets assisted by a "worthless handful" of Russian dissidents such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

Moscow's present détente policy follows on the heels of a decade of "protracted conflict" in which the Soviets have pursued their objectives with persistence and impressive skill. The dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance has been the primary goal of the contemporary phase of Soviet influence-expansion. Specific goals have been: (1) Achievement and codification of nuclear parity with the United States (marked by the Soviet strategic buildup culminating in SALT I). (2) Legitimization of the East European empire (marked by Western acquiescence in the CSCE). (3) Acquisition of large-scale economic and technological assistance from the West (marked by *Ostpolitik* and the Moscow-Washington summit talks).

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[39] *Ibid.*, September 20, 1973.

[40] B. Bolshakov, "Who Stands on Positions of 'The Cold War,'" *Pravda*, September 15, 1973.

Whether the Soviet Union succeeds in achieving the dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of transatlantic security arrangements depends on the ultimate outcome of the conferences on mutual force reductions, European security and SALT II. If it can gain its objectives at these conferences without making any concessions regarding the opening up of its society, the present détente may not endure for long.

Future Prospects

U.S.-Soviet relations are approaching a crucial fork in the road. During his June 24, 1973 television address to the American people, Leonid Brezhnev said:

> You probably know that two years ago the 24th Congress of our ruling party, the Communist party of the Soviet Union, approved the Soviet peace program, which is a concrete embodiment of the policy of peaceful coexistence in modern conditions. It is a program of active contribution to international détente and to securing a truly lasting peace on earth for many generations to come. It expresses not only the convictions and intentions of our people but also, we are sure, the aspirations of millions and millions of peace-loving people all over the world.[41]

But the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in April 1971 also urged a continuing struggle against "imperialism" while advocating more subtle meddling into the domestic affairs of other states. The directive noted that

> Conditions have arisen in many capitalist countries for an anti-imperialist alliance of the revolutionary working class . . . and broad masses of religious people. Positive cooperation and joint action between communists and broad masses of Catholics and followers of other religions are developing. Their united action against imperialism for democracy and socialism is extremely timely. . . . Mass action of religious people can become an active force in the anti-imperialist struggle. . . .[42]

This variance in Soviet doctrinal statements notwithstanding, both President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev anticipate that the present détente will be long-lasting. Nixon talks about a generation of peace and Brezhnev discusses "securing a truly lasting peace on earth for many generations to come."

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[41] *New York Times*, June 25, 1973, p. 18.

[42] *24th Congress of the CPSU, Information Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 7-8 (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1971).

In a speech on July 16, 1973 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt told his people:

> As you know, adviser Hafiz Isma'il went to Moscow and returned two days ago because the international détente between the U.S. and the Soviet camps and the effect of this international détente on us and on our cause had to be discussed with the Soviet Union because, as Brezhnev has said, this détente might last for 20 or 30 years.[43]

Assuming that the détente lasts for at least a generation, what are the prospects for the Soviet Union becoming satisfied with its power and position in the world community? The index will be the amount of relaxation in those domestic measures historically justified by the Soviet government as necessary because of the imperialist threat. The initial test, as I see it, is twofold: (1) how the Soviets observe Article 13 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights — the right to free emigration; and (2) how they arrange for freedom of travel, so that people can move in and out of the Soviet Union as easily as a Britisher visits France or an American travels to Canada.

Brezhnev described the essential condition of normality well in his June 1973 American television address:

> To live at peace, we must trust each other, and to trust each other, we must know each other better. We, for our part, want Americans to visualize our way of life and our way of thinking as completely and correctly as possible.[44]

The crucial question is, how will this goal be sought in practice? The enlightened self-interest of both superpowers should favor a durable détente despite the associated risks they face. But, having been disappointed so many times in the past, Western analysts exhibit a natural concern that the Soviet Union is utilizing the present détente to improve its overall power position vis-à-vis the United States. According to David Watt,

> The present Soviet aim appears to be the "status quo *plus*". . . . The U.S. aim is "the status quo *minus*". . . . The deviations on both sides of a strict balance of advantage are not large and by themselves hardly constitute much cause for worry; but their combined effect over a long period of time could well be a tilt in the geopolitical balance of power.[45]

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[43] *New York Times*, July 17, 1973, p. 2.

[44] *Ibid.*, June 25, 1973, p. 18.

[45] David Watt, "Four More Years—of What?," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972-73, pp. 7-8.

Marshall Shulman has called attention to the Soviet determination to become the "Number One" power:

> . . . having smarted for so long under what they felt as the "arrogance" of American strategic superiority, the Soviet leadership is in a chesty mood, prepared to enjoy the advantages of a rising power position.[46]

While the Nixon Administration promotes trade and other accords as an "investment in peace," the Soviet government continues to depict Soviet policies in ideological terms as devoted to the struggle with American "imperialism." The importance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy has sometimes been denigrated, but as Walter Laqueur points out, Soviet leaders have themselves emphasized that their doctrinal statements refer to practical politics. George Kennan has stated succinctly:

> The Soviet regime continues to be inspired by an ideology hostile in principle to the Western nations, from which it dares not depart. . . . To this must be added the ties it continues to maintain to certain foreign communist parties . . . a further dimension of insecurity from the standpoint of Western countries.[47]

If there is to be a fundamental change from confrontation to accommodation on Moscow's part, it will have to be accompanied by a gradual redefinition of the issues at stake and gradual changes in the choice of means, the allocation of priorities, and the definition of national goals. A review of the internal allocation of Soviet resources raises serious questions concerning the Soviet commitment to a "normalization of relations."

In this connection, regardless of whether trade leads to linkages or interdependence, U.S. trade and loan credits may aid in establishing a stronger Soviet industrial base and allow for greater emphasis in the military-strategic sphere. The West has helped the Soviet Union to keep on top of a carefully controlled tide of rising consumer expectations while simultaneously devoting a constant portion of steadily rising GNP to defense forces and military, space and atomic R&D.

Too frequently the assumption is made that trade is a technical matter and should be handled as such. That trade may indeed be primarily a political issue is plainly illustrated by the Jackson and Vanik amendments to the U.S. trade act with the Soviet Union, the East-West Trade Act. The issue involved is the Soviet practice of levying a large tax on university-educated citizens seeking to emigrate. While the U.S. Administration opposes the linkage of trade to the emigration issue, Senator Jackson and Congressman Vanik seek firm assurances that the Soviet government will live up to The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ". . . when we talk of free trade, let us also talk of free people. When we bring down the barriers that keep manufactured goods from Communist countries out, let us also bring down the barriers that keep their people in."[48] The fact that Brezhnev spent so much of his time during his 1973 visit to Washington defending the Soviet policy restricting emigration, particularly of Jews, indicates the effect of the Jackson Amendment as well as Brezhnev's interest in overcoming this obstacle to his goal of importing technology and goods from the United States.

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[46] Marshall D. Shulman, "What Does Security Mean Today?," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971, p. 611.

[47] George F. Kennan, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970's," *ibid.*, October 1972, p. 214.

A major consideration is whether U.S. foreign policy should be based on the belief that "the way of life" is important and that basic human rights, civil liberties and human dignity must be observed, as opposed to the "realist view" that the United States should deal with a regime notwithstanding its policies. While issues of emigration can perhaps be viewed as domestic problems, U.S. policymakers must establish whether our relations with the Soviet Union are to be conducted on a purely amoral basis. The minority problem in the USSR is by no means confined to the Jewish element but involves Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Turks, other minority peoples and dissident Russians as well. Thousands of these people are political prisoners, currently in Soviet labor camps.[49] The United States could ignore the repression in Soviet domestic rule, but American pressure can make a difference.[50] Certainly unless pressure is exerted on Soviet leaders in behalf of oppressed Soviet minorities and human rights in general, the promises of benign interdependence will never materialize.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental question that must be raised and answered in negotiations and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union concerns the benefit each derives from such negotiations. The United States may choose to view the negotiation process and the notions of cooperation and interdependence as sufficient goals in and of themselves, but only at its peril.

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[48] *New York Times*, June 5, 1973.
[49] *Ibid.*, June 17, 1973, p. 26.
[50] See Anthony Lewis, *New York Times*, June 21, 1973, p. 39 M.

Some functional areas such as trade and cooperation in science and technology seem to provide the Soviet Union with a higher payoff than the United States can expect. Because of this, the United States has attempted to link these payoffs to Soviet restraint in both strategic areas and regional conflicts. Thus trade seems to have been used by the United States as an incentive for SALT. However, this type of linkage can be mutually advantageous only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the U.S. defense posture must be sufficiently strong to prevent the Soviet Union from turning the tables in the area of linkage politics. The effort during the most recent summit by Leonid Zamyatin, head of TASS, to make a SALT II agreement contingent on U.S. trade concessions underscores the potential weakness of any bargaining strategy that rests solely on Soviet good will. As a second condition, Soviet leaders must share a similar view of the necessity for interdependence. Dr. Kissinger's defense of the American position in SALT rested, in part, on the argument that since the United States was not willing to engage fully in the strategic competition, it would, without the SALT accords, have fallen farther behind in this area. A strategy of cooperation and interdependence without the political will either to ask for legitimate concessions or to compete when necessary will be fraught with danger.

Over the long haul the Soviets can be induced into cooperative behavior either by the political neutralization of their military potential or by demonstrating that the benefits of friendship far exceed the opportunities available from another policy. Our military preparations and alliances are intended to accomplish the former, while a willingness to negotiate seeks to achieve the latter (the notion of a "web" of interests). Détente should be pursued in such a way as to reduce the possibility of Moscow's reversion to strong-arm tactics. The progress of détente depends upon a real reduction of the Soviet capacity to use military force, threaten its use, or provide such large-scale arms shipments to its client states as to enable them to wage proxy wars against U.S. allies.

The 1973 Middle East war seemed to follow the familiar pattern of Soviet arms followed by the outbreak of hostilities. The coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria could have had no chance for even limited success without Soviet arms and equipment. Although there may be a measure of truth in claims that the détente limited the degree of direct Soviet intervention, it is clear that, in fact, Israeli military momentum and American firmness prompted the Soviet leadership to persuade Arab leaders to accept the cease-fire. It is legitimate to ask how deeply the Soviet Union is committed to détente with the United States if only the imminent defeat of its proxies and a worldwide U.S. military alert can induce Moscow to exercise self-restraint in a crisis. Obviously from the U.S. point of view there should be better linkage between Soviet smiles from Moscow and peace in the world's troubled areas.

Arms control and trade should be linked. If they are not connected, our "trade" will simply increase the Soviets' military option in the short term by diverting our resources to their economic benefit, while their resources are freed for armaments. American reluctance to confront this argument directly may indicate a naive belief in the "intangibles" afforded by the long-term political consequences of foreign trade. It is sobering, however, to recall that Russia's trade with Germany reached all-time highs, first in 1913 and then a generation later in 1940. Apparently, trade is a weak reed with which to build a lasting peace.

Churchill said in 1950: "The Soviets fear our friendship more than our arms. We must labour to create the reverse." Soviet policy seems now to seek to take maximum advantage of "peaceful coexistence" by equating "friendship" with a timely diversion of Western economic resources to ameliorate a worsening technological gap, while improving Soviet power to the point where Moscow need not fear our arms. At that moment, our "friendship" will, willy-nilly, take on aspects of a permanent system of technological tribute in return for Soviet good behavior. This facet of Soviet-American interaction has been woefully underestimated. Manifestly the pace of détente and disarmament in the West is moving in much more of an interlocking web than the pace of détente and disarmament in the East. There, to borrow from Marxist terminology, the policy of peaceful coexistence has been the ephemeral political "superstructure"; the less transient underlying "substructure" has been a massive military buildup in strategic arms, naval construction and airlift capability.

If the Soviet Union genuinely wishes to enter into the kind of long-term international cooperation which mankind so desperately needs, it will have to shift its policy to something far more benign than peaceful coexistence. Among other things this would require some reordering of priorities away from the steady increase in military spending that has characterized Soviet budget allocations over the past ten years. Because of the closed nature of the Soviet system, Soviet intentions must be derived through inferences drawn from Soviet behavior. Many Western statesmen have found Soviet behavior menacing in the strategic arena, opportunistic in the Third World, hegemonic in Eastern Europe, and divisive as regards relations between the United States and Western Europe. Today it may be argued that these are misperceptions, but to the extent that they are, it is due in no small part to the secretiveness cloaking Soviet national security policy. Accordingly, a partial lifting of the veil of secrecy surrounding Soviet defense expenditures and defense policy is a prerequisite for building an enduring structure of peace.

Some divisive activities can be expected. Soviet maneuvers in such widely separated spots as Aden, Cuba, Somalia and Iceland may surface either because of the momentum of the past or as a result of continuing efforts to extend Moscow's influence into regions distant from the Soviet Union. Some conflict is inevitable even in a more stable world and need not result in an irreversible shift in the global balance of power. In this respect, remarks by President Kennedy in his speech at American University on June 19, 1963 are apropos:

> World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor: it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever.[51]

What cannot be tolerated, however, if the détente is to be genuine, is the combination of a Soviet military buildup with greatly increased East-West trade and Western military retrenchment. This combination can only erode the delicate balance on which strategic and regional stability rests. According to the *New York Times,*

> Andrei D. Sakharov, the dissident physicist, declared that Western reconciliation with Moscow on Soviet terms posed a serious threat to the world.
>
> Large amounts of Western technological aid to the Soviet Union, he said, would help the Russians get rid of economic problems they cannot solve on their own and would enable them to concentrate on accumulating strength.
>
> "As a result," he said, "the world would become helpless before this uncontrollable bureaucratic machine." He added that unqualified Western willingness to improve relations with the Soviet Union would "mean cultivating a country where anything that happens may be shielded from outside eyes — a masked country that hides its real face."[52]

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[51] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1, 1963, p. 3.
[52] *New York Times*, August 23, 1973, p. C 3.

The West would do well not to ignore this warning from so courageous a man.

The lesson we must learn is that some kind of conflict between ideologically divided nations is likely to continue so long as superpowers — and nations more generally — inhabit this earth. We have to keep our eyes open and maintain our strength, not only because we continue to live in an uncertain world, but also because power and cooperation are two sides of the same coin. Genuine cooperation must be based on mutual respect — and the ingredient of respect is power prudently managed. What tenuous peace the global system has known since 1945 has depended to no small extent on the fact that the United States has maintained a state of military preparedness sufficient to deter attacks upon nations which have sought U.S. protection. If that preparedness is now allowed to atrophy for spurious reasons, the international situation will look much more menacing a decade hence than it does today.

Regardless of the objective factors, Soviet secrecy places Western negotiators seeking cooperation at a disadvantage whatever the issue being negotiated. The SALT I agreements were based on an open U.S. inventory of our own strategic weapons and U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet strategic forces. U.S. farmers and consumers were badly defrauded by the Soviet wheat deal because key U.S. officials apparently knew so little concerning the actual dimensions of the Soviet grain shortage. Despite all the fanfare surrounding oil and gas deals between the Soviet government and "hard-nosed" Yankee traders, the odds are that the Soviet negotiators withheld many important factors from the bargaining table. In dealing with their Soviet counterparts, Western negotiators rarely have the information they need about Soviet affairs to make prudent, rational decisions.

The United States and its Western allies require far more open an accounting from the Soviets on what they are allocating to the acquisition and development of the instruments of power before they furnish the technological means needed to provide the necessities and amenities of life for the Soviet people.

The Soviet Union is not impervious to the global forces crying for a cooperative solution. Failure to solve vital problems affecting all mankind will wreak havoc on the Soviets as well as everyone else. This being so, the West could hasten the advent of true international cooperation by insisting that the Soviet Union participate in the world system in a mature, responsible and normal fashion. The Soviet Union has become too powerful to continue to be the most suspicious "loner" of the world community.

The massive nature of the problems facing all of us demands the sacrifice of national and ideological animosities. *This is a lesson the Soviets must learn.* In order to cooperate genuinely and credibly they must enter the modern world sociologically as well as technologically. They must begin to open their society and permit the free movement of people and ideas between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. The *contents* of the present "détente" have consisted to date almost entirely of unilateral American concessions in favor of the USSR. For instance, look at SALT I now, in the light of recent and entirely predictable Soviet achievements in testing MIRV; look at the United States' willingness to drop the vital "B" from M*B*FR (Mutual *Balanced* Force Reductions); look at the wheat deal and the question of granting most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. What single meaningful concession has Moscow made to balance these unilateral U.S. sacrifices?

The time has come to ask the Soviet regime to concede reality. There can be no genuine détente unless the Soviet Union begins to respect human rights within its borders. Without a willingness to move in this direction the reality of its détente policy is suspect.

> Those who insist that the pace and development of détente should reflect progress in the area of human rights are often accused of opposition to détente itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. The argument is not between the proponents and detractors of détente, but between those who recognize that a genuine era of international accommodation must be based on progress toward individual liberty and those who choose to pretend otherwise.[53]

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[53] Senator Henry M. Jackson, *New York Times*, September 9, 1973, Section 4, p. 17.

MULTIPOLARITY, ALLIANCES, AND U.S.-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

IN a major departure from its historic policy of avoiding "entangling alliances," the United States in the generation after World War II led in the development and maintenance of a complex series of defense arrangements. It joined multilateral pacts such as NATO and SEATO, as well as bilateral alliances with scores of countries in nearly every part of the world. U.S. military forces were stationed in many countries around the world as tangible evidence of the American security guarantee.

If alliances were fundamental to American policy in the recent past, what is their role in the international system of the 1970's? Do U.S. efforts to reach political accommodations with both the Soviet Union and China render less important the preservation of existing alliances? Can the United States, as the leading member of several alliances, prevent their erosion as it engages in new forms of diplomacy with powers against which the alliances were formed? Are alliances, as symbols of continuity in relationships among nations, compatible with foreign policies based on maneuverability and flexibility and betokening a less bipolar international system? How can existing alliances be updated or transformed, to make them more responsive to the major issues now facing their members?

A reconsideration of the importance of alliances in American foreign policy is prompted by several factors. These include: (1) the perception, both in the United States and abroad, that the threat which created the alliances has been greatly diminished or altered in nature; (2) the decline in the credibility of U.S. security guarantees as a result of the immense increase in Soviet military capabilities; (3) the disillusionment of certain influential segments of American public and elite opinion with allegedly excessive U.S. overseas alliance commitments and burdens; (4) the unwillingness of allies, as perceived (rightly or wrongly) by Americans, to assume a more equitable portion of their own security so as to enable the United States to reduce its defense burdens; (5) the interest of the United States, especially evident in the Nixon Administration, in exploiting the opportunities for diplomatic flexibility afforded by a less bipolar world in general and especially by the Sino-Soviet conflict; and (6) the occurrence of new areas of divergence, especially in economic affairs, between the United States and its principal allies in Europe and Asia.

It is axiomatic that alliances — whether in domestic politics or international relations, between individuals or nations — are formed between partners who share an interest in attaining some common goal for themselves or in preventing another party from undertaking an undesirable activity. Alliances endure so long as the goal for which they were formed remains important to the partners and so long as alliance membership provides a suitable means for its attainment. Once the goal has been reached or, for whatever reason, abandoned by the members, the alliance is either formally dissolved or ceases to be operative as the interests and policies of its members shift.

The alliance systems of the United States and the Soviet Union have faced differing types of eroding tendencies which have diminished the superpower alliance cohesion that existed in the 1950's. In this respect, the problems besetting the USSR have been even more formidable than those confronting the United States. While the U.S.-European relationship has been plagued by the defection of France from NATO's command structure (but not from the Atlantic Alliance itself), the debates of the last decade over nuclear strategy and the control of nuclear weapons, and, more recently, issues of trade, monetary policy and defense burden sharing, the once-close Sino-Soviet alliance has given way to intense hostility manifested in armed border clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops in 1969 and 1970. In addition, Moscow has faced challenges to its dominance in Eastern Europe, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine designed to provide legal sanction for Soviet military intervention to prevent "counter-revolution" in communist states.

While the factors contributing to the recent weakening of alliances are numerous, they relate ultimately to changes in the foreign policies of major actors in the altered international system of the 1970's. In the generation after World War II, the United States conducted its foreign relations in a bipolar system in which the disparity in capabilities between the superpowers, on the one hand, and the remaining powers, on the other, was vast. This system had elements of stability as well as destabilizing features. Under bipolarity, for example, there were relatively cohesive alliance systems in which the options available to superpowers and allies for changes in alignment, or even for independent diplomacy vis-à-vis non-alliance members, were severely limited.

Nevertheless, both superpowers attempted to reduce the cohesiveness of the opposing bloc. Soviet diplomacy toward NATO consisted largely of efforts to exploit and exacerbate differences in order to weaken the links between the United States and the West European members of the alliance. Western powers evolved policies designed to weaken the Soviet grip on East European states by encouraging polycentrism in foreign policy and "liberalization" in domestic affairs. Opportunities available to the West to diminish Soviet control over Warsaw Pact members were greatly limited, however, by Moscow's willingness to use military power to intervene in Eastern Europe. It is doubtful that this Soviet propensity has been diminished in the present era.

In the international system of the 1970's, both superpowers still seek to retain their own allies while attempting to reduce the cohesiveness of the opposing alliance. But the emerging international system offers them more latitude in this respect than they had in the past. In the present system, the United States and the Soviet Union are endeavoring to retain bipolarity in strategic nuclear relationships while encouraging a form of diplomatic and political multipolarity and divisiveness in each other's alliance systems. Superpower negotiations on arms control, as evidenced in the SALT, are conducted in a bilateral framework. Agreements, as in the case of the Nonproliferation Treaty, are designed to retard other powers' acquisition of the most advanced weapons, although, from the Soviet perspective, the need to prevent or retard the acquisition of nuclear weapons by powers such as China and the major countries of Western Europe is greater than that of the United States.

At the same time the principal adversaries, and especially the Soviet Union, entertain the hope that East-West détente will be the means of decoupling superpower defense guarantees from the defense of allies. Soviet policy in Europe is designed to encourage the *gradual* withdrawal of U.S. military power and security guarantees as Europe is neutralized under a form of "Finlandization" or Soviet "hegemony," without direct military control from Moscow.

Yet, while seeking to undermine U.S. alliance commitments, the USSR has been extending its own influence by a variety of means, including alliances with countries in the Third World.

Since 1970, it has concluded alliances with Egypt and India, both of which once eschewed alignment with a superpower. Soviet interest in these alliances results from Moscow's effort to gain greater influence in the strategically important Middle East, with its abundant energy reserves, and in South Asia and elsewhere on the periphery of China in order to counter Peking's power. One of the effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict has been to heighten Moscow's perceived need for Asian alliances and collective security arrangements designed to minimize Chinese influence.

II

The evolving international system is characterized by two basic sets of triangular relationships, both of which will affect the nature of U.S. alliances in the 1970's.[1] The first triangle includes the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The second consists of the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Both triangles are vital to the development of that New Structure for World Peace of which President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have spoken, and without the United States' active participation in each, such a global structure becomes impossible. To a greater extent than any other country, the United States is able to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry so as to diminish the capacity of Moscow and Peking to conduct foreign policies that would be destabilizing. In the case of the second triangle, the United States provides the principal link with each of the other two members, for only the United States has alliances with both Western Europe and Japan.

The U.S.-USSR-China triangle is based primarily upon the diplomatic-military standing of its members. It includes the formidable strategic capabilities of the world's two superpowers, as well as China's much weaker, yet substantial, defense capabilities. It contains contradictory forces: In some areas, parallel interests exist among pairs of its members, even though each remains deeply hostile to much of the foreign policy, ideology and domestic political structure of the others.

This complex triangle derives its primary significance for U.S. foreign policy from the opportunities afforded by the Sino-Soviet conflict. So long as a deep rift exists between the Soviet Union and

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[1] For an analysis of triangular international relationships, see William E. Griffith, *Peking, Moscow and Beyond: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle* (Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington Papers, No. 6, 1973); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1972, pp. 54-59.

China, neither Moscow nor Peking can allow Washington to develop an improved relationship with one at the other's expense. Because of their rivalry, both communist governments have a strong incentive to prevent a major deterioration in relations with the United States. This consideration, together with the Soviet need to gain greater access to Western technology and agricultural products, undoubtedly contributed to the Kremlin's willingness to proceed with the Moscow Summit Conference in May 1972 at a time when the United States was intensifying its bombing of North Viet Nam and mining North Vietnamese harbors in order to halt the massive spring offensive launched by Hanoi's armies in South Viet Nam. From the Soviet perspective then, it was essential that President Nixon's historic visit to Peking in February 1972 be followed by a comparable summit meeting in Moscow.

The second distinctive triangular relationship of the contemporary international system, composed of noncommunist countries that have been closely allied for more than a generation, represents the vast bulk of the world's technological-industrial-economic capabilities and accounts for most of the world's trade. Unlike the members of the first triangle, the members of the U.S.-West European-Japanese triangle share a mutually compatible conception of the international system. Despite the fact that this triangle contains both of the principal U.S. enemies of World War II, no major *political* issues divide its members in their foreign policies — although the October 1973 Middle East war produced, temporarily at least, a deep cleavage between the United States and Western Europe and Japan. Because the economic capabilities of two of its members — Western Europe and Japan — are not matched by great military strength, vast disparities exist between their defense forces and those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Increasingly, however, both Western Europe and Japan have become economic competitors of the United States. Differences have arisen among them on issues of trade, international monetary policy and the Middle East which, if unchecked, could adversely affect security relationships.

Owing to the manifest disparities in strength among members of each of the triangles, the world is likely to remain bipolar in the military/strategic sense at least for the next decade, even though it will become increasingly multipolar diplomatically and economically. The superpowers will remain the principal contenders for influence in each other's alliance systems, even though both Western Europe and Japan will gain greater leverage as a result of their increased economic capabilities and potential political roles.

Although only the United States, by virtue of its outstanding military, technological and economic capabilities, is a member of both triangles, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly seek over the next decade to strengthen its influence with Western Europe and Japan and thus to weaken the American position in the U.S.-Western Europe-Japan relationship. Compared to the United States, both the USSR and China remain weak economically and technologically, except for impressive Soviet achievements in military capabilities. The United States, because of its overall strength, together with its unique diplomatic position vis-à-vis both allies and adversaries, can maneuver more fully than any other power in either triangle. Indeed, it will be essential for U.S. security interests that the United States play an active role in both triangles in the years ahead.

In recent years, the United States has enjoyed greater diplomatic success within the Sino-Soviet-American triangle than it has in its relationship with Western Europe and Japan. The most notable gains registered in "triangular" diplomacy with Moscow and Peking were the Viet Nam settlement, the SALT ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles, and a general relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union in Europe and the People's Republic of China in Asia. Yet both Moscow and Peking have benefited greatly in this triangular relationship. The PRC has achieved several long-held goals: withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina; a tacit understanding that Washington would view with alarm a Soviet attack on China; a relaxation of U.S. prohibitions on trade with China; and abandonment by the United States of its "two China" policy. Similarly, the Soviet Union has gained much: U.S. recognition of the territorial division of Europe, including the partition of Germany and the relinquishment of the German Democratic Republic to Soviet hegemony; U.S. acquiescence in the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to ratify the division of Europe; U.S. acceptance of a form of nuclear "parity" on strategic weapons systems; the sale by the United States of large amounts of grain; and the prospect of large-scale technology transfers by the United States, Western Europe and Japan to assist in modernizing technologically backward sectors of the Soviet economy.

It has thus proven easier for the United States to deal with adversaries on the plane of extremely limited common interests than it has with allies with which it maintains a wide range of complex security, commercial, military and diplomatic relationships. The task of negotiating with the relatively monolithic Soviet and Chinese leaderships poses fewer problems than dealing with many European governments and a European Community in the early stages of a halting, uncertain political unification process. While finesse and even brilliance in its diplomacy have enabled the United States to manipulate the Sino-Soviet rift to its advantage, it has permitted a deterioration in the American-Japanese-European triangular bonds, perhaps more by benign neglect than conscious policy.

Much of the discussion concerning the problem of maintaining partnerships with allies while entering negotiations with adversaries centers on the question of foreign policy priorities. Can the United States cultivate a new relationship with China and the Soviet Union, except perhaps at the expense of its allies in Europe and Asia? A strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, or the achievement of greater defense collaboration in Western Europe, it has been alleged, will damage the prospects for détente with the Soviet Union. The American policy of "tilting toward Pakistan" at the time of India's invasion of Bangladesh has been explained, in part at least, as an effort to act in tacit accord with China, with which Pakistan has enjoyed cordial relations, at a time when the United States was engaged in delicate negotiations leading to President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972.

The conduct of diplomacy, both with allies and adversaries, is highly delicate and complex in the international setting of the 1970's. In a political system whose decision-making process is as complicated and diffuse as that of the United States, the formation of foreign policy is the product of negotiations and alliances within a bureaucracy with many interests and numerous departments and agencies. Such a process is repeated, although perhaps on a different scale, in the political systems of the United States' major allies. If diplomacy in today's world is characterized by surprise and flexibility, opportunities for consultation among allies in advance of negotiations with countries such as the Soviet Union and China are likely on occasion to be extremely limited.

The fact that the United States is part of both triangles confers on U.S. policy a degree of flexibility that appears often to have been overlooked in the U.S. effort to reach political accommodations with the Soviet Union and China. For tactical reasons, both Peking and Moscow now perceive a need to adjust their relationship with the United States. The Chinese and Soviet rationales for this change in policy are based on carefully formulated conceptions of their respective national interests at this stage in their historical development. China, deeply hostile to the Soviet Union, is said to fear a Soviet military strike designed to eliminate Chinese nuclear capabilities and other forms of military strength before the PRC becomes a far more formidable competitor for influence in the communist world. The Soviets are apprehensive about the Chinese military potential, and seek, therefore, to resolve outstanding security problems on the Western flank in Europe. In addition, they desire access to Western technology to modernize their industry and want assurances of agricultural imports to compensate for domestic shortages of foodstuffs. While the United States, Japan and Western Europe, each for its own reasons, has an interest in improved relations with the Soviet Union and China, both communist powers need the United States at least as much as the United States needs them. Therefore, the leverage available to Washington in dealing with Moscow and Peking is considerable.

III

As long as this basic condition prevails in the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relationship, Washington need not jeopardize basic relationships with the second triangle composed of its major allies. In fact, the attractiveness of the United States — and its allies — to Moscow and Peking is enhanced as a result of the strength of the U.S.-West European-Japanese triangle. For example, a strong Western Europe, linked in its security with the United States, could provide a powerful counterpoise to Soviet power in Europe and limit the Soviet capacity for exerting military pressure on China's frontiers. Such a role for Western Europe is highly compatible with the security interests of China as well as the United States.

Preservation of a Japanese security link with the United States provides an alternative to a nuclear-armed Japan. Thus, the interests of both Moscow and Peking are served by a U.S.-Japanese security agreement that gives adequate nuclear protection to Japan, even though Moscow's policy has sometimes appeared to encourage the gradual decoupling of the U.S. guarantee and Japan's neutralization. Peking and Moscow would be apprehensive if Japan chose either to develop her own nuclear weapons or to form an alliance with one communist power at the expense of the other. Hence, the continuation of the basic security relationship between Japan and the United States remains vital to the stability of the Pacific Basin. Of the powers in the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle only the United States can provide a security guarantee that furnishes a clear alternative to Japanese remilitarization or neutralization.

In an era of U.S.-Soviet strategic "parity," however, the nuclear guarantees extended by the United States to its allies rest upon uncertainty. The continued growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, accompanied by a decline in the American willingness — perceived or actual — to maintain alliance commitments, would further diminish the credibility of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia. In part, the logic of strategic parity is such that neither superpower can extend ironclad nuclear guarantees to allies without risking its own destruction. Historically, defense treaties were concluded to enable participating countries to gain an increment in their security. If the risks inherent in alliance membership come to outweigh the potential gains, the incentive for nations to join or to remain in existing alliances will be diminished, especially if the superpower with which they have been allied falls far behind the opposing superpower in technological-strategic-military capabilities.

In the changing international system of the 1970's, therefore, U.S. foreign policy should be based on the preservation of security treaties, especially with Western Europe and Japan, and on the development of frameworks for collaboration on a wide range of issues in other fields. The continuing effort of U.S. diplomacy should be to enhance collaboration among the three partners in areas where they share common interests: security, trade, the international monetary system, science and technology, the protection of the environment, and the future of world energy reserves.

In general, the United States should give priority to relations with major allies, although paradoxically these relations are likely to prove even more difficult, because of their wide range and complexity, than those within the Sino-Soviet-American triangle. In the latter case our goal should be to evolve, with both Moscow and Peking, better relations than either can maintain with the other. Our interest lies in the continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict so long as it does not lead to a war that would result in China's devastation. We should accordingly continue in our attempt to evolve *bilateral* relationships with each of the communist states without taking sides in the rift between them.

In an era of foreign policy based on greater flexibility and maneuverability, the damage to our alliances resulting from bilateral U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese diplomacy can be minimized by a U.S. policy that gives those alliances priority. To Washington belongs much of the credit for the emergence of additional centers of power in the contemporary international system. U.S. policies of the postwar period contributed decisively to the restoration of Europe, Japan, and other states that has raised them to unprecedented levels of economic strength. The innovative programs of the United States, together with the efforts of the peoples of Western Europe and Asia, created the essential conditions for the more multipolar world of the 1970's. Clearly it is the United States, more than any other power, which has enhanced the prospects for an international system based on pluralism and diversity.

In this respect, the Nixon Doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine represent two fundamentally opposed conceptions of the ordering of relations among nations. In the Nixon Doctrine the United States favors, and actively supports, the emergence of an international system based on several distinctive, independent centers of power. In contrast, the Brezhnev Doctrine symbolizes the opposition of the Soviet Union to pluralism, diversity and independence in the communist world. In addition, the Soviet government cannot view with approval the creation of a more multipolar world wherein Western Europe, Japan and China would join the United States and the USSR as power centers.

If the basic thrust of international politics for the remaining years of this century lies in the emergence of additional power centers, the world of the future is likely to be more in harmony with American than Soviet interests. In the matter of China the Soviets face a long and perhaps deepening conflict. Japan has the capacity to outstrip the Soviet Union economically and technologically. The prosperous "open" societies of Western Europe provide a powerful attraction to the peoples of East Central Europe and even those of the USSR itself. On balance, the potential power centers appear to have more compatibility of interests – and hence more inclination to cooperate – with the United States.

Conversely, because Moscow's interest lies in retarding the evolution of a more multipolar world, the present period furnishes unique opportunities for Soviet foreign policy. The power centers of the future are still in a formative stage at a time when the United States appears less prepared than before to bear alliance burdens. At this time, moreover, the Soviet Union has acquired a tremendous strategic capability and has attained a position of parity codified in SALT I that may (hopefully from the Soviet perspective) be strengthened in future strategic arms limitation negotiations with the United States. By encouraging the decoupling of the U.S. strategic force from Western Europe and Japan and by pressing an active diplomacy designed to weaken the U.S. alliance commitment especially in Europe, the Soviets seek to gain greater control over the process of the evolution of additional centers of power. Where the emerging centers cannot be neutralized under growing Soviet influence, they must, as in the case of China, be contained by a combination of Soviet military power and alliances between Moscow and other Asian capitals directed against Peking.

IV

Even though the world of the future generally accords more fully with U.S. interests than with those of the Soviet Union, the problems facing the United States are not easily surmounted. The alliances of the past generation sprang from a domestic foreign policy consensus which by the early 1970's had been considerably weakened. Under conditions of bipolarity, where clearly defined threats to American national security existed, it was possible to summon both the popular support and the material resources essential for the complex U.S. alliance system.

For the United States, the need to retain alliances in the 1970's and beyond remains as great as in the earlier period. Allies are vital to its foreign policy, especially in seeking a reduction in its own overall international burdens. The complex issues of defense burden sharing, the future international security role of Europe and Japan, the creation of a more effective international monetary system, and the joint development of new technologies to provide more abundant energy and to find substitutes for other scarce raw materials and natural resources make collaboration among the United States, Western Europe and Japan imperative. The problem is the transformation of alliances into partnerships — the development of frameworks for collaboration that encompass defense but go beyond it to include other areas of common concern.

In an assessment of the Atlantic Alliance, Robert Strausz-Hupé wrote:

> Alliances which have existed for a long time and were intended to be permanent, have always reached a critical threshold: on this side of it lies stagnation and ultimately dissolution; beyond it lies another evolutionary stage. . . . The choice is between moving forward or backwards, and not between either of these alternatives and standing still.[2]

The U.S. alliance systems stand at that critical threshold between adaptability and stagnation. If they are not adapted to the security and other needs of the changing international system, they are likely to stagnate and become increasingly irrelevant adjuncts to the foreign policies of their members. Unless it is countered by a U.S. effort to update alliance relationships, the Soviet strategy of trying to weaken the American alliances will eventually diminish the prospects for the world of great diversity, based on several power centers, envisaged in the Nixon Doctrine.

A major goal of U.S. diplomacy in the creation of a more peaceful world is the transformation of the superpower confrontation from a strategic-military standoff to other forms of competition, together with the broadening of areas of joint effort between them. This process is, at best, risky and protracted, and fraught with the possibility of reversal, misunderstanding and miscalculation. It is unlikely to succeed if the United States is unable to maintain security links with emerging power centers as an alternative to greater Soviet influence. Alliances, transformed into partnerships, are vital also to the success of U.S. efforts to collaborate with power centers in the resolution of other issues.

V

The meaning of partnership in discussions of American foreign policy for the 1970's has been nebulous. To be sure, it implies greater equality, or less inequality, between the United States and its allies. Some of the disparities have already diminished, especially in the economic sector, although they remain vast in strategic-military capabilities and in certain other areas as well. But if partnership implies greater equality, it also provides for a diplomacy designed to take full account of U.S. interests and those of allies. This means not only U.S. recognition of the right of other states to assume a larger share of their defense, but also willingness to drive a hard bargain where specific U.S. security and other interests are at stake. It implies a disposition to consult as fully as possible with allies in the preparation of U.S. diplomatic initiatives toward adversaries *in return for* a similar willingness by the allies to consult with us in such circumstances. Above all, it should mean that the United States recognizes the need for specific steps that will strengthen the defense capabilities of allies in transition from dependency to partnership. In all such endeavors, however, American diplomacy is complicated by the fact that, especially in security affairs, the gap between U.S. and allied strength remains wide. In addition, there exists a psychological block for countries accustomed for more than a generation to taking their cue in foreign affairs from Washington. The transition from dependency to partnership, closely related to the transformation of the international system itself, will be at best painful and protracted.

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[2] Robert Strausz-Hupé, Introduction to Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1969), pp. 8-9.

The U.S.-West European-Japanese triangle is based on a complex set of bilateral and multilateral relationships. These include formal treaty commitments embodied in NATO and the U.S.-Japanese Defense Treaty, common membership in international organizations and groupings such as OECD and the Committee of Twenty, and bilateral diplomacy among pairs of nations in the triangle on a wide range of problems of common concern. Certain of the relationships include all three major partners in the triangle. Others consist of only two: the United States-Western Europe; the United States-Japan; Japan-Western Europe. The relationships are asymmetrical, because the United States has a more important set of bilateral agreements with both Western Europe and Japan than either has with the other, chief among these being the U.S. security treaties and periodic meetings at Cabinet level.

While the security relationships are likely to remain bilateral, there are nonsecurity problems that encompass all three of the triangular partners. These include trade, monetary and energy policy issues, for which there now exist few, if any, formal frameworks for the discussion and harmonization of policy.

With regard to both Western Europe and Japan the United States faces a series of security problems of fundamental importance. In neither case are the allies prepared to increase by much their contribution to the huge foreign exchange costs incurred by the United States, even though these costs have weighed heavily in the U.S. balance of payments deficit. However, neither Western Europe nor Japan wishes the United States to abandon its defense commitment. Both would like to continue to benefit from U.S. military protection without greatly increasing their payments for it. At the same time, the United States, while it has come to find onerous the burdens imposed on it by the existing security relationship, does not wish to end it abruptly, and even seeks to use it as a bargaining lever in economic relations with allies. The Europeans and Japanese, believing that the United States will not abandon them, conclude that they can preserve a U.S. guarantee without making major new commitments to their own defense.

VI

It is difficult, but nevertheless essential for the continued viability of the U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese security relationships, to find a way out of this vexing dilemma. Therefore, the goal of U.S. alliance policy should be to reaffirm the security commitment to European NATO members and Japan in return for reciprocal action. For example, Japan should be encouraged to assume a more equitable share of the Pacific defense burden. She could be asked to contribute to an "offset" fund to reduce U.S. expenses for basing and other costs created by the American military presence in the Pacific Basin. A Pacific Defense Fund could be created, with Japan as a major financial contributor, to lessen the burden upon the United States.

To sustain the Atlantic Alliance, the United States should be prepared to reaffirm its commitment to station forces at a specified level in Europe for a long period of time in return for reciprocal action by the Europeans to contribute to their own defense posture. For the Europeans, such a *quid pro quo* should provide for the modernization of members' military equipment and, under appropriate circumstances, collaboration between Britain and France in the strengthening of their nuclear forces.

By far the preponderance of the world's trade is conducted among the members of the U.S.-West European-Japanese triangle. While tariff and nontariff barriers remain, each of the partners has taken major steps toward the freeing of trade in the past decade or, in the case of Japan, in the early 1970's. The European Community, the United States and Japan should adopt as a general goal the eventual formation of a free trade area embracing the three most advanced power centers of the world. This would accord with the conception of a strengthened relationship among the three contained in Dr. Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech in New York on April 23, 1973. Western Europe represents a potentially more important market for Japanese exports, and the European Community could substantially increase its exports to Japan.

The problems of the monetary system highlight another issue area where common approaches by the United States, Western Europe and Japan are essential. A more equal partnership in this triangular relationship means, among other things, that the Japanese and Europeans can no longer expect the U.S. dollar to bear the burden of being the international reserve currency. It has become imperative to the economic well-being of all major industrial nations to create a new monetary system jointly financed by the advanced nations and leading to the elimination of national reserve currencies as principal sources of international liquidity. The periodic monetary crises that have perturbed the United States and its allies should be elevated from the speculation of international money markets to the level of long-term planning and cooperative consultation, particularly among the three leading Free World economic powers.

The energy problem is another common concern of the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Because each is heavily dependent on petroleum for its economic health and future growth, the basis exists for cooperative action designed to ensure equitable pricing, the development of new energy sources and refining facilities, and the resolution of disagreements between oil producing and oil consuming countries. This is not to suggest that oil consuming countries should form a counterpart to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose purpose is to strengthen the bargaining power of the producer states. The consumers must, however, take steps to minimize the prospects for competition among themselves for available petroleum. To that end they should consult with each other before establishing their respective national energy policies and developing policies toward the producing countries. Concerted action, jointly or separately as appropriate, is called for to ensure the creation of a cooperative, rather than a competitive, relationship among oil consuming countries, and between the producing and consuming states. Major oil consumers such as the United States, Western Europe and Japan might cooperate with producing countries in building oil refineries. The Japanese initiative in establishing an oil refinery in Indonesia, using capital from Kuwait, could be duplicated by producers and consumers on a multilateral basis.

In recent years the Soviet Union has embarked on a major effort to gain greater access to Western technology in order to modernize its economy. Illustrative of problem areas where outside assistance is actively sought are the development of Siberian oil and natural gas resources and the expansion of the Soviet consumer goods sector. Moreover, the hostile relationship between Moscow and Peking serves to heighten Soviet interest in Western technology as a means of strengthening the Soviet economy and allowing Moscow to expend technological resources on defense capabilities. In this situation it is in the interest of the United States, Western Europe and Japan to minimize the prospects of competitive bidding for contracts in the Soviet Union. In dealings with the USSR the industrialized countries should seek to evolve common guidelines for East-West trade designed to reduce Soviet opportunities to exploit their differences and achieve both short-term and long-term benefits.

Taken together, the United States, Western Europe and Japan provide the greatest potential for technological innovation. They have either produced, or benefited most extensively from, the signal advances in science and technology of the past generation. Each new advance affords the prospect of further technological innovation and opens exciting new prospects for solving many problems facing peoples around the world. Yet, the cost of exploiting the great potential inherent in all sectors of science and technology is becoming prohibitive even in the richest countries. The economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan, together with the need for all industrialized countries to continue to exploit technology, creates the basis for technological collaboration in the U.S.-Europe-Japan triangle. The United States and Western Europe possess vast resources of scientific-technological talent. Japan has accumulated large reserves of capital and could participate as an equal in a common effort by technologically advanced countries. Problems of supersonic transport and aerospace, the exploitation of the seabed, the more effective utilization and conservation of the world's fisheries, the development of urban and intercity transportation, and the creation of alternative sources of energy represent but a few of the areas of collaborative research and development where exciting technological breakthroughs could occur.

VII

The world of the 1970's and beyond is likely to be characterized by a broad range of relationships, some of a competitive and others of a collaborative nature. Although the possibility for competition in nonsecurity relationships exists among the United States, Western Europe and Japan, the need for cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world increases the urgency of updating and broadening the alliances of the past generation to a new form of partnership.

In the other triangle with the Soviet Union and China, the United States faces the need to broaden the range of issues on which Washington and Moscow, and Washington and Peking, can collaborate. The incentive for each communist power to engage in collaborative, rather than competitive, behavior will be enhanced as a result of the strength of the U.S.-West European-Japanese relationship. If the United States is to play a major role in creating a new structure for world peace, priority must now be given to the U.S.-West European-Japanese triangle. Herein lies the key to the evolution of a new relationship with both Moscow and Peking built on the diplomatic achievement of the early 1970's. At the very least, the U.S.-European-Japanese triangle rests upon a more durable and more broadly based set of interests and relationships than the U.S.-USSR-China triangle. In fact, the preservation of the U.S.-European-Japanese triangle is an essential prerequisite to the continued success of U.S. diplomacy with Moscow and Peking. Over time it could lead the Soviet Union and China to fuller participation in an international system in whose preservation all major powers have a stake.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL

by James E. Dougherty

THERE is always a temptation, in analyzing one specific aspect of a nation's policy, to treat it as if it were the central focus of policymakers' thought at all times. Undoubtedly Soviet leaders are quite interested in strategic arms limitations and other arms control negotiations (such as the talks directed toward MBFR — mutual and balanced force reductions). They have a variety of reasons for this, including economic implications, relationship to détente diplomacy, and above all, consequences for Soviet national security and the eventual outcome of the worldwide struggle between political-ideological systems in an era of "peaceful coexistence."

But it might be a mistake to think that Soviet leaders look upon arms control in the same light as do most Western arms control analysts — as a "good cause" in itself, a modest movement in the direction of decision-making rationality, a faint beacon of hope to mankind, a way of stepping back from the precipice, a mode of enhancing the safety of the international environment against the contingency of war until the convergence and synthesis of competing systems into something higher can render mutual deterrence obsolete, and so forth. If arms control now receives a high priority in Moscow, as it appears to, this is because it has become intricately enmeshed with other crucial policy problems, in particular the revision of the fundamental power equation between Soviet socialism and Western "capitalist-imperialism" and the manipulation of the global environment for purposes of controlling or at least significantly influencing the future behavior of the United States, China and Germany.

The Soviets, therefore, are more likely to pursue arms control for reasons of *Realpolitik* than of Enlightenment. No doubt there is a corresponding tendency in the West to clothe self-interest in glowing verbal raiment in order to make it appear much nobler than it really is. But one of the weaknesses to which Western intellectuals have become heir in recent decades is reflected in their disposition to be much harsher in criticizing the policies of Western governments than those of the Soviet Union. We are, of course, under a strong moral injunction (which we should never forget) to worry more about the beam in our own eye than the mote in others'. If that injunction is to be applicable to politics, as it ought to be, the striving should be to make it apply universally, and not only in the one region of the world most culturally and ethically disposed to take it seriously. One has reason to believe that Soviet propagandists learned long ago how to exploit to their unilateral advantage the self-recriminating propensities of Western societies' intelligentsia, while strictly limiting the freedom of their own intelligentsia to engage in politically meaningful criticism of Kremlin policies. (Even in late 1973, it is certain that the deeply moving condemnations of the Soviet system made by Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn and Amalrik have been circulated much more widely in Europe and the United States than inside the Soviet Union itself.) The cause of moral political truth is not well served by placing such emphasis on the internal deficiencies and corruptions of the democratic process that the totalitarians, in comparison, seem almost paragons of virtue and integrity.

We often attribute too much subtlety of mind and refinement of feeling to the men in the Kremlin, and too much loftiness of motivation, as if they were a group of Harvard professors who had expatriated themselves from the banks of the Charles in order to implement their utopian dreams for mankind. We should never lose sight of the unlovely methods by which most of the present generation of Soviet leaders came to the top.[1] Nor should we ignore the important fact that, despite all of its remarkable achievements in the realms of science, technology and socioeconomic development, the Soviet system, politically speaking, is still the most backward in the entire industrialized world. As Anatole Shub pointed out following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a half century after the Bolshevik Revolution there has been an almost complete atrophy of any political sense among the Soviet masses.[2] This is a fact of considerable significance for a discussion of arms control, for it means among other things that when Soviet leaders engage in arms negotiations with the United States they are not under comparable domestic political pressures to "reorder national priorities," reduce national commitments abroad, or curtail the influence of "the military-industrial complex" (even though such a complex does exist in the

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[1] Robert Conquest, "Stalin's Successors," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1970, pp. 509-524.

[2] Anatole Shub, "Lessons of Czechoslovakia," *ibid.*, January 1969, p. 271.

USSR — characterized by at least as much of a "vested interest" mentality and a good deal less reconversion flexibility).

The foregoing introductory remarks are not intended to imply that there is anything uniquely sinister or evil about Soviet leaders. Rather the point is to keep in mind those persisting behavioral patterns the study of political anthropology reveals to us — patterns that change at a glacially slow pace. One is sometimes compelled to admire the manner in which Soviet communist leaders, now in their sixth decade of rule, have managed to maintain considerable continuity in pursuit of their national interest and their ideological objectives within a changing international environment. They probably have difficulty trying to keep up with the never-ending stream of theories, hypotheses and interpretations that pours out of the typewriters and dictaphones of Western intellectuals, anxious to explain what is really happening in the international system. Indeed, Soviet leaders must be amazed at times by the fertile creativity of Western "explainers," who are bound by no requirement to be logically consistent with each other, or even internally consistent with themselves over time, for that matter. Yet the men in the Kremlin must strive to keep abreast of the great variety of the pluralist West's efforts to verbalize international political reality, simply to know which themes are worth attending to and using for their own purposes.

Although the Soviets are supposed to be "revolutionary" and the West "status quo" in global outlook, there must be moments of inward honesty when Soviet leaders see Western culture as being much better able to thrive on innovation than their own. At times they convey the impression of being a bit confused by the pace of international change, and of wanting to slow it down the better to understand it in terms of their peculiar brand of Marxist scholasticism. In the image trenchantly depicted by Isaiah Berlin, they prefer to emulate the hedgehog rather than the fox.[3] Occasionally they cannot help wondering, with a sly half-smile, whether the world of politics with its surprisingly persisting basic configurations really undergoes profound transformations as rapidly as Western intellectuals are prone to think.

In reflecting on the Soviet approach to the armaments problem, therefore, we should attempt to put the matter in some historical-conceptual perspective instead of relying upon apparently significant semantic shifts in the latest speech or communiqué issuing like an infallible pronouncement from the Third Rome. That we should proceed in this way is perfectly in keeping with the spirit which constantly infused the teaching and scholarship of the man in whose honor these essays are written — Robert Strausz-Hupé.

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[3] Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York: New American Library, 1957). Berlin begins his classic treatise by quoting (at page 7) the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."

LENIN ON DISARMAMENT

Lenin's thinking on disarmament, as Walter Clemens has shown, exhibits two fairly well-defined stages.[4] During the period of revolutionary activism from 1905 to 1917 and even later, Lenin condemned disarmament and pacifism as sentimental bourgeois dreams. Convinced that significant social change results only from violent revolution and that genuine peace cannot be achieved until the classless society has been established, he opposed disarmament negotiations because they fostered illusions harmful to the revolutionary mentality. He held explicitly that the objective of communism should be not international disarmament but the arming of the proletariat for the purpose of disarming and defeating the bourgeoisie.[5] But when Lenin came to power, he inherited certain continuities from Tsarist foreign policy, including the notion that disarmament talks might be pragmatically useful as a means of strengthening peace sentiments and revolutionary movements in the West, while buying time for a technologically inferior Soviet Union and simultaneously showing up the contradictions in Western society.[6]

The second approach was most strikingly manifested after Lenin's death, when in 1928 Maxim Litvinov startled delegates to the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference by proposing the abolition of all national military establishments within a period of one year. Meeting in Moscow that same year, the Sixth Congress of the Communist International sought with the following declaration to reassure the faithful that there was no serious contradiction between what Lenin had taught and what the Soviet government was proposing:

> The aim of the Soviet proposals was not to spread pacifist illusions but to destroy them. . . . Disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only

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[4] Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Nicholas II to SALT II: Continuity and Change in East-West Diplomacy," *International Affairs* (London), July 1973, p. 399. See also his "Ideology in Soviet Disarmament Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* March 1964, pp. 9-10, and "Lenin on Disarmament," *Slavic Review,* September 1964, pp. 504-525.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia,* second edition, 30 vols. (Moscow, 1926-1932), Vol. 8, pp. 395-397.

[6] Clemens, "Nicholas II to SALT II . . . ," *op. cit.,* pp. 393 and 399.

> with the fall of capitalism. . . . It goes without saying that not a single Communist thought for a moment that the imperialist world would accept the Communist proposals.[7]

By sustaining their call for universal and complete disarmament throughout most of the League period, the Soviets demonstrated their contempt for bourgeois diplomacy and advertised their own radically new approaches to the problems of the world, just as they had by publishing all the documents in the files of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry on the secret wartime agreements among the allies. (Not all secrecy is bad, of course, only that practiced by Western imperialist governments. Communist official secrecy is as morally good as it is extensive.)

The disarmament theme may also have been designed as a defense mechanism, first against the feared contingency that the capitalist nations might be tempted to unite and repeat their ill-fated 1918 expedition with the hope of crushing the still weak citadel of Bolshevism, and later against the growing military menace of German fascism. But on at least two scores Soviet interwar policy turned out to be inconsistent and counterproductive. In the early 1920's the two pariahs of the international diplomatic community, the Soviet Union and Germany, entered into collusion at Genoa and Rapallo, and for a while the Soviet military actively helped the German military to evade the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty.[8] Furthermore, the communists' propaganda for peace and disarmament in the 1930's produced nonsymmetrical effects in the democratic and fascist countries, contributing toward a delay in timely defense responses by the former to the belligerent behavior of the latter. In any event, it can be said that Soviet policy attitudes on disarmament for the last half century have reflected a fundamental dichotomy and have oscillated dynamically between its two poles — on the one hand, a deep-rooted ideological skepticism about disarmament and on the other, an awareness, clearer at some times than at others, that the conduct of disarmament and arms limitation negotiations can be a useful tactical instrument to serve both the national interest of the Soviet Union and the cause of the international revolutionary struggle.

[7] Quoted in Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 72.

[8] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 201, and *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 40-42.

THE STALIN ERA

Diplomatic developments in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II, Hitler's betrayal in 1941 of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact, and certain perceived or imagined aspects of the wartime behavior of his Anglo-American allies (including the delay in opening the second front, Churchill's suggestion concerning an invasion through the Balkans, the support given to the Polish government-in-exile, and indications, more suspected than real, that Britain and the United States might make a separate peace with Germany) all undoubtedly helped to confirm Stalin in his conviction that a basic, sinister duplicity pervades Western diplomatic dealings with communist governments. After the war, Stalin displayed no serious interest whatsoever in disarmament negotiations with the West, not even for purposes of stalling the formation of the Atlantic military alliance. The Red Army was occupying the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, and that was perhaps sufficient reason for him to be indifferent to disarmament talks.

Furthermore, at the United Nations the United States was pressing for acceptance of the Baruch Plan for a veto-free International Atomic Development Authority that would exercise monopoly control over every aspect of atomic energy activities throughout the world.[9] At that time some Western observers were puzzled by Moscow's refusal to accept an offer which apparently would have removed from unilateral U.S. control a significant strategic advantage in nuclear weapons technology. Today, in retrospect, it is easier to realize that in the Soviet view the proposed IADA would have been established exclusively on U.S. terms, in virtue of the then existing American monopoly of scientific-technological expertise, and that the "real purpose" of the Baruch Plan was to infringe upon the sovereign national rights of the USSR by establishing international capitalist control over a segment of its industry, all with the aim of preventing a communist government from achieving independent ownership of nuclear weapons.[10]

If in those years Stalin felt that his country had become strategically vulnerable because of the vast military-technological chasm that had suddenly opened between itself and the West, he did not show it either in his policy actions or in his writings. He moved with self-confidence to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe, even by testing the West's resolve in such critical areas as Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia and Berlin, and by directing Western communist parties to do what they could to sabotage West European efforts toward Marshall Plan economic recovery as well as the construction of defenses within the NATO framework. While no doubt anxiously awaiting the day when the USSR would acquire its own fission weapons, Stalin as military doctrinaire went out of his way to stress the traditional "factors of war" and to deemphasize the importance of atomic bombs, which communist propagandists everywhere demanded must be banned by declaratory policy, without inspection or controls.[11] The U.S. response to North Korean aggression may have given Stalin a few worrisome moments, but on the whole he did not bat an eyelash in the measured application of his "protracted conflict" strategy, which prescribed the constant exertion of pressure against the West in indirect and carefully managed ways, short of provocation of a war involving the USSR.[12]

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[9] For the text of the U.S. Plan, see *Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959* (Washington: GPO, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 7-16.

[10] Joseph L. Nogee, *Soviet Policy Toward International Control of Atomic Energy* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 233.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

The acquisition of significant nuclear capabilities by the Soviet Union coincided with Khrushchev's rise to leadership. During the mid-1950's while the Soviet top echelon was still sorting itself out in the void left by Stalin's death, Moscow's overriding concern appeared to be with Germany, which was just then being brought into NATO. The Soviets attempted to head off the military interlocking of the Federal Republic with the Western alliance by resorting to several different approaches: (1) the exemplary neutralization of Austria through the State Treaty of 1955; (2) the offer to accept the Western disarmament proposal on May 10, 1955, which led the United States to reserve its previous positions; (3) the offer made at the Geneva summit meeting in July 1955 to bring about the reunification of Germany; and (4) the *démarches* made by Polish leaders Rapacki and Gomulka (certainly authorized if not initiated by Moscow) looking toward the creation of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe. Here we are interested only in the second and the fourth.

The United States has often been accused of missing a momentous opportunity in May 1955 by retreating from disarmament as a policy goal just as the post-Stalin leadership of the USSR appeared ready to subscribe to the Western proposals.[13] Actually, the Soviet *démarche* was a shrewd tactical maneuver designed to place the United States in an awkward position on two counts. First, the Soviet offer called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany — a requirement which, if accepted, would have completely dismantled the West's "forward strategy" defense in Europe. Nations simply cannot reverse gears in that fashion, and the Soviets knew it.[14] Second, the Soviet proposal, in a passage of rare candor, contained an acknowledgment that the production of fissionable materials had already reached such proportions as to render impossible foolproof international controls against the danger of nuclear weapons stockpiles being accumulated clandestinely in violation of a disarmament treaty.

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[11] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 5-9.

[12] Robert Strausz-Hupé *et al.*, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper, 1959), Chapter 4.

It is theoretically possible, of course, that the collective leadership which temporarily succeeded Stalin was sufficiently naive in the ways of international politics to deem the stakes represented by Germany worth a bold and serious disarmament gamble. But in retrospect this does not appear the likely explanation. There is better reason to think that, as Soviet planners assessed the situation, the United States, accustomed ever since the days of the Baruch Plan to the oft-repeated Soviet *nyet,* had failed to do its technical homework in the light of changing conditions, and thus would be caught short by an unexpected *da* which Washington during the first Eisenhower-Dulles term was not psychologically prepared to accept.[15] At the least the subsequent behavior of the Soviets in respect to armaments and arms negotiations leads to the conclusion that during those years they were rather cynical about disarmament except on terms so patently disadvantageous to the West that they could not have seriously entertained the notion of Western acceptance.

The same judgment can be made about East European communist proposals for the denuclearization of Central Europe. These were a natural follow-on to the intensive debate of the mid-

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[13] See, e.g., Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), p. 9.

[14] See James Richardson, *Germany and the Western Alliance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), Chapter 2; John Lukacs, *A New History of the Cold War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 123-128.

[15] See Soviet Proposal in the Disarmament Subcommittee, May 10, 1955, in *Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 465; and Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 314-315.

1950's over "disengagement" and "demilitarization" in a period when political talk about change proved to be, as it often does, a partly frustrating but mostly satisfying substitute for actual change. Ulbricht's East German regime had been rendered nervous by every suggestion involving withdrawal of the Soviet troops who served it as a guarantee against popular upheaval. Thus it made strategic sense for the Eastern bloc (and no one doubted then that it was a bloc) to proffer zonal arms limitation plans which would affect nuclear armaments only, especially since it was widely recognized that NATO's commitment to a nuclear strategy of deterrence and defense made it possible for the United States to subscribe to a plan for a nuclear-free zone encompassing Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Given the geostrategic realities of the European situation, including Soviet conventional reinforcement capabilities and the West's lack of defensive depth, the NATO allies were bent upon building rather than dismantling or freezing nuclear forces in Europe and were unable to consider either the Rapacki Plan or the Gomulka Proposal as offering anything approaching symmetrical security consequences for East and West.[16]

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

In 1959, when Premier Khrushchev visited the United Nations, he revived the old Litvinov motif of general and complete disarmament (GCD).[17] From the standpoint of political propaganda, this ploy proved more effective in the nuclear age than it had during the days of the League. In a tense world exhausted by living with the specter of nuclear war, Khrushchev's proposal was immediately attractive to public opinion, particularly since it sidestepped the economic, technical, strategic and political obstacles in the way of GCD and made the whole thing look like a simple affair — requiring nothing but good will on the part of all concerned. The Western powers lacked a sufficient sense of political humor to laugh the simplistic Soviet proposal out of the international negotiating forum. Instead, they felt obliged to come up with their own more responsible counterproposals in March 1960, and again in September 1961, which emphasized as a prerequisite or concomitant of complete disarmament the building of international institutions capable of keeping the peace and safeguarding the security and rights of disarmed national societies.[18]

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[16] Cf. James E. Dougherty, "Zonal Arms Limitations in Europe," ORBIS, Fall 1963.

[17] *Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 1454-1474.

This is not the place to analyze in depth the problems inherent in the concept of general and complete disarmament.[19] Nor would it be fair to suggest in what follows that the failure of grandiose disarmament planning during the last fifteen years has been attributable primarily to the intransigence of Soviet diplomacy. The truth is, although disarmament has become a persistent rhetorical theme in the foreign policies of many nations in the twentieth century, none of the nuclear-armed states has acted consistently as if it regards total disarmament as a high priority goal, or as the best available means of achieving national security. Regardless of what their spokesmen may declare from the rostrums of international diplomatic gatherings, not one of them can say with convincing evidence that its dominant decision-making elites have ever viewed general disarmament as a feasible policy goal in the presently evolving stage of the international nation-state system. Nevertheless, since this article deals exclusively with the Soviet Union, it is not inappropriate to review briefly how Soviet policymakers probably look upon total disarmament in the nuclear age.

First, what about the economics of disarmament? The Soviets, after all, are still Marxists, and Marxists assume that "Western capitalists" are motivated in their behavior chiefly by economic considerations. In their view, the capitalists' desire for the profits accruing from the "arms race," the fear within the West that substantial disarmament may bring recessive or depressive effects upon economic growth, and the entrenched interests of the Pentagon and the "military-industrial complex," all serve to make Western governments drag their feet on disarmament. The publication of several U.S. and UN studies suggesting that the economic consequences of disarmament, although not negligible, are nonetheless manageable, have done little to disturb the ideological biases of Soviet policymakers on this score. No doubt some are sophisticated enough to realize and to admit to themselves that much more than economics is at the root of the world's disarmament impasse. They may also suspect that, if disarmament were to come, the American "military-industrial complex" might prove much more flexible than their own in adjusting to the new environment. But all of these speculations are slightly irrelevant, since disarmament is not really expected. The traditional Marxist interpretation, in its modern format as a "neo-devil theory of war," serves a highly useful purpose, however, in the political propaganda effort to keep Western intellectuals and students suspicious of or, better still, hostile to their governments' defense policies.

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[18] *Documents on Disarmament 1960* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 68-71; and *Documents on Disarmament 1961*, pp. 475-496. (Hereafter reference will be made simply to the annual volumes in this series.)

[19] The author has frequently performed this analysis elsewhere, most recently in *How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: Crane and Russak, 1973), Chapter 8.

Going beyond economics, what should be said concerning the controversial issue of inspection or verification as part of a disarmament agreement? During the late 1950's and early 1960's, when discussion of GCD was at its peak, a good deal was written about the confrontation of the "open society" and the "closed society." The West frequently accused the Soviets of wanting "disarmament without controls," to which the Soviets retorted that the West sought "controls without disarmament" in order to legalize espionage in the USSR under the guise of "international inspection." The Soviets professed a willingness to permit "inspection of disarmament" – i.e., international or adversary observation of the weapons dismantling process. The Western powers insisted that this would not be sufficient; fuller access to the territory of the signatory parties would be needed to guarantee that while a disarmament agreement was being complied with in one place it was not being violated elsewhere. At that point the Soviets would declare that the West wanted to inspect not only disarmament but armaments as well, no doubt for the purpose of acquiring military intelligence to plan a surprise attack.

To a certain extent, the Soviet position was understandable, given the Russians' historic phobia of outside prying (reflected in their neurotic reaction to the U-2 incident of May 1960). No doubt the Kremlin dictatorship's aversion to Western inspection proposals can also be traced to apprehensions lest granting freedom of access and movement to international teams might gradually lead to the erosion of social controls and carefully planned communications patterns within the USSR. In April 1963, Khrushchev went to the brink, as it were, and flirted with the idea of accepting a maximum of two or three on-site inspections annually under a comprehensive test ban treaty, but that was at a time when many U.S. Senators were known to entertain serious reservations about the adequacy of the current American proposal in which the minimum annual number of on-site inspections had been reduced from twenty to twelve and finally to seven.[20] From the early 1960's onward, Western analysts who assumed that the Soviets were sincere in their desire for disarmament, but were prevented from reaching agreements with the West largely because of the inspection issue and their emotional xenophobia, began to turn their attention to the task of devising "non-intrusive" verification systems. Khrushchev's overture, whether a serious offer or a tactical gambit of the moment, was an aberration in the general stream of Soviet policy. Since 1963, Moscow has been adamant in its refusal to countenance any international inspection of arms agreements, and has insisted that purely national means of verification be relied upon to monitor whatever agreements can be reached.

One is compelled to take exception, however, to the view that the inspection issue was the real stumbling block to disarmament. Just as the Marxists exaggerated the importance of economic factors, so the West exaggerated East-West differences over verification safeguards as stumbling blocks to progress in the disarmament sector. Economics and safeguards are both important. But strategic and political factors have been the crucial determinants. The basic strategic fact is that for the nuclear-weapons states, and no doubt for many others as well, the strong preference is to pursue national security and foreign policy objectives through the maintenance of deterrence and defensive capabilities rather than through negotiated international disarmament. For more than a decade, strategic analysts and policymakers throughout the world have been asking to what extent strategic armaments can be reduced before the condition of international military stability known as "mutual deterrence" is corroded to the point of ineffectiveness. Several writers warned long ago that there is probably a level below which it becomes unwise to reduce nuclear forces, inasmuch as this could make the "unthinkable" once again "thinkable" and generate renascent incentives for surprise attack, based on the expectation of achieving a decisive advantage.[21]

As early as 1962, the Soviets demonstrated their awareness of this central strategic problem, as well as their sensitivity to the part it played in American thinking. At the Geneva disarmament negotiations, instead of continuing their earlier calls for the elimination of all intercontinental missiles in the first stage of a three-stage disarmament process, they tabled a revised draft treaty providing for "an agreed and strictly limited number" of missiles to be retained by the two superpowers "exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage."[22] One year later, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced that the USSR was willing to extend the concept of the "nuclear umbrella" as a guarantee against surprise attack until the end of the third stage.[23] These Soviet offers were hailed by some in the West as remarkable concessions to Western misgivings, and thus as a significant breakthrough in the negotiations. Yet the Soviets could not have been so naive as to suppose that the United States would accept a proposal for a minimum deterrent of unspecified proportions, based entirely on land (after the dismantling of all U.S. submarine-launched missiles and the liquidation of the U.S. military presence in Europe in Stage I) — a proposal which did not solve the problem of hidden nuclear stockpiles that might remain as an undetectable real source of danger and threat after the "nuclear umbrella" had been destroyed.[24]

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[20] Cf. Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, *Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 447-449.

[21] Cf. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 235-236; Henry A. Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, pp. 559-561; and Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 97-103.

Gromyko's generous proposal for a nuclear umbrella was seriously deficient in one other respect. Conceived entirely within the context of negotiations between the two superpowers, it ignored the interests and wishes of the other states then possessing nuclear weapons — Britain and France. Perhaps the Soviets thought the United States would be able to persuade its two European allies to give up their deterrent forces in Stage I, but since they knew de Gaulle, this is a highly dubious supposition. In any case, everyone expected the Chinese soon to enter the ranks of the *beati possedentes* (as they did in October 1964), and no one thought the Soviets could persuade Peking to repose its trust in the twin umbrellas of the superpowers until the completion of the disarmament process. When one looks back on that period of the early 1960's, he can only be amazed that governments could have gone through the charade of pretending to negotiate GCD with such straight faces. Perhaps they did have a sense of humor after all.

There is good reason to think that even then, before the emergence of China as a nuclear power, the Kremlin leaders were happy with the condition of mutual deterrence, and were not ready to trade it for a radically transformed international environment of disarmed states, with all the latter's attendant uncertainties, unfamiliarities and unpredictability. Russian elites had historically suffered from a sense of scientific, technological and military inferiority vis-à-vis the West. But with the acquisition first of nuclear weapons and then of missile delivery systems, the Soviets had begun to experience an abiding sense of self-confidence. The capitalists could no longer reverse the Bolshevik Revolution by force. Soon the socialist bloc, which had been cautiously bold in a defensive position, would be able to break out and assume a global initiative, as "capitalist encirclement" gave way to "socialist encirclement."

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[22] *Documents on Disarmament 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 916-917.

[23] *Documents on Disarmament 1963*, pp. 515-516.

[24] See the author's "The Status of the Arms Negotiations," ORBIS, Spring 1965, pp. 62-65.

Just when Soviet leaders became convinced that the moment of greatest danger had passed is difficult to say. Oddly perhaps, they often appeared to be more fearful of a nonnuclear Germany than of a nuclear United States. Much of their pathological suspicion of NATO was traceable to the fact that Germany was in the alliance, and to the theoretical possibility that the Germans might some day drag NATO into their revanchist war against the USSR, or that the United States might give nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic. (Both the degree of influence Germany exerted over NATO and U.S. strategy and the desire of the United States to arm the Germans with nuclear weapons were greatly exaggerated in Moscow.) In any event, despite all their post-Sputnik boasting about powerful ICBM's (which helped to bring on the "missile gap" fallacy of the 1960 election campaign in this country), Soviet leaders assigned top priority in those days to the production and deployment of MR-IRBM's that were targetable on Western Europe's cities.

By bringing Western Europe "under the gun," as it were, they managed successfully to deter both Germany and the United States.[25] But they knew that they would soon be able to deploy ICBM's in substantial numbers, carrying awesomely large warheads, and this enabled them to feel that before long they would be on a par with the West so far as their ability to deter was concerned. Henceforth, no country could attack the Soviet Union with impunity. Such a thought filled them with an unprecedented sense of security. It is doubtful whether any group of leaders in that historical situation could have seriously entertained the idea of general disarmament as a desirable policy goal at a time so precarious with danger (as the nuclear powers approached parity) and pregnant with promise. The crowning achievement would be the Soviet Union's emergence on the world stage as a full-fledged superpower, invested with growing prestige, increasing global mobility, and the ability to cast its protective mantle over not only the socialist states of Eastern Europe but also client states in the Caribbean, the Middle East and southern Asia.

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[25] We should not forget that when many writers in this country were asking glibly whether Washington would risk missiles on American cities in retaliation for the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in Western Europe, the Soviets were targeting European, not American, cities.

At no time during the period of GCD negotiations did Soviet leaders and theoreticians give evidence that they had carefully thought through and accepted the long-range political consequences of a disarmed world. The more U.S. analysts pondered the implications, the less enthusiastic they became,[26] but at least people in the U.S. government had been made vaguely aware that GCD would entail radical changes in the international system, whereas published Soviet writings of the time do not reflect an understanding that total safeguarded disarmament would necessitate profound changes in Soviet foreign policy and methods of domestic rule.[27] Certainly there was no thought of strengthening the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, which had long been regarded by Soviet Marxists as a product of Western bourgeois liberal idealism. Khrushchev was under no illusions as to the deep differences existing between communist and Western conceptions of the basis on which the future world order was to be organized. When he blueprinted the future at the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1961, he scarcely mentioned the United Nations. In that same year he declared: "Even if all the countries of the world adopted a decision which did not accord with the interests of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would not recognize such a decision and would uphold its rights, relying on force."[28] This was no different from Gaullism, or from good old-fashioned Yankee chauvinism, but there is no doubt that Khrushchev meant what he said, and what he said cannot logically be squared with the espousal of GCD in a well-ordered world ruled by majority principle rather than totalitarian fiat. The opposition of the Soviets to the creation of international military forces for peacekeeping operations increased markedly after the UN intervention in the Congo.

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[26] Cf., e.g., Arnold Wolfers *et al., The United States in a Disarmed World* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Arms Control and World Government," *World Politics,* July 1962, especially p. 643.

[27] See Richard J. Barnet, "The Soviet Attitude on Disarmament," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1961, p. 37; Arthur I. Waskow, "Alternative Models of a Disarmed World," *Disarmament and Arms Control,* Winter 1963/1964, p. 63; and Joseph I. Coffey, "The Soviet View of a Disarmed World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* March 1964.

[28] *New York Times,* July 12, 1961.

The reader may ask why the Soviets have pressed so long and so eloquently for general disarmament if they regard it as neither feasible nor desirable under existing conditions. The question is a fair one and could as well be addressed to other powers, such as the United States and China, which likewise do what they do and say what they say for their own reasons. By continuing to call for total disarmament the Soviets contribute to the self-fulfilling dialectic. They help to create a "world public opinion" that can be expected to have a greater impact on decision-making processes in Western than in communist countries. The campaign for nuclear and for complete disarmament helps to promote the development of an organized peace movement within the West, and makes growing numbers of democratic citizens skeptical of the wisdom and cost of defense policies.

GCD is probably not the primary cause, but it fosters a climate in which Western scientists are made to feel ill at ease over working on weapons programs, and in which university students question military service, conscription, ROTC programs and on-campus recruitment by defense-related industries. (The process of alienation, of course, develops at a particularly rapid pace during a period of protracted, foreign and ambiguous conflict such as the Viet Nam war.) A psychosocial chasm opens up between the "peaceful" pursuits of universities and the "warlike" policies of Western governments. Western political institutions are set to working at cross purposes in preserving an adequate defense posture while simultaneously pursuing approaches to disarmament — a paradoxical process further confusing the public. Western statesmen become reluctant to pursue foreign policy objectives that would jeopardize the climate of détente and give rise to widespread dismay over the prospects for disarmament. Even the conduct of negotiations produces within the Western alliance a certain dichotomy between the objectives of managing defense and managing détente, and this causes diplomatic problems that might not arise in a less ambiguous context.

All of the foregoing results are reckoned by the Soviets as tangible gains, no matter that in some instances they may be only marginal and readily compensated for by additional efforts on the part of Western governments. In the Soviet perspective of how the dialectic operates, and in view of political asymmetries between the communist states and the Western democracies, the manipulation of the world political climate by way of disarmament propaganda enables the Soviets to exert more influence on the strategic responses of an economically and technologically superior West than vice versa. With a small expenditure of material resources and a great output of words, they receive a substantial return on their investment, and it is difficult to see how the campaign for GCD has yet had much influencing or inhibiting effect upon their own behavior.[29]

KHRUSHCHEV'S SHIFT TO ARMS CONTROL

All this having been said, it should now be pointed out that the Soviet Union is no more anxious than any other nuclear-weapon state to end up either in an unbridled arms race or in nuclear war. Undoubtedly Soviet leaders want for their country the most secure international environment that can possibly be nurtured. In light of their World War II experience, they have even better reason than the United States to be deterrence-minded and defense-minded. Even though their declaratory zeal for GCD must give rise to serious doubts in the West, their interest in certain modes of arms control seems genuine and cannot be dismissed.

Initially the Soviets were hostile to the "arms control" concept, which they branded as a capitalist deception designed to distract attention from disarmament negotiations and convey an impression that the world could be made safe despite the continued existence of nuclear weapons forces.[30] During the late 1950's and early 1960's, Soviet positions, unsurprisingly, were not always consistent. At one time Andrei Gromyko condemned U.S. policies under which atomic war might result from the slightest mistake on the part of an American military technician.[31] A few years later, a Soviet commentator went out of his way to ridicule the theory of accidental war advanced by American writers. Arguing from Marxist premises, he denied that the most cataclysmic event in human history might occur purely by chance rather than as the result of the interplay of titanic social forces, notably the aggressive policies of capitalist imperialism for which the notion of accidental war was merely a cloak.[32]

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[29] See James E. Dougherty, "Soviet Disarmament Policy: Illusion and Reality," in Eleanor L. Dulles and Robert D. Crane, *Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 138-178.

[30] Prior to 1962, they scarcely ever used the term "arms control." Cf. Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 7; H. S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré and Thomas W. Wolfe, Introduction to the English translation of *Soviet Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 77; Yuri Sheimin, "A Soviet Scientist Looks at Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1964.

[31] *New York Times*, July 19, 1958.

But in the contest between political pragmatism and ideological rigor, pragmatism gradually came into its own. Particularly in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet policymakers became more willing to enter into partial arms control measures designed to dampen international tensions and the dangers of war, provided that they could plausibly be said to help prepare the way for general disarmament. In the same period they began to display increased interest in American writings about such unilateral arms control notions as invulnerable, nonprovocative strategic weapons systems and improved command, control and communications procedures calculated to minimize the risks of accidental war, unauthorized or precipitate use of nuclear weapons, human psychic failure, misinterpretation of warning signals, and uncontrollable escalation from conventional to nuclear war.

The change in the Soviet attitude was brought about during the last few years of Khrushchev's leadership. Even before reaping the bitter fruits of his "missile adventurism" in Cuba, the Soviet Premier had ingratiated himself with some Western arms controllers by withdrawing technical assistance from the Chinese nuclear weapons program in 1959 — an action sometimes cited in the West as the watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. Moreover, Khrushchev accepted the McCloy-Zorin Agreement of September 1961 whereby both superpowers subscribed to the principle that disarmament should be balanced and should not place either side at a military disadvantage. After periodically heating up the Berlin crisis between 1958 and 1962, and after carrying out a series of large warhead tests in 1961 — tests in the range of fifty megatons — the Soviet Union signed a partial nuclear test ban treaty in the summer of 1963. By excluding underground testing from prohibitions, the negotiators of the treaty circumvented the odious issue of international inspection on Soviet territory. In that same summer, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a Moscow-Washington "hot line" to facilitate communications during times of crisis. Within a year, despite the inability of the two powers to negotiate a formal agreement to cut their military budgets, each side announced a modest reduction in defense expenditures according to the concept of what Western writers called "reciprocal unilateral measures" of a "confidence-building nature," and what the Soviets described as "mutual example." This trend was reversed in 1965 when the Viet Nam war expanded.

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[32] V. Berezhkov, "The 'Automobile Accident' Theory of War," *New Times* (Moscow), April 18, 1962.

Generally speaking, Khrushchev has been treated rather kindly by Western arms control analysts – in spite of Hungary, Berlin, the fifty-megaton tests and Cuba. They have preferred to stress his better side, and to excuse his deficiencies. He did, after all, concede that wars are no longer inevitable (except just wars of national liberation); that a thermonuclear war between the socialist and capitalist camps would destroy not merely capitalism but both systems; that the Western economy was not entirely made up of plotting imperialist aggressors but might even contain within its ranks "men of reason."[33] He often distinguished between sober-minded and militaristic forces within U.S. ruling circles and, citing Lenin for precedent, stressed the importance of cooperating with prudent "representatives of the bourgeois camp who gravitate toward pacifism."[34]

Compared with his predecessor and many of his contemporaries, he seems to have been somewhat more oriented toward the production of consumer goods in determining the allocation of resources. Realizing, notwithstanding his boastful oratory in the early 1960's, that the Soviet economy was showing a declining growth rate, he may have been genuinely interested in developing a détente with the West so that he would be in a better position to achieve at least a slight reduction of the military budget.[35] Up to a point, the growing antagonism of China, which branded Khrushchev and his fellow revisionists as "betrayers" and "deceivers" for signing a test ban treaty with the head of world imperialism, may have helped to reinforce his interest in seeking further rapprochement with the West. But the dialectical process is harsh, and seldom treats anyone kindly – not even good Marxists. Perhaps as the China threat loomed larger in Soviet eyes, Khrushchev's efforts to reallocate resources (if that really is what he was trying to do) may have become intolerable to the military. It is ironic that

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[33] Alexander Dallin and others, *The Soviet Union, Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1964), pp. 117-118.

[34] *Pravda,* April 23, 1960, as quoted in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

[35] Bloomfield *et al., op. cit.,* Chapter 17.

Khrushchev's fall from power occurred in the same week as China's first successful test of a nuclear weapon.[36]

ARMS CONTROL IN THE KOSYGIN-BREZHNEV ERA

During the two years following Khrushchev's ouster the Soviets made no significant movement on the arms control front, although they carried on negotiations for two agreements with the United States — one relatively easy to reach, and one quite difficult. Under the easier one, the Outer Space Treaty, finally signed in January 1967, the two superpowers formalized their earlier tacit understanding that they saw no point in placing mass destruction weapons either in orbit or on the moon. Perhaps the new Soviet leadership, while groping its way toward self-confidence, perceived that no particular harm could come to national security by entering such a self-denying ordinance — a "cosmetic agreement," some skeptics called it, designed by U.S. arms controllers to create in the eyes of the world a spurious impression of "forward momentum" in the arms control field when there really was none. (This is not to suggest that the Outer Space Treaty is unimportant; even though it deals with a rather esoteric environment, its limiting provisions may take on added significance with the passage of time.)

The more difficult negotiation pertained to the Nonproliferation Treaty. By the early 1960's the Soviets generally recognized that the global proliferation of national nuclear forces was not in their interest. They had pulled back from helping China to acquire nuclear weapons just as the United States was warming up to the debate with France over the utility and dangers of the *force de frappe,* although both Washington and Moscow probably perceived the futility of trying to do anything to prevent Paris and Peking from achieving their avowed goals. But the real problem — as U.S. arms controllers kept urging these others to see — was to prevent the diffusion of independent centers of nuclear capability beyond the five governments already allocated a privileged veto position in the United Nations Security Council. Without immediately grasping all of the subtle theoretical arguments American anti-proliferators were able to concert in support of their position, the Soviets comprehended the main point — they stood to gain little, and perhaps to lose much, by diluting the currency of nuclear-power prestige. Nevertheless, they were determined to take advantage of the nonproliferation negotiations to achieve unilateral political objectives in addition to mutual arms control interest.[37]

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[36] Cf. Peter B. Reddaway, "The Fall of Khrushchev — A Tentative Analysis," in Sidney I. Ploss, editor, *The Soviet Political Process* (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Company, 1971), pp. 241-264. (Reprinted from *Survey,* July 1965.)

Among these additional objectives, the following are worth mentioning: (1) generating a certain amount of divisiveness within NATO by introducing into the NPT negotiations issues which impinged on the interests of America's European allies, but which were made to look as if they would be settled by superpower compromise; (2) forcing the United States and NATO to draw back from the plans of the early 1960's to strengthen the alliance through increased "nuclear sharing" – e.g., in the projected multilateral force (MLF); (3) "educating" the United States and Europe (East and West) to the dangers of German revanchism – an evil possibility the Soviets deliberately exaggerated in the mid-1960's, perhaps with a view to securing the sort of defensive compensatory reaction they later got in the *Ostpolitik*; and (4) using the NPT bargaining process as a forum to enhance the diplomatic respectability of the German Democratic Republic.

No doubt the Soviets would also have liked to exploit the NPT talks to score political points with the Third World, but in this sector their diplomatic spin-off was somewhat less successful than in Europe. Many Third World countries thought the superpowers were in a collusion "of the armed to disarm the unarmed" and to place the peaceful nuclear activities of less developed countries under modes of international control and inspection which the Soviet Union was particularly reluctant to accept for itself. In the final analysis, the Soviets probably realized that there was no possibility that a treaty could provide an absolute guarantee against the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not already possessing them. But they also probably saw that such a treaty could inhibit a nuclear spread and thus possessed a certain amount of utility. Moreover, the United States' eagerness for the treaty created the opportunity for them to accomplish political objectives *beyond* arms control.

After the Nonproliferation Treaty was opened for signature, attention shifted to the problem of the strategic balance between the superpowers and ways of ensuring a continuation of that balance through armaments limitation. The Soviets had been aware of the debate developing among U.S. strategic analysts since the early 1960's as to the possible effects of ABM deployment on global strategic equilibrium. As early as January 1964, the United States had begun to insist at the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference that the arms race could not be reversed until it had first been brought to a halt through a verified freeze on offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles.[38] But as late as 1967 Soviet diplomats in the West were frankly asserting that their government intended to acquire every bit of defense that could be purchased, including ABM. Some official Soviet spokesmen professed to be somewhat puzzled by the debate over ABM in the United States. In their eyes ballistic missile defense was not at all provocative or destabilizing. In fact they expressed a preference for a U.S. policy shift toward defensive missile technology rather than the procurement either of numerous offensive strategic delivery vehicles or the newly developed MIRV's which Defense Secretary McNamara had for several years contended made ABM deployment unnecessary, since with multiple warheads it would always be easier and cheaper for the offense to smother ABM defenses.

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[37] Cf. R. N. Rosecrance, editor, *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Morton H. Halperin, "A Ban on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," in Evan Luard, editor, *First Steps to Disarmament* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 132-160; and James E. Dougherty, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Russian Review*, January 1966, pp. 10-23.

The pressure to initiate SALT came primarily from the American side in the mid-1960's. The Soviets gradually became mildly interested in the concept as their program of missile production and deployment brought them closer to parity of strategic power with the United States — interested, but scarcely enthusiastic. First of all, the Viet Nam war was in high gear, and if Moscow were to enter an important new round of arms negotiations vitally affecting the distribution of military power between itself and Washington, it could expect Peking to hurl vitriolic accusations of "collusion with the archimperialists" and betrayal of the socialist struggle in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, some Soviet strategic planners undoubtedly hoped to take advantage of the fact that the Americans were bogged down in the quagmire of a costly counterguerrilla conflict so as to improve the USSR's position in strategic weapons systems relative to that of the United States. (Both superpowers increased their military spending by commensurate amounts as the Viet Nam war intensified, but whereas the cost of the U.S. effort exceeded $20 billion a year, Soviet aid to North Viet Nam was estimated at about 5 per cent of that sum, or a billion dollars, up to 1967.)[39] In the absence of any bilateral agreement establishing ceilings, the USSR, by sustaining its peaking missile deployment momentum, could expect soon to surpass the strategic missile strength of the United States; the latter, in view of changes in the public attitude toward war and military and defense expenditures, would not find it easy to expand a strategic missile force whose size had been held steady for a few years.

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[38] *Documents on Disarmament 1964,* pp. 17-21.

But as time went on, Soviet policymakers began to perceive reasons why it would make sense for them to enter into bargaining sessions for the purpose of regularizing the strategic-military relationship with the United States. The term "regularizing" does not necessarily imply codifying parity, although even that aspect of it may have been seen as a useful objective, at least temporarily. Actually, such concepts as parity and balance of power do not loom large in Soviet strategic literature, where the preferred term is the more ambiguous "favorable relation of forces." When the Soviets decide to negotiate with the Western capitalist foe — and he is indeed a foe, "peaceful coexistence" notwithstanding — it is not for the purpose of achieving a durable parity (which presumably is the comfortable thought lodged in the minds of many U.S. policymakers), but rather to gain leverage over the way in which the configuration of military forces in the global system is changing, and to gain greater influence over the future capabilities and behavioral modes of the United States and its allies than the West will be allowed to gain over the Soviets and the socialist camp. Whether "objectively realistic" or not, this is certainly what they intend, for they believe that the future belongs to them, that it is their mission to shape the manner in which technical and social processes are unfolding, and that the West lacks a comprehensive, unified vision of the future comparable to that bequeathed by Marx and Lenin. Moreover, there is little doubt in their minds that, while the United States has been suffering a "decline of imperial will"[40] since its traumatic Viet Nam experience, the global power of the Soviet Union, as well as the will to project and use that power, is in the ascendancy.

Governments rarely if ever act on the basis of a single explanatory cause. One can usually cite a spectrum of possible interpretations, and these are difficult to rank because in the final analysis the motives and intentions of governments are largely impenetrable to accurate investigation and evaluation by outside observers, and sometimes obscure even to those inside. This problem is compounded in the case of the Soviet government, not only because of its excessive penchant for secrecy but also because it is itself governed by a "holding company" – i.e., the Communist Party – which still is unable to divest itself of the conspiratorialism the Leninist operational style inherited from the Czarism Lenin hated and fought. All that we can prudently do, therefore, is to summarize the factors commonly mentioned by specialists as entering into Soviet calculations on SALT. Generally speaking, they can be grouped under four broad headings: (1) the China problem; (2) developments in the United States; (3) internal Soviet problems; and (4) the strategic uses of détente and arms control in Europe and elsewhere.

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[39] *New York Times,* March 31, 1967.

[40] See Peter Wiles, "Declining Self-Confidence," *International Affairs* (London), April 1971, and Wayne Wilcox, "United States: Imperial Recessional," *ibid.,* October 1973.

The China Problem

If in the mid-1960's the Soviets appeared anxious about Germany and concerned over China, the conditions seemed to be reversed as the decade drew toward a close. In contrast to the growing willingness of the Federal Republic's leadership to pursue *Ostpolitik*, tensions were reported to be rising along the Amur-Ussuri rivers. The Soviets enjoyed a vast margin of nuclear superiority over China, but in view of their geographical position they were much less able than the United States to adopt a relaxed view of the security threat China posed. While the United States is physically remote from the People's Republic, the Soviets share a 4,500-mile border – the "longest defended boundary" in the world. Moscow can scarcely ignore the problems that might arise in the years ahead as China develops an ability to strike Soviet cities, industrial complexes and missile sites with nuclear weapons.

In late 1969, just as SALT was about to get under way, some Western analysts suggested that Soviet military forces, discerning the advantages of preventive over retaliatory action, were preparing to mount an attack on the Chinese nuclear installations at Lop Nor.[41] We may never know exactly what transpired at that time. Perhaps Soviet leaders were disappointed by their soundings in the West. Perhaps they realized that an attack on China might irreparably weaken communism as a world political force and benefit the Western imperialist camp. Perhaps they were apprehensive that the East Europeans would exploit a war in the East to gain independence from Moscow. Perhaps they feared the role of the United States as *tertius gaudens*. Perhaps, conversely, the reports of the imminence of war were exaggerated. The reality may have been that the Soviet leaders, good Russians and good communists, had a healthy respect for the unknowabilities and unpredictabilities of war between great powers in the nuclear era, and recognized that they possessed no genuine option other than to watch China develop such capabilities as would create the conditions of mutual deterrence in Asia.

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[41] Cf. Victor Zorza, "Is Russia Planning War on China?," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 4, 1969, and "Spectre of War on Two Fronts," *ibid.*, January 24, 1970.

On the Chinese side, the start of SALT was accompanied by misgivings that the superpowers were about to coordinate their ABM programs to provide defense against China. But almost as if to reduce this sense of strategic isolation, first the Soviets intensified their dialogue with Peking, and later, before the conclusion of SALT I, the United States opened its lines of communications with the PRC, arousing Soviet suspicions in the process: "Why precisely at this time of Sino-Soviet tension?," Russian diplomats asked. In any event, the Soviets have not been unmindful that the Chinese are a silent party, as it were, in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and that the "triangular relationship," which is fraught with all the uncertainties of the "three body" problem in Newtonian physics, furnishes an important backdrop to SALT.[42]

Nor should we forget that if the conflict with China provides an important motivation for the USSR to negotiate with the West, the fear of a future danger emanating from China also sets limits on what the Soviets are willing to negotiate in the way of strategic arms limitations. By way of illustration, it should be noted that for a whole decade the principal point of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the United States over the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and subsequently the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, had to do with the question of verification. The United States insisted that some international on-site inspection would be necessary to police a total ban on underground tests; the

[42] Pierre Maillard, "The Effect of China on Soviet-American Relations," in *Soviet-American Relations and World Order: The Two and the Many* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 66, March 1970). For fuller background on the "China factor" see Morton H. Halperin, editor, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967) and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1968).

Soviets insisted that purely national means of verification would be sufficient. As recent advances in seismology improved the prospects for distinguishing underground tests from natural events without on-site inspection, however, the Soviets, perhaps thinking that U.S. arms controllers were moving toward acceptance of a comprehensive test ban, began to let it be known at Geneva that they would not be interested in such an arms control measure unless it were adhered to by all nuclear-weapons powers, including China (which has not yet signed even the partial test ban treaty). There is no reason to think that the Soviet Union is ready to step on the "down escalator" while China is still on the one marked "up." During SALT I, Soviet negotiators displayed no interest at all in arms reductions.

Developments in the United States

The second set of factors pertained to the United States, which seemed to the Soviets to be ready, almost anxious, to enter into discussions on the subject of the distribution of military power between the superpowers. As a nation, the United States had become frustrated by the Viet Nam war and was under growing internal pressure to lower its international profile, reduce its global commitments, and divest itself of its role as "world policeman." From the Soviet standpoint the era of movement "from confrontation to negotiation" was not an uncongenial time for SALT inasmuch as the United States was obviously under mounting compulsion to shift its public spending priorities from the international to the national and local scenes to allay unrest on campuses, in the cities, and among disaffected minority groups. Granted that the Soviets themselves may have been interested in controlling the costs of military-technological competition, they knew that the pull of gravity toward nonmilitary budgets was much stronger in the American political system, and could be reinforced by a SALT-flavored détente.

One serious problem loomed on the horizon. The U.S. government, after carrying on an intramural debate for nearly a decade over the value of missile defense, moved cautiously toward ABM deployment during the last year of President Johnson's administration. The Sentinel program was designed as a "thin defense" against China and against accidental launch. In early 1969, the incoming Nixon Administration reviewed the problem of missile defense and replaced the Sentinel with a Safeguard program. This shifted the emphasis to the defense of land-based missiles, now becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack as the Soviets continued to deploy heavy missiles (SS-9's and SS-11's) capable of carrying much larger payloads than U.S. delivery vehicles. Because the Soviets were beginning to draw abreast in the strategic weapons sector at a disturbingly rapid rate, the United States sought to reinsure its security position by preparing to deploy Safeguard around as many as four out of twelve Minuteman sites and to arm half of its land-based missiles and three-quarters of its submarine missiles with multiple-warhead weapons.[43]

There seems little doubt that U.S. officials, including National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, looked upon the potential deployment of Safeguard as the principal American trump card in the SALT negotiations, and perhaps the only "hardware lever" for inducing the Soviets to level off at crude parity instead of trying to achieve the kind of strategic superiority the United States had for all practical purposes renounced. In a word, Safeguard was a "bargaining chip." It has become fashionable among American intellectuals to disparage the "bargaining chip" approach on the seemingly logical grounds that it is absurd to threaten a stepped-up arms race in order to negotiate an attenuation of strategic weapons competition. Yet some sort of symmetry had to be introduced into the situation: there is no equality of bargaining power if only one side is apprehensive about the intentions of the other.

Posing the prospect of Safeguard deployment was an appropriate move on the part of the United States, because such a program would become necessary if the SALT produced no agreement and if the Soviets were wondering whether the U.S. political system, in the climate prevailing as a result of the Viet Nam trauma, was really able to sustain a large-scale ABM program. They could not be sure. The Senate's willingness to approve Safeguard in the summer of 1969, albeit by the narrowest of margins, must have led Moscow to question whether, if Congress could act this way on the eve of SALT negotiations, it would not be likely to increase its support for Safeguard in the event the negotiations collapsed.

Moreover, the Soviets possessed a healthy respect for American productive know-how, and they knew that once long- and short-range interceptors and large phased array radars had been deployed around a few Minuteman sites, the technology could be extended rather quickly to cover the entire national territory. They could tell, from the intramural debate over ABM in the United States, that American analysts and policymakers were not enthusiastic about deploying current-state missile defense, but Soviet planners probably concluded that since U.S. defense technology was better than their own, a costly race in that sector was to be avoided if at all possible.[44]

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[43] See *New York Times*, December 6, 1970, December 20, 1970, and February 27, 1971.

Internal Soviet Problems

The third set of motivations for entering the SALT arose from internal conditions. Soviet leaders undoubtedly felt a variety of pressures to limit the cost of strategic weapons programs. Within the USSR the chasm between the productive efficiency of the military sector and the inefficiency of the consumer sector becomes more apparent every year. Intelligent Russians are aware that the results of national economic growth during the last two decades have been manifested primarily in war-making and space-exploring programs, scarcely at all in such areas as housing, transportation and other amenities of life which abound in the West. Granted that the Soviet system lacks institutional channels for the expression of popular protest over the state of things, nevertheless even the most ideologically loyal planner must sometimes cringe in humiliation at the thought of how inferior certain dimensions of the Soviet life style appear to those who can draw comparisons with the West — and their numbers are increasing. The Soviets do quite well in literature and the performing arts, as Spartan societies often do, but they still encounter great difficulty in keeping abreast of the West in computers or even in mass-producing reliable elevators for hotels and office buildings. Yet socialist ideology demands that foreign tourists should depart from the Soviet Union more impressed than appalled by what they have seen.

It is in this context, perhaps, that Soviet planners begin to ponder the "economics of futility" in the strategic weapons sector. To the extent that they are capable of grasping the problem, they may wonder whether the indefinite expansion of nuclear missile capabilities and open-ended investment in costly new weapons systems — which if duplicated on the U.S. side will produce a reciprocally canceling effect and which might not be useable in any case — will satisfy the requirements of the *avant-garde* image they would like to project to the world during the last quarter of this century.

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[44] Only a few examples of a voluminous literature can be cited: Harold Brown, "Security through Limitations," and D. G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1969; George W. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969); Matthew P. Gallagher, "The Uneasy Balance: Soviet Attitudes toward the Missile Talks," *Interplay,* December 1969/January 1970; J. I. Coffey, "The Soviet Union and Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* January 1970; Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, editors, *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); and William R. Kintner, editor, *Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969).

We cannot lightly dismiss the possibility that Soviet leaders find it difficult to conceive their problem in the terms just stated. Even while recognizing that strategic superiority in numbers and throw-weight of ICBM's and SLBM's may not prove militarily operational (in view of all the uncertainties involved in plotting a first strike), they may perceive psychopolitical advantages in the possession of such superiority. Yet it could still make sense for them to want to modulate the pace of military-technological competition at this particular juncture. Given the total requirements of the long-haul strategy, they may be under heavy constraints to increase investment in agriculture and consumer industries, and thus to increase trade with the West for the purpose of narrowing the "technological gap" in nondefense sectors. Thomas W. Wolfe and Marshall D. Shulman, both astute observers of the Soviet internal scene, attribute considerable importance to the Brezhnev regime's desire to take advantage of détente in order to import technology. This, it is thought, will help the leadership to remedy the deficiencies of the socio-economic system without necessarily passing through domestic reforms that could prove awkward and painful.[45]

Beyond the desire to bolster the civilian economy, Wolfe has suggested an additional consideration arising in the minds of some military leaders. Although the Soviet military in general were reluctant to enter SALT, and probably actively opposed the talks or sought to postpone them as long as possible, once it became apparent that the superpowers were moving toward negotiations to limit strategic weapons systems, a certain amount of interservice rivalry may have surfaced within the USSR. It is not difficult to imagine that nonstrategic military sectors in the army and navy would seek to exploit the SALT in order to bring about a reallocation of defense resources away from strategic missiles.[46] Soviet military planners may have realized that they would be confronted with a serious dilemma in their efforts to match or exceed the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities in the post-Viet Nam period. The United States had carried out a partial but not insignificant modernization of its conventional and counterinsurgency forces during the course of the Viet Nam war. Once U.S. forces were withdrawn from Southeast Asia, the Pentagon would be able to turn its attention back to the development of new strategic weapons systems while retaining for several years ample stocks of weapons, ammunition and transport and communications equipment put to the test of battle. It is conceivable, therefore, that at least some Soviet military planners discerned potential benefits in SALT negotiations which would enable the USSR to gain a deployment margin in strategic missiles while setting limits on what the United States might be able to do to exploit its superior technological productivity in the post-Viet Nam period.

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[45] Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1970, pp. 1-10; and Marshall D. Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 43-44.

The Strategic Uses of Détente: Arms Control

The last set of Soviet motivations pertains to objectives vis-à-vis other countries and the enhancement of the USSR's ability to operate within the global system. For a variety of reasons, the Soviets wanted to promote a climate of détente that would enable them to achieve certain long-sought goals in Europe: the recognition of postwar frontiers, of the status quo in Eastern Europe and of East Germany as a separate state; the weakening of the North Atlantic alliance as well as a slackening of the pace of West European integration; the gradual reorientation of the Federal Republic of Germany from a *Westpolitik* to an *Ostpolitik*; and perhaps a reduction in the level of the military confrontation on the western flank which would permit Moscow increasingly to turn its attention to the security threat posed by China. The last-named goal, however, is a far from certain hypothesis; it is more likely that in the future Soviet threat perceptions will continue to oscillate between Germany and China at five to ten year intervals, and that the Soviets will attempt to deal with their two-front security problem by controlling the environment so that they will be able to concentrate on one principal problem at a time.

The conduct of SALT negotiations, precisely because they are fraught with ambiguities, can contribute to the success of Soviet policy in Europe. SALT enhances the image of the Soviets as reasonable in Western eyes; it fosters an atmosphere of pacifism, anti-militarism and the desire for reduced military expenditures; it induces West Europeans to think that the United States is more interested in concluding superpower agreements than in maintaining NATO's cohesiveness and war-making readiness; and the expectation of reaching arms control limitations increases American willingness to ignore, rationalize or excuse interventions à la Czechoslovakia which may be necessary from time to time to maintain the Soviet hegemonial position.

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[46] Wolfe, *op. cit.* See also Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., editors, *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 38.

The men in the Kremlin, no less than U.S. policymakers, must ponder the implications of the SALT and its outcomes for the continued viability of the Nonproliferation Treaty. They were never quite as interested as their American counterparts in the general theoretical principles underlying the treaty, although they did eventually come around to regarding the NPT as part of a structure of international political relations that would provide an additional constraint on the future course of Germany. Nor do the Soviets wish to see Japan acquire nuclear weapons, both because of the historic Russian image of Japan as an enemy and because if one of the two principal Axis powers defeated in World War II should acquire them this would increase the tendency for some Germans to think that their country was being discriminated against within the global system. Moreover, if India should "go nuclear," this would provide an additional political incentive for Japan to do likewise, and so on. The Soviets have partially attenuated the Indian appetite for nuclear weapons by concluding the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of 1971 and by supporting India in the conflict with Pakistan over Bangladesh, thereby demonstrating to New Delhi that a country can attain important foreign policy and defense objectives without possessing nuclear weapons.

Moscow probably views the Nonproliferation Treaty as a symbol of the interconnectedness of things, and would not be happy at the prospect of its coming undone since this could set in motion a chain of consequences difficult to predict. Soviet leaders invariably seek to maximize the favorable probabilities and minimize the dangerous uncertainties of the international environment in which they operate. They realize that neither the superpowers nor the treaty can guarantee the prevention of proliferation, but they also recognize that Moscow and Washington can do certain things to discourage or forestall proliferation by providing disincentives and compensations (e.g., by giving or withholding economic-technical assistance, conventional arms aid or defense guarantees).

They are aware that a small number of capitals may be determined to move steadily toward reducing the time interval between a decision to acquire nuclear weapons and actual acquisition for use *in extremis,* and that in the final analysis the outcome of SALT will not be the primary determinant of decisions to be taken in such capitals as New Delhi, Tokyo or Tel Aviv. But in any event the collapse of the fragile NPT is more likely to compound than to ameliorate the problems the Soviet Union faces in the conduct of its foreign policy. The linkage between Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the SALT, therefore, provides at least a marginal motivation for Moscow to cooperate with the United States in an ostensible effort to halt "vertical nuclear proliferation," for the failure of the superpowers to make any progress on this front would supply an additional moral-political justification for threshold powers to repudiate the entire nonproliferation concept when the treaty comes up for review in 1975.

There is no need here to present a detailed analysis of either the SALT negotiations or the agreements announced in Moscow in May 1972.[47] It is sufficient to note that the Soviets proved themselves to be hard, single-minded bargainers equipped with a relatively simple strategy for gaining the maximum benefit for themselves by exploiting a willingness on the U.S. side to compromise for the sake of achieving an election-year spectacular. On ABM, the Soviets obtained what they had wanted — a low level ceiling on Safeguard deployment. Along the way, they induced the Nixon Administration to back away from its earlier insistence on closely linking defensive and offensive weapons in the same package. ABM was finally dealt with in a permanently renewable treaty, while ICBM's were treated separately in an Interim Agreement. Even the ABM treaty was not quite symmetrical, insofar as the Soviets enjoy much greater freedom to deploy around a second site than does the United States, and insofar as Soviet defense missiles around Moscow protect not only the national command and control center but also a substantial number of ICBM's (more than the United States will protect with Safeguard at Grand Forks, North Dakota).

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[47] For an excellent account of the negotiations, apparently based on the most authoritative sources, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973). For discussions of the provisions of the Moscow agreements and their meanings, see Donald G. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review,* June 23, 1972, pp. 685-692, "President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger Brief Members of Congress on Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements," *Department of State Bulletin,* July 10, 1972, pp. 37-49; Joseph I. Coffey, "The Limitation of Strategic Armaments," *Yearbook of World Affairs* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1972), pp. 128-151; Dougherty, *How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament, op. cit.,* pp. 176-188; William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Strategic Arms Limitations of 1972: Implications for International Security," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, *op. cit.,* pp. 385-404.

On offensive weapons, throughout the negotiations the Soviets displayed no interest in freezing armaments in areas where they were lagging, especially in respect to MIRV's. They refused to close out the option of deploying land-based mobile systems — not necessarily because they have any intention of deploying them, but perhaps because if the United States wants a prohibition it can be made to pay for it in the future. The final text of the Interim Agreement, hammered out hurriedly in the last few days before the signing, assigns to the USSR a 40 per cent margin in the total permissible number of land-based launchers and a 30 per cent edge in the number of sea-based launchers.[48] Several U.S. analysts have called attention to the possibility that as the Soviets develop their MIRV technology, as they are known to be doing, the substantially greater "throw-weight" of their heavy missiles will enable them eventually to reverse current assumptions concerning U.S. superiority in total warhead numbers.[49] The fear is not so much that the increased mathematical vulnerability of the U.S. Minuteman force[50] might some day tempt the Soviets to carry out a nuclear first strike as that the USSR would be able thenceforth to project to the world, and especially to Europe, a politically effective image of military-strategic superiority over the United States.[51]

[48] Texts in *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1959-1972* (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 1, 1972), pp. 108-119.

[49] Cf. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *op. cit.*

[50] It has been estimated that the SALT I limitation on the deployment of no more than 313 heavy SS-9 missiles by the Soviets can be expected to reduce the percentage of U.S. Minutemen destroyable in a first strike from 95 to 70. "Only a change in the Soviet MIRV configuration is required to confront the United States again with the possibility that the Soviet Union could destroy 95% of the Minuteman force in a first strike." Presumably this could happen within the five-year life of the Interim Agreement. See Lynn E. Davis and Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted to Know About MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* June 1973, pp. 240-241.

[51] See Walter Slocombe, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 37, May 1971), p. 18; and Morton A. Kaplan, "The Implications of SALT I (and Potentially SALT II) on the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance," paper delivered at the Sixth International Arms Control Symposium, Philadelphia, November 1-4, 1973.

We should not make the mistake of thinking that the Soviet leaders obtained everything they asked for in SALT I. The United States did not consent to include the so-called Forward Based Systems (FBS) — i.e., nuclear weapons systems in the NATO area which the United States calls "tactical" and which Moscow defines as "strategic" because they are technically capable of striking at targets in Soviet territory. But the fact that the Soviets keep harping on this point, and will no doubt continue to do so throughout SALT II, heightens West European nervousness over the prospect that the essential requirements of NATO-area deterrence and defense may be "up for grabs," as it were, in the superpower deals now being made. After the announcement of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on June 1973 "to act in such a manner . . . as to avoid military confrontations and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them," many knowledgeable West Europeans wondered whether this pledge reflected a backing away from the U.S. defense commitment to NATO Europe, which has long rested upon a nuclear strategy.[52]

Not even Marxist decision-makers can escape the fact that dilemmas inhere in policy choices. Soviet leaders who agree with the course being charted by General Secretary Brezhnev might wish at times that they could promote détente with the West at a faster rate, reduce their uncertainty about Washington's future weapons deployment plans, and assure their own ability to move steadily toward enhanced military-technological security at a cost their economy can sustain. Obviously they would like to neutralize the great productive potential of the United States and, by generating an atmosphere of "peaceful coexistence," weaken further the popular support for such new defense improvements as the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber. But they themselves are unwilling to accept constraints on the qualitative upgrading of central strategic weapons systems, and they have long been psychologically incapable of thinking seriously about quantitative reductions, which would involve the actual destruction of weapons already in existence. (It will be most interesting to see whether, during the lifetime of the Interim Agreement, Moscow will decide to dismantle pre-1964 land-based missiles in favor of additional sea-based deployments under the terms of the agreement.) If Soviet leaders are really as preoccupied with China as we have reason to believe, their concern is certain to set limits on what they will be ready to do in SALT II.

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[52] Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973. Europeans were not entirely reassured by Dr. Kissinger's observation that the agreement did not impair alliance obligations if war could not be prevented. *New York Times,* June 23, 1973.

The Strategic Uses of Détente: Eastern Europe

When they turn their attention from China to Europe, Kremlin policymakers are confronted by more than one dilemma. To begin with, the climate of détente resulting from a decade of Soviet-American arms control agreements, Bonn's Eastern treaties and the Berlin Accord has made it possible to convene in Geneva the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), aimed at "normalizing" the European situation twenty-eight years after the end of the Second World War. Yet the Soviets know as well as the East Europeans that the situation in the region between West Germany and the USSR is not normal. The very progress of détente between East and West may increase instability within the communist state system, necessitating not only political repression of human liberties inside the USSR but also new applications of the Brezhnev Doctrine in socialist countries on the western border. Just as quite a few Western diplomats no doubt hope through a series of interlocking negotiations — political, economic and military — to influence Soviet behavior in a benign direction by raising the cost of dramatic reversals, so the Soviets probably sense that their participation in multi-tiered negotiations provides them with useful leverage over Western behavior and enhances their own flexibility for taking such action as they may deem necessary to keep their empire intact. They remember that from the mid-1960's onward the United States was so anxious to undertake SALT negotiations that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which profoundly disturbed government policymakers in Western Europe, delayed only temporarily the preparations for superpower talks.[53]

If a Soviet suppressive move in Eastern Europe should again prove necessary, the network of ongoing East-West negotiations will help to moderate the Western response. The Western states will warn the USSR that détente is being seriously imperiled. Negotiations may be suspended for six months or a year, and NATO governments in Europe will pledge stepped-up defense efforts. The curves depicting East-West trade and various modes of technical cooperation will slump sharply before resuming a cautious rise. Western punitive measures are not likely to be carried beyond this point. Probably within a year, the desire to place the derailed détente back on the track will predominate. Western governments, citing the importance of avoiding a relapse into Cold War thinking, will return to the negotiating tables, not with any illusions but with a sense of resignation that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to the art of diplomatic persuasion.

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[53] It should also be noted on the Soviet side that once SALT was under way, neither the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970 nor the U.S. decision to mine Haiphong Harbor in the spring of 1972 caused ripples in the Helsinki-Vienna discussions. The Soviets apparently were not looking for political excuses to scuttle negotiations from which they expected benefits.

The foregoing scenario is not the one ideally preferred by Moscow. The Brezhnev government certainly does not want to intervene again with military force in Eastern Europe if this can be avoided. Such interventions are politically embarrassing; they require endless rationalization, even to the West European communist parties — until they are forgotten. But given the intensification of relations with the Western capitalist system entailed in détente, the necessity of future interventions cannot be entirely discounted by Soviet leaders. Did not the West German policy of "bridge-building" under Erhard and Schroeder, after all, contribute toward the evolution of the "Czechoslovak spring"? Today, again, it is being suggested that Western Europe must accept the territorial status quo but should not accept the political-ideological status quo in Eastern Europe.[54] A high-priority objective of the Soviet leadership at CSCE, therefore, is to diminish the possibility that another military intervention in Eastern Europe will be necessary while Soviet influence gently flows westward. Even before the CSCE began in October 1972, the Soviets had gone a long way toward accomplishing two of their prime goals: West German acceptance of the eastern boundaries and Western recognition of East Germany as a separate state. Their purpose at CSCE is to secure the widest possible ratification of these two historic developments, and also to strengthen the presumption that Eastern Europe (including Yugoslavia) is to be rendered permanently impregnable to political-ideological efforts by the West to alter existing conditions within that region through channels variously called "the free flow of ideas," "cultural and information exchange" and "human contacts."[55]

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[54] See, e.g., Roger Morgan, "West-East Relations in Europe: Political Perspectives," *International Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 177-189.

[55] See Text of Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Department of State Bulletin*, July 30, 1973, pp. 181-188. Cf. also Richard Davy, "The ESC and the Politics of Eastern Europe," *World Today*, July 1972, pp. 289-295, and the Symposium on "European Security Conference, "*Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1972, pp. 285-330.

The Strategic Uses of Détente: Western Europe

The Soviets are now engaged in an extremely delicate operation vis-à-vis Western Europe. They are trying to promote a form of pan-European détente that will simultaneously accomplish a number of almost contradictory objectives: (1) widen the sense of political distance between the United States and its European allies, and persuade the latter that the former has become an uncertain guarantor whose defense commitment is slowly dissolving; (2) arrest the development of the European Community toward political and military unity; (3) create in the post-Viet Nam environment an international political climate conducive to the steady growth of pacifism and anti-militarism and a steady decline of public support for defense expenditures in the Western countries, while overall Soviet strategic military capabilities are improved qualitatively and quantitatively at a gradual pace which provokes no unanticipated Western reaction; (4) bring about the phased withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Western Europe without stimulating Britain, France and Germany into the compensatory action of moving toward European political-military unity; (5) prevent the people's democracies of Eastern Europe from seeking to take advantage of the détente by enhancing their own freedom of maneuver at the expense of Soviet-bloc cohesion.

Perhaps the principal dilemma the Soviets currently face in Europe has to do with the problem of prolonging the U.S. military presence on the continent until its termination will best serve Moscow's purposes. For nearly two decades, the Soviets frequently demanded in the most uncompromising language the liquidation of all U.S. bases in Europe. That was a natural propaganda line to pursue at the height of the Cold War, when no one expected anything of the sort to happen. But in the era of emerging multipolarity, international politics has become more complex and more ambiguous; the operation of the dialectic is not as clear as it used to be in an era of sharp dichotomies. At the present time the Soviets cannot be certain how either Germany or the European unity movement will go. Their long-range goal undoubtedly is still to reorient Western Europe away from the United States and bring it under the sway of their own socialist system — in short, to "Finlandize" Western Europe.

But the near future contains worrisome uncertainties. Whereas the present situation is stable and safe for a Soviet *Westpolitik*, Moscow is determined to minimize two undesirable possibilities.

The first is the development of a conviction that as the U.S. pledge to protect Europe under the umbrella of deterrence becomes less reliable, the European Community must forge a common foreign and defense policy, based on the coordination of British and French strategic nuclear weapons programs, and including some form of West German support, cooperation and participation. Granted that serious difficulties inhere in the concept of European deterrence — and the political problem of Germany's role is generally recognized as the thorniest of all — nevertheless the subject has received increasing attention since Britain's entry into the Community and the transatlantic dialogue over the future shape of NATO have spurred Europe's efforts to define its own identity.[56] The Soviets of late have become more concerned over what they perceive as a growing interest in the idea of closer West European cooperation in defense and political matters.[57]

The second future possibility, abhorred even more by the Soviets, is that West Germany, confronted by U.S. troop withdrawals, the gradual breakup of NATO, and the failure of France and Britain to cooperate toward credible European deterrence, will conclude that she must henceforth take whatever steps are necessary to assure her own defense. In the most extreme case, this could mean repudiating the Nonproliferation Treaty and acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Such a specter has prompted Soviet writers in the past to issue such vague but ominous warnings as the following: "The appearance of nuclear weapons in the FRG would indeed compel the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries to take serious countermeasures."[58]

It is the fear that West German participation in a European nuclear force might merely be the first step toward ultimate nuclear independence for Bonn which in large part prompts Moscow's hostility to the creation of a European force. If the Soviets could be convinced that the Federal Republic's West European neighbors were as determined as the USSR to prevent the FRG from going nuclear, and that a European deterrent force was the only way of achieving this objective, the Kremlin leaders might reluctantly acquiesce. But thus far they remain deeply suspicious, and so long as European deterrence appears to be a viable option, the Soviets may prefer the lesser evil of a continued U.S. military presence in the familiar context of a nonhostile confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[59]

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[56] For discussions of the increasing attention being paid to European deterrence, the technical, strategic, economic and political problems attendant thereto, and the likelihood or unlikelihood of its coming into being, see Andrew J. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1971, and "Can Europe's Security Be 'Decoupled' from America?," *ibid.*, July 1973; François Duchêne, "A New European Defense Community," *ibid.*, October 1971, and "The Strategic Consequences of an Enlarged European Community," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1973; Wynfred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn, *Nuclear Politics: America, France and Britain* (Beverly Hills: Sage, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973); Paul C. Davis, "A European Nuclear Force: Utility and Prospects," ORBIS, Spring 1973.

[57] *New York Times*, November 22, 1973.

[58] V. Ia. Aboltin, *Politika Gosudarstv i Razoruzhenie* (*Policies of States and Disarmament*) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1967), Vol. I, p. 73; quoted in W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964-1972* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 131.

In the meantime, the MBFR negotiations in Vienna between four Warsaw Pact countries and seven NATO members (with eight other states as observers) provide a mechanism whereby the USSR can exercise leverage over the rate and direction of changes in the European political-military environment. MBFR[60] talks help to legitimize Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and at the same time to forestall precipitate unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals, which some Soviet analysts would probably regard as the action of an "irresponsible power" because of the potentially unsettling and unpredictable consequences.[61] Everyone expects MBFR negotiations to last for several years – "a lifetime career for diplomats," they have been called – and thus they will furnish ample opportunity for the Soviets to gauge whether the strategic threat posed by China is of sufficient magnitude to warrant a long-term redeployment of Soviet combat divisions from Eastern Europe to the Chinese border.

The Vienna talks will also furnish the Soviets with means of accumulating additional information about NATO force deployments, NATO decision-making processes, and potential political fissures among the Western allies (e.g., between West Germany and the nuclearized European states, between those who want MBFR and those who do not, between those who support and those who oppose a European nuclear force) – information which might later prove valuable to Soviet political strategists. They will undoubtedly be tough bargainers in Vienna, as they have always been in arms negotiations. They have begun by rejecting the Western contention that, because the Warsaw Pact now enjoys military superiority over NATO, whatever force reductions are negotiated must be asymmetrical — i.e., greater on the Soviet side.[62] But the Soviets can be expected in the changing political-military environment of Europe to be flexible enough to exploit such advantageous openings as may appear. In the final analysis, if they think asymmetrical reductions will serve their larger political purposes they will be quite capable of accepting asymmetrical reductions, provided that these do not adversely affect Soviet security requirements.

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[59] Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[60] Although the NATO countries still refer to the negotiations under the heading of "mutual and balanced force reductions," the official title agreed to during the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting in June 1973 is "Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe" (MURFAAMCE).

[61] This interpretation was advanced by a Soviet diplomat in a conversation with the author in late 1971.

CONCLUSION

Despite the intensified arms control discussions between the superpowers in the last ten years, Western policymakers must continue to labor in half-darkness as to Soviet motivations and intentions. Détente in the SALT era is not incompatible with serious conflicts of purpose and confrontations of power between the United States and the Soviet Union under circumstances more conducive to the erosion than the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, as the Middle East war crisis of October 1973 demonstrated. Obviously both superpowers have a variety of reasons for pursuing arms control, even if neither one entertains realistic expectations that "peaceful coexistence" will lead to "convergence."[63] Both sides are compelled to cope with the dangers of the nuclear era and with the complexities of emerging multipolarity. The thrust of this essay, which was written with Moscow's perspectives of arms control in mind, should not be taken to imply a prediction that the net advantages must necessarily accrue to the Soviets. The inheritors of Lenin's legacy probably possess a clearer and more unified idea of the political objectives they wish to achieve; they are also confident that their strategy for achieving their objectives is superior to that of the West. But in the long run the value-goals sought by the pluralist, pragmatic West are more humanly important, and the West's apparently chaotic methods may surprisingly turn out to be more effective. History alone can be final judge as to which was cleverer — the hedgehog or the fox.

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[62] See Yu. Kostko, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe," *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya,* June 1972, reprinted in *Survival,* September/October 1972, pp. 236-238; Y. Tomlin, "Problem of Armed Forces Reduction in Europe," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1973, especially p. 39. For Western discussions of the problems of negotiating a new local-regional balance in Europe, see Christoph Bertram, *Mutual Force Reduction in Europe: Political Aspects* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 84, 1972); Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Attitudes Toward MBFR and the USSR's Military Presence in Europe* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1972); Ian Smart, *MBFR Assailed: A Critical View of the Proposed Negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1972); J. I. Coffey, "Arms Control and the Military Balance in Europe," ORBIS, Spring 1973; John Yochelson, "MBFR: The Search for an American Approach," *ibid.;* Albert Willot, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe," *NATO Review,* No. 1, 1973; Frederick S. Wyle, "European Security: Beating the Numbers Game," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1973.

[63] It is not possible to make any certain predictions with regard to the total impact of modernization on the USSR and the liberalization of its economic and political systems. See Oleg Zinam, "Impact of Modernization on the USSR: Convergence or Divergence?," *The Russian Review,* July 1973, p. 263.

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

by Gerhart Niemeyer

HISTORICALLY there can be no doubt that the Communist Party was made to measure for Lenin's ideology. Party and ideology were related as interlocking forces: the uncompromising strictness of ideological concepts was to cement and discipline the army-like political organization, and the uncompromising centralism of the hierarchical party was to secure the ideology's purity and correctness. From the outset this structure comprised yet another element, practice, the *Party Line,* never a mere derivate from ideological principles but itself a revelation of history's "concrete truth," and thus functioning as the current criterion of party loyalty and unity.

Ideology and party organization, mutually reinforcing each other, might have amounted to no more than a sectarian preservation of some narrow dream world. For, let this be clear, the party took form as a response to a myth that, unlike myths about divinity, had no roots in human experience of reality. The Marxian myth referred to a nonexisting object, history, which is not given as a real object since that part of events and processes which lies in the future has not yet occurred. The communist myth, all the same, comprises not merely the past but the whole of history, including the future, as if it already existed. This history happens to a nonexisting subject, mankind, which cannot be said to exist in reality except if all men, those living, already dead, and not yet born, were present to each other. The myth culminates in a nonexisting society, describing it in logical and abstract harmony while ignoring any and all of the defects and obstacles that in human experience have plagued every known society. The myth postulates an instrument of historical change, the proletarian revolution, as if it were a fact, while actually no such thing as a revolutionary proletariat has existed in our time. The myth finally sees its own consummation dependent on a nonexisting man, collective man, asserting that this man will be created by special human beings possessing the magic power of Marxism-Leninism.

In this imaginary world of Marxian ideology one could go wandering about for a long time, almost forgetting that the phantasmal scenery has nothing to do with the reality in which human beings live. Sects addicted to such irrational worldviews have frequently occurred in history. The fact that the world refuted their idea system by its existence would not necessarily bring them to abandon the system: they would rather close themselves off from reality in order to protect their beliefs. There were moments in the history of the Communist Party when such tendencies came to the fore. They could not prevail, however, because the party existed for the sake of transforming the existing world, and it could not hope to do so unless it took notice of the obstreperous living men and existing things. Lenin, who in 1903 was responsible for the narrowing and stiffening of the communist dogma, was also the one who in 1905, 1917 and 1920 forced his comrades to acknowledge given realities and to estimate soberly the requirements of party action.

The communist movement characteristically keeps one eye riveted on the irrational concepts of its myth, and the other sharply focused on extant social power structures, practical methods by which it might be loosened and then dismantled, and ways in which meantime these hostile power structures could be exploited to the communists' tactical advantage. One assumes that by virtue of the myth, communism must be called irrational; one wonders whether by virtue of its strategic and tactical pragmatism it should be considered rational. This conclusion could hold only if the dogma were something resembling what in Christian life we call "Sunday religion," a belief held for emotional gratification but with little or no practical relevance.

Leaving aside the question of whether that is true even of "Sunday religion," one should note that in communist ideology the basic myth could be said at least to intrude into the party's pragmatism, and, more accurately, to underpin and confine that pragmatism in decisive ways. Lenin taught the party to resort to "zig-zag" maneuvers and not to disdain "compromises and concessions," but sternly warned against concessions and compromises that would erode the party's main goal. Moreover, such concepts as "proper time" and "proper place" for revolutionary actions do not in communist parlance have a purely pragmatic content.

II

Let us look a little closer at the supposedly "realistic" character of the communist analysis of society. Comparing it with some of the great attempts to comprehend extant societies in modern times — e.g., with Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Max Weber — one can call Lenin's analysis only partial and reductionist. He did not want to see anything but a web of hostile power, class rule and oppression. This dogmatic postulate put blinkers on his observation. Given such stark limitation, one must concede that he developed remarkable insights into power phenomena, even beyond what he inherited from Marx. One could go so far as to say that Lenin's analysis of power and power strategies surpassed anything that had been achieved in this line before him. Nevertheless, a severe bias prevents this from contributing anything of value to human knowledge and understanding. The distortion occurs in both the underlying motive and the basic assumptions.

Aristotle formulated man's "desire to know" as his wonderment about the reality in which he lives; Bergson added that the "desire" is informed by basic "sympathy" with reality. Aristotle begins his investigation of politics by reflections on the citizen, and it is in a spirit of citizenship that he inquires into institutions, principles and human characters. Before Lenin begins his analysis, the desire totally to combat and ultimately to destroy society is already fixed. His "realism" remains confined to that of a leader in battle; his motive is not existence with other humans but total victory. The "realism," at the same time, remains subject to fixed assumptions that are all but realistic: the pretended knowledge of history that has not yet occurred, the polarization of all people into those who promote and those who impede the forward march of history, the counting on the "new Soviet man" as the *deus ex machina* who will make possible a hitherto unheard-of type of society. Worst of all, these assumptions are treated not as hypotheses but passed off as "scientific" certainties, surely a colossal piece of self-delusion on the part of people taking pride in their sobriety.

Even when he gives himself wholly to some concrete and practical task in the framework of existing societies, the communist always carries as an ulterior motive — and not far underneath the surface — preconceived ideas about societies supposedly doomed by "history," men whose group existence causes them to have stereotyped attitudes, historical processes that are bound to occur at certain times and will necessarily go on to completion, and an ultimate end that could justify any amount of evil in the present. A communist at the least feels that ubiquitous struggle is the setting for his own life, with peace a distant future end contingent on the party's universal triumph.

One need not delve deeply into philosophy to realize how far such notions are from the common sense on which normal people operate day by day. It is obvious that common sense has been deliberately set aside by communists; they have replaced it with contrived assumptions valid only within a closed thought-system. This does not mean that communists rehearse, as it were, the whole complex of their dogmas every time they go into action — the need is as little as for every normal man to consult his assumptions as he goes about his daily work. All fundamental notions are effective insofar as they have become "second nature" and can be taken for granted among others who know and share them. That being so, it is most important to realize that the communists have committed themselves to basic assumptions which they emphatically do not share with others, and that this includes the assumptions governing their pragmatism. "A great gulf has been fixed" between communists and other men, not by God's hand or even by history, but by the irrationality that communists have chosen to be their mental world.

To conclude at this point: The chief source of irrationality in communism is its phantasmal view of history, society and man; the resulting irrationality is substantive. With regard to practice, communists are pledged to sobriety and flexibility, based on assessments of reality seen as class struggle with a predetermined end. Insofar as this is rationality, it is instrumental, the choice of means to given ends. Among other ideologies, the communists have managed to keep their minds relatively uncluttered when the choice of means is at issue. The Nazi ideology, for instance, embraced a wholly irrational preference for war as a means, but this kind of thinking is quite alien to communism. Of communism one could say that it is even cynically indifferent to the variety of means, to the point where mutually incompatible means can be adopted simultaneously.

All the same, communists do not manage to act in a purely pragmatic way. Any pragmatism operates with some basic notions regarding what is "useful," "good," "working successfully," notions usually supplied by common sense. Common sense is what the communists have disallowed, with the result that the criteria of pragmatic success tend to elude them. Since they assume that the process of their struggle will continue over a long period, "replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organizational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats," what particular operation, in this complex, could be termed a "success"? They resort to dialectical rhetoric which sees victory in a defeat, but one suspects that this is not mere bravado to deceive their own followers; rather, the notion of "success" can be grasped no more when an ultimate outcome appears preordained by history and still the path leading there is considered subject to human choice.

With all their exemplary sobriety, communist regimes seem often to spin around themselves, to wallow in indecision, to be incapable of making headway. It seems that a pragmatism unsupported by a rational ontology remains an equation with nothing but irrational numbers. At best then, the rational practice of communism must be given the attribute of semi-rationality, a mental attitude capable of operating in the setting of given realities but incapable of making its home there.

III

These results, established solely on the basis of communist ideology, add up to a prima facie problem of communist irrationality. In a setting of common-sense foundations of social institutions and practice, no such problem arises; irrationality is an exception that carries the burden of proof. In the case of communism, the burden of proof rests on the argument that communist leaders operate with the same rationality as statesmen elsewhere. That burden is usually avoided on one of two grounds: communist ideology is treated as "another view," a variety of social order differing from Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, and a number of social traditions only in its content (or "preferences," as it is ordinarily put), but not in nature; or else it is asserted that from the practical responsibilities of running Russia, communists have learned motivations that have superseded those of their ideology.

Regarding the first of these two: communist ideology simply is not one among several possible ways of seeing the world rationally. The crudest primitive myth is by comparison rational, since it seeks to assimilate, in an open-minded way, man's full range of experiences of that which surrounds him and goes on within him. That myth is deferential to reality in a way in which communist ideology is not, since communism postulates a "second reality" not given to experience, with the claim that communists will create it. Communism is willful rather than "desirous of understanding," as it asserts that a "true" reality will arise in the future from a total destruction of whatever exists. Its hostility to reality roots in the closed mind that constructed it as a closed-thought system, in which each idea is validated only by the other parts of the system. This is the characteristic of an ideology different in kind from an open-minded approach to reality, based on experience.

Now to the second question. How is the communist outlook affected by the taking over of governmental responsibilities? What happens to the communist ideology as the humdrum of administration, business management, education and diplomacy replaces the excitement of revolutionary drama? Has utopia any relevance to governing practice? Can the executives of a superpower remain ideologists?

The first item to be noticed is the absence of any relevant instruction in ideological scripture. Lenin's numerous works on strategy all were concerned with the seizure of power, besides which only two of his books, *State and Revolution,* and *Imperialism,* contain remarks of relevance to the post-seizure period. Regarding the problem of government, there are no more than a few dicta by Marx and Lenin about the "period of transition," which would entail government in the form of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" — that period to consist of the "revolutionary transformation" of society by means of "despotic inroads" into the process of production, which in turn would "necessitate further inroads," so that government could be nothing else but a "regime based on force and unlimited by law." The state, having thus waxed to maximal power, would eventually "wither away," and the "realm of freedom" would arrive as a society without political machinery, held together by the businesslike voluntary discipline of co-producers.

Thus there is no communist theory of government as an institution rooted in the nature of men and things, and limited by basic norms. Communist rule during the "period of transition" operates essentially without limitations other than those of circumstances, guided only by the technical requirements of maximal power, similar to an army in battle. Nor is there any theory about a socialist economy, other than the dogmatic assertion that it would be characterized by making public property of the means of production and by central planning. One recalls how communists rushed into a headlong attempt to realize utopia on the spot, an attempt later called "war communism," in order to conceal the shameful failure of the ideological recipe by blaming it on unfavorable conditions. One remembers further the three or four years of discussion about the follow-up to the NEP, during which the conceptual tools of discussion were lifted wholly from Marx's analysis of the *capitalist* economy, simply projected into Soviet Russia (e.g., Preobrazhenskii's notion of "primitive socialist accumulation"). To this day, all there is of "socialist economic theory" is limited to the few vague and general formulae elaborated by Stalin in 1952-1953.

In government and economics, accordingly, communists had at their disposal some basic dogmatic positions but no practical guidelines comparable to Lenin's strategic principles, which pertained to the seizure of power alone. They were compelled to resort to improvisations, concerning which a mere handful of dicta served them as criteria of validity (for instance, Lenin's "socialism plus electrification," and his characterization of peasant production as a continuing source of capitalism).

In foreign policy, too, the communist rulers found themselves ideologically unprepared for what awaited them. Lenin's *Imperialism* did project the class struggle onto the scene of world politics and distinguished among imperialist, colonial and semi-colonial countries, which distinction seemed to provide a relevant category for China and Weimar Germany. The book also contained some generalizations about the causes of war, to which later was added the dictum that war between capitalist and socialist countries would decide the outcome of the revolution. Furthermore, Lenin thought it a good idea for communists to instigate wars between imperialist countries. That, however, was all. In this intellectual void something like a pattern of Soviet foreign policy was slow in emerging and did not begin to take recognizable shape until Stalin laid down a global revolutionary strategy, using such concepts as "the weakest link in the chain of imperialism," and "capitalist encirclement," which was to be converted into "socialist encirclement."

The question now arises whether the improvisation into which the communists were forced gradually developed into a pragmatism autonomous from the few ideological absolutes that were mentioned. In the history of the Communist Party, its members have always been engaged in practical tasks not governed by ideological principle: studying chemistry, running a business, handling a printing press, flying an airplane. The capability and versatility of communists in mastering such technical requirements has been noted even by their enemies. Moreover, Marx has explicitly exempted one aspect of human life from the radical transformation of socialist revolution: the technology of production. This, the achievement peculiar to the bourgeoisie, would not only continue into the socialist future but would constitute the prime requisite of socialist abundance. In that framework, factory discipline would remain essentially what it had been before, as indicated by Marx's demand in the *Communist Manifesto*: "establishment of industrial armies." Activities of a technical and value-neutral character would thus not appear to communists as something like an alternative to ideological thinking, but rather as something positively required by revolutionary seriousness.

If one may digress for a moment, one could observe also in our society that Christianity, the natural law, the dignity of the person, due process, and other fundamental norms would not affect one way or another such activities as traffic regulation, organizing a smeltering process, digging a canal, running a department store. It is obvious that technical processes enjoy a certain autonomy from the complex of beliefs and norms governing human conduct and general relationships. Reversely, one would not expect a general order of human conduct and purpose of life to emerge from the area of technical activities, although possibly involvement in such activities might result in a certain insensitivity and callousness with regard to higher normative demands.

The fact that communists, in the course of running subject countries, do a multitude of things resembling what we also do, allows no prima facie conclusion that the basic beliefs and norms of communism have come to resemble ours. A communist truck driver could profitably compare notes with his Western colleague, but if he also were the party representative in his residential block, they would soon come to blows over freedom and human dignity. A waning of communist commitments could be expected only where other fundamental beliefs and higher norms compete successfully with the communist persuasion. What evidence do we have of such a mutation?

The hard evidence seems to be all on the other side. In Soviet Russia and its satrapies, control centers in the Communist Party. It is not the Council of Ministers but rather the party's Politbureau that makes the decisions and also assigns them to the respective ministries which are to publish them as if they were their own. The Supreme Soviet, meeting for no more than a week, puts its stamp on party decisions, many of which have taken effect before the stamping act. The party derives its own tasks not from the state or the people but from its ideological vision. In its *Program* of 1961, for instance, one finds these conceived in terms of future developments over which normal governments would not claim control: "complete unity," "the instilling in the people of conscious discipline and a Communist attitude toward labor," "the disappearance of classes," "the withering away of the state," "the transformation of organs of state power into organs of public self-government," and so on. In its own understanding, the party considers itself "ahead" of both Russia and its people; Soviet society is as yet underdeveloped, the "people" are as yet beset with survivals of capitalism and therefore "backward" as compared with the "advanced" party, so that all "progress" depends on the "hegemony" of the party. In other words, the party cannot look on itself as representing either the state or the people, and least of all the Russian tradition, but sees itself engaged in a mission to bring about the mythical future of utopia.

Obviously the communist ideology presents communist rulers with a public-relations problem of the first magnitude, since its message to the living generation says that it behooves them to serve as expendable forces in the march of history. Lenin saw clearly that for this reason the ideology could appeal only to a few and that the masses, concerned with daily living, would be incapable of "revolutionary consciousness." His hope that education might awaken the masses to "consciousness" has turned out to be an illusion. At any rate, the popular appeal of the party's ideology in Soviet Russia is low. Mao Tse-tung has had better success developing something like a civil theology, mixing communist notions with traditional Chinese symbols, an idea Stalin also tried but botched.

In view of the low yield of political support to be expected from ideological propaganda, one can only be astonished at the enormous amount of money and effort the communists vest in this activity. Education, from kindergarten up, is shot through and through with ideology until in the last two years about one-half of the program is direct indoctrination. The volume of ideological publications, including the classics, is staggering. Literature, poetry, theater, film, painting, sculpture, all serve ideological purposes, and music is at least prevented from arousing what are considered reactionary emotions. Armed forces are all penetrated by *politruks*; neighborhoods, student groups, factory sections, collective farms meet weekly for discussions under party supervision. Anti-theistic propaganda abounds. The abundance of this kind of evidence establishes a strong prima facie probability that the party has not grown indifferent toward its own ideology. The regime must be called, above all, an ideocracy, the forceful and total imposition of an idea system on a whole people. Since the people, in spite of everything, remain by and large unconvinced, the party's insistence testifies more to its own beliefs than to its worldly wisdom.

IV

So far the argument has turned around prima facie probabilities and burdens of proof. This is where the center of gravity of the problem lies. Can one not say anything more positive about the impact of the ideology on government practice? One can, provided one is not expected to come up with a major premise-minor premise-conclusion formula of alleged ideological precepts. For the party, the embodiment of the communist ideology, manifests through its Party Line history's truth *in concreto*. That means that no abstract formulation of the ideology can be right against the party and its current policy. To be sure, the general dogma about capitalism and history's socialist future is repeated, in condensed versions, as a kind of introduction to any assessment of the given situation, and so are Lenin's strategic formulae. But the communist ideology is not to be thought of as a set of formulae, concepts, principles or recipes. Rather, it is practice in unity with, and obedience to, the party.

The party, however, is much more than an organization of political leadership. It is a "movement" endowed with superhistorical authority; authority which was revealed when the party succeeded in making a historical event, the Revolution of 1917, come to pass at a time when the historical prerequisites were not in existence, and then proceeded to bring about those necessary conditions *ex post facto*. The party then assumed an overlordship over history and, on the basis of communist history-worship, came to be vested with the halo of infallibility. Like Rousseau's *volonté générale,* it acknowledges the possibility of being mistaken on occasion, but it is nevertheless the only true movement toward the all-good future. It is this character of the party that imparts to Soviet public affairs their ideological quality.

Communism has been called a religion, and the party a priesthood. There is some truth in that characterization, but the party's assumed rank is really higher than priesthood; it is that of semi-divinity. Hence the general line is more than a matter of prudence; it is revelation of a sort. To be sure, the party dispenses jobs, distributes housing, grants promotions, arranges for services, offers education; but it is not for setting up a welfare state that it claims and receives semi-divine veneration. In mankind's vaunted movement toward the future the party is "ahead" of all others, and has proved sovereign even over history. Thus arises its arrogation of authority of authorities, to which is attached a demand, not for citizenship, but for "support of the masses."

Yet the doctrine of mankind's movement toward the future has nothing to say about the perennial concerns of the present: birth, death, marriage, worship, justice, personal destiny. The generation of living subjects may accept and use a material dependence on the party as Supreme Manager of the Soviet-State-Monopoly-on-Life, without finding in that function grounds for the party's assertion of semi-divine authority, from which results the ubiquitous make-believe and not-quite-real note so characteristic of life in the Soviet Union. The party, considering the "masses" not to be on its side, must look on terror and manipulation as the only viable way of ruling. Although the extreme forms of Stalinist terror are no longer used, there are many other ways of attaching terrifying consequences to inadequate conformity and making them publicly known. "Soviet legality," much praised in propaganda, remains subject to the current requirements of party strategy, just as much of the Constitution (freedom of speech, of assembly) has never been honored even by the bow of hypocrisy. There are many similar manifestations of a basic falsehood that stems, not merely from personal corruption which is also present, and not merely from bureaucratic arrogance which is omnipresent, but from the irrational position of the party and the resultant absence of honest norms in the party's relations with its members, its subjects, and the nation over which it rules.

V

In foreign policy, an ideological quality manifests itself through the concept of "strategy" which has come to replace that of policy. Strategy, as Clausewitz expressed it, is "the use of engagements to attain the objective of war." That concept would differ from "policy," which one could define as the perception and planned pursuit of objectives within changing relations. War is considered to impose a single objective on the belligerents, to which all plans remain subject. In the flux of ordinary, open relationships objectives are not given but must be decided upon, which is precisely the process of policy formation. Communists assume that history has already laid down its own final objective, the overthrow of capitalism and the universal triumph of communism. With that end fixed, all decisions of the party must be seen as intermediate, i.e., strategic.

The communists' frame of reference in thinking about their foreign conduct resembles that of war, and consequently they have introduced military terminology into the rhetoric of international affairs, with the result that others, particularly the United States, have been induced to conceive of a "counter-strategy" looking to an eventual deliverance from the communist threat. The concept of "strategy" has nearly replaced that of foreign policy in our days, because one superpower's view of itself as being engaged in a "protracted war," a continuous sequence of engagements toward a preordained goal, has sufficed to impart to the whole world a wartime frame of reference, as evidenced by a group of states which call themselves "nonaligned nations."

The communists' axiom of a protracted struggle is of one piece with their notion of a class as the enemy, a class whose overthrow will "emancipate mankind," and which is identified not only with governing bodies but with entire nations as such. They will look upon foreign relations in terms of strategy as long as their minds operate on the axiom of the class enemy; to replace this enemy with something else does not seem to lie in their power. Consequently, when speaking of "peaceful coexistence" they must see it as "a new form of class struggle," and also must perceive in it a temptation to themselves to forget their revolutionary determination. It is indicative that I. Alexandrov, in an article in *Pravda* on August 7, 1973, speaks of the "principle-minded and class-bound policy" of socialist countries. Their "new strategy" of 1956 governs not only the foreign policy decisions of the Soviet Union but also the tactics of communist parties in leading countries of the world, parties that appear in their writings on international problems as "reserves" behind the Soviet Union as the main "instrument of the Revolution."

In Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, he mentions four categories of war, of which one is "popular uprisings." There can be no question that the long-term objective of all Soviet foreign policies is internal subversion, particularly in leading Western countries, with communists replacing the now ruling elements.

The Soviet threat, in the sense of arms race, propaganda war, and expansion of international influence, ultimately involves a communist threat. If Soviet policy is temporarily content with objectives short of revolutionary subversion, it is nevertheless beyond the party's intellectual possibilities to conceive of a meaning for communist policy other than total defeat of the class enemy.

The reason for this impossibility must be found in a mental vacuum. Communist ideology has no concept of "people" as something to which legitimacy and authority are traced. Mostly it speaks of "the masses," a power concept. Similarly, "the state" is looked upon as a temporary evil, and "the nation" as something to be outgrown. "Society" in communist thinking is a name for the scene of class struggle, and thus devoid of peace. Indeed, "peace" remains inconceivable to a communist except after the total victory of the party over all its enemies. Law, as a complex of norms limiting political power, is a "bourgeois" idea, as is morality apart from the "interests of the class struggle." If communists were to arrive at notions comparable to normal statesmanship, they would have to learn to think about politics in terms of "peace," "society," "higher law," "prudence," "human nature" — all of which they learned to despise and reject when they opted for the party and yielded themselves to its molding discipline. Where there once were viable alternatives to the ideology, there is now a self-inflicted vacuum. Communists could no more return to common-sense ideas than a modern astronomer could return to Ptolemy's universe. A reform of communists by way of a thinking process must be considered improbable.

VI

There remains the question whether reform could issue from spiritual or psychic impulses, i.e., supra-intellectual attraction or infra-intellectual drives. Religious conversion has been reported of a number of former communists who then divested themselves, bit by bit, of the idea system. This occurred, however, primarily to communists in prisons or concentration camps, or in other circumstances that freed them at least temporarily from party pressures. It is not likely to happen to a leader in the thick of daily party decision-making. Psychic impulsions could take effect without such leisure, though. One thinks chiefly of two passions that might possibly erode the communist resolve: the quest for the easy life, and nationalism.

One can expect that a party running a whole country will include many self-seekers, time-servers, careerists and opportunists, and one wonders whether the leaden presence of such people might not bring the party down from its ideological clouds. The party, however, still sets and enforces its ideological orthodoxy, and self-seeking party members could not succeed in their petty pursuits if they did not act as if they were convinced and dedicated communists, so that by their lips and gestures they must reinforce that which the true believers among the membership proclaim with authority. The bandwagon riders may seek to misuse the party's mission for their selfishness, but they do not publicly deny it and thus have nothing to say by way of a common-sense public alternative. At most they generate petty tyranny which attaches to the party's grand tyranny, working not toward erosion but rather adding insult to injury. Moreover, the party has remained ever-watchful of this type of weakness, determined to purge itself periodically of such inadequate characters.

Nationalism has undoubtedly affected the emotions of communists, particularly in relations between "fraternal parties." Russians feel distrust toward a foreign nationalism which they easily attribute to the always present class enemy. A national pride in collective achievement has bolstered communist regimes, without any help from the ideology. National pride and fear played a role in Tito's split from Moscow, and Mao's from Khrushchev. Nationalism may have had a part in the events in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, when local party leaders accepted political notions belonging to the national heritage and added them to the communist elements of their regimes. Also in Poland, communism is widely viewed as "foreign," which is not the case, of course, in Russia. The list could be expanded ad libitum. An admixture of nationalist sentiments of pride, jealousy, suspicion and contempt is one of the facts of life in communist regimes.

One is not justified, though, in inferring from these feelings the espousal of an intellectual concept of "the national interest" by communist leaders, at least not the leaders of the Soviet Union. "National interest" presupposes a notion of representation, continuity and stewardship, a sense of obligation for the people's well-being, an awareness of forming part of a nation among other nations — all of which communists do not have. Such views are not part of a movement existing for a historical mission. Russia, a subject nation, is the party's greatest power resource, and as such has its own requirements. It must be preserved and increased, for the sake of the party's ultimate interest. That care involves also a minimal concern for the people of this territory who, after all, constitute the measure of the party's power. Such a pragmatic concern differs in no way from a soldier's care for his rifle; both are void of any higher significance. Nationalism remains a set of emotions bearing on the mode of communist actions but not on basic communist beliefs.

VII

This discussion, far from asserting with certainty what is in people's minds, has sought to establish prima facie plausibilities and probabilities about where the burden of proof lies in the debate over our *Ostpolitik*, which is likely to increase in urgency and intensity. The probabilities cannot be established with any sense of reality if one focuses so strongly on the communists' pragmatic activities and infra-intellectual impulsions that he fails to take seriously their dogmatic world view. Communists and their ideas surely deserve to be taken as seriously as ourselves. One wonders, though, whether we take ourselves with adequate seriousness, when we permit our yearnings for peace sentimentally to override our intellectual capacity to see things as they are.

THE POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET DISSENT

by Nils H. Wessell

THE evolution of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, erratic though it has been, has cast a fundamentally new light on the interaction between Soviet domestic policies and the outside world. Fifteen years ago, when Soviet persecution of Boris Pasternak was in full swing, many Westerners denounced the campaign but with a feeling of futility. Western defenders of the Soviet novelist and poet were resigned to the fact that the USSR would pursue with impunity whatever policy it wished vis-à-vis Pasternak and others. Today the situation has ostensibly changed. Moscow's interest in détente and its fruits has unexpectedly conferred on Western governments and private organizations a modicum of leverage upon Soviet domestic policies of repression.

For the American observer of the contemporary Russian scene, the fluctuating Soviet campaign against internal dissent raises a number of critical questions. First, is the Soviet Union becoming more "liberal," as suggested by relaxed emigration rules for Soviet Jews, or is Soviet policy tightening, as evidenced by the renewed denunciations of such intellectuals as Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn? Second, how strong is the dissident movement in the Soviet Union and what are the movement's prospects? Third, does the Soviet-American détente serve to promote internal relaxation in the Soviet system, or does it, on the contrary, render compensatory repression all the more likely? Fourth, can the United States, and should it, exert pressure to alleviate domestic conditions in the Soviet Union?

DUAL TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

Notwithstanding the benign light the Soviet-American détente has shed on present Soviet leaders, there seems to be nearly universal agreement among the Soviet intelligentsia that the Brezhnev regime has, if anything, intensified the repression of dissidence since Khrushchev's ouster almost a decade ago. In the last year alone this repression has sanctioned the persecution of some Jews (while others have been permitted to emigrate), the confinement of critics of the regime in mental hospitals, press campaigns and threats against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, political "trials" of such leading Soviet dissenters as the historian Pyotr Yakir and the economist Viktor Krasin, and, in its most mellow form, the forced exile of others such as physicist Valery Chalidze and biochemist Zhores Medvedev.

At least on the surface, however, the Soviet record in the last several months is by no means categorically negative in this respect. As many as 30,000 Jews have been allowed to emigrate since January 1973; the "education" tax on émigrés has been "suspended indefinitely"; several thousand ethnic Germans, descendants of settlers admitted by Catherine the Great to work land along the Volga, have been allowed to emigrate to West Germany; and Soviet efforts to jam the Russian-language broadcasts of the Voice of America, the BBC and the West German radio have been halted, at least for the time being.

This mixture of repression and seeming liberalization naturally has evoked speculation over which Soviet "policy" accurately reflects the intentions of the party leadership. Such an either-or approach, however, misses the point. The point is that Soviet policy has assumed new flexibility in response to pressures from abroad, whether real or anticipated. Just as the modest easing of barriers to Jewish emigration reflected in part the need to win U.S. Congressional support for the extension to the Soviet Union of long-term, government-backed credits and lowered trade tariffs, so permission for German emigration has been aimed at consolidating Moscow's relations with West Germany. Similarly, the reduction in jamming responds to external pressures for a freer flow of information and ideas across national boundaries — pressures the West European governments, even more than the United States, have mounted at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In short, Soviet policy appears to pursue repression where it may safely do so, but to apply expediency where dangers of a hostile foreign reaction are evident.

The recent, continuing and fluctuating campaign against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn underscores this duality of Soviet policy. As suggested by Chalidze, the campaign may well have been instituted precisely because the authorities had no intention of arresting the two dissenters. Its periodic easing suggests the promise of emergent liberalization in the Soviet Union and thus provides a cover for the persecution of less well-known dissidents.

The same dialectical strategy may be discerned in the suspension of the "education" tax on Soviet Jews, which attracted favorable comment abroad but distracted from the real issue — namely, the right to emigrate not only for Jews, but for all Soviet citizens regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation.

REPRESSION AND DÉTENTE

Despite the constructive role of Western pressure on Soviet authorities, the prospects of the movement in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union are not bright. In fact, foreign pressure has tended to dim these prospects — not because foreign protests create a blacklash among Soviet officials by provoking them into vindictive measures, as is sometimes alleged, but rather because Western pressure *has* been singularly effective up to the present. The large-scale emigration of talented and courageous Soviet Jews has narrowed the social base of the movement. The depletion has been compounded by the emigration, sometimes forced, of many leaders of the movement, including Chalidze, Medvedev and the mathematician Alexander Yesenin-Volpin. Yet the domestic crackdown has inflicted far graver damage. In the wake of numerous arrests, trials and hospital confinements, the "movement" has lost its momentum and much of its membership. Nevertheless, the Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights, as it is called, continues to circulate *samizdat* statements among Moscow intellectuals.

The diverse foreign pressures demanding that the Soviet Union curtail its repressive policies are the strongest, if not the sole, reason for optimism concerning the future of the movement for democratic liberties. In the United States, the campaign to intimidate Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn provoked critical responses from the heads of both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Letters from those organizations to Mstislav Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Ekaterina Furtseva, Minister of Culture, clearly implied that the Soviet-American scientific exchanges, in which Soviet leaders have a special interest, would be jeopardized by further harassment of either of these eminent men. The letter of September 14, 1973, to Keldysh from Harvey Brooks, President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, was especially pointed in this regard:

> We hope that on reflection you will be willing to use the great prestige of the Soviet Academy to persuade the authorities in your government that

> any harassment of Academician Sakharov and others could jeopardize the recent trend towards détente as well as the implementation of Secretary Brezhnev's proposals for scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. . . . A growing détente that depends so much on an increasing commitment to cooperation and joint programs of research and technological development requires greater understanding and respect among our scientists and technologists. It is here that the actions to which I refer are taking a heavy toll and the advances made over the last decade are eroding . . . *no amount of official goodwill can compensate for the disillusionment of the scientists and scholars on whom the implementation of these official agreements depends.* (Emphasis added.)

This type of reaction from various individuals and groups in the United States presents Soviet authorities with a special problem. It is more difficult for them to reach with their counterparts in the American scientific community the kind of tacit understanding they have apparently struck with high officials of the U.S. government — namely, that the broader interests of both nations require that divisive issues be swept under the rug or be handled by "quiet diplomacy." At the same time, Soviet authorities lack leverage for reaching such an understanding because it is the Soviet Union which stands to gain the greater benefit from continuing scientific and technological exchanges. Thus, while the détente has permitted the Soviets to create a variety of vested interests in "smooth relations" among American businessmen and policymakers, détente has also heightened the sensitivity of Americans to Soviet domestic repression by bringing it closer to their attention. Expanded exchanges inevitably mean that large numbers of American scientists are coming to know at first hand either the targets of Soviet repression or the Soviet academicians who join in the denunciation campaigns, forty of whom did so against Sakharov.

The intimidation campaign against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn strains Soviet foreign relations in still another respect. Both the French and Italian communist parties — each the second most powerful political party in its country — are in the midst of a delicate process of reassuring Socialists and liberal Catholics that an electoral alliance with them and a potential coalition government harbor no danger of a suppression of democratic freedoms. To safeguard their plans, French and Italian communist leaders have now found it necessary to caution Moscow against further repressions. With reference to Sakharov, Georges Marchais, general secretary of the French party, coupled an attack on the "anti-Sovietism" of some Western supporters of the embattled Soviet physicist with the warning that the PCF would "rear up against . . . and condemn . . . the slightest slip back to the methods" of Stalinist repression. Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian Communist leader, criticized the Soviet campaign in similar terms. Hence, to the extent that the Soviet policy of détente aims at manipulating Western public opinion, the highly visible repression of prominent Soviet dissidents undermines that effort.

The relationship between Soviet domestic repression and foreign policy has long been a subject of debate among observers of the Soviet scene. A facile assumption, made less frequently now than in the past, has been that international détente reduces Soviet leaders' paranoia, eases their perceived need for "vigilance" against ideological "diversions," and acclimates them to the processes of cooperation and compromise. The events of the past two years have challenged this comfortable assumption. The actual dynamics of East-West relations appear to induce the reverse: as the Soviet-American détente deepens, the regime perceives a growing need to cow the population and insulate it from the harmful effects of greater contact with foreigners.

Dissent and Foreign Leverage

Logically, if one were to extrapolate from this, he might conclude that Soviet dissidents cannot survive much more Soviet-American good will or another summit. But whether this pessimism is justified depends on the nature of the détente pursued by the United States. A U.S. policy that proceeds to cement Soviet-American relations in disregard of Soviet internal policies would invite a sharp step-up in Soviet repression. On the other hand, a U.S. policy that extracts modest but specific concessions in Soviet domestic policies for the sake of détente might prevent such a crackdown. Andrei Sakharov reflected this view in his open letter to the U.S. Congress voicing his support of the Jackson Amendment:

> The abandonment of a policy of principle would be a betrayal of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camps and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin Wall.
>
> Such a denial would lead to stronger repressions on ideological grounds. It would be tantamount to total capitulation of democratic principles in the face of blackmail, deceit and violence.[1]

The debate over whether the United States should make improved relations with the USSR contingent on Soviet internal relaxation has taken place not only among American observers but

[1] *Washington Post*, September 19, 1973.

among prominent Soviet dissidents as well. Sakharov's warning that Western trade and capital investment in the Soviet Union would enable Moscow to overcome economic bottlenecks and concentrate resources on military procurement and research and development has not been shared by certain other critics of the regime. Taking issue with Sakharov's view that the U.S. Congress should use the Soviet thirst for Western technology as a means of prying domestic concessions out of the Brezhnev leadership, the dissident historian Roy Medvedev — brother of the exiled biochemist — warned that such a tactic overestimated the influence of foreign opinion on the Soviet leadership and would play into the hands of neo-Stalinist factions. Moreover, in a *samizdat* essay circulating last November, Medvedev argued that the present relationship between détente and repression will be reversed in the long run:

> Although relaxation of international tensions is not accompanied at present by broadening of democratic freedoms and is used even by certain circles to intensify pressures on dissidents, the more distant prospect — though this is not too consoling a prognosis — is that international détente will undoubtedly promote broadening of democratic rights and freedoms in our country.[2]

The conflicting views of these two intellectuals, who incidentally are close friends, are particularly important at a time when the U.S. Administration and the Congress must resolve the thorny issues connected with measures to increase Soviet-American economic cooperation. Although American economists generally discount the degree to which extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) status would enable the Soviet Union to earn needed hard currency by spurring its exports to this country, the Brezhnev leadership has been insistent on the MFN issue. Considerations of prestige apparently weigh more heavily in the Soviet position than the fact that most exports to the United States are likely to be raw materials and primary products. These products are only minimally affected by the absence of preferential MFN treatment since U.S. tariff rates tend to climb with the degree of processing.[3]

[2] *New York Times*, November 9, 1973.

[3] John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday, *U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy,* prepared for the Sub-committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Congress (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 54. The authors of this study note that if the structure of Soviet exports should change in the direction of advanced industrial products, the extension of MFN status might have a significant impact on Soviet sales.

The extension of Export-Import Bank credits is of far greater importance to Soviet plans than the MFN provision, since the attraction of U.S. capital investment is a prime goal of Soviet trade policy. Under legislation proposed by Representative Charles A. Vanik (D-Ohio) and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Washington), both the credits and MFN treatment would be prohibited unless the President determined that the Soviet Union as a "nonmarket economy country" had ceased to deny the right of emigration to all Soviet citizens (not only Jews) and to impose anything more than a nominal emigration tax. Since the House voted overwhelmingly in December to deny credits but not MFN status to the Soviet Union pending liberalization of Soviet emigration practices and since the Jackson Amendment has almost eighty cosponsors, some sort of restrictions on Soviet-American trade will very likely emerge from the Congress.

Most discussions of these issues today end with a choosing of sides for or against the Jackson-Vanik amendments. Left in abeyance is the question whether these measures can achieve either their stated ends or the broader purpose of stalling the Soviet-American détente on the grounds, implicit in Sakharov's further statements, that the Soviet Union cannot be a reliable partner so long as it practices a ferocious intolerance at home and shrouds this and other national security policies in a cloak of secrecy and half-truths.

Few serious students of the Soviet system believe the Brezhnev leadership can or will comply with the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendments. To permit free and unencumbered emigration from the Soviet Union would undermine the foundations of the regime. While fewer Soviet citizens might emigrate than Westerners expect, the fact that they were given the opportunity to do so would eliminate one basic psychological ingredient in the communist system of voluntary and involuntary control: the certain knowledge on the part of the citizen that he cannot in the last analysis evade the overall control of the administrative apparatus. The existence of a viable alternative — emigration — would open a veritable Pandora's box of problems for the authorities.

If the Jackson Amendment cannot achieve its stated goal, can it accomplish its broader purpose? On reflection the answer would seem to be negative. Although increased economic cooperation appears to be a major motive behind the Brezhnev foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, the détente — however defined — preceded

Brezhnev's ascent to power and would probably survive his fall. The elements of détente in Soviet-American relations derive from considerations beyond the prospect of increased trade, and they will continue to motivate Soviet leaders even in the event that trade fails to expand appreciably. In short, irrespective of the circumscriptions of the Jackson Amendment, the détente is likely to continue so long as the superpowers share an interest in avoiding nuclear war and so long as Sino-Soviet relations remain strained. The net effect of the amendment is likely to be a slowing down, but not an elimination, of the process of technology transfer, and the erection of a substantial barrier to the flow of U.S. capital investment to the Soviet Union.

What, then, are the uses of the Jackson Amendment from the viewpoint of loosening internal controls in the USSR? Since Soviet interest in technology transfer and foreign capital investment remains high, the United States clearly has some degree of leverage. Before examining how this leverage may be used, however, it is necessary to question *whether* it should be used for the purpose of affecting Soviet domestic policies. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked the rhetorical question at his confirmation hearing: "Should it be the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal?" Only a few idealists in the Wilsonian tradition and still fewer "realists" would disagree with the negative answer implied. Yet, the problem here is that the wrong question has been asked. A better question would be whether *one* goal of American foreign policy might not be to assure that peaceful coexistence is not a cover for our toleration of an internal war directed against Soviet advocates of genuine détente with the United States. A firm U.S. policy on Soviet repression will serve the national interest in the long run.

The effort to utilize the United States' limited leverage to ease the plight of Soviet dissidents has been assailed on the grounds that interference in the domestic affairs of another state is improper. But the Jackson Amendment does not entail actual interference in Soviet internal affairs. Rather it offers the USSR a choice between two alternatives: credits and tariff reductions with free emigration, or restricted emigration without credits and tariff concessions. Moscow need not accept U.S. conditions if it deems them improper. As Chalidze has observed, it is, after all, an internal American affair whether and under what conditions the United States extends economic concessions.

Again, the argument has been advanced that efforts to alter some of the worst aspects of Soviet repression are counterproductive. One commentator has cautioned:

> Turn the situation around and the cogency of [Kissinger's] question is clear. Should the Soviet Union refuse to deal with the United States, for example, until the Federal Government finds and tries those responsible for the killings at Kent State? Or until all charges are dropped against those who resisted the draft in the belief that the war in Vietnam was immoral and illegal? However justified in the abstract, or from the Soviet viewpoint, such a policy probably would seem self-righteous and self-defeating to most Americans.[4]

This line of thought may appear persuasive until one realizes that foreign pressure has been indispensable in securing what modest progress has thus far been achieved in Soviet emigration policies. Moreover, the Soviet leadership almost certainly ignored the option of pressuring the United States on the above-mentioned issues for one simple reason — they were of no concern to Moscow.

In any event, the issue revolves less around moral imperatives than around the larger imperative that the Soviets must not emerge with asymmetrical advantages from closer relations with the United States. Détente confers on the Soviet Union a number of indirect benefits stemming from reduced Western public concern over defense preparedness and common alliance commitments. Largely immune to similar, broadly based pressures, the Soviet leadership has had, and will continue to have, the freedom of action it needs to pursue détente internationally while undertaking large-scale military modernization programs at home. No Western democratic government enjoys the same latitude.

Against this background, Brezhnev's repeated statements that peaceful coexistence demands an intensification of the ideological struggle inevitably arouse anxieties. These anxieties are heightened by Soviet internal policies aimed at crushing a minority of independently thinking intellectuals. Apprehensions have also been compounded by reports that Brezhnev has assured East European leaders — for whatever reason internal to Soviet-bloc politics — that Moscow's détente policies will result in the achievement of Soviet military superiority while Western public opinion is lulled.

Under these circumstances, even if some Soviet statements on the ideological struggle have been viewed in the West with excessive alarm, Soviet concessions in the direction of relaxed internal controls would serve as a bona fide of Moscow's commitment to a long-term cooperative relationship with the United States. They would also partially offset otherwise asymmetrical Soviet benefits derived from the impact of détente on Western public opinion. Finally, a freer flow of information, ideas and people between the Soviet Union and the world outside would enable American policymakers to judge Soviet capabilities and intentions more surely — an essential precondition for a stable and lasting détente.

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[4] Tom Wicker, "Kissinger's Question," *New York Times,* September 15, 1973.

VULNERABILITIES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

by Allan C. Brownfeld

AT a time when the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of détente toward the United States and Western Europe, life is becoming increasingly harsh and repressive for the Russian people. It is ironic that many in the West take Soviet assurances of peaceful intentions at face value, while ignoring the real evidence which leads to a far different conclusion.

Consider, for example, the rehabilitation of dictator Josef Stalin. More than two decades after his death on March 5, 1953, Stalin enjoys a more favorable public reputation than Nikita Khrushchev, the man who denounced him for his political purges and "cult of personality." Roy Medvedev, a dissident who chronicled the Stalin purges in his major work, *Let History Judge,* has observed that not only is Stalin's official image refurbished but that "some party officials openly and proudly call themselves Stalinists, without risking expulsion from the party."[1]

Shortly after Khrushchev's famous "secret speech" at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in 1956, thousands of Stalin's victims were freed from prison camps and cleared of charges. Hundreds of towns, streets and sites bearing Stalin's name were renamed, including Stalingrad, where the battle the Russians consider the turning point of World War II was fought. The city became Volgograd and the battle became the Battle on the Volga.

After Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, his successors reversed the trend. They signaled the end of de-Stalinization in May 1965, during celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the allied victory over Germany. For the first time Stalin was pictured on television screens as a wartime leader and father figure for the Soviet people. The battle of Stalingrad regained its original name.

Beginning in 1966, Stalin's wartime leadership was increasingly praised. In 1967, a handbook for Communist Party officials called him an economic leader in peacetime and asserted that he had "made a serious contribution to the development of the world Communist and liberation movement." In 1969, the leadership formally celebrated the ninetieth anniversary of his birth, and in

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[1] Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York: Knopf, 1972).

June 1970 a bust of Stalin was placed over what had been his virtually unmarked grave behind the Lenin Mausoleum. In 1972, the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union was commemorated on Stalin's birthday, December 21, rather than on the proper day — nine days later.

It is not only the man who has been rehabilitated. His policies of repression have also been brought back. A lengthy article in *Pravda* in June 1973 made this clear by pointing out that close economic relations with the United States were not to be associated with a relaxation of political controls in the Soviet Union. The article, "A Turning Point to Stable, Peaceful Relations," by Daniel F. Kraminov, stated, "Only naive people could expect the recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence by leaders of the greatest capitalist power to eliminate or weaken the basic conflict of our epoch, the conflict between capitalism and socialism, or that ideological struggle between them will lose its significance in the international arena." Kraminov wrote that expanded foreign trade with the United States, such as the wheat deal, "will represent a promising way of raising the efficiency of the Soviet economy."

The Soviet secret police have been busy implementing the policies set forth in government pronouncements. An intensive eighteen-month drive has all but ended the Soviet civil rights movement's activities as an organized group. While a few of its prominent members remain free, most are either in prison, under investigation and awaiting arrest, underground or simply have withdrawn.

The publications that knit the dissidents into their loosely organized democratic movement, including the *Chronicle of Current Events*, have been suppressed. None has appeared for more than ten months. It was reported in May 1973 that arrests of civil-rights-group members numbered more than sixty-five in the previous year, and that in the previous eighteen months, more than 160 persons had been arrested on charges of anti-Soviet nationalism in the Ukraine as part of a related crackdown on Ukrainian nationalists.[2]

There has been, in addition, renewed suppression of religion. In Siberia, a well known Buddhist scholar was sentenced to five years in prison on charges of running an illegal sect for criminal ends. Far to the west, in Byelorussia, four Baptists received undisclosed jail terms for giving children unauthorized religious lessons. Elsewhere in the country, a Ukrainian secret policeman resurrected the old Stalinist charge that "bourgeois nationalists," who include leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and "Zionists," are allied against Soviet interests. A Leningrad museum features both Charles Manson, the California cult leader and murderer, and the late Cardinal Francis Spellman in its exhibit on the evils of religious belief. In Turkmenistan, local communist leaders called for an increase in anti-religious propaganda against Moslems and the introduction of more holidays and party ceremonies to make the official atheism more attractive.

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[2] *New York Times,* August 30, 1973.

If ever a system manifested its internal vulnerabilities and weaknesses, it is the system currently in power in the Soviet Union. While Soviet military and technological advances have led many in the West to believe that the USSR is maneuvering in today's complex world from a position of strength, the fact remains that the Moscow leadership speaks only for itself and can in no sense claim to represent the people it governs. In a time of trouble, it can expect little support. Instead, the religious feelings and national identities present beneath the surface of the imposed collectivism of Soviet rule are always ready to emerge. This can hardly be a comforting thought to the regime in the Kremlin.

II

That the Soviet leadership views its own people as the primary enemy is shown, in part, by the manner in which the re-Stalinization process and the new reign of terror against dissidents are being carried out. Consider the manner in which psychiatric hospitals are used to repress those who have expressed what the state considers to be "unorthodox" and "antisocial" opinions. In September 1972, one man who managed to leave the Soviet Union after several experiences in such psychiatric hospitals, the distinguished mathematician Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, testified about his experiences before a U.S. Senate committee. An important document containing this testimony and other previously unpublished material was issued by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, entitled *Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union.*[3]

Although his mathematical work was well recognized, Yesenin-

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[3] *Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union,* Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 26, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1973).

Volpin was told that he would never rise above the rank of junior researcher at the All Russian Institute. His superiors warned him: "While you continue your obscure social activity you never will be a senior researcher." He asked: "Is such discrimination in the Soviet Union possible?" He was advised that not only is it possible, but someone conducting "anti-Soviet activity" could be put in jail.[4] What was Dr. Yesenin-Volpin's "anti-Soviet activity?" He objected to the arrest of distinguished academicians who had called for human rights. For this "crime" he was declared insane and sent to a mental institution.

Any imprisoned person may be sentenced to a psychiatric hospital *in absentia*. No procedural rights are granted to an individual who is declared insane and, therefore, not responsible for his actions. Yesenin-Volpin was one of the lucky ones. Ninety-five of his colleagues signed a letter protesting his incarceration. As a result of this pressure he was eventually released and, in effect, expelled from the country.

Others have not been so fortunate. General Pyotr Grigorenko was imprisoned in a mental institution in 1969 because, disregarding the warning of the Moscow authorities, he journeyed to Tashkent to deliver a speech in defense of a group of Crimean Tartars who were being tried for their attempt to return to their homeland. He was accused of engaging in "anti-Soviet calumnies," then pronounced "not responsible" for his actions. In the spring of 1970 he was locked up in a special hospital at Chernyakhovsk and he remains there because he refuses to compromise on his convictions.

Confined in the Leningrad Special Hospital are Viktor Feinberg, imprisoned for participating in a demonstration of protests against the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and Vladimir Borisov, an electro-technician, because he signed a petition addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights. Both have twice engaged in lengthy hunger strikes — in protest against the inhuman treatment of other inmates as well as against the conditions of their own imprisonment and their total deprivation of civil rights.

In early October 1956, in the city of Gruiev, a forty-year-old engineer, Pyotr Lysak, was arrested because he had sent written questions to a communist lecturer, among them: "Why is it that in an allegedly free country such as the Soviet Union, foreign radio broadcasts are being jammed?"[5] On being accused of engaging in calumnious statements against the Soviet regime, Lysak replied that this charge was itself a calumny, whereupon he was proclaimed "not responsible" for his actions and confined to the Leningrad psychiatric hospital. There, in discussions with psychiatrists, he continued to insist that radio broadcasts were, in fact, being jammed. He remained under treatment in this hospital for more than eight years and was then transferred to a "psychiatric colony" at Sychiovka. His further fate is unknown.

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[4] Personal interview.

[5] *New York Times*, September 2, 1973.

Vladimir Bukovsky, who has been in and out of mental hospitals and prisons for such "offenses" as the possession of Milovan Djilas' book, *The New Class*, and protests on behalf of writers such as Sinyavsky and Daniel, has reported about his experiences. He spent what he calls "fifteen months of hell" in a prison asylum in Leningrad.

"There were about 1,000 men in the asylum, political prisoners and insane murderers," says Bukovsky. "The sick raved, and healthy suffered. I had two wardmates, an old Ukrainian nationalist who'd been there sixteen years, and a maniac who murdered his children, then cut off his own ears. The Ukrainian spent every waking minute yelling about independence. The murderer just sat and smiled all day."

Three methods of "medical punishment," reminiscent of the Nazi doctors at Buchenwald and Auschwitz, were used.

> On the recommendation of a trustee or turnkey, doctors would inject a drug that produced severe stomach cramps, fever, intense pain, and a temperature of 104 degrees. Another drug reserved for serious misbehavior induced sleep and dulled the brain. Inmates were punished with ten days of daily injections. They woke up as human vegetables. The third punishment was the canvas bandage. An inmate would be tightly swathed in wet canvas from neck to toes. The canvas shrinks as it dries. It is not a pretty sight.[6]

III

Even apart from the return to Stalinism, the use of psychiatric institutions to punish political opposition, and the increasing imposition of Marxist orthodoxy upon all forms of literary and artistic expression, the Soviet leadership has been disturbed by the continuing growth of religious faith and its failure to eliminate the influence of Christianity, Judaism and Islam among the population.

During recent years in the West there has been a great deal of discussion about the Soviet persecution of the Jews. Demonstrations have called for the right of Jews to emigrate, and men and women who never condemn communism for any of its other depredations find themselves vocal and vehement with regard to Soviet anti-Semitism. It is proper that Soviet anti-Semitism be condemned, but the unfortunate implication in this campaign is that Jews, and Jews alone, suffer religious persecution and that if, somehow, the Jews were permitted to leave, everything in the Soviet Union would become humane and acceptable.

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[6] *Abuse of Psychiatry. . . , op. cit.*

The facts tell a far different story. On February 1, 1972, for example, the Norwegian Parliament discussed the question, "Can anything be done on the part of Norway to end the persecution of Christians in the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain?" It was later pointed out in the press that

> many of the countries in which religious persecution is carried out under government auspices have signed the U.N. Charter on Human Rights, of which freedom of religion is one of the fundamental ones. People who are today suffering under religious persecution appeal to this Charter. On the 27th of March, 1972, after the Storting debate had taken place, 17,000 Catholics in Lithuania protested against the systematic religious persecution which is in contravention to the Soviet constitution — as practiced in Lithuania.

The volume, *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967,*[7] reminds us that ever since the Revolution of 1917, religion has been held in disrepute in the Soviet Union, and that from that time forward the Soviet government has made strenuous efforts to eliminate it. In 1925, the League of Militant Atheists was formed to publish and spread anti-religious materials and, like the government's economic plan, an atheistic five-year plan was launched in 1927 and again in 1932. The program aimed at the complete disappearance of God's name from the USSR by 1937. In the late 1930's the League was reported to have 3.5 million members. Richard Marshall, Jr., in his foreword to this volume, criticizes those who have tended to overlook and minimize Soviet religious persecution:

> Exponents of the . . ."soft" view would appear to be unaware of the harsh repressive measures taken against various religious groups and individuals throughout the last half century for no other reason than the fact of their religious beliefs. They also do not face up to the contradiction between the guarantee of freedom of confession on the one hand, and, on the other, the strictures placed upon religious instruction by a continuing and extensive campaign of anti-religious propaganda. . . .

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[7] Richard H. Marshall, Jr., editor, *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971).

Furthermore, they do not seem to be aware of either the tenacity of traditional religion or of the increased interest in religion in the U.S.S.R., especially among the intelligentsia, which has been manifested in a variety of ways since Stalin's death.[8]

Many in the West believed the death of Stalin would usher in a more liberal period in the life of Soviet citizens. But with regard to religion, at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in 1961 Khrushchev openly gave his support to the anti-religious campaign which by then was well under way. He declared:

> The battle with survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of the people, the changing by our revolution of the habits and customs of millions of people built up over centuries, is a prolonged, and not a simple matter. Survivals of the past are a dreadful power, which like a nightmare, prevail over the minds of living creatures.

After admitting that, more than forty years after the Russian Revolution, religion and other "subversive" forms of thought were still prevalent and widespread, Khrushchev noted that "Communist education presupposes emancipation from religious prejudices and superstitions. . . . A well thought out and well proportioned system of scientific atheist propaganda is necessary, which would embrace every strata and group of society to prevent the spread of religious attitudes, especially among the young. . . ."[9]

The rules concerning religion were severely enforced and strengthened. Beginning in late 1961, children under eighteen were forbidden to attend Baptist worship services, and by the fall of 1963 this restriction was being applied in Orthodox churches as well. In 1963, the Central Committee of the Komsomol urged that services not be allowed to commence if children were present in church. Baptism was made all but impossible. Seizing upon the occasion offered by the widely publicized death of an infant after an Orthodox baptism, the government passed a law making it a crime to cause a threat to health under the guise of religion. Children have been taken away from parents who refused to conform to the party rules. *Sowjetskaia Russia* recounts how a Baptist mother named Marinkowa had six children taken away from her because she gave them Christian faith and forbade them to wear the communist pioneer necktie. When she heard the sentence, she said only, "I suffer for my faith."

With respect to the subject peoples, that all the years of

[8] *Ibid.*, p. xi.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

repression have not succeeded in eliminating their national and religious identities and loyalties has been made evident in the ever bolder actions of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Jews, fundamentalist Protestants and others. In Lithuania, as mentioned above, more than 17,000 people signed an open letter to the United Nations deploring the deportation of Catholic bishops, the arrest of priests, and the closing or destruction of churches. Perhaps the most moving temporal appeal was made by Simus Kudirka, the Lithuanian sailor who was sentenced to ten years at hard labor for having attempted to escape aboard a U.S. Coast Guard vessel in 1970. At his 1971 trial, Kudirka cried: "All I demand is an independent Lithuania, one that is not occupied by any army, and has a free, democratic system of elections."[10]

IV

Within the Soviet Union certain dissidents have not been intimidated by the renewed repression — timed to coincide with the external policy of "détente" and "coexistence" — but have spoken out in terms more challenging than ever before. Where critics previously asked only that the Soviet leadership adhere to its own rules, particularly the Soviet Constitution, now some are declaring that socialism itself is a failure and should be replaced by a system in which the freedom and integrity of the individual are regarded as of primary importance.

Andrei Sakharov, the man most responsible for the creation of the Soviet Union's first hydrogen bomb in 1960, is one of the most persistent voices of dissent in the USSR today. In an interview with Olle Stenholm, a Swedish radio correspondent in Moscow, later published in the Stockholm newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, he detailed his criticisms of Soviet government policy:

> The pure socialization of the state has led to inhibition of personal initiative in areas where it otherwise would come into its own. Restraining personal initiative has a negative effect on the living standard of the people and simply makes life much more drab and more filled with melancholy than would be necessary. That also applies to personal initiative in consumption, service, education and health-care areas. Everything would get a more positive effect were the monolithic structure of the state to be weakened. The party's monopolization of the government rule has reached limits which have made the ruling body itself realize that the whole thing is untenable, that the governing is getting ineffective.

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[10] *Washington Post*, August 12, 1973, p. C4.

Again, defying a high-level warning against foreign contacts, Dr. Sakharov summoned Western newsmen to his apartment on August 21, 1973, and, in a ninety-minute conversation, ranged widely over problems posed by the current relaxation of international tension and the prospects of expanded East-West trade. He declared that large amounts of Western technological aid to the Soviet Union would assist the communist government in solving economic problems it could not solve on its own and would enable it to concentrate on accumulating strength. "As a result," he said, "the world would become helpless before this uncontrollable bureaucratic machine." Unqualified Western willingness to improve relations with the Soviet Union would also "mean cultivating a country where anything that happens may be shielded from outside eyes — a masked country that hides its real face. No one should ever be expected to live next to such a neighbor, especially one who is armed to the teeth."[11]

The Soviet Union's desire for expanded economic relations with the Western world is, as Sakharov explained, based on its inability, under a socialist economic system, to meet the needs of its people. In the face of chronic economic problems, compounded by a disastrous harvest and by the inefficiency of collectivized agriculture, the leadership has changed its policy from autarky, or economic self-reliance. Discussing this shift in policy in the *Wall Street Journal* of June 20, 1973, Robert Keatley notes that

> Soviet problems are complex. Mr. Brezhnev acknowledges there is more to life than steel and cement, and thus is placing more emphasis upon consumer goods, especially on meat and dairy products. But this stress on quantity, better quality and extra variety compounds Moscow's already difficult planning process. The Soviet economy is highly centralized, and its growing complexity, as new priorities are introduced, has caused many fresh problems for officials who try to balance flows of goods and raw materials among farms and factories.

By the end of 1972, the goals of the ninth five-year plan were in jeopardy, and the leadership was forced to make substantial changes in its domestic and foreign economic policies, states James Noren, a senior economist at the Central Intelligence Agency who specializes in Soviet affairs. These changes include a major reordering of investment priorities, the cuts to be absorbed by heavy industry so that the output of food and consumer goods will not suffer excessively. The goal is to put the overall plan back on course. According to Noren, it "can best be characterized as a last-ditch attempt to save the 1971-75 plan."[12]

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[11] *Ibid.*

Labor productivity is another continuing problem. Although the USSR has a labor force 50 per cent larger than that of the United States, it produces approximately half as much. Thus, Noren observes, "The Soviet leaders believe that the shortcut to technological progress and accelerated growth of productivity lies in importing Western machinery and technology while promoting other technical exchanges."[13]

The government also looks to the United States for a way out of its agricultural difficulties. The communist leadership wishes to make more meat and dairy products available, but the USSR is unable to grow the feed grains needed by larger livestock herds. As a result, large orders must be placed overseas, particularly with the United States. Even with improved harvests, experts predict that the Soviet Union will have to import twelve million tons of grain annually if the Brezhnev program is continued.

Moreover, because the Soviet economy cannot finance the purchases it needs, Moscow has called for subsidization by the United States, including American credits and tariff concessions. Robert Kovach, another CIA specialist on Soviet economics, estimates that country's 1972 hard-currency trade deficit at $600 million and says that this year's figure may reach $2 billion.[14] One partial solution would be to sell gold from reserves which totaled 1,900 tons at the end of 1971. But in the long run exports will have to be increased to finance the high rate of imports contemplated. American subsidization is providing the Soviet leadership with an opportunity to benefit from Western trade without, in any sense, altering the inefficient socialist economy at home.

It is not only the collective farm system of agricultural production that has failed, but also the food-distribution system. For example, V. K. Pobokin, director of a state fruit and vegetable farm in the Krasnodar territory, east of the Black Sea, frets because he cannot get half-liter containers for food packaging. Consumers must bring their own glass jars to the farm. "The glass plants put out three to ten liter jars," he complains, "figuring it is most profitable for them."[15] But what housewife wants to carry two gallons of tomatoes? Why does the glass plant make only large jars? It is under the command of the Ministry of Building Materials Industry, which is unconcerned about vegetables.

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[12] *Wall Street Journal*, June 20, 1973.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Edward Hughes, "Why the Soviet Union Can't Feed Itself," *The Reader's Digest*, April 1973, pp. 146-150.

Edward Hughes, for some time head of *Time*'s Central European Bureau, writes that

> Bad planning underlies almost all the problems. Year after year, statisticians miscalculate essential details. At the Luza State Farm in Omsk province, farmers normally sell their hogs to the Omsk-Kirov Meat Combine. Last year the combine instructed the state farm: "Hold back deliveries. We will not accept livestock." The trouble was that the planners had stepped up the state farm's production but had not touched Omsk-Kirov's capacity. The animals could not be processed and, as a result, 1,000 hogs never reached Soviet consumers.[16]

Reflecting on the life of a collective farmer, Hughes notes that

> Though wages on collective farms have increased to about $100 a month, life in most of the countryside is hard. Fewer than half the farm settlements are electrified. A Moscow newspaper survey of Smolensk province found that 25 per cent of the population had to "trudge through mud and snow for kilometers just to reach a store, movie or schoolhouse." Moreover, the collective farmer is bound to his farm much as was the 19th century serf. He is denied the "internal passport" required in the USSR to move from one place to another. He has no say in choosing his boss, or redress against unfair treatment. Many farmers get even with this brutal life by dabbling in shady enterprises. . . .[17]

V

With the advent of the wheat deal with the United States, and further business arrangements with the West, Moscow has been eager to discuss a period of "détente" and an "end" to the Cold War. Yet its policy of re-Stalinization and repression has been intensified, with the expectation that observers in the West will overlook such a contradiction. It is also a continuing admission by the Soviet leadership that it remains uncertain about the loyalty of its own people. It has good reason for such fear.

As Paul Wohl wrote in the August 21, 1973 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*, "Cultural repression has reached a new high in the U.S.S.R. – but so has the defiance of some of its victims." An example of such defiance came to light when the Soviet Writers Union asked Vladimir Maximov, one of the most promising and widely read writers of the postwar generation, to confess his errors. Maximov replied:

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[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*

> I have no reason to apologize to you and I regret nothing. When you are alone with yourself and bravely, without prejudice, face reality, you too are assailed again and again by the question: Why? This is what happened when I wrote my novel.
>
> Why, in this country of triumphant socialism, does drunkenness take on the scale of a national tragedy? Why do egotism, corruption, barbarism threaten to become the rule of our day-by-day life? What are the causes of this behavior? . . .
>
> The consequences will be incalculable and the ensuing calamities innumerable. If our society does not give itself account of this today, tomorrow will be too late.
>
> I am deeply conscious of the consequences which my expulsion from the Writers Union will have for me. But in the end I am buoyed by one certitude. . . . In the vast spaces of my country I shall find young men who will follow the same road as I. They will not allow our state to be buried stealthily, despite all the efforts displayed by gravediggers of every shading and caliber.[18]

On June 27, 1973, Maximov was expelled. For the younger generation his ouster has the same significance the ejection of Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn had for the older generation. Much like Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, Maximov writes of religion and individuality, and opposes the brutality of a collectivist state. His most recent novel, *Seven Days of Creation,* describes the fate of the Lashkov family, whose children gradually reject the inhumanity they experience in their place of work, in corrective labor camps, and in their social relations. One after another, they discover religion, a simple religion of truth and love.

Vladimir Maximov was born in 1933, grew up in an orphanage where communism is constantly inculcated into children, yet became a believer in religion and in individualism. His background is clearly "proletarian." After graduating from factory school, he worked for several years as a stonemason and plasterer on building sites all over the Soviet Union. Despite many official efforts to silence him, he remains outspoken. In a letter to the West German Heinrich Boll, winner of a Nobel Prize for literature, Maximov sharply criticized Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* as one of "appeasing" the Soviet Union. He expressed the view that the West should permit the Soviet regime to grapple with the difficulties it has created for itself — rather than bail it out.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn is known the world over as a fearless critic of the Soviet regime. In August 1973, when his application to move from the provincial city of Ryazan to Moscow had been rejected, although his wife is a legal resident of Moscow and the law allows a non-Muscovite to move in with a Moscow spouse, this literary lion gave Western newsmen copies of an open letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs in which he wrote:

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[18] *Christian Science Monitor,* August 21, 1973, p. 1.

> With all the discussions about the freedom of emigration for thousands, one cannot but be struck by the fact that millions lack the right to pick their place of residence and occupation even within their own country. . . .
>
> I want to remind you that serfdom in our country was abolished 112 years ago. . . . It would seem that I, like any other citizen of this country, am neither a serf nor a slave and should be free to live wherever I find it necessary, and no one, not even the highest authorities, should have the proprietary right to separate me from my family.[19]

Shortly after this statement Solzhenitsyn, in a rare and bluntly frank interview with two Western newsmen, declared that his life had been threatened. Telling the men from the Associated Press and *Le Monde* that he and his family had received warnings, he said that if he was imprisoned or killed, "the main part of my works will be published." "If I am declared killed or suddenly mysteriously dead," he continued, "[the world can conclude that] I have been killed with the approval of the K.G.B. or by it." He stated that the period of repression now being imposed in the Soviet Union represents "Chineseization," but added that it would be impossible for the authorities to return to the suppression that prevailed under Stalin.

Concerning the death-threats, Solzhenitsyn remarked, "The question arises, if our State Security Committee protects the world's most advanced state order, which, according to the world's only true philosophy of life is guaranteed universal historical victory anyway, why such fuss and such low methods?"[20]

Discussing the meaning of the crackdown on dissidents, Theodore Shabad of the *New York Times* notes that

> the developments suggest that an effort is being made to eliminate the last vestiges of domestic opposition and clear the decks for dealing with the West on the grand plan for closer economic collaboration. The Soviet leadership has never made a secret of the distinction between its desire for better political relations with the West and readiness to open tightly controlled borders to an unimpeded flow of people and ideas. The Kremlin contends that such a flow would be used by the West to undermine the Soviet system.[21]

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[19] *New York Times*, August 29, 1973, p. 1.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*, September 2, 1973, p. E5.

VI

Even more surely than in the case of its own people, the Soviet Union knows that it does not command the support of the peoples of Eastern Europe, whom it controls through the use and the threat of force. Dissidents there are speaking out against communist rule and repression, much as is occurring within the USSR, although they are more reluctant to speak out publicly and vocally. Kenneth Ames, the East European correspondent for *The Economist,* reports from Rumania that

> There have been films obliquely criticizing the Stalinist era and veiled parables against oppression. One daring effort drew queues at Bucharest cinemas until it was withdrawn after a few weeks as "unsuitable." Entitled "The Power and the Truth," the film showed the transformation of underground, war-time Communists into party leaders, their quarrels and alienation from the masses they professed to represent. The two principal characters were unmistakably based on the former party leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and his successor, President Nicolae Ceausescu. "It did rather look," said a Rumanian who saw the film with me, "as though the younger man, who physically resembled Ceausescu, had dealt his leader a political stab in the back. A bit too rich, that."[22]

Concerning the attitude of intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Ames reports that a distinguished writer in Prague, known for several books published abroad before 1968, commented:

> Many of us are writing for our desk drawers; I have three completed manuscripts and several of my friends have been working hard. We shall wait until they can be published here. I regard Solzhenitsyn as a great writer, but personally I do not wish to adopt his system and have my books published abroad until they appear in my own language. Maybe it's chauvinism, but that's how I feel.[23]

Ames relates that

> The all-powerful Writers' Union is dominated by hard-liners, more functionaries than writers, and almost nothing of any significance has been published in Czechoslovakia in five years. Pre-Christmas publishers' lists revealed a wasteland even in writing for the very young — there were only four titles in Slovak, none in Czech. Czechoslovak film directors, once the envy of avant-gardists everywhere, do not fare any better. Their studios are almost silent after several years of "shooting for the can" — making films that were banned from distribution. The cinemas fill up for showings of Class-B American and Western European movies (because the Class-A films are either too controversial or too expensive). Soviet films normally play to thin houses.[24]

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[22] Kenneth Ames, "The Psychedelic Carrot," *New York Times* Magazine, August 19, 1973, p. 11.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*

Throughout the Soviet bloc, writers, scientists, artists, movie directors — almost the entire creative community — have suffered increasing constraints since the announcement of the policy of "détente." The stress within the communist world has been on continued ideological warfare. This was re-emphasized by a warning from top television commentator Yury Zhukov against listening to Voice of America broadcasts, and young people have been warned not to write listener letters to the Voice of America. On August 22, 1973, a *Pravda* article, maintaining that "problems of ideological struggle cannot be a subject for intergovernmental negotiations," spelled out the new party line, reinforcing the distinction between peace and trade, on the one hand, and the exchange of ideas, on the other.

Regarding the renewed Soviet repression, Robert R. Bowie, a member of the faculty of Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, remarked

> Lowering the barriers to freer exchange will take a long time. It is intimately linked to the dependence of the Soviet and East European regimes on domestic repression to maintain one-party rule. Major change will only be feasible as the regimes come to rest on the consent of their citizens for their legitimacy. That evolution will be slow at best, and will depend mainly on internal forces; but it can be helped along to some degree.
>
> Radio Free Europe and similar facilities which broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can play a constructive role by providing objective information. The Soviet campaign to silence them as contrary to the "spirit of détente" is utterly self-serving and should be ignored.[25]

VII

To recapitulate, the Soviet Union is an internally weak and vulnerable society. The one-party governmental leadership does not have the support of the people and, consequently, must engage in recurrent campaigns to keep their hostility and opposition in check. Despite almost sixty years of communist rule, the belief in religion and in individualism is growing, most strongly in the younger generation. No longer are critics cowed by the threat of government repression. In response to threats of death or imprisonment, some now call press conferences for Western newsmen. Such actions are indicative of how far from total control the Soviet government still is. In Eastern Europe, the natural opposition to totalitarian rule which has surfaced is even stronger than that in the USSR, for it combines a nationalistic desire for independence with long-standing hostility to the presence of Soviet troops.

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[25] *Christian Science Monitor,* August 22, 1973.

In many respects, the Soviet leadership is able to maintain its position of power primarily because of the aid and assistance it is seeking, and receiving, from the West. It is for this reason that distinguished Soviet dissidents have risked their lives to warn the West that the policy of détente being pursued by communist leaders is designed to strengthen their control over the country, not to democratize their domain.

While the Soviet Union has made dramatic advances in military and weapons technology, the West has permitted itself to stagnate and accept nuclear parity and even inferiority in some areas. Yet, for all its new-found military prowess, the Soviet leadership approaches the new "post-Cold War" period not from strength, but from mounting internal weakness.

Only if we understand the basic vulnerabilities of the Soviet system will we be able to approach the business of policymaking in a manner calculated to ensure both world peace and a better life for those who are today victimized by totalitarianism. Peace, in the long run, can never be purchased at the expense of human suffering. The fact that totalitarian rule remains at the heart of the communist leadership's goals indicates that its lip-service to "peace" is a device for its own ends.

FORMATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

by Vladimir Petrov

THE process of foreign policy formation in the Soviet Union has been one of the most difficult subjects to study. No books or articles have been written about it in Russia; for the lack of reliable basic information, Western studies have also been wanting. Intelligence analysts have probably pieced together enough to reconstruct a plausible picture, but intelligence analysts rarely write for publication.

Reasons for Soviet secretiveness, when it comes to the mechanics of their operations in the international arena, are many, the most obvious being that there is nothing to be gained from revealing something that does not have to be revealed. Another principal reason is that in contravention of the Soviet Constitution, it is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), and not the Council of Ministers, which determines the general direction of foreign affairs, and the CC's Politburo which devises specific policies and the ways and means of implementing them. The Central Committee *apparat* has, in addition, a monopoly in performing the executive tasks of keeping the Socialist Commonwealth together; it also maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the links with foreign communist parties and other revolutionary forces in the world. If these need to be rendered more than political support, the Politburo instructs the Council of Ministers accordingly.

Soviet scholars and officials have had a notorious difficulty in discussing sensitive issues with foreigners, remaining extremely cautious even in the most congenial surroundings. Besides their deep-seated awareness that they deal with the "enemy" or with people on whose discretion they cannot count, they are congenitally averse to the idea of an intellectual give-and-take, so much taken for granted in the West. No matter what their positions at home, they behave as if they were representatives of the Soviet state while abroad, and try, often clumsily, not to go beyond elaborating the "official line" — whatever it happens to be at the moment.

As high Soviet officials go about transacting business with their American counterparts, the adversary relationship is implicitly recognized, but so is the need to be businesslike. In high-level meetings, the tone and the content of discussions are vastly different. Candor is not uncommon, for there is no danger of destroying the idealism of a Kissinger or a Nixon, and their discretion can be taken for granted. But even in these conversations, frankness is limited to policy matters, and much of what passes for candor can be something else. Again, there is no reason, even at this high level, for the Soviets to reveal to the Americans (or any foreigners) the hidden picture of sensitive relationships within the Soviet hierarchy.

Of late, some Americans in Moscow have had contacts with intellectual dissidents whom we tend to regard as the Soviet equivalent of the New Left (but who are regarded, within the Soviet context, as spokesmen for the New Right). Some of the dissidents have also appeared abroad, mainly as part of the Jewish emigration. But although the dissidents' critique of the Soviet system has some value, by no stretch of the imagination do they qualify as "insiders," for with very rare exceptions, they have never been privy to its inner workings. In recent decades, no high-level insider, able and willing to throw light on the intricate mechanics of Soviet foreign policy, has turned dissident and passed to us his knowledge.

The remarkable case of Alexis de Tocqueville notwithstanding, studies of alien societies tend to be descriptive and interpretive, reflecting little of the enormous complexity of factors entering the ultimate political makeup of the government. Even the most talented Kremlinologists cannot quite relate the policymaking processes in Moscow to the whole Soviet culture, and Soviet historical and political experience. In the absence of perceptive (and reliable) biographies of individual Soviet leaders, an excessive reliance has been placed on explanations provided by communist ideology, to the unavoidable neglect of the multitude of other factors that have molded the leaders' individual *Weltanschauungs* and determined their behavior: their tastes for food and poetry, as well as for power; their family backgrounds and personal associations and experiences; their national and social prejudices and predilections; their self-images; their individual ideas about their historical functions and mission. No "insider" can know much of it either. But if he is a part of the same general milieu and strongly identifies with it, he can project a much more accurate, albeit impressionistic, picture than any foreigner.

FORMATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The following essay contains no actual revelations. Its claimed originality is that it attempts to sketch the picture of Soviet foreign policymaking as it appears to a composite "insider": a bureaucrat, a diplomat, a researcher in a policy-oriented academic institution, a journalist. No attempt will be made to corroborate this picture with other sources of our knowledge and, needless to say, its piecing together is fully the responsibility of the author.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

No policy is formulated in a vacuum, and for its collective knowledge the political leadership of the Soviet Union is dependent on a variety of sources. One of the primary suppliers of information about the outside world is a vast TASS network. The raw data cabled from abroad are sorted out and edited in the TASS headquarters in Moscow, which then circulates, in increasing order of importance, the weekly digest *Atlas,* the daily *Bulletin of the Postal Information of TASS,* and the *Special Bulletin* wherein translated key articles appearing abroad are grouped by geographic regions. All these publications are "for official use only," and only selected officials and scholars can read them. In addition, there is an intelligence digest (*Bol'shaya razmetka*) prepared by a special inter-agency group, whose distribution is limited to no more than fifty top party hierarchs.

The other source of raw information is the Soviet embassies abroad, many of whose political and economic reports are distributed beyond the Foreign Ministry, to KGB, the Ministry of Defense, certain research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, and other government agencies dealing with foreign affairs. KGB's own information and that of the Ministry of Defense go only to the Secretariat of the Secretary-General of the CC CPSU, to Brezhnev's foreign affairs unit currently headed by Alexandrov-Aghentov. It can be assumed that in digesting the raw information, the appropriate offices bend over backward trying to retain maximum objectivity, as every analyst is constantly reminded of the dangers of "overestimating" and "underestimating" developments affecting Soviet interests.

FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION

The prerogative of providing the general direction of Soviet foreign policy belongs in theory to the plenum of the CC CPSU. Although it is difficult to measure to what extent this power is exercised, the CC is the only forum in which top government



FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN THE USSR

TASS and Other Correspondents Abroad
Embassies and Other Missions Abroad
KGB
ANDROPOV
Ministry of Defense
GRECHKO
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
GROMYKO
Academy of Sciences
International Department
PONOMAREV
"The Department" of the CC
KATUSHEV
SUSLOV
Department of Cadres Abroad
Secretariat of the Secretary-General
BREZHNEV
POLITBURO
Premier KOSYGIN
KEY:
Flow of Raw Information
Processed Information and/or Policy Recommendation
Policy Inputs

bureaucrats, wearing their hats as Committee members, can directly influence the course of Soviet foreign relations. Otherwise, the power of decision in both general policy and specific issues rests with the Politburo, whose membership is weighted heavily in favor of party functionaries: out of twenty-three members, only nine occupy positions in the government.

Subsidiary Role of the Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers administers the affairs of state and coordinates activities of individual ministries, but it does not determine high policy. Any significant expansion (or reduction) of foreign commitments, or a basic change in policies toward a major country or region, must be decided by the Politburo. The appropriate departments of the CC, rather than the Council of Ministers, provide steady guidance to the ministries in implementing Politburo decisions. The Council of Ministers has no power in conflict management except within specific guidelines provided by the Politburo. It does not decide major policy questions in relations with the socialist states. Being in charge of state-to-state relations only, it has no part in determining policies regarding various revolutionary movements; it does not enter disputes among communist parties, ruling or nonruling; and it cannot provide guidance to the propaganda apparatus concerning how to treat particular issues of international relations or "class struggle" in individual countries. All such matters fall in the domain of the Central Committee.

Any ministry or specialized state committee (e.g., External Economic Relations, KGB [the Committee for State Security], Gosplan, or even the nongovernmental Committee of Friendship Societies) can initiate *a specific proposal related to foreign policy* and submit it, through the appropriate ministries, for Politburo consideration if it is so important that the question cannot be resolved within the governmental structure. Before such a proposal reaches the top level, it is discussed — informally as well as formally — among representatives of interested organizations, including the appropriate departments of the CC. Since major proposals usually affect several ministries or state committees, the process of securing everybody's concurrence is cumbersome and requires considerable lobbying. After the proposal takes shape, it is submitted to the Secretariat of the Secretary-General, where it is reviewed for both form and substance. Brezhnev's staff may demand additional information, request the views of various officials, or suggest that the proposal be supplemented by additional options, indicating the likely consequences of each possible Politburo decision.

Role of the Central Committee Apparat

At this point it should be stressed that formal lines of communication and subordination within the upper party structure mean relatively little. No chart can reflect the crucial personal and family ties, shifting political alliances, and past and present informal associations among the members of the governing elite. Within the Central Committee *apparat*, expertise and jurisdictions often overlap. Since competence and talent abound on the upper-middle levels of the CC staff, it frequently happens that an important decision is made in fact by the interested staffers, who then enlist support of the men at the top of the CC hierarchy for formal passage of the proposal in question.

The most powerful men in the *apparat* are ten Secretaries of the CC who oversee the implementation of policies decided upon by the Politburo. Each one of them directs the activities in a specified area, giving the appropriate ministers and heads of other governmental agencies guidance and instruction. But in the decision-making process, lines become blurred; any Secretary can become actively interested in the development of a policy.

Aside from Secretary-General Brezhnev, responsibility for supervising the USSR's external affairs rests with Secretary Suslov, the senior man in terms of length of uninterrupted service in both Secretariat and Politburo. Closely working with him are Secretary Ponomarev, who is also a candidate member of the Politburo, and Secretary Katushev, who is not in the Politburo. The former directs the International Department (ID) of the CC which controls matters related to capitalist and Third World countries. The latter is in charge of the Department of Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties (DLWCP), known in Moscow as "The Department," which deals exclusively with the countries ruled by such parties. It is not quite clear that these are in fact two entirely separate departments. Their joint function is to evolve the overall foreign policy of the Soviet Union; some of their staffers are area specialists, others are generalists with diversified knowledge and experience. Thus it can be said that they represent one bureaucratic unit dealing with the world as a whole, with Ponomarev in charge of one set of policies and Katushev the other.

In addition to ID/DLWCP, there is one more department dealing with foreign affairs, that of Cadres Abroad (CA). It selects and screens all personnel sent abroad on prolonged assignments, except for KGB and GRU whose cadre are controlled by the Administrative Organs Department. It also resolves complex jurisdictional disputes in Soviet missions abroad and has a final say in the matters of promotions, demotions, transfers and recalls. With the appointment of Abrasimov as its head, the CA has expanded its functions to include long-range policy planning and developing current policy positions for Soviet delegations to the United Nations, conferences on European security, disarmament, MFR, and so on. Administratively, the CA is subordinated to Secretary Ponomarev who has become one of the principal figures in the CC foreign affairs establishment.

Finally, lodged in the CC *apparat* is the Exit Commission which screens the less important scholars, artists, performers, or junior members of various missions for travel abroad, making sure that only reliable individuals obtain passports and visas. Those who are more important — or have high level connections — bypass the Exit Commission and obtain the necessary clearances from the ID. It should be added that because of the specific procedures involved in processing the would-be travelers, the Exit Commission is functionally a KGB outfit. Similarly, KGB fills the "foreign relations" positions in the government and academic institutions involved in contacts with the foreigners.

Formally speaking, the ID/DLWCP deals with party leaderships rather than with governments or countries at large; its function is to devise Soviet political strategy. The International Department retains full control over relations with the nonruling communist parties and revolutionary movements (nationalist, anti-colonialist, peasant, workers', and so on). It has primary responsibility for developing overall political attitudes toward countries involved in active confrontation with the forces of imperialism, such as Egypt, Syria or Iraq. It also evolves policy positions regarding conflicts in which no Soviet action is contemplated, whether a racial issue in South Africa or the socio-religious strife in Northern Ireland. It can be said that, under the overall guidance of Suslov, the ID/DLWCP, more than any other organization, is responsible for the continuing ideological thrust of Soviet foreign policy, for it puts all the specific policies in the general framework of Marxism-Leninism (as currently interpreted), and assures their consistency and interpretation in Soviet periodicals and the propaganda media.

Yet on the pragmatic level of policy formulation, the ID has no monopoly, if only because its institutional knowledge of the intricacies of state relations falls far short of the mark. Thus it has become standard practice in Moscow to create *ad hoc* committees to develop specific policy positions. Convoked by Brezhnev's Secretariat, these committees include representatives of the Foreign Ministry, KGB, sometimes Defense and other ministries, and leading experts from the appropriate institutes of the Academy of Sciences, with the International Department providing coordination and supervision of the deliberations. This ID function is facilitated by the relative ideological flexibility and pragmatism (sometimes referred to as "liberalism") characterizing its staff. In this respect, the ID – and the DLWCP – stand out in the Central Committee machinery, in contrast to the extreme conservatism prevailing in departments managing administrative affairs and the domestic politics of the Soviet Union. As the ID goes about forging Soviet foreign policies, it can request information on any subject from any government agency, invite for consultation any individual, and communicate directly with any revolutionary organization in the world. Its formal policy proposals, once reviewed by the Secretaries, are submitted to the Politburo for final approval.

The primary function of the DLWCP is to develop and maintain the unity of the Socialist Commonwealth, the alliance of communist states regarded as the extension of Soviet power in the world arena. It thus has jurisdiction over Soviet relations with the ruling communist parties and closely supervises day-by-day relations between Soviet ministries and state committees and the governments of communist states. While the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact alliance lie in the purview of the Ministry of Defense, its political aspects are fully managed by DLWCP.

The DLWCP develops policies for dealing with all the minor and major crises within the Socialist Commonwealth, among them those which had led to the confrontations with Poland and Hungary in 1956 and with Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. It determines the foundations for bilateral and multilateral accords with the fraternal states, and Soviet attitudes toward such regimes as the Yugoslav, Albanian or Rumanian. It serves as a clearinghouse for the *political* problems arising out of the war in Indochina. In close cooperation with the ID, it devises strategies and tactics for the global struggle against the Maoist heresy. The

ID/DLWCP is also charged with the responsibility for isolating China and its allies within the world communist movement.

As is the case with the International Department, policies originating in the Department of Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties require the approval of the Secretariat and the Politburo. It is evident, however, that both departments are much more than collective advisers to the leadership, for within their respective jurisdictions they perform extensive executive functions in which they command the government's full cooperation. Jurisdictional conflicts between the CC departments and the government do not arise, simply because the primacy of the Central Committee is recognized by all concerned. If Kosygin, in his role as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, has his reservations or objections, for instance, he can voice them only on the Politburo level. Once a decision is taken, he is expected to carry it out faithfully.

Politburo Policymaking

The method of arriving at a decision in the Politburo is that of forming a consensus. The twenty-three members, of course, are not alike — temperamentally as well as psychologically — but what they have in common outweighs their differences by far. No matter how sharp may be differences of opinion on a particular issue, in the end they are resolved, even if prolonged deliberations are necessary. Actual voting on policy issues is a rarity, and on some truly critical issues (especially involving far-reaching security and economic commitments or applications of military force), unanimity is mandatory. To achieve unanimity is sometimes difficult. The membership of the Politburo is heavily weighted in favor of individuals concerned with domestic affairs. Although they recognize that some of their colleagues (Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov, Ponomarev, Grechko, Andropov, Gromyko, Podgorny) are better versed in foreign affairs, the statute gives them full equality in deliberations. Every member (including alternate members whose status differs from that of full members only in that they cannot vote) is automatically responsible for *all* the decisions of the body and thus is entitled to follow his own judgment. Some may choose to defer to their more knowledgeable colleagues or allow themselves to be persuaded, but Politburo members cannot, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be overruled. Since the overwhelming majority of the members are preoccupied with internal matters, this serves as a natural brake on any enterprising individuals who might be prone to engage in more activist — and more costly — foreign policies. The Politburo's bylaws are unknown, but a quorum is probably required to make its decisions valid. On urgent questions, absent members can be polled by telephone, although modern electronics allows them to participate in actual discussions from afar.

In the case of a deadlock, or an irreconcilable division in the Politburo, or when an especially critical issue has to be decided, the Central Committee plenum may be called to serve as arbiter and ultimate judge. It may have performed this crucial function on the eve of the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and certainly during the "anti-Party group" revolt in 1957. For the rest, although the CC plenum can theoretically modify and even reverse the broad policy guidelines which the Politburo outlines to it three to four times a year, there is no evidence that this actually happens. Plenum practice calls for the Politburo's submission of a draft resolution, followed by debate which may result in modification of the resolution. Once the latter is adopted, however, it becomes law, both for the party and the government.

Needless to say, in emergency situations the Politburo acts without the benefit of CC advice and consent. When Francis Gary Powers' U-2 plane was shot down, the Politburo voted on the case while it assembled on top of Lenin's Tomb to survey the May Day parade in 1960. The Central Committee was not consulted during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, nor in the decision to disregard the mining of the Haiphong harbor by the United States shortly before President Nixon's scheduled visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972.

The ingrained discipline of the party and government hierarchs generally precludes any resistance to decisions already taken. If, on the rarest of occasions, someone persists in disagreement — as did Shelest on the eve of Nixon's visit to Moscow — he is punished. However, Shelest's punishment required the formal concurrence of the CC plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which removed him from the post of First Secretary. Had he persisted more, the majority of the Politburo would doubtless have succeeded in persuading a CC CPSU plenum to drop him from membership in that body as well. It must be added that Shelest's disobedience was only the proverbial last straw; he had been a cause for Brezhnev's concern for some time because of the tight reign he had established in Kiev and his lack of cooperative spirit in Politburo deliberations.

There is one exception to the procedure governing the submission of policy proposals to the Politburo. Each member of this body can raise any issue he wants — bypassing the Council of Ministers and/or Brezhnev's Secretariat — and have it discussed by the Politburo. If, for example, Andropov, in his capacity as Politburo member, decides to circumvent Kosygin, his superior in the government, he can do it. If his recommendation deals with KGB activities (say, with the staging of a coup d'état in Somalia or the Sudan) and is accepted, he can automatically proceed to implement it, knowing that the cooperation of the Council of Ministers and the appropriate CC departments will be forthcoming.

It can be assumed that differences of opinion and clashes of personality are common occurrences in the Politburo, and that close personal friendships are rare. On the other hand, the way in which the top men are selected, and their many years of association in sharing the burdens of office, provide for a degree of closeness among them, enhanced by the sense of responsibility and the enormous self-discipline of the chosen few. They seem determined to prevent the ascent of another "strong personality" and are thus doomed to a perpetual search for consensus among themselves. Aside from the Khrushchev episode, when too many feelings and interests were hurt to permit his continuing paramountcy, errors of judgment are mutually forgiven and there is little inclination to search for scapegoats. It is notable, however, that although the main foreign policy outlines were preserved after Khrushchev's downfall in 1964, the style and contents changed. On the one hand, there was an intensification of the strategic buildup, related in part to the China menace, but mainly for the purpose of making it impossible for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength." There also was the involvement in Viet Nam which, at least initially, looked extremely promising. On the other hand, the post-Khrushchevian foreign policies have been manifestly more conservative, external political commitments have been drastically reduced and politically-motivated foreign aid cut to the bone. "Realism," Soviet style, became the Politburo's motto.

This system of policymaking and of control over policy-implementation, developed under Stalin, has functioned with minor modifications ever since — except that there is no longer a "strong personality" presiding over it. The system assures stability and continuity in the foreign affairs of the Soviet state, but it has serious disadvantages. Policy formation is a slow and cumbersome process, making fundamental revisions of old policies difficult. Since the leaders have virtual life tenure, new blood penetrates upper echelons extremely slowly, and the party bureaucracy makes sure that only compatible individuals move up the ladder.

Nevertheless, the extraordinary complexity of Soviet foreign relations and of the problems confronting the USSR place an increasing premium on competence and professionalism. The leaders themselves are basically politicians and administrators, rather than statesmen capable of grasping the intricacies of international relations. (It is commonly assumed that true competence and true talent in the Soviet hierarchical structure cannot be found above the level of a ministry department chief or above the top tier of experts in Central Committee departments.) The leaders are compelled, in the interests of the state as well as for their own good, to rely on expert advice. Much of it comes from within the government, some from outside the formal structure. The *ad hoc* committees for policy development organized by Brezhnev's Secretariat have already been mentioned. In addition, the Central Committee commands a pool of experts loosely described as the "consultative group." Some of them are employed full time, some part time, by the ID and DLWCP; others are retained as "advisers" by CC Secretaries. Even Shelepin now has his own Center for Studies of the International Workers' Movement, some forty people strong, which provides the ambitious Politburo member with an independent source of knowledge.

There is no doubt that all these experts share the same basic political philosophy and that the ultimate aims of Soviet foreign policy are invariably their aims. Yet their disagreements on the tactics to be employed in practically any area can be and often are quite sharp, providing for foreign policy inputs barely discernible a decade ago.

Changes in Soviet Perceptions

Discussions of trends in Soviet national and international affairs require a degree of caution, for every detectable sign of change evokes intense interest among the observers searching for such trends. Many observers tend to assume that the trend they detect — even if it is of a clearly tactical nature — is likely to continue, and gear their extrapolations accordingly. Their projections quickly attract the attention of Western officials and politicians, who then begin to advocate changes in policies toward the Soviet Union, tailoring them to the anticipated future state of affairs.

The trouble with Soviet trends is that they can change and even be reversed, and that some unexpected cataclysms — like Stalin's death, or the Cuban missile crisis, or the eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict — can start entirely new trends. Yet study them we must, concentrating particularly on those factors which appear to be dominant and irreversible, determined by broad developments that are beyond the power of Soviet leaders to control.

Conflict and Cooperation

Soviet foreign policymakers envisage a perpetual conflict between the forces of socialism and those of imperialism, and profess to believe that socialism will triumph in the end. This perception of conflict predetermines the dynamic character of Soviet foreign policy and Moscow's impulse for backing anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist forces in their struggles against the "class enemy."

The same ideology, however, dictates caution in relations with imperialist states. Interests of the Soviet Union, as the principal socialist state, must be preserved at all costs. While the conflicts taking place in the enemy camp should, if possible, be aggravated, the enemy should not be provoked into taking a dangerously aggressive posture. This aspect of ideology accounts for a policy of "peaceful coexistence," or détente, whose vehicles are foreign trade, cultural and scientific contacts, and a diplomacy seeking to diminish the potential sources of threat to the Soviet Union.

Earlier we noted that the Soviets' institutional policymaking setup gives the upper hand to the party *apparat,* whose natural impulse is to stress vigilance and keep reminding all concerned of the ever-present element of conflict. On the other hand, the impulse of the government, which maintains diplomatic and commercial relations with the outside world and which must find the most efficient use of the available material resources, is to oppose policies likely to lead to conflict situations. Some high-placed officials are known to disapprove of the proclivity for mischief found in the party *apparat,* the KGB, or among the military. This does not mean that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade are staffed by less dedicated communists. It means that government officials, operating under tangible restraints and concerned with essentially constructive tasks, tend to subordinate activism stemming out of ideology to their more mundane everyday tasks.

It would be highly simplistic to assume that the Central Committee *apparat* stands for revolutionary mischief while the government reflects the more conventional national interests of the Soviet Union. Such an assumption would imply a division and even an institutional conflict within the Soviet system which in fact do not exist, and would disregard the commanding role of the Politburo in policy formulation. As the Presidency in the United States system is the focal point of all the internal and external pressures, converging, interrelating and forming the "reality" in which the nation's foreign policies are formulated, so the Politburo is the focal point of the Soviet system. The Politburo's collective will may be greater, and the ideological foundation of communism gives it a sense of direction well beyond what the American system can produce. But in determining Soviet foreign policies, the members of the Politburo take their "reality" into account no less than does the President of the United States. To the extent that they retain revolutionary impulses, they control them. If on occasion they burn their fingers, this happens mainly because of miscalculation and not because of excessive revolutionary zeal.

Caution has been increasingly detectable during the last decade in what the Soviets actually *do* in supporting revolutionary forces in the world. In part, this comes from awareness that their physical resources are limited and that much of the past investment in fomenting and exploiting various crises has been nonproductive. In part it admits of the difficulty in matching the Maoist appeal to radical revolutionary elements in the West and Third World elites. Caution is also a function of détente. As state-to-state relations with Western nations improve and begin to bring benefits to the Soviet Union, they acquire their own momentum and tend to discourage endangering activities. Therefore, Soviet leaders, in their dealings with the outside world, constantly seek the optimum combination, allowing for both détente and the promotion of revolutionary causes — a balance between what they want to achieve in the struggle against imperialism and what they can reasonably expect to achieve. This perpetual search endows their strategies in international relations with a peculiar mixture of conflict and cooperation, a mixture in which the latter component now seems to be favored.

In the American political world dominated by the Jackson Amendment debate and reverberations of the Middle East conflict, this trend toward cooperation may appear less than convincing. Yet we ought to remember that Soviet perceptions do not mirror our own, and that the Cold War climate has always produced different temperatures in the two countries. In the Soviet view, détente has been predicated not upon mutual good will but upon President Nixon's realization of the decline of American power and the resulting need to avoid dangerous confrontations that overstrain American — and Soviet — political, psychological and economic resources. There has also been a growing realization that, ideological struggle aside, the Soviet Union could ill afford to continue expending its scarce resources in international competition with the West; its internal economic development had to take priority over the dynamism of its foreign policies.

Even in their present disposition, however, the Soviets do not want to appear too anxious in seeking the good will of the United States. Détente does not signify the end of the two superpowers' adversary relationship, and Moscow expects no concessions beyond what the United States is prepared to make in its own interest. By the same token, the Soviets will resist American attempts to weaken their internal political structure or to undermine their international position. They doubtless regard as highly unreasonable American expectations that they should incur grave political losses in the Arab world, or even forgo the promising long-term advantages, in order to secure Israel's predominance in the Middle East and the uninterrupted flow of Arab oil to the United States, Japan and Western Europe. In other words, to Moscow détente means no more than the avoidance of confrontations, a limited improvement in the overall international climate, a slowing down of the armaments race if "parity" — military as well as political — is recognized in the West, and if all goes well, closer economic relations with the United States. It certainly carries no obligation on the part of the Soviets to protect American interests, least of all at the expense of their own.

Socialist Commonwealth Affairs

A competent discussion of Soviet foreign policies is impossible without taking note of the paramount importance Soviet leaders attach to their special relationship with the communist states, the so-called Socialist Commonwealth. The state of affairs in this autonomous world directly affects the Soviet posture vis-à-vis the West. The roots of this phenomenon lie in memories — embedded in Lenin's teachings — of the early postrevolutionary period when Soviet Russia was isolated and surrounded by enemies, and survived because of "contradictions" among them and because of the support of the revolutionary proletariat and other Western "progressive forces."

An even greater impact on Soviet perceptions of the outside world was provided by the traumatic experience of the Second World War, when German armies devastated the country all the way to Leningrad, Moscow and the Volga, while the British and the Americans, seemingly determined to fight the war with "small blood," were seen as having minimal concern for the sacrifices of their embattled Soviet ally. If Stalin had any illusions – as he may have had for a few months after the Teheran Conference–about forging lasting links with the West, these vanished as the incompatibility of the two value systems (and the latent hostility in the West to Soviet imperial ambitions) became apparent to him.

The unforgettable wartime experiences created a powerful urge in Moscow to establish a geopolitical buffer in Eastern Europe and to develop reliable alliances with countries that would add their power and resources to those of the USSR, and act in concert with it in discouraging all potential enemies from attempting to "roll back" communism. To be reliable, these allies had to have socioeconomic systems similar to the Soviet Union's, share Soviet mistrust of imperialists, and be dependent on Moscow for their security and well-being.

This system of alliances started disintegrating almost as soon as it was created, however, beginning with Yugoslavia's defection in 1948. It was dealt the severest blow when the second largest member of the Socialist Commonwealth, China, not only defected from the ranks but turned decidedly anti-Soviet.

Nobody has attempted to measure it, but it can easily be shown that of the total amount of energy and attention the Soviets devote to external affairs, the overwhelming part has been spent on trying to maintain communist unity, first in confronting the hostile imperialist world and, lately, in trying to eliminate Maoist influences in the world communist movement. But the greatest effort has been directed toward counteracting centrifugal trends in Eastern Europe.

The need to make such an effort has been a sobering experience. Particularly since the 1968 Czechoslovak episode, it has become a matter of great concern for Soviet leaders. The growing skepticism detectable in Soviet theoretical writings indicates that the once-sacrosanct concept of communist unity is being reassessed. In practical terms, with the ability to manipulate internal politics in the allied capitals largely gone, the Soviets are increasingly compelled to resort to carrot-and-stick methods more befitting imperialist powers, just to maintain a facade of unity. In moments of candor, many a Moscow official is likely to remark that having such friends, one doesn't need enemies.

The seemingly irreversible trend toward greater independence among some of the communist states (and the corresponding weakening of their ties to the USSR) poses a major dilemma. In the past, to achieve unity and to keep the Warsaw Pact nations together, the Soviets continuously emphasized the gravity of the global conflict, exaggerating the imperialist threat to the socialist world. Now that this threat appears less and less credible, the old rationale for unity sounds less convincing to East Europeans — a situation not unlike that which has developed in NATO. Yet, while Moscow realizes that its own pursuit of détente is bound to be contagious and that Warsaw Pact cohesion is bound to suffer as a result, there is hope that the domestic imperatives in socialist countries (primarily the need to keep the existing regimes in power) will prevent the governing regimes from drifting too far away: for example, the Soviets watch with considerable satisfaction the recent conservative trends in Yugoslav politics.

Since the view of the Warsaw Pact as a major component of Soviet strategic power is still widely held in the Kremlin, the political uncertainties in Eastern Europe and Moscow's doubts in its ability to control indefinitely the centrifugal forces operating in this region dictate a growing reliance on the USSR's own military might. This is by no means a Fortress Russia concept. Moscow will do all it can to delay the inevitable and keep Eastern Europe within its sphere of influence, and there are no "neo-isolationists" in the Politburo. But in order to expand and improve their own strategic forces, the Soviets must reallocate their resources, taking them from what otherwise may have gone to the allies. Possibly a further reduction of economic leverage in friendly capitals could be offset by the psychological impact of the Soviet Union's greater might.

Viet Nam and Egypt

USSR objectives, as the post-Khrushchev leadership decided early in 1965 to render large-scale assistance to the Vietnamese communists (aside from the natural impulse to prop up the fraternal regime in Hanoi) included: (1) tying the United States down in a region far away from the areas of Soviet concern; (2) posing as the principal champion of a popular "national liberation" cause; (3) prodding already anti-Soviet China toward a confrontation with the United States with a hope of rekindling its anti-Americanism and forestalling a possible rapprochement with Washington, thereby repeating Stalin's maneuver in the Korean War.

The actual development of the Viet Nam conflict did not conform to Soviet expectations:

(1) The Vietnamese communists demonstrated a much greater capacity for fighting against tremendous odds than Moscow had anticipated and, in the process, became the most authentic heroes of the international Left.

(2) The American involvement exceeded anything the Soviets had hoped for, with the United States paying a high price in expended resources and impaired international prestige.

(3) Political cleavages in the United States caused by the war produced a windfall as the once-formidable adversary lost much of its zest and vigor in combating communism.

(4) The growth in Hanoi's stature, and its skillful handling of relations with Moscow and Peking, gave it unexpected leverage in dealings with the Soviet Union.

(5) Mao Tse-tung refused to join Moscow in a "unity of action" effort in Southeast Asia, limiting Chinese cooperation to allowing the shipment of goods and military equipment across China, and shrewdly abstained from actions that could have put China on a collision course with the United States.

(6) President Nixon's Vietnamization program eliminated much of the rationale for the extremely costly Soviet aid to Hanoi. Moscow discovered that America's losses were not necessarily equal to Soviet gains.

Thus, as seen from Moscow, although the successes were significant, and even spectacular, the Viet Nam involvement also resulted in important drawbacks. To the Soviet mind, the notion of what the result might be "on balance" is fundamentally alien. Hence it was natural that these drawbacks were given primary consideration in Moscow's high councils.

What evidently disturbed Soviet leaders most was that in spite of all their efforts on behalf of the Vietnamese communists, their influence in Hanoi remained marginal. The advice they offered — in the most circumspect fashion — was listened to. But the Vietnamese felt free to ignore and even reject it if it conflicted with their own judgment. They were receptive to advice from Peking, and the Soviets could do nothing about it. On occasion, ungrateful Hanoi, carried away by its revolutionary self-righteousness, even dared to criticize Moscow — publicly — and could not, in turn, be criticized. The nature of the Moscow-Hanoi relationship was such as to preclude any possibility of serious Soviet sanctions against the recalcitrant ally, for Hanoi had the recourse of appealing its case to the international Left, thereby automatically strengthening China's hand in the communist movement. In addition, continuous reassessment of the overall strategic picture had gradually resulted in the conclusion that, regardless of the Viet Nam war's outcome, the Soviet position in remote Indochina was likely to turn out to be ephemeral.

While it was too late in the game to try to disengage fully in Viet Nam, the lesson the Soviets drew was that they ought to guard against commitments which could significantly reduce their freedom of action. The retention of maximum control over their foreign policies has emerged as a paramount requirement, superseding all other considerations. Thus when in 1972 the Soviets came under severe pressure from the Cairo regime, which demanded advanced offensive weapons and a much harder stand vis-à-vis Israel and the United States in the region, they told Sadat to follow his judgment — at his own risk; the Soviet Union would not alter its policies to suit his wishes. Provided he remained prudent in his actions, Soviet aid and support would continue, but within the limits determined in Moscow, not Cairo.

We may surmise that the Soviet defense establishment and even the Central Committee *apparat* were concerned about the strategic and political consequences of the reassertion of Egypt's sovereignty. But the Politburo apparently judged that no course taken by Egypt could lead to a lasting settlement with Israel or dim the long-term prospect of the disintegration of Western positions in this strategic region, a judgment proven correct by subsequent events. Although the Soviet Union is committed to support Egypt, Syria and Iraq in their struggle against Israel and to prevent their military defeat, this commitment remains essentially unilateral and limited, not in a class with the open-ended "proletarian internationalism" presumably binding all communist states; it watches for its own — not Arab — interests.

This striving to reduce entanglements that make superpower decisions too dependent on the fickle moods and policies of militant and insecure regimes, no matter how "friendly," is a cumulative result of the unhappy Soviet experiences of the 1960's, when a great many resources, badly needed at home, were wasted on ventures that came to nothing or even backfired. It also reflects a firm determination to avoid the risk of war with the United States and to minimize serious confrontations with Western "ruling circles" in general.

We can further speculate that in the Soviet perception détente is becoming more than a mere tactic: the Western world in the 1970's appears less united and less motivated in its opposition to the Soviet Union than at any time since the 1917 Revolution, and thus less menacing. This perception combines with growing reservations — if not pessimism — regarding revolutionary prospects elsewhere. Besides, as the experience with China has shown, the triumph of communism does not necessarily bring benefits to the Soviet Union. If this is in fact the trend of Soviet thinking, we may well witness a much greater emphasis on the strengthening of Soviet economic and military power — rather than the expansion of communism in the world — and external policies considerably different from what we have been accustomed to.

INPUTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Every revolution must run its course and every revolutionary regime, to stay in business, must sooner or later come to terms with the society it rules. This point in Soviet history was marked by the Twentieth Party Congress which abolished police terror as a means of assuring the acquiescence of the masses and condemned the excesses of the preceding two decades of Stalin's rule. Simultaneously, for tactical purposes, the Khrushchev leadership modified Lenin's and Stalin's concept of the totality of conflict between the socialist and imperialist worlds. Although the existence of the conflict was reasserted, détente with the West and the view that bourgeois-nationalist regimes of the Third World represent potentially friendly forces in the international arena, have also become fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy. These innovations were gradually accepted by the Soviet establishment but rejected by the revolutionary wing of international communism led by Mao Tse-tung's China. The unforeseen ideological split created an entirely new international problem and an environment in which the Soviets could pursue — with ups and downs — a policy of détente with the West but at a cost of a near-total hostility with Communist China, hostility which is unlikely to result in war but serious enough to be perceived as a major external threat.

"Progressive Forces"

Today it is difficult to imagine the ignorance of the outside world that dominated at least the lower rungs of the Soviet foreign affairs establishment during the Stalin era. There were competent diplomats and scholars even then, but their findings — if not slanted to fit the leader's perceptions to begin with — were filtered through such an overlay of dogmatic thinking that by the time they reached the party hierarchs they only remotely resembled objective realities. Stalin apparently sincerely believed, for example, that Henry A. Wallace had a fighting chance to become President of the United States in 1948. He regarded Jawaharlal Nehru as one of the leaders of the imperialist camp because Indian communists thought that. And for at least a year after Tito openly challenged Soviet omnipotence, Stalin fully expected that "good" Yugoslav communists would overthrow the heretic and bring Yugoslavia back into the fold.

Fears of war which weighed heavily on Soviet decisions in the late 1940's and early 1950's opened the door for a greater recognition of many noncommunists who were critical of the "containment" policies of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. Moscow sponsored, coordinated and sometimes directed such actions as those generated by the so-called World Peace Movement. But in spite of their contributions to Soviet interests, leftist, liberal and anti-war activists were not accepted as genuine allies of the socialist camp.

Soviet flexibility in dealing with the noncommunist Left in Western societies increased in the late 1950's. If the "nonaligned" nations of the Third World could be regarded as potential Soviet allies in the struggle against imperialism, there was no reason to view too critically anyone opposing the anti-Soviet thrust of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, the great need to learn more about the complex world the Soviets were entering as they emerged from Stalinist self-isolation after the Twentieth CPSU Congress dictated utilizing the knowledge of liberal Western scholars, whose writings became accessible to ever increasing numbers of Soviet specialists. To be sure, the non-Marxist interpretations in these works were rejected. Nevertheless, exposure to the infinite variety of viewpoints left an inevitable imprint on more than one mind.

The recognition accorded to Western scholarship took a new turn in the late 1960's as intellectuals spearheaded the anti-war movement in the United States. For a brief period, the political turbulence generated by this movement set visible limits on what the United States could do internationally and caused Moscow to disparage the ability of the foremost enemy country to lead the worldwide anti-communist crusade. Some Soviet observers concluded that in the specific American condition the New Left had, in effect, replaced traditional communists in heading the "class struggle" for the revolutionary transformation of American society. Although the most extreme (and often Maoist-oriented) leftists came to be regarded in Moscow as near-fascists by 1969, the wide acceptability of New Left intellectuals in universities and government agencies gave rsise to considerable optimism regarding their political potential as a legitimate social elite. Even those leftists who leaned toward Maoism, despite their occasional anti-Soviet utterings, appeared surprisingly congenial. There was hardly any need to try to assist and manipulate the newly emerging "progressive forces" whose anti-imperialist, anti-Establishment sentiments seemed to exceed in intensity the sentiments of traditional communists.

The general evolution of American society has enhanced these optimistic expectations. As seen from Moscow, the change from the situation that existed two decades ago has been nothing short of spectacular. Some students of the American scene compared the protest movement headed by Henry Wallace in 1948 with that of George McGovern and were impressed by the latter's ability to seize the Democratic Party nomination. They register the treatment accorded to Daniel Ellsberg or Angela Davis by the public and the media, recall the fate of Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss, and draw — perhaps unjustifiably — optimistic conclusions. Looking back, the Soviets can say that the communists and allied forces of the Truman era were isolated and had no future. The Left of the 1960's and 1970's — which is often not even identified as such — operates in a much more favorable environment, they observe, and may yet emerge as a major political factor.

Against this long-term trend, they take note of the outburst of anti-Soviet sentiments in the United States in the last few years, ascribing it primarily to heightened Jewish hostility after the Six-Day War and the last-ditch effort of "imperialist circles" to assert American supremacy in the world. Although it is disturbing, Moscow regards this development as temporary. The U.S. commitment to Israel is already causing irreparable damage to American economic interests in the Middle East. If things go far enough, the Soviets reckon, the international isolation of the United States, the inevitable strain in its relations with Western

Europe and Japan, and a full-blown energy crisis at home, would further weaken the once formidable adversary, making détente — on Soviet terms — more appealing to the Americans. Such, at least, is the expectation of a number of Soviet experts in international affairs, both within and outside the government.

The Academy of Sciences

The departure from the simplistic Stalinist *Weltanschauung* and the enormous complexities of Soviet external relations have placed a premium on competence and professionalism in the party and governmental bodies concerned with the day-by-day conduct of foreign affairs. Greater knowledge of the world, combined with a somewhat reduced requirement for total conformity (and conformity itself much less definable than in the past) and the emergence on the scene of a generation only vaguely remembering the Stalinist era, helped to create an atmosphere in which clashes of opinion in closed discussions became fully legitimate. While positions of power remained in the hands of the old-timers, the upward mobility even in the party *apparat* gave a degree of influence to the less dogmatic — although still fiercely patriotic — new breed of experts involved in policy formulation.

Knowledge and comprehension of the outside world come to the foreign affairs establishment in a variety of ways, including traditional intelligence gathering and diplomatic reporting. Perhaps more significant in the long run, however, is the role played by research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, a role vastly increased in the last decade.

In the Soviet setting, neither the Foreign Ministry nor the departments of the Central Committee dealing with foreign affairs conduct systematic foreign area studies; only limited research is done at the country desks and regional offices. Thus every time a new problem arises or an old one demands additional information and insight, officials frantically search for specialists in their midst or look for outside expertise. This expertise, as a rule, is now provided by scholars working in specialized research institutes under the jurisdiction of the Section of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences, which is headed by the Academy's vice president, Academician Fedoseyev, a *de facto* CC CPSU representative.

The Social Science Section consists of four divisions: History, Economics, Languages and Literatures, and Philosophy; but only the first two are actually involved in support operations of the foreign affairs establishment. The Division of History, headed by Academician Pospelov, supervises the institutes of General History, History of the USSR, Africa, Latin America, Orientology, Slavic and Balkan Studies, Ethnography, and Archaeology.

The Division of Economics, headed by Academician Khachaturov, supervises such institutes as World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Optimal Planning (IOP), Problems of Management (IPM), Economics of World Socialist System (IEWSS), Sociological Studies (ISS), International Workers' Movement (IIWM), Far Eastern (IFE), and United States Studies (IUSA). Of these, IUSA, IMEMO, IEWSS, ISS and IFE are for all practical purposes subordinated directly to the Section of Social Sciences and deal with the Division of Economics only in minor administrative matters. If the reform now under consideration goes through, the Academy of Sciences may form a new Section of Political Studies encompassing all the policy-oriented institutes.

Research programs of the institutes must be approved by the appropriate divisions and sections and, ultimately, by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, which works in close cooperation with the Department of Sciences and Scientific Institutions of the CC CPSU. Because of the centralized administration, research can be closely directed and coordinated, scholarly talent is presumably more efficiently utilized, and unnecessary overlaps are avoided. Further coordination is provided by the Editorial-Publishing Council of the Academy of Sciences, which must approve all publication programs.

Some duplication of research effort is unavoidable, because no one institute fully monopolizes the field. In order to reduce the waste of effort due to this factor, certain institutes are regarded as "principal," while scholars cultivating the same field but working elsewhere are considered more or less auxiliary. For example, Americanologists exist in the Institute of General History and in IMEMO; they can be found in the Academy of Social Sciences and in the General Staff organizations. But since the Institute of the USA is the "principal" institute in U.S. studies, it keeps track of the work done in other places. The importance of the "principal" institute is underscored by its budget and by its control over the leading monthly or quarterly journal in the field. It usually has more hard currency at its disposal for purchasing books and periodicals, computers or Xeroxing machines from abroad. It has primary claim on quotas for foreign travel (which is closely supervised by the Presidium of the Academy and by the Departments of Sciences and Scientific Institutions of the CC CPSU and of Cadres Abroad) and has more generous funds to subsidize traveling scholars. "Principal" institutes also play a major role in organizing international conferences in Moscow and in determining the composition of Soviet delegations to conferences abroad.

Whatever their formally approved scientific plans may be, administrators of a policy-oriented institute are at all times at the disposal of the Central Committee *apparat.* Whenever the ID/DLWCP or a CC Secretary requests it, they launch "emergency studies." In such cases, approved programs go by the board, for the priority of party needs is recognized by all. Studies produced in this way are uniformly classified and do not appear in print. Some institutes are also commissioned to produce periodical "situationary analyses" of chronic crisis situations, e.g., dealing with the China Question or the Middle East.

Because of the intricate relationships existing among highpowered bureaucrats in Moscow, an emergency study may on occasion be made at the request of an official in the Foreign or Defense Ministry who happens to be on close terms with an institute director or deputy director. Finally, institutes may originate such studies entirely on their own and then circulate them among the officials concerned in an attempt to advance a new approach to a critical problem or influence policy. Since institute directors are men of stature and influence, with access to policymakers, such studies represent an important input in the cumbersome decision-making process.

The researchers in these Academy institutes rely in their work on "open" sources and such materials as TASS bulletins or select embassy reports that are made available to them "for official use only." They have no access to secret information and data obtained by intelligence agencies, and only on rare occasions is an important expert requested to take part in an in-house project in a ministry or a committee where secret projects are carried out.

A connection of sorts between institutes and ministries is further maintained by the practice of having certain officials of scholarly background and disposition serve on the institutes' scientific councils, in which capacity they frequently take part in discussions and conferences. Another link is provided by a widespread urge among officials to work for advanced academic degrees. They write their dissertations under (sometimes nominal) supervision of specialists in research institutes and, in due course, have to submit and defend them in prescribed fashion.

The practice of appointing scholars to high CC and government positions (many of them graduates of the prestigious Institute of International Relations) creates additional ties between the academic world and the foreign policy establishment. More intriguing (although less detectable), some of the Politburo members occasionally supplement the knowledge they obtain through the official setup by informal consultations with academic experts in the field. Such informal personal advisers are probably viewed with suspicion by the experts in the Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But Politburo members who seek to form opinions of their own feel free to call upon anybody for advice.

Moscow's academic world (as perhaps *any* academic world) is highly competitive and relations among its leading figures are rarely friendly. In the fierce struggle for influence the outcome usually depends on personal connections. Positions are enhanced by such trappings as membership in the Academy of Sciences, the Central Committee, or even in the Supreme Soviet. Those academic administrators who began their careers in the CC *apparat* or in the editorial offices of *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* usually have a natural edge over their rivals. Their public relations talents and ability to attract more prominent scholars (in spite of the "no-raiding" rule in the Academy of Sciences institutes) and give good jobs to relatives of party and government hierarchs also determine their relative standing.

It is impossible to measure, with any degree of accuracy, the overall impact scholars and their institutes have on foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union. They clearly are no match, in their total influence, to the "insiders" in the CC CPSU and the government; bureaucrats in the USSR, as in other countries, still have final say. But the lofty position scientists occupy — in social status, income and job security — assures them an important and visibly growing role in Moscow's high councils, a role difficult to envisage a decade or two ago.

Political Makeup of Soviet Elite

As foreign policy objectives take shape in the Politburo of the

CC CPSU they represent an integral part of the Soviet Union's goals. As was pointed out at the beginning of this article, the members of this august body are essentially "generalists" of equal status who, in their deliberations, take into account all the major factors affecting Soviet life. Stated simply, the goals the Politburo tries to attain boil down to assuring political conformity, state discipline and prosperity at home; and communist unity, expansion of influence and military security in confronting the outside world. The difficulty in accomplishing these objectives is in the Soviet leaders' desire to assure *total* conformity and discipline, *total* communist unity and *total* security. Prosperity, to them, means not only a reasonable and improving standard of living for the populace, but a level which ideally could demonstrate to the world the superiority of the socialist system. This level has proved to be hard to reach, partly because of the country's limited resources, partly because of poor management, but to a considerable extent because so much of Soviet wealth has been channeled into defense and into aiding friendly forces abroad as a part of an expanding global role.

Of all the major Soviet objectives, only domestic conformity and state discipline are within reach. External security is relative, depending as it does on the good will of the United States and its allies and on the whims of Mao Tse-tung. International communist unity has proved to be increasingly elusive. The expansion of influence, in spite of the cost and effort that went into it, has been neither steady nor irreversible, except perhaps in the Middle East where factors beyond anybody's control, but generally favoring the Soviets, have been at work.

We do not know the extent of Soviet leaders' fears and frustration, but frustrated and insecure they are. The desire to keep their people isolated and protected from alien influences (as manifested in the recent threat to shoot down U.S. communication satellites attempting to broadcast TV programs over Russia, or the continued jamming of some of the foreign radio broadcasts), and the tightening of ideological screws, do not indicate much self-confidence. Externally, the nagging conflict with China, the intractability of the Hanoi leadership, the periodic reverses in relations with Arab countries, the humiliation of having to purchase large grain supplies from the number-one adversary, the United States, all add up to a less than optimistic picture. Prospects for an improved détente atmosphere with the West represent brighter spots in Soviet foreign relations, but the strategic vulnerability in the Far East calls for defense outlays not foreseeable ten or fifteen years ago.

The fact is that the Politburo, in spite of its strong collective will and motivation, is not a free agent in its decisions and must respond to a multitude of pressures, domestic as well as external. It has to reckon with the lagging economy, institutional pressures, and intractable allies and adversaries. It also has to reckon with the erosion of dedication to the cause among the Soviet elite — among the thousands of intellectuals working in the highly politicized area of foreign relations who tend to take exception to the simplified formulas of the leadership and whose collective *Weltanschauung* appears to be undergoing a gradual change.

To define and categorize the attitudes of these men is not easy, because the Soviet political culture is radically different from any other. Categories used by journalists and experts ("liberal," "conservative," "Stalinist," "hard-lining," "nationalist") are at best meaningless and at worst misleading. While they seem to help us to sort out "good guys" from "bad guys" and establish our emotional preferences, they have limited descriptive and no predictive value in matters of foreign policy. An analytical approach based on Marxist-Leninist ideology is equally inadequate since the Soviets, confirmed communists as they are, also deal with highly pragmatic problems. Their view of these problems is determined by *their* perception of Soviet national interests, not ours. The inescapable conclusion seems to be that before we attempt to explain Soviet realities in our terms, we ought to try to see them as they appear to the more knowledgeable and enlightened Russians who form part of the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

A basic fact about this Soviet elite is that it is not homogeneous. Its common denominator is fierce patriotism, a belief in a one-party political system, a view that the Soviet Union leads the worldwide struggle against the fundamentally hostile West and that this hostility is predetermined by the conflict between two drastically different socio-economic systems. The foreign relations elitists further believe that a major war must be prevented; that for its strength and security the Soviet Union depends on its military might; and that in order ultimately to win the struggle it must keep expanding its ties with friendly nations and sociopolitical forces eroding the cohesiveness of the opposing camp. Above all, they believe that the Soviet system is fundamentally "good" and that in the long run this goodness will be recognized by the majority of mankind.

This set of beliefs may appear all-embracing, leaving little room for diversity. In fact, differences are vast and important. Patriotism has degrees; it can be Soviet-Communist and it can be Great Russian, with strong chauvinistic overtones. Some assign the party a much larger role in Soviet affairs than do others. Soviet struggle against the West can be viewed in strictly philosophical and general political terms – and in a much more specific way, calling for relentless diplomatic activity and constant mobilization of all "progressive forces." Again, the hostility between the two systems can be seen in theoretical terms or as a continuous international "class struggle" in which all means short of war can and must be employed. Finally, one encounters individuals who believe that U.S./USSR cooperation is desirable to maintain international peace.

The elite's commitment to the necessity of avoiding a major war seems unalterable. But there are great differences between those who put heavy reliance on constantly building up Soviet power and those who believe that a better result might be achieved by a balancing and even a mutual reduction of strategic forces. The belief in alliances is not uniformly strong, and there are people who insist that allies cannot be trusted and that the Soviet Union must prepare to be satisfied with the political appearances, rather than the realities, of the Warsaw Pact setup. There are men who look for every opening to expand Soviet ties with the nations at loggerheads with imperialists, who want to fill every "vacuum"; and those who point out the volatility of many "friendly" regimes and the high cost of keeping them on the Soviet side. Supporting the "progressive" forces operating in noncommunist states has attraction to some, while others argue against entanglements and substantive commitments to movements which cannot be effectively controlled by the Soviet Union. Even the elite's belief in the goodness of the communist system is relative: one can encounter people who would welcome an eventual convergence with the capitalist system, and a corresponding diminution of the international "class struggle."

These are substantial differences, especially for a society that only a quarter of a century ago was rigidly conformist in its political outlook. They are not readily visible to the readers of Soviet publications, which are still strictly controlled by the party ideologues. But while the written word is addressed to the uninformed masses and outsiders, what circulates "for official use only" and what the "insiders" say in their meetings behind closed doors is often totally devoid of propagandistic overtones. Debates, as a rule, concentrate on specific issues, and those who attempt to argue the case solely on the basis of what Marx or Lenin, or even the latest party congress resolution, had to say are regarded by their more sophisticated colleagues as dogmatic fools who have no place in deciding important issues.

One important aspect of the Soviet elite is that it is largely composed of the intelligentsia, not only because of its education but also because of its predisposition toward independent thought and judgment. It is a *communist* intelligentsia, of course, upholding the Marxist-Leninist "scientific method" and the superiority of socialism over capitalism. But not infrequently today's Russian intellectuals subscribe to a definable set of moral and ethical values and are susceptible to idealistic notions resembling those of their spiritual ancestors of the pre-revolutionary era.

Not all of the Soviet elite consists of intelligentsia in this sense. There are opportunists everywhere, preoccupied with their own careers and following the prevailing political winds. On the higher reaches of the government and party *apparat* the moralistic quality diminishes as the sense of power and responsibility displaces idealism. The interesting thing, however, is that those intellectuals who live and function on the periphery of power tend to be critical of the leadership, its policies and performance. Their patriotism and communist convictions do not translate into an automatic loyalty to, say, the Central Committee; and few take the thesis of the CPSU's infallibility seriously.

It would be farfetched to say that the more enlightened part of the elite is in opposition to the regime: it constitutes an integral part of the regime and has no desire to replace it with anything else. Yet it deviates from the thought and behavior patterns prescribed by the party for all Soviet citizens, and in its function as a repository of expertise and knowledge it does not hesitate to assert itself. For example, the Academy of Sciences enthusiastically follows the "advice" of the Central Committee not to award the coveted rank of academician (or corresponding member) to ministers and other government bureaucrats, or to the administrators of the CC *apparat*. This modification is aimed at preserving the autonomy and integrity of the scientific establishment and protecting it from becoming a hunting ground for ambitious politicians. Since the Academy is not exactly independent (its budget, for one thing, is financed by the government) and since it has to live in the real world, compromises are inevitable. Nevertheless, the relative independence of this highly prestigious group and the research establishment it controls provides an attractive alternative, not only for young specialists in search of a career, but also to mentally alert individuals frustrated by the routine and rigid requirements of government service.

This essay is not the place for a discussion of specific ideological deviations among the Soviet elite, although their implications for the direction of foreign policy may become significant. The growth of Soviet power on the one hand, and the numerous failures stemming from policies based on the doctrinaire communist *Weltanschauung* on the other, have given birth to a variety of new trends in the postwar years. Russian nationalism, bordering on chauvinism, has acquired legitimacy not only in the government but also in the cultural field. Among the younger generation there is less ideological vigilance in interpreting the bourgeois-capitalist world — and more suspicion of the fraternal socialist states. The massive economic failure, especially in agriculture, evokes criticism of the inept leadership and sometimes raises doubts about the soundness of the system as a whole. Costly foreign ventures, whether aimed at weakening the forces of imperialism or advancing the cause of communism, are looked upon with distinct disfavor by a great many otherwise loyal Soviet scholars.

These tendencies are strongly resented by government bureaucrats and Central Committee functionaries who have been primarily responsible for policies and actions that failed. Yet the imperatives of governing the Soviet state, with its far-flung interests and commitments, preclude a significant purge of specialists who, after all, have been repeatedly proven right in their forewarnings and analyses. And although the leadership may on occasion feel defensive, it has thus far successfully controlled the natural impulse to quash criticism if it is voiced according to the rules, i.e., in confidential discussions and in studies prepared "for official use only."

Such uneasy relationships may continue in the foreseeable future, resulting in a symbiosis between bureaucrats and academics, in which the former will doubtless predominate and yet be forced to reckon with the latter. The decision-makers in the Politburo, having no need to fear for their power but with no disposition to accept the role of scapegoats for unsuccessful policies, may come to rely more on outside advice, thereby giving tacit approval to this strange adversary relationship in an otherwise tightly-organized system.

The phenomenon cannot be analyzed as just one more institutional conflict in the Soviet Union, for the elite is not organized and its members are not only scattered throughout scientific organizations, but can be found in many government offices. It is, at least potentially, a vehicle of change in a regime that has been notorious in its ability to resist evolution. A natural impulse is not to overrate it, but in the absence of other positive forces on the scene it clearly warrants watching.

THE REAL REVOLUTION IN WARFARE: THE COMPUTER IMPACT*

by Stefan T. Possony

THERE is considerable confusion today about the strategic importance of computers. Many analysts point out that numerous other technologies are revolutionizing warfare, such as giros, lasers, nucleonics, metallurgy and propulsion. This is true, but in one way or another *all* emerging technologies, including the computer technologies themselves,[1] are dependent on computers, just as the technologies of the first revolution were related to energy. Furthermore, computers, lasers and nucleonics are interrelated.

Computers are as important and intrusive as the mathematics and the data processing systems required to conceive, build and operate complex new machines and to create new materials. They are indispensable for the recording and interpretation of entire classes of observations. They make it possible to handle and quickly recall large numbers of informational bits. They are part of communications and are needed for operations analysis. They assume production and distribution jobs and perform a nearly limitless number of other vital tasks.

Without computers modern weapon systems could not be built, integrated, tested, deployed, kept combat-ready and operated. In fact, weapons such as missiles, aircraft, tanks and submarines incorporate computers as part of their armament. Avionics are intrinsically computer linked, and so is missile accuracy. Helicopters used against tanks are provided with computers and computer links to obtain the real-time information needed for effective battlefield interaction. In brief, there are no modern weapon systems that are not vitally dependent upon high-speed computers. And a number of strategic missions are centered on high-performance computers, e.g., early warning systems, command-control-communications (C-3), anti-ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, space operations, and several branches of intelligence.

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*This article is adapted from a portion of a forthcoming study of the Soviet Union's strategy toward the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The problem of computers arose in the context of a discussion about the accuracy of Soviet missiles.

[1] Illiac IV, at present the most advanced computer in the United States, and probably in the world, was built with the help of several other large computers.

Computers are not just swift calculating machines. They are entire systems which include, in addition to the computers themselves, memory stores, testing and correction mechanisms, and peripheral equipment such as display units, input-output links, communications, and "software," i.e., old and new instructions. Big operational structures — for instance, a missile force or the meteorological and hydrological services — require several large general-purpose computers and special computers feeding the general-purpose machines, plus field computers on board mobile units such as ships, airplanes, missiles and space vehicles.

For example, in the Apollo program a fairly large computer is carried in the Saturn booster, one computer is housed in the command spacecraft, and two computers are attached to the lunar module. The launch site has a large computer installation, the vast tracking system contains many smaller and several large computers, and mission control has still another large installation. The Earth Resources Technology (ERTS) program would be useless without computers to handle and "enhance" the inputs from the diverse sensors carried on the satellite.

II

There are no exact statistics on the utilization of computers or on their distribution as to type. It is believed that by 1972 the United States already operated about 80,000 computers, while Japan, Britain, Germany and France had computer banks of not more than one-tenth the U.S. size.

In 1973 the U.S. Air Force operated 1,302 general-purpose computers serving fifteen basic functions and an undisclosed number of special-purpose computers and computers integrated into weapons. The value of these general-purpose computers is about $870 million and the annual operating cost amounts to $1.5 billion.[2] The two other American military services also have large computer banks, as do AEC and NASA. The latter is in charge of Illiac IV, which is a key facility of the large computer network run by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The entire U.S. defense establishment may well operate more than 5,000 general-purpose computers, including many of high potency. The computerizing capabilities of the defense-related industry must be added to this total.

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[2] Edgar Ulsamer, "Computers — Key to Tomorrow's Air Force," *Air Force Magazine*, July 1973, pp. 46-52.

By contrast, the USSR is believed to have had by 1971 about 6,000 computers, virtually all of which were allocated to the military and arms industry. According to another estimate, the USSR in 1972 had about 8,000 computers, approximately the number the United States was using in 1961.[3] Of course, without a substantial capability Soviet equipment could never have reached the moon, Venus and Mars. But there are strong indications that a large number of Soviet computers are obsolete and obsolescent; Soviet computer memory devices are poor and hold comparatively little information; peripheral equipment is poor; software is inadequate; time-sharing is poorly organized; and parallelism and multi-processors are as yet undeveloped.

It has been reported that the "true believers" in the Soviet Communist Party have been opposing the proper utilization of computers,[4] but perhaps this opposition has been stilled. There is little question that the USSR recognizes its deficiencies in the computer area. The best evidence on this point is that the current bloc computer production plans emulate the IBM 360-system,[5] to such a degree that compatibility will be feasible and IBM equipment can be bought and incorporated in Soviet installations.

Undoubtedly one of the main Soviet purposes in following a détente policy is to obtain much needed computer equipment, but large and expensive purchases would be required and they may be difficult to finance. In 1968 the USSR imported some $300 million worth of computer equipment and scheduled larger imports for 1969 and 1970, but payments were made in installments strung out for seven years.[6] The USSR must procure at least $10 billion worth of computer equipment, and perhaps $20 billion, if it is to catch up with the United States.

Soviet production plans supposedly aim at an annual output of 3,000 modern computers. Even at this rate, the United States cannot easily be overtaken in the computer race, and it is doubtful that the USSR is in any way close to fulfilling its computer plan.

It should be kept in mind that the Soviets have no difficulty with the mathematics and the other scientific bases of the computer sciences. Their difficulties are of an *industrial* nature, and they also seem to lack the personnel to carry out extensive software programs. The industry appears to be inefficiently organized.

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[3] Georges Anderla, "Le développement de l'informatique en URSS," *Est & Ouest*, October 1-15, 1970, supplement to No. 453, estimated that in 1967 the USSR had no more than 1,500 computers, as compared with 40,000 in the United States and 15,000 in Western Europe.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 16 ff.

[5] International Data Corporation, *EDP Industry Report*, newsletter, July 27, 1973, p. 2.

[6] Anderla, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Furthermore, large computers are expensive to operate. In America operating costs reportedly have been running at .01 cents per bit, although this cost is being reduced to .00001 cents in modern computers. By comparison, current Soviet computers seem to be much more costly to operate.

Whether the USSR will catch up is uncertain; it will definitely require much time. But whether the Soviets will soon reach the *current* level of U.S. computer technology is a different question, and the answer seems to be that by the end of the decade — at the earliest — they probably will have a computer technology comparable to the one the U.S. armed forces possessed at the beginning of the 1970's. The fact is that American computer technology is at present in the midst of a breakthrough. The base of the Soviet computer industry, as presently constituted, is too narrow to compete effectively with the U.S. computer establishment.

III

What is the significance of the Soviet lag? Computers usually are classified by generations. According to one classification, the first generation used vacuum tubes; the second, tubes and transistors; the third, semi-conductors; and the fourth, integrated circuits. Far more advanced technology is on the way. Since this classification by technology is not informative in thinking about strategy, we will classify computers by performance in terms of operations per second and memory capacity. By this yardstick U.S. computer technology showed the following expansion:

	Operations/Second
Before 1946	less than 1
1946-1951	less than 100
1951-1953	less than 1,000
1953-1963	30,000-160,000
1963-1965	up to 4 million
1967-1971	10-30 million
1972-	more than 100 million

Memory capacities, which are perhaps more significant than computing speed, rose to 100,000 words during the 1950's, to many millions of words during the 1960's, and are rising now into the billions. The Unicon laser memory attached to Illiac IV stores one trillion bits.

Current military computers are geared to radio-radar information carriers operating at less than 10^{10} cycles per second. As lasers come into use, information flows will be at the rate of 10^{15} cycles/second, or one thousand times one trillion.[7] Thus, the new laser technologies will be of little value until there are computers capable of handling the inputs — and, of course, laser technology, i.e., electro-optics, will be used to improve the capacities of computers.

It is not feasible to correlate computer proficiency too closely with weapons technology. Sometimes technologists cannot fully utilize the computer potential; at other times they manage to overcome the limitations of their computers. But there are some generally accepted correlations. For example, manual and electric calculating machines were sufficient for building the atom bomb, the basic missile technology, short-range missiles, and short- and medium-range jet aircraft. The computer capacity needed for the initial thermonuclear technology and the first B-52's was still limited. A computer technology of some 30,000 operations/second was correlated with the first ICBM's, space satellites and the SAGE air defense system. Computers with 100,000 to 900,000 operations/second were used to develop Minuteman, Polaris with the A-1 missiles, later B-52 models, initial space reconnaissance and navigation systems, and a C-3 structure suitable for a first-strike strategy. Computers operating in the low millions served to develop large supersonic aircraft, variable wing geometry, initial ABM and nuclear technologies, space warning, forty-eight-hour dependable weather forecasts, and an initial C-3 structure adapted to a second-strike strategy.

The computational center of the first Aerospace Control Squadron, Aerospace Defense Command, runs one computer that performs some 900,000 arithmetic operations/second. A second computer stores about 1.6 million binary bits in core, and up to 361 million alphanumerical characters on magnetic tape. A third computer serves as backing for either of the two. A fourth large and full-time computer supports the Missile Warning Center. All of these computers are slated for early replacement by larger and more potent equipment.[8]

The computer regime of more than 10 million operations/second allowed the low altitude modification of the B-52, effective MIRV's, the late Apollo missions, Skylab, and the initial designs of Trident and the B-1. Computers operating in the 100-1,000 million range will be required to produce reliable seven-day weather forecasts, the space shuttle, C-3 systems with the prompt retargeting capabilities required to conduct an effective second-strike strategy, and anti-MIRV ABM's. An ASW (anti-submarine warfare) system against deeply submerged submarines needs exact, real-time oceanographic data and calls for computers capable of one billion operations/second or more than one operation per nanosecond.

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[7] Ulsamer, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[8] *Air University Review,* September-October 1973, pp. 78, 81.

An ASW system is permeated with computers: to build the ships and the weapons; to accomplish weapon reliability and accuracy; to navigate; to operate the sensors, integrate their signals and enhance their data; to determine hydrological conditions; to communicate; to receive orders, and to fight. Computers of great power must also be used if earth survey satellites — for example, for geodetic, mineral resource and real-time reconnaissance applications — are to give outstanding results.

The fundamental thesis that advances toward more complex weapons and augmented performance are dependent upon increases in computer capabilities is illustrated by Figures 1 to 4. The data, originating from the Lockheed Computer Operations Department, illustrate the development of SLBM's. Figure 1 shows processing speed in terms of arithmetic operations. Figure 2 depicts the growing capability of communicating with the computer. Figure 3 deals with memory and shows the speed of retrieval and the increase of storage capacity, as well as the nearly 5,000-fold gain in capability since 1966 when memory technology was, in the main, transferred from tapes to discs and drums. Figure 4 conveys an image of sophistication. The message is clear: technological superiority is a function of superiority in computer technology.

IV

In 1968 the USSR acquired an integrated circuit computer, the BESM-6 together with the Ural-16. No performance data on Ural-16 seems to be available, but it is a slow speed and low memory device. Soviet disclosures indicate that the BESM-6, the more widely used machine, has a capacity of one million operations/second, as compared with IBM 360/76 which handles 1.4

million operations/second.[9] However, the BESM-6 memory is only one-fifth of the comparable IBM equipment and is far less powerful than that of the most capacious memories of the IBM-360 series. The BESM-6 is used by the Institute of High Energy Physics at Serpukhov, but it is regarded as unreliable. The Institute often sends its data for computer analysis to Western Europe and America. The technological lag denoted by BESM-6 is an estimated six to seven years. It is worth noting that the factory at Voronesh, which is building the supersonic TU-144 passenger plane (one of which crashed in Paris), is apparently served by a computer rated at only 31,000 operations/second.

A new computer series called RYAD[10] is to be developed by Comecon, notably by East Germany and Poland in cooperation with the USSR. Conceived in 1967, the facility is planned to have five members, ES-1020, 1030, 1040, 1050 and 1060, which are to be designed as equivalents to or copies of IBM 360/20, 30, 40, 50 and 60, respectively. In this line-up operations per second increase as follows: 20,000, 100,000, 250,000, 500,000 and 2 million, and memories range from 500,000 bits to 16 million.

Prototypes of ES-1020, 1030 and 1040 were completed in 1972. The 1020 was in production by summer 1973, and production of the 1030 probably has begun. The status of the 1040, scheduled to be produced in East Germany, is unclear. By mid-1973, there was a 1050 prototype, but no production schedule, and the 1060 was still under design.[11] The testing of MIRV's suggests an improvement of the USSR's computer capability: during the 1973 tests Soviet boosters carried on-board computers for the first time, but what general-purpose computers were used to back up the MIRV program is not known.

The important point is that, so far as we know, all presently deployed Soviet ICBM's were built on a computer technology corresponding to the U.S. technology of the late 1950's or, at the most, the early 1960's. They are tied to ground-controlled guidance systems based on low capacity computers. The system will certainly be upgraded, but there are limits to such improvements, especially if the new computers still are not up-to-date and may not be available in sufficient numbers.

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[9] There are non-Soviet data suggesting that the BESM-6 capacity is only 500,000 operations/second.

[10] Ryad means row, line or series, and military file.

[11] International Data Corporation, *op. cit.*, p. 4 f.

FIGURE 1: INCREASE IN LARGE COMPUTER PROCESSING SPEED WITH TIME AND WEAPON DEVELOPMENT



FIGURE 2: INCREASE IN LARGE COMPUTER TRANSMISSION RATES



Source: J. Martin, *Telecommunications and the Computer* (Prentice-Hall, 1969), including extrapolation to 1980.

FIGURE 3



FIGURE 4


Parallelism
Serial
Compute Input/ Output
Multi-Program, Single Processor
Multi-Processors
Mini-Computers
Large Computer Ultra-Sophistication
Electronic Technology
2nd Generation (Vacuum Tubes)
Discrete Solid State
3rd Generation Integrated Circuit Solid State
4th Generation Large-Scale Integration
1960 Polaris A1
1964 A2
1968 A3
1972 Poseidon C3
1976
Trident C4
1980
Time

TABLE I
SLBM DEVELOPMENT: COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS

SLBM	*Technology*	*Processing speed (ops/second)*	*Transmission Rates (million bits/ second)*	*Tape Retrieval (bits/ second)*	*Storage Capacity (millions of bits)*
A1	2nd generation, input-output	500,000	10	100,000	2
A2	2nd generation, advanced	700,000	20	250,000	500
A3	3rd generation, multi-programs	1,000,000	35	550,000	10,000
C3	4th generation, multi-processors	1,200,000	50	800,000	25,000
C4	4th generation, (advanced) large-mini computer combinations	2-3,000,000	150	1,200,000*	200,000*

*Extrapolations by author.

A study by Jiri Slama and Heinrich Vogel[12] shows that fourteen types of computers have been used in Czechoslovakia. Of these, three came from the USSR, one from East Germany, and one from Czechoslovakia; the United Kingdom and West Germany contributed four types each, and France delivered one computer type. In 1971 Czechoslovakia had altogether 275 computers, of which one-third came from the United States and Western Europe. The indications are that the bloc-produced computers had a short life-span.

The data also show that the bloc began to install third-generation computers only by 1968-1969. At present, the bloc's computer bank is composed of equal parts of second- and third-generation equipment.

The USSR's past computer production levels and future production schedules are worth noting.

Production (in billions of rubles)				Planned Production	
1967	.26	1970	.71	1973	1.28
1968	.36	1971	.87	1974	1.60
1969	.49	1972	1.18	1975	2.00

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[12] See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* August 25, 1973. This study is based on *Pravda,* January 30, 1973, and on official Czech statistics, and was prepared in the Osteuropa-Institut, Munich.

The average annual growth was close to 30 per cent, which is quite substantial — if we are to believe Soviet statistics. But there is no evidence that qualitative improvements are rising as rapidly. In particular, the costs of computer operations continue to be extremely high, according to official Czech statistics. The conclusion drawn by Slama and Vogel is that the USSR is now forcing the installation of third-generation computers.

V

Granting gaps in our knowledge, it is evident that Soviet computer capabilities need massive development. This statement is borne out by Moscow's strenuous efforts to buy computers in Western Europe, Japan and America — the primary goal of nearly all its trade endeavors. If the West sells, the USSR will move into a position where it is able to achieve genuine strategic superiority.

What if the West does not sell? Soviet scientists are resourceful. They are known to have linked computers together to boost the number of operations, but since their equipment does not include many interchangeable modules, link-ups cannot provide the necessary operational flexibility. In any event, there cannot be enough link-up machines to bridge gaps of two or more orders of magnitude. The odds are that Soviet-bloc R&D structures will be able to solve the problem by themselves, but only after considerable time and after their approach to computer design and production has been reorganized. For the time being they will continue to trail, but as they move forward, presently insoluble military problems will be solved.

To what extent and in which way computer capability is correlated with accuracy need not be decided. A broad correlation is apparent. To hazard an estimate, we might expect that an accuracy of .5 miles requires computers with a capacity of about 100,000 operations/second; .4 miles accuracy presupposes operations within the 1-10 million range; and .3 miles accuracy calls for operations substantially above the 10 million/second level. For this correlation to be valid, the missiles must be built so that they can effectively utilize computer inputs. Furthermore, the requisite computer systems must be fully developed and *all* needed modules must be available for *all* missiles.

The available public evidence suggests that in 1972 the accuracy of the Soviet missile force did not exceed .5 nautical miles or roughly 3,000 feet CEP.[13] This evidence is suggestive, not conclusive. Still, on the data available, a .4 miles accuracy should not be attainable technologically before the ES-1060's are available and are functioning effectively — i.e., a few more years hence. After the technology is at hand, such accuracy would become a real force capability only if high-grade computers of different types were deployed in sufficient numbers.

According to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the Soviet MIRV force could reach parity with the U.S. force by 1980. As a planning factor it must be assumed that by that time the MIRV technology available to the USSR battle order will have been perfected. This could mean that Soviet boosters may then have a .3 miles or 1,800 feet CEP accuracy. From that point on, the threat to the Minuteman force would become serious, regardless of whether SALT I and its numerical restrictions remain in force.

The United States must anticipate the danger and take suitable precautionary actions which may include, among other improvements, the stepping up of the technological development of thermal lasers, the construction of site defenses for missile launchers, the acceleration of Trident and B-1, and the building of more modern and improved missiles to replace the Minuteman warhorse which, though still useful and even vital, is aging.

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[13] By this reckoning the accuracy of the old 210 SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's and of the SS-N-6 SLBM's would be less.

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP CRISIS: DOOM OF AN HEIR?

by Jürgen Domes

SHORTLY before the second plenary meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in late August 1970, the policies of the People's Republic of China appeared to be firmly established and the leadership comparatively secure. Marshal Lin Piao, the only Vice-Chairman of the CC, First Vice-Chairman and de facto head of the party's Military Commission, and Minister of National Defense, had been expressly mentioned in the new party statute as Mao Tse-tung's "most intimate comrade-in-arms and successor."[1] Western observers had detailed political biographies of the new Politburo members, and some idea about their respective positions in the power hierarchy that emerged from the convulsions of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR). All of us felt we had the necessary instruments of analysis to project where China was going. But in the last three years, many unpredicted changes in policy and leadership have greatly transformed the Chinese political scene.

The upheaval has been startling. Only three years ago, Lin Piao was celebrated as a model of ideologically correct behavior, the most loyal disciple of the Chairman, and therefore the most trustworthy lieutenant to the party leader. On September 15, 1970, hardly a year before his demise, *Jen-min jih-pao* published the following accolade:

> Vice-Chairman Lin made a living study and living use of the brilliant philosophical thought of Chairman Mao, and he made a creative application of dialectical materialism and historic materialism.[2]

Even on the day of Lin's *échec* – September 12, 1971 – *JMJP* proclaimed:

> Comrade Lin Piao has always lifted high the great red banner of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, has always firmly put into practice and protected the proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao, and has always been a shining example to the whole party, to the whole army, and to the people of the whole country!

Not quite two months later, the "shining example" – whose name has been ignored in the Chinese media for almost two years — had become the "Liu Shao-ch'i type sham Marxist political swindler," the "Chang Kuo-t'ao type army-splitter," a "plotter, ambitionist, renegade and traitor,"[3] and "dog's excrement undigestible by mankind."[4] On November 18, 1971, the garrison commander of Hangchou had this to say about Lin Piao and his associates:

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[1] *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party*, April 14, 1969, Article I.
[2] *Jen-min jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), Peking (hereafter cited as *JMJP*).

> They pretended that they were the most thoroughly versed in Marxism-Leninism and the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, even while they were exalting themselves above the masses. This assumed the form of leftist extremism which imposed slavery. . . . They pretended to be prophets and geniuses. They represented a reactionary voluntarism and grossly exaggerated the subjective powers of man. They denied . . . that matter determines the spirit; for them, spirit took the place of matter. In practical work, they substituted politics for work and production by revolution. They were *empty-headed politicians,* who denied the unity between politics and economics, politics and techniques. . . . They substituted emotions for politics.[5]

These quotations demonstrate the impact Lin Piao's downfall must have had on the Chinese political scene in general, and on the credibility of the political system in particular. The Lin Piao crisis came as a shock to the common people. Contrary to the basic Maoist theory that major political developments are engineered by the masses — and contrary to the romanticizing of some Western scholars about the participation of the masses in Chinese politics[6]— the decisions that led to the overthrow of Lin and his group were taken behind closed doors. For more than a month the masses in China knew nothing about them. The street-demonstration-type of domestic crisis prevalent during the Cultural Revolution, which seemed to promote the image of a comparatively open decision-making process — although one might still harbor doubts about the reality of its participatory character — was, thus, followed by a political crisis resembling a rather old-fashioned palace coup. Lin's purge was a crisis without the masses. What had happened?

A number of observers have analyzed the Lin Piao affair as a case of sheer power politics, arguing that when Lin began operating as though Mao were no longer on the scene, the

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[3] Hunan and Ssuch'uan People's Broadcasting Stations (hereafter cited as PBS), October 30, 1971.

[4] Chekiang PBS, November 7, 1971.

[5] *Ibid.*, November 18, 1971. (Emphasis added.)

[6] See, for example, Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution," in *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1972, pp. 620-653.

Chairman became suspicious of his designated successor. Others explain Lin's overthrow as the result of a confrontation between the army and the reorganized party,[7] in the course of which the party was able to reassert its predominance after a period that Joachim Glaubitz has labeled a "proletarian military dictatorship."[8] These interpretations contain some relevance, yet they do not provide a sufficient answer. For the Chinese communists, power conflicts have mostly been conflicts over political orientation as well. This was true in the Lin Piao crisis. In this article we will explore all issues that could have brought on the confrontation between Lin Piao and his associates in the central military machine plus a minority of supporting regional military leaders, on the one hand, and the coalition of the old administrative and diplomatic cadres, the majority of the regional commanders, and the remnants of the Cultural Revolutionary Left, on the other hand. But first we will review the course of developments that resulted in the downfall of the Lin Piao group.

I

During the two years since the palace coup in Peking, some reasonably well established facts have emerged. The most important sources are two confidential documents of the Chinese Communist Party Center, circulated among the middle and lower echelon cadres in early 1972. They were secured by the Chinese Nationalist intelligence service and published in Taipei.[9] Although Chinese communist documents published by Chinese Nationalist organizations should be viewed with due skepticism, the authenticity of both has by now been confirmed through comparison with the Chinese communist press and numerous cross-checks with mainland refugees in Hongkong. There is, however, room for doubt about the accuracy of their contents. They tell only the winners' side of the story and therefore must be used with considerable caution.

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[7] This assumption is proposed in the thought-provoking study by Parris H. Chang, "The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics," ORBIS, Fall 1972, p. 797 f; and by Richard E. Thornton, *The Bear and the Dragon: Sino-Soviet Relations and the Political Evolution of the Chinese People's Republic, 1949-1971* (New York: 1972), p. 65 f.

[8] In a paper delivered at the Conference on Chinese Politics, sponsored by the German Association for East Asian Studies in Hamburg, February 14, 1971.

[9] Document *Chung-fa* (*Chung-kung chung-yang fa-pu*), No. 4/1972, January 13, 1972, an alleged draft outline for a coup d'état, the so-called *5-7-1* document, prepared by the son of Lin Piao, Lin Li-kuo; and the alleged confession of the Director of the Political Department, Fourth Air Force, Li Wei-hsin (English version published in *Issues & Studies* [Taipei], May 1972, pp. 79-82). And, Document *Chung-fa*, No. 12/1972, March 17, 1972, a collection of remarks by Mao Tse-tung to cadres on an inspection tour between mid-August and September 12, 1971 (published as *Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao* [Reference Material], by the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, RoC, Taipei, August 16, 1972).

According to these documents, and to parallel evidence taken from pronouncements of the Chinese media before and after the Lin Piao crisis, conflicts between Mao and Lin erupted in the summer of 1970, probably over preparations for the establishment of new provincial party committees, and especially over the rehabilitation of leading party cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution.[10] Furthermore, Lin Piao and his group, at that time in close cooperation with the head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, Ch'en Po-ta, who for more than thirty years had been Mao's secretary and closest associate, tried to keep the Chairman aloof from the decision-making process. Praising Mao as a "genius," they apparently sought to elevate Lin Piao to the position of Chief-of-State.[11] To accomplish this, they might have attempted to wrestle from Mao a considerable portion of his power in order to secure Lin's succession while Mao was still alive.

During a conference at Lushan in Central China from August 23 to 25, 1970, which preceded the second plenary meeting of the Ninth Central Committee, Lin reportedly made this suggestion in what Mao called a "surprise attack," without having given advance notice to other members of the Politburo's Standing Committee, except for Ch'en Po-ta.[12] Apparently, Mao and those who supported him against Lin managed to fend off the attack — if there was any against Mao himself. The Lin Piao group, although in agreement with Ch'en, during the summer of 1970 took the same attitude toward Ch'en as Liu Shao-ch'i had displayed toward Lin's predecessor as Minister of Defense, P'eng Teh-huai, who was purged at the historical first Lushan conference in 1959: they did nothing to support Ch'en, probably hoping that, after his purge, they could nevertheless implement the return to the Great Leap Forward policies of 1958 which Ch'en appears to have advocated.[13]

After the Lushan incident of August 1970, Lin's enemies began an elaborately planned drive to undermine his power, combining regional purges with attempts to win over some of his former associates on the regional level, in particular the commanders of the Fuchou and Canton military areas, Han Hsien-ch'u and Ting Sheng.[14] In December 1970, the Party Center convened a North China Conference which in the following month produced the purge of two of Lin's staunchest supporters in and around China's capital: the provincial leader of Hopei, Li Hsüeh-feng, an alternate member of the Politburo, and the acting commander of the Peking Military Area, General Cheng Wei-shan.[15] Soon afterward, the strongly pro-Lin 38th Army Corps, which up to then had garrisoned areas near Peking, was transferred to northern Manchuria, under the pretext of strengthening the defense line against the Soviet Union.

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[10] See *Chung-fa*, No. 12/1972, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 14.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[13] See *China News Analysis* (hereafter cited as *CNA*) (Hongkong), August 13, 1971; Hsüan Mou, "The Mystery of Ch'en Po-ta's Disappearance: Have the Early 'Secret Surrender and Anti-communist Confessions' Been Revealed?," *Chung-kung yen-chiu* (*Studies on Chinese Communism*) (Taipei), March 1972, pp. 28-42; and Fang Chün-kuli, "The Purge of Ch'en Po-ta Confirmed," *ibid.*, July 1971, pp. 4-7.

In April 1971, after an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee's Military Commission, chaired by Lin, had failed to produce a sufficiently plausible condemnation of Ch'en Po-ta,[16] the Party Center convened in Peking another conference of ninety-nine Central Committee members and regional leaders. Here, Chou En-lai submitted an investigation report which confirmed the downfall of Ch'en, Li Hsüeh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan. A report of the Central Committee's "North China Group" – probably drafted by Lin's supporters and only mildly critical of Ch'en – was rejected. More importantly, five of Lin's closest associates for the first time came under severe attack: Politburo members Yeh Ch'ün, Lin Piao's wife; Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff; Wu Fa-hsien, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; Li Tso-p'eng, First Political Commissar of the Navy, and Ch'iu Hui-tso, Director of the PLA's General Rear Services Department.[17]

At about the same time, the Chinese leadership decided to enact a major revision in agricultural policies, as urged by the commander of the Nanking Military Area and strong man in East China, General Hsü Shih-yu,[18] and apparently shifted the emphasis in the field of guided missile development from ICBM's to IRBM's and MRBM's.[19] This was, furthermore, the time of the American table tennis team's visit to China, and therefore the period when Peking made the crucial foreign policy decision in favor of a relaxation of tensions with the United States. The latter two decisions reflected a major change in the character of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Since 1968 the conflict, at least in the eyes of Chinese leaders, had assumed the features of a confrontation between countries with different political and social systems. Hence, Chinese attitudes toward the USSR became dictated solely by national security considerations rather than by the previous interest in nurturing a pro-Chinese faction *within* the world communist movement. This outlook apparently was not altogether shared by Lin and his associates, who continued to adhere to the Maoist policies of *simultaneous* conflict with both superpowers of the early- and mid-1960's.

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[14] *Chung-fa*, No. 12/1972, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 9 f.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[18] The general's opposition to Lin's policies is discussed below.

[19] On this topic, see William W. Whitson (with Huang Chen-hsia), *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 542 f.

Under the impact of these developments, it appears that the remnants of the Cultural Revolutionary Left around Madame Mao and the two Shanghai leaders, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan — finding themselves unable to defend their former colleague in the Cultural Revolution Group, Ch'en Po-ta, faced with an ever stronger anti-leftist drive in the provinces, and deprived of their regional power bases except for Shanghai — decided to "jump on the bandwagon" and join the anti-Lin coalition.

By early May 1971, it must have become obvious to Lin Piao and his adherents that they were fighting a losing battle. The documents of the coalition suggest that at this time the Lin faction started to draw up plans for a coup d'état against the Chairman, using the air force and some units of the army around Shanghai, in Chekiang, and in northern Manchuria as their major operative forces.[20] It allegedly wanted to secure control of Shanghai by arresting the city's First Party Secretary, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and — while fending off a possible counterattack from Nanking, which by implication meant Hsü Shih-yu[21] — abduct Mao, thus seizing political power in China. The documents imply that the Lin group made two attempts on the Chairman's life[22] and tried to establish contacts with the Soviet leadership by means of secret talks.[23]

The current ruling coalition's full story of the crisis has not yet been told. But Prime Minister Chou En-lai reported to the Tenth Party Congress that, after his plot had been discovered, Lin Piao, his son and his wife tried to escape to the Soviet Union on a jet plane on the evening of September 12, 1971 and were killed when the plane crashed in Outer Mongolia.[24] More than a month after the plane crash, the first provincial radio stations — all of them in southern China — began to hint at Lin Piao's demise.[25] But not until December 1, 1971 was the first substantiated attack on him and his group, though still not mentioning his name, published by the major central communications media.[26]

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[20] This was the *Wu-ch'i-i kung-ch'eng chi-yao* (*5-7-1 Draft Outline*), appendix to document *Chung-fa*, No. 4/1972, *op. cit.*, especially p. 5 f. Hereafter the draft outline will be cited as *5-7-1*.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[22] *Chung-fa*, No. 4/1972, *op. cit.*, p. 82 f.

[23] *5-7-1, op. cit.*, p. 6.

II

This is the story as derived from Chinese documentary sources. Yet three questions arise: (1) Is there enough reason to believe that Lin Piao planned to stage a coup d'état against Mao? (2) Was he actually killed in the September 12 plane crash? (3) How could the anti-Lin coalition muster enough strength to overcome this extremely strong and formidable adversary?

(1) The so-called *5-7-1* document, which contained the outline for a coup against Mao, was circulated *after* Lin's purge by those who defeated him. This immediately raises doubts about its authenticity. Furthermore, it is hardly believable that such experienced politicians as Lin and his closest associates, weathered in more than four decades of party conflict, civil war, and struggles against many odds, would have been so foolish as to prepare written plans for a coup in but thinly veiled language.

Again, why was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao the only party leader mentioned by name in the document? Besides him, the only persons attacked were Mao himself (for whom the draft plan uses the alias of "B-52," to signify one who is high above the clouds, striking suddenly) and, according to the accompanying confession of Li Wei-hsin,[27] Hsü Shih-yu. Why not Madame Mao or Chou En-lai, who would have been eminently suitable targets? Was it in order to enhance the prestige of the two East China leaders? These and other implausibilities suggest that the document, rather than being authentic, may have been fabricated, perhaps *post facto,* in Shanghai or Nanking. The only indication that it could be the work of the Lin Piao group seems to be the strongly anti-Maoist slogans contained in one of its sections.[28] These, however, could well have been planted in order to make it appear genuine. A former Red Guard member, now a refugee in Hongkong, stated that she felt the document was fabricated by a new "anti-Mao group."[29]

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[24] New China News Agency (Peking), August 31, 1973. The anti-Lin coalition's allegation that he and his associates had established "illicit connections" with, and had tried to escape to, the USSR, however, should not be taken at face value. Even with hindsight, nothing in their attitude before their *échec* suggests a position toward the Soviet Union any different from those of other leaders. One may conclude that the attacks on Lin, in this respect, are of the same quality as Stalinist allegations in the 1930's that Trotsky was a Gestapo agent.

[25] Kuangsi PBS, October 16; Hainan PBS, October 25; Hunan and Ssuch'uan PBS, October 30; and Yünnan PBS, October 31.

[26] *JMJP; Chieh-fang-chün pao* (*Liberation Army Daily*) (Peking); and the journal *Hung-ch'i* (*Red Flag*), in a joint editorial, December 1, 1971.

[27] *Chung-fa,* No. 4/1972, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

A close scrutiny of the document in connection with other evidence indicates that there either was no plan for a coup d'état, or that, if there was one, it was not designed by Lin Piao but by a group of "Young Turks" in the air force collaborating with his son, Lin Li-kuo, who sought to countervene rising opposition against Lin and acted without his father's knowledge and consent. If the plot was fabricated, which seems more plausible, it might have been so in order to convince the Chairman to join the front against his "close comrade-in-arms."

(2) While doubts about the validity of the *5-7-1* document are widespread, the story of Lin's death in the plane crash on September 12 has been accepted by most observers. Nevertheless, there is room for doubt even in this respect. If Lin died on the plane, why was he still mentioned favorably in provincial broadcasts until October 8, 1971,[30] and in the October edition of the multilingual *China Pictorial,* which was distributed in Hongkong in early November? If he himself died in the crash, and not just a group of his supporters including his son and others of the "Young Turk" group, for what reason was most of the air force grounded for at least three weeks after the incident? Why did the attacks against him not begin for a month after September 12? Chinese leaders' intimations about the end of Lin Piao suggest that he was a traitor, a Soviet stooge who tried to bring China back under Soviet supremacy. Yet his whole political stand for more than ten years before 1971 makes such an attitude highly improbable. Could it be that there was no planned coup *by* Lin, but that the anti-Lin coalition, having finally obtained the consent of the Chairman, staged a successful coup *against* him, which made him

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[28] *5-7-1, op. cit.,* p. 6.

[29] She fled China for Hongkong in mid-August, 1972, and my interview with her took place on September 16, 1972.

[30] Cf. Kuangsi PBS, September 16; Fukien PBS, September 19 and 30; Sinkiang PBS, September 18; Hupei PBS, October 3; and Tibet PBS, October 8.

or some of his supporters take the desperate last resort of fleeing to the Soviet Union?

(3) The paltry information released by Chinese leaders fails to explain the events of early September 1971 conclusively. But one thing is sure: Mao's designated successor lost his position, and most probably his life, in a conflict with the coalition that rallied against him in 1970-1971, forged, as it appears now, by the outstanding skills of Chou En-lai – and surely not without the blessing of a Chairman highly suspicious of his chosen heir, a Chairman who thus effected or at least supported the demise of his second designated successor within six years. How did this coalition come about?

In the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution, some observers came to believe in the monolithic character of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). They thus tended to overlook the existence of "loyalty groups" within the army, loosely affiliated with the five great field armies formed during the last stage of the civil war.[31] As the Cultural Revolution elevated the influence of the loyalty group of Lin Piao's own Fourth Field Army, opposition grew among the other subsystems of the PLA, in particular in the Second and Third Field Army groups. The former group rallies today around the commander of the Shenyang Military Area, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and the Director of the PLA's General Political Department, Li Tê-sheng, while the Third Field Army's group has its stronghold in Hsü Shih-yu's Nanking Military Area.

Compounding these traditional differentiations in group allegiance, after 1969 a conflict of interest developed between the central military machine around Lin Piao and the major regional military leaders, who – as we shall see – took a position contrary to Lin's on a number of controversial issues. Such traditional and functional divisions engendered a process of factionalization[32] within the PLA which eventually led to the isolation of Lin and his associates from the majority of the Chinese military. The way for the anti-Lin coalition was thus paved, and his fall became possible.

But though the Lin Piao affair rocked the very foundations of the Chinese political system, its repercussions for PLA personnel have not been as severe as were those for the Soviet army following the Tukhachevsky purge in 1937. So far, we know the names of forty-two military figures purged as a result of Lin's fall, nineteen of whom were identified with the air force.[33] They include five Politburo members, the Chief of the General Staff and four of his eight deputies, the Director and four Vice-Directors of the General Logistics Department, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and four of his deputies, the First Political Commissar of the Navy and one deputy naval commander, but only two or three (counting the earlier deposed Cheng Wei-shan) out of eleven military area commanders. In addition, it appears that only two or perhaps four of the twenty-seven provincial military district and city garrison commanders have been purged.[34]

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[31] See Jürgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," in *Asian Survey*, May 1968, p. 350. For a detailed treatment of this subject, cf. William W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," in *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1969, pp. 1-30.

[32] "Factionalization," as opposed to "factionalism," has been defined by this author as a type of intraparty group formation with changing, mostly issue-based, affiliations. See my "Basic Elements of Internal Party Politics in Communist China, 1949-1969," in *Internationales Asien Forum* (Munich), January 1970, p. 63.

That the purge obviously hit the central military machine much harder than the regional establishments confirms the assumption that the majority of the regional leaders sided with the anti-Lin coalition. This provides further evidence that the Lin Piao crisis cannot be validly interpreted as a confrontation between party and army.[35] At least on the provincial level, leadership of the party machine is still to a large extent identical with that of the PLA. Even today, after the impact of Lin's downfall, nineteen out of twenty-nine provincial first secretaries are military men,[36] and in spite of a number of new appointments, the PLA, in July 1973, held eighty-eight or 51.8 per cent of the 170 provincial secretary or alternate secretary positions. Furthermore, of the twenty-three ministers and commission chairmen in the State Council, whose names we know so far, eleven are military men. The Lin Piao incident is therefore more convincingly interpreted as the victory of one faction *within* the PLA – allied with the majority of civilian cadres – over another faction.

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[33] A list of forty-one ranking military cadres purged in connection with the Lin Piao crisis appeared in *Chung-kung yen-chiu*, September 10, 1972, p. 6 f. This list, however, contains the name of General Liu Hsing-yüan, former First Political Commissar of the Canton Military Area, who has since reappeared in Ssuch'uan, and does not include General Lung Shu-chin, Commander of the Sinkiang Military Area.

[34] Hsiung Ying-t'ang (Chekiang), Yang Tung-liang (Kiangsi), and possibly Lung Ping-ch'u (Kansu) and Chu Yao-hua (Fukien).

[35] Such an interpretation would represent a superficial analysis. We could register the re-establishment of "party" control over the military only if there really was a separate subsystem of a civilian party machine as had existed between the early 1950's and 1966.

[36] Wang Huai-hsiang (Kirin), Ch'en Hsi-lien (Liaoning), Yu T'ai-chung (Inner Mongolia), Hsieh Chen-hua (Shansi), K'ang Chien-min (Ninghsia), Liu Hsien-ch'üan (Ch'inghai), Hsien Heng-han (Kansu), Yang Te-chih (Shantung), Hsü Shih-yu (Kiangsu), Li Te-sheng (Anhui), Tseng Ssu-yü (Hupei), Han Hsien-ch'u (Fukien), She Chi-te (new, Kiangsi), Ting Sheng (new, Kuangtung), Wei Kuo-ch'ing (Kuangsi), Wang Chia-tao (Heilungkiang), Liu Hsing-yüan (new, Ssuch'uan), Lu Jui-lin (new, Kueichou), and Jen Jung (Tibet).

This leads us to the central questions that must be raised in analyzing the crisis: what issues were at stake, and what underlying policy disputes were settled with the doom of Mao's heir?

III

A close scrutiny of political developments in and affecting China since the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969 yields the conclusion that, within the ranks of the post-Cultural Revolution leadership, controversies arose in at least *four* major policy areas. Between summer 1969 and spring 1971, these controversies escalated into disputes and, finally, into open conflict, in the process transforming the type of group formation in the Chinese leadership from *factionalization* to *factionalism,*[37] and thus making a crisis inevitable. These four conflict areas are discussed here in reverse priority order in terms of their connection with the overthrow of Lin Piao.

First, in the realm of *foreign policy,* the double shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in combination with the Brezhnev Doctrine emphasizing the limited sovereignty of socialist states, in August 1968, and the outbreak of armed border clashes between China and the Soviet Union in March and August 1969, forced Chinese leaders into an "agonizing reappraisal" of national security priorities.[38] This led Chou En-lai and the administrative and diplomatic bureaucrats around him to conclude that China had to de-escalate one of her two conflicts with the superpowers: that with the United States. Lin Piao, on the other hand, obviously wanted to continue the policy of simultaneous conflict with both superpowers, which had been the Maoist line in the early and mid-1960's, and which he himself had outlined in his article on "victory in the people's war" in September 1965.[39] In essence, the Chou-Lin dispute developed from different evaluations of the Sino-Soviet conflict: while Lin and his group still regarded it as a conflict over the leadership of the world revolutionary movement, Chou realized that it had become a confrontation on the state-to-state level. The majority of the regional commanders, although not directly involved in this issue, apparently came around to supporting Chou's position by winter 1970-1971, either because of logistical considerations or because of a give-and-take deal whereby they hoped to secure Chou's support for their demands in domestic politics.

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[37] Domes, "Basic Elements of Internal Party Politics . . . ," *loc. cit.*

[38] Cf. Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking Under Soviet Pressure* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1971), *passim.*

[39] Lin Piao, "Jen-min chan-cheng sheng-li san sui" (Long live the victory in the People's War), *JMJP,* September 1, 1965.

Second, a conflict appears to have developed with regard to the *planning and management of the economy*. Although evidence on this is scarce, indications are that Lin Piao and the central military authorities began a drive for the *re*centralization of planning and management during the second half of 1970, while the regional military leaders wanted to continue *de*centralization on the military area and provincial level, taking advantage of the momentum gained during the convulsive days of the Cultural Revolution. In 1969 and 1970, one could collect comprehensive information about the differing length and content of provincial plans.[40] In the quest for defense industry priority, which the military ministry promoted all through 1969-1970, a stronger central influence on industrial planning and management was urged.[41] Yet after Lin Piao's fall, Chinese media revealed that such vital industrial complexes as the Anshan-Pen-ch'i Steel Combine in southern Manchuria[42] and the Wuhan Steel Works[43] are no longer directly controlled by the center, but by the respective provincial leadership. In this field, it appears, the regional commanders won their case.

Third, a major policy dispute developed over whether the process of *liquidating the Cultural Revolution*, which began in late summer 1967, should be halted after the domestic political situation had been stabilized and the Maoist mass organizations had been successfully disciplined — as Lin Piao obviously suggested; or whether it should continue with an *ideological readjustment*, which would lead to major revisions of basic Cultural Revolutionary doctrines — as Chou En-lai and the majority of the regional military leaders obviously desired. Here, one can detect the link between Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta, the leader of the Cultural Revolution's Maoist left wing. There is no doubt that Lin promoted disciplinary action against the Red Guards and other Maoist groups after August 1967. But we must also take into ac-

[40] Cf., for example, *CNA*, November 14, 1969; Heilungkiang PBS, January 18, 1970; Hunan PBS, February 5, 1970; and Kiangsu PBS, February 21, 1971.

[41] *Chieh-fang-chün pao*, September 5, 1969 and March 7, 1970.

[42] *JMJP*, January 15, 1972.

[43] Hupei PBS, August 17, 1972.

count the fact that in late July of that year, he still supported a major purge within the PLA — then the most vociferously requested goal of the Left[44] — and that as late as August 9, 1967, he called for a distribution of arms to the leftist organizations.[45] Rather than his own choice, his decision to approve the disciplinary actions taken by the regional PLA leaders against the Maoist organizations most probably resulted from a compromise with them;[46] and it definitely did not cover a drive to revise basic Cultural Revolutionary doctrines. Consequently, this drive was begun cautiously in the context of the nationwide campaign against Ch'en Po-ta in the summer of 1971.[47] Only after the fall of Lin Piao did it gain full steam. The term "four-good-unit," which Lin had coined in the early 1960's to denote military units of outstanding Maoist correctness and which had been extended to institutions in all sectors of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution, was last mentioned in October 1971.[48] In January 1972, attacks commenced on what is now called the "reactionary bourgeois deviation" of "egalitarianism" (*P'ing-chün chu-yi*),[49] and by that fall the shibboleth of the Cultural Revolution, the Little Red Book, was under scathing criticism for being "wantonly distorted" and "misleading."[50] All this appears to justify the conclusion that Lin Piao's *échec* signified the beginning of the final stage in the liquidation of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

Fourth, for further substantiation, consider what in my view was the most important dispute influencing the doom of Mao's second heir: the unnegotiable conflict over the *nature of the mainland Chinese society*. When the waves of the Cultural Revolution had subsided, and the disciplinary measures against the Red Guards had been completed, there were a number of indications that the group then dominating the central leadership wanted to stage a return to the Maoist policies of the Great Leap Forward of 1958. In his speech at the National Day ceremonies in 1969, Lin Piao referred again to the 1958 term, "more-faster-better-more economical" (*to-k'uai-hao-sheng*).[51] Shortly afterward he began talking about a "leap," this time a "new flying" one (*Hsin fei-yüeh*): "We go forward in flying leaps, with a speed which equals one day to 20 years."[52] Soon, mass labor programs of 1958 proportions were revived in China, starting in the southern province of Kiangsi, where the leaders were close associates of Lin,[53] and spreading in the next year or so over considerable parts of the country.[54]

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[44] *JMJP*, August 26 and 27, 1972.

[45] Lin Piao, "Speech at the Meeting of the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission, August 9, 1967," in *Chu-ying tung-fang-hung* (Pearl River Film Studio: The East Is Red) (Canton), September 13, 1967.

[46] See Jürgen Domes, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-68," in *The China Quarterly,* October-December 1970, p. 121.

[47] Cf., Hunan PBS, August 12; *Fu-chien jih-pao* (*Fukien Daily*) and Fukien PBS, August 29; Shensi PBS, September 11 and 14; and Yünnan PBS, September 14, 1971.

[48] Ssuch'uan PBS, October 9, 1971.

[49] As noted, among other places, on Anhui PBS, January 10, 1972.

[50] *JMJP,* September 7, 1972.

The decisive battleground for Lin's attempt to revitalize the Maoist policies of 1958 could be nowhere else but in the villages, where more than 80 per cent of the Chinese people still live, with the target agriculture, from which over 70 per cent of the people derive their income. In 1969 and 1970, efforts were made to reduce the area of the private plots the peasants had been granted after the failure of the Great Leap and to discourage private animal husbandry, in particular the non-collective raising of pigs.[55] The villages were again exhorted to emulate the model of *Tachai*, an agricultural production brigade in northern China which had allegedly promoted the spirit of self-reliance and distributed remunerations not only according to labor, but also according to the correct political attitude of the peasants, who worked day and night for the collective good in "bitter production fights."[56] Material incentives to farmers and workers were disapproved,[57] the peasants' sideline occupations were banned, and handicrafts-men were no longer allowed to practice their trade individually.[58]

Lin's policy was to be implemented by the PLA teams present everywhere in the society. Thus, the image of a new nation, with new men modeled after the Maoist blueprint of 1958, emerged. One of the most informed sources of commentary on the Chinese scene has described this image as that of a nation under an iron hand, led by a military supposed to be imbued with a fighting

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[51] *Ibid.*, October 2, 1969. For more on this subject see Colina MacDougall, "The Cultural Revolution in the Communes: Back to 1958?," in *Current Scene* (Hongkong), April 11, 1969, pp. 1-11.

[52] *Hunan jih-pao* (*Hunan Daily*) and Hunan PBS, both on November 27, 1969.

[53] Kiangsi PBS, November 6 and 25, 1969; cf. *CNA*, January 2, 1970.

[54] Kansu PBS, November 16, 1970; Hunan PBS, January 5 and March 16; Shansi PBS, January 13; Kiangsu PBS, January 21; and *JMJP*, January 25 and March 13, 1971.

[55] Kiangsi PBS, January 23, 1970; *CNA*, October 17, 1969.

[56] "The Tachai Sweat," *CNA*, January 8, 1971, furnishes a number of further references from the Chinese press and provincial broadcasts.

[57] Ssuch'uan PBS, January 15, 1972.

[58] Anhui PBS, January 19, 1972.

Marxist spirit.[59] I picture, rather, a *Carnotist* army with a deep sense of ideological purpose, dedicated to the militarization of the whole society, and thus to an ideologically motivated, egalitarian concept of army-state. Yet it was at this point that the confrontation concerning two alternatives of military rule became evident in China – a confrontation that helped to seal the fate of Lin Piao – because most of the regional commanders subscribed to a different image of the military. Their concept visualized a *Wallensteinian* army, a loosely knit coalition of sufficiently professionalized military leaders with distinct regional power bases, dedicated to the stability of the domestic base for national security rather than to revolutionary experiments – and therefore sure to secure public support by downgrading the level of extortions from the populace.

Amid the deepening conflict over this issue, Lin Piao's drive to stage a second Maoist experiment ground to a halt. In the closing months of 1970, Hsü Shih-yu, the powerful regional commander in the Lower Yangtze Valley, had argued that "revolutionary zeal must be combined with a practical scientific attitude, blind fervor must be avoided, and the people's hardship should be taken into account."[60] Soon Hsü's subordinates took up the argument, even daring to propose that "reasonable rewards" were different from the villainous Liu Shao-ch'i's "material incentives."[61] In late February 1971 Hsü launched a general attack against Lin's agricultural policies:

> There are people who condemn the private plots and domestic industries as tails of capitalism. . . . This way of thinking is Left in form, but Right in substance. Such men think that the more leftist they are, the better. They do not realize that they may become alienated from reality.[62]

The Nanking commander was not alone in these sentiments. During that winter, popular restiveness and regional military resistance against Lin Piao's policy spread over large parts of the country. There were critical remarks about the movement to emulate *Tachai,* mostly intimating that while this movement, which Mao himself strongly promoted, was correct in principle, its guidelines could not be applied everywhere.[63]

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[59] *CNA*, January 1, 1971.

[60] Kiangsu PBS, October 28 and November 5, 1970.

[61] *Ibid.*, December 19, 1970.

[62] *Ibid.*, February 27, 1971.

[63] Cf. Shensi PBS, September 22; Hupei PBS, October 12; Kuangsi PBS, November 16; Anhui PBS, November 17 and December 15; Yünnan PBS, November 26; Chekiang PBS, December 19, 1970; and a report from *Che-chiang jih-pao* (*Chekiang Daily*), reprinted in five installments in *JMJP*, March 25-29, 1971.

Sometime during February or March 1971, the opposing forces won their first battle. In a major policy switch, the central authorities endorsed a new line in agricultural policy, the Rural Economic Policy (*Nung-ts'un ching-chi cheng-ts'ê*), which removed many of the restrictions placed on the peasant's individual operations in 1969 and 1970.[64] It is significant that this change affecting the villages of China was confirmed by the center only after Lin Piao's power base in and around the capital had been eroded and after his closest associates had come under attack.

One last notation reinforces the theory that the dispute over agricultural policy — amounting to a basic disagreement over the future image of the Chinese society — was an important and perhaps decisive factor in the demise of Lin Piao: no more than three months after his fall, on December 26, 1971, the central authorities circulated a document, down to the county and regimental levels, in which an entirely new approach to rural policies was decreed.[65] Henceforward, people's communes would not be allowed to recruit labor without the explicit consent of the smallest agricultural units, the production teams, which consist of five to fifteen families, often of the same clan. Grain rations for the farmers would be distributed to and administered by the individual household, and the *Tachai* model — Mao's own agricultural shibboleth — was not to be "transplanted and copied indiscriminately." The provisions of this circular and the ensuing orders by the regional leaders, signaled not only a return to Liu Shao-ch'i's readjustment policy of the early 1960's, but in some respects went beyond that policy, thus indicating that a thoroughgoing revision of the doctrines Lin Piao attempted to revitalize in a second Maoist experiment is underway.

Lin Piao's demise therefore has much deeper significance than the doom of an heir. It came about because of a major conflict over political options, and it resulted in a second failure for a Maoist societal experiment. It might consequently, in spite of the continued physical presence of the Chairman, and the current emphasis on the more moderate aspects of his earlier doctrines, assume historical dimensions as the beginning of de-Maoization in China.

IV

One last question remains unanswered: What could be the impact of the Lin Piao crisis on the future of Sino-Soviet relations? There are two alternatives to consider. (a) It could exacerbate the conflict, since the anti-Lin coalition's propagandistic attempt to involve the USSR at Lin's side intimated that Moscow had tried to interfere actively in Chinese domestic politics. Or, (b) it could facilitate a future rapprochement between the two communist-ruled countries because, in the context of the crisis, the level of conflict was clearly transferred to the area of state-to-state relations, where a relaxation of tensions might be achieved with greater ease. Either development is possible.

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[64] *JMJP,* March 21, 1971; *CNA*, April 23, 1971.

[65] Document *Chung-fa,* No. 82/1971, December 26, 1971, published in *Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao, op. cit.*

However, China's changing aspects must be taken into account. The Lin Piao crisis has thrown the question of Mao's succession wide open again. It has, furthermore, greatly contributed to an increased differentiation in the complex power relations existing among the Chinese communist elite. Any further leadership shifts will be based on compromise even more than formerly. The decision to de-escalate the Sino-Soviet conflict, at least to the extent that China assumes a more neutral stand between the two superpowers, could well be part of such a compromise. For the short range, the Cold War between China and the Soviet Union will most probably continue. Yet the leaders in Peking might decide later that the transfer of the conflict from the ideological and organizational arena to the stage of state-to-state relations, as prompted by the purge of Lin Piao, facilitated China's turn toward a posture which U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has promoted to a virtue in international politics: unpredictability.

CHINESE TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES: IS THE PRC A STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE?

by Yuan-li Wu

THROUGH its rapprochement with Peking, the United States has in effect assigned a positive role to the People's Republic of China in the maintenance of the world's power balance in the 1970's. As we view this policy with the benefit of hindsight, one short-term American objective seemed to be to enlist Peking's support in persuading Hanoi to come to the negotiation table as a means of ending the Indochina war. Thus far, this objective has at least been partially attained, because there has been an end to the participation of U.S. forces in that war.[1] In both the short and long run, however, the new U.S. policy toward Peking is obviously trying to take advantage of the apparent break-up of that erstwhile monolith, international communism.

More specifically, because of (a) the Sino-Soviet dispute, (b) the Chinese perception of an imminent Soviet military threat, and (c) U.S. perception of the outward manifestations of Soviet hostility toward Peking, U.S. policymakers seem to have, in their own minds, ascribed to the PRC a balancing role on the Soviet Union's Far Eastern front. This balancing role, the same policymakers may have hoped, is to help bring about a SALT agreement, prepare the ground for future reductions of the U.S. military presence in Europe, and offset the preponderance of the USSR's conventional power on its Western front under conditions of acknowledged U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity. Perhaps such a view of U.S. strategy and of the sequential steps taken to implement it is at once too simplistic and too grandiose. It is not always a simple matter to differentiate good planning from opportunism or to distinguish both from *post hoc* rationalization. But the single fact that the United States envisages Peking as a balancing force vis-à-vis the Soviet Union cannot be gainsaid.

This article will examine some of the assumptions implicit in envisaging such a role for Peking. A fundamental question is whether in view of the economic and technological capabilities of mainland China, the PRC can be expected to become a major economic power able and willing to contribute to global, as well as regional, stability. A second question is whether Peking's economic and technological capabilities will enable it to acquire a nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (and eventually, of course, also against the United States), so that a multipolar balance will materialize and can be maintained, *again in the interest of world and regional peace.* Depending on the answers to these questions, inferences can then be drawn about the appropriateness of U.S. policy either in part or *in toto,* assuming that what we have postulated above is a correct interpretation of this policy. If the October 1973 outbreak of the Middle East war has called for re-evaluation of the possibility that the Soviet Union may not have fully accepted the balance of power scenario and the self-restraint demanded of it according to the rules of the game as interpreted in Washington, it will do no harm to re-examine some of the other assumptions that have been made about developments on the other side of the globe. Surely one major criterion of prudent policymaking is to provide for the contingency that some of the assumptions underlying current policy may be questionable, if not entirely wrong.

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[1] Some would argue that this was the primary objective insofar as Indochina was concerned.

Chinese Economic Policy and Capability after the Tenth CCP Congress

In spite of the partial lifting of the Bamboo Curtain to Western visitors and the presence of many foreign missions, including a U.S. Liaison Office, in Peking, the scarcity of comprehensive data respecting mainland China remains unalleviated. Western scholars have little concrete information either to project the PRC's future economic growth or to engage in a thorough re-evaluation of the country's past economic performance. Given this caveat about the quality and breadth of our information on China in the open literature, some useful speculation can nevertheless be made.

In the first place, a comparison of three different estimates of China's gross domestic product for the period 1957-1970 shows that the annual rate of overall economic growth was decidedly unimpressive.[2] According to *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment,* a compilation of papers prepared by U.S. government experts in 1972, Communist China's GDP, estimated at constant 1970 prices, grew at an average annual rate of 3.1 per cent during 1957-1970. A 1972 estimate by Alexander Eckstein puts the average rate of growth of Chinese GDP (at constant 1952 prices) at 3.7 per cent. The joint estimates of T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, also at 1952 prices, offer a range of 2.6 to 3.3 per cent a year, with 2.8 per cent as the most probable rate. We need not dwell on the fact that these rate estimates invariably compare unfavorably with the corresponding rates of growth of other Asian countries. For the purpose of the present essay the main point is whether this low rate of growth can be improved upon and whether the likely growth of China's overall product will yield political and military implications compatible with the assumptions that appear to underlie U.S. policymaking.

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[2] See Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, "Chinese and Other Asian Economies: A Quantitative Evaluation," *The American Economic Review,* May 1973.

One reason for the low average annual rate of growth of China's total product since the end of the PRC's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) has been the absence of steady growth. Short periods of high growth rates have been followed by sluggish performance and even downright declines. In projecting the PRC's economic future, we must therefore speculate on the likelihood of repeated economic fluctuations in the next decade.

However, let us first consider a hypothetical case of no fluctuations. A place to begin in this exercise is the pattern of allocation of mainland China's gross domestic product by end use. In this connection, we can refer to the pattern of estimates by Liu and Yeh for 1970. According to them, the PRC's GDP in that year was probably allocated in the following manner:

	Per Cent
Personal consumption	64
Government consumption	10
Fixed investment	23
Change in inventory (and statistical discrepancy)	3
Export surplus	1
TOTAL	100*

*rounding error ignored

Here "government consumption" obviously includes both defense spending and spending for civilian administration.

Other findings by this writer and some of his associates[3] are that the PRC's total defense spending during 1952-1960 probably ranged between 9 and 14 per cent of its GNP. For the 1961-1968 period, 10 per cent may be a good working assumption. Hence the above percentage distribution would seem to understate government consumption (including defense).[4] Our higher defense spending estimates are nearly twice the pre-1961 published budget figures given under the category of defense, and it is hard to say by how much Peking has increased its defense spending beyond the 1968 level in its current program of military preparedness. Various conjectures are possible, and even plausible, including the doubling of spending from the 1968 level. Thus, it is probably more than conservative to estimate total government consumption, including defense, at no less than 15 per cent of the Chinese GDP in 1970, and to assume that it may be as high as 25 per cent, including 15 per cent for defense and 10 per cent for government consumption for nonmilitary purposes.

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[3] The results of this effort have not yet been published.

In addition, the Chinese communists have said from time to time that, over the long run, they would expect to record a rate of investment averaging 20 per cent of the nation's annual output.

Given this set of estimates for government consumption and investment, we can postulate two patterns of allocation of the national output, one representing high consumption and low investment, the other low consumption and high investment.

PERCENTAGE OF GNP

	Pattern I (high consumption)	*Pattern II* (low consumption)
Personal consumption	65	65
Government consumption		
Non-defense	10	15
Defense	15	
TOTAL CONSUMPTION	90	80
Civilian investment	10	20
TOTAL	100	100

In spite of the uncertainty surrounding China's population figures, the general impression of demographers who have studied the subject supports the continuation of growth. All four of the population projection models advanced by John S. Aird indicate an annual growth rate of around 2.4 per cent through most of the 1970's.[5] To accommodate this growth, both personal consumption and government consumption for non-defense purposes must rise. Furthermore, if the government is to convince the population of the wisdom of its policies, it should provide some gradual increment in personal consumption. Should it decide against such an "incentive" policy, it might find itself compelled to increase government consumption nevertheless, in order to keep discontent under control if for no other reason. Thus, in one form or another, total personal and government consumption must be allowed to increase in excess of the rate of population growth.

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[4] However, as discussed later, some defense spending is really of an investment nature.

Given a natural population growth rate of 2.4 per cent for the next few years, we shall assume here, as a working assumption, a 6 per cent annual growth of consumption (both personal and government, but excluding defense) under the first pattern of allocation, and we will hold military expenditure at the 15 per cent level assumed for the base year. This would allow us an allocation of 10 per cent of the gross domestic product for civilian investment in the base year. In the second, "low consumption" pattern, we shall assume that government consumption, including defense, will remain at the 15 per cent level in terms of the base-year GDP; we will, however, allow personal consumption alone to rise at 6 per cent per annum. This second allocation pattern would leave us with 20 per cent of the GDP for civilian investment in the base year.

Of course, not all defense expenditure is incurred on expendable items. Some of the spending will be on investment projects within the defense sector and completion of the projects will lead to an expansion of the output of military end items, thereby contributing also to the rise of the national output. However, if we disregard this aspect of defense spending, any increase in total output must come from either investment in earlier years or increases that can take place independently of prior investment. The latter increases, in turn, must be derived from one or more of the following sources: (a) increase in productivity, largely as a result of technological innovation, (b) employment of hitherto unused resources, and (c) infusion of foreign resources, over and above foreign technological transfers, which do not have to be paid for with current domestic output.

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[5] See John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China," *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment* (Washington: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1972).

If we assume that for each additional dollar output, a prior investment of $3[6] is required, and allowing for a one-year lag, a 10 per cent investment in the base year would give the GDP in the following year an index of 103.3, while the 20 per cent investment in the low consumption model would yield a GDP index of 106.6 for the following year. If personal and government consumption should rise at 6 per cent in the high consumption model or if, in the low consumption model, personal consumption alone should rise at 6 per cent, the following patterns of allocation of GDP by end use would obtain in the first year (the base year being Year 0):

	Pattern I (high consumption)	*Pattern II* (low consumption)
Personal and government consumption (excluding defense)	79.5	....
Personal consumption	....	68.9
Defense	15	....
Government consumption (including defense)	....	15
Civilian investment	8.8	22.7
TOTAL	103.3	106.6

The preceding exercise demonstrates quite plainly that the consumption levels in the high consumption model — yielding an overall growth rate of 3.3 per cent that coincides with the "high estimate" of Liu and Yeh for the 1957-1970 period — do not permit of maintaining civilian investment at the same base-year level in the long run. Hence, one cannot expect this rate of overall growth to be maintained unless some of the parameters used in the projection are altered. That is to say, some of the following conditions must be realized: (a) a lower population growth than 2.4 per cent, (b) a lower growth rate of personal and government (non-defense) consumption than 6 per cent a year, (c) a defense expenditure lower than 15 per cent of the base-year GDP, (d) some diversion of investment in the military sector to civilian production, (e) an increase in productivity, (f) an increase in employable resources, and (g) the infusion of foreign credit. But for the long term, factor (f) cannot be depended upon; only the other six factors can offer Peking a viable course of economic development under the high consumption pattern.

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[6] Statement by Yuan-li Wu, in *Economic Developments in Mainland China*, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 1972.

A glance at the second or low consumption model will show that investment in the civilian sector can continue to rise as a percentage of the gross domestic product, so that the rate of overall growth could well accelerate. However, taking account of population growth, it is hard to envisage a constant level of government consumption for purposes other than defense. If such non-defense government consumption were to rise, it would have to take place at the expense of either civilian investment or the military sector. In order to obviate any encroachment upon the allocation to civilian investment, one would have to fall back on the six factors mentioned above or a reduction in military expenditure, which must presuppose a shift in external policy or a substantial amelioration of the perceived threat.

Before going further, we should note in this connection that, according to Liu and Yeh, the "gross incremental output-fixed capital ratio" is 0.17, which suggests that our assumption of $3 of investment to $1 of incremental output (i.e., a corresponding gross incremental output-total capital "ratio" of .33) may be too low. If the ratio were changed to 5 to 1, one would barely be able to maintain for Year 1 a GDP index of 104 and a total civilian investment of 20.1. That is to say, an incremental capital-output ratio of 5 to 1 could be regarded as the boundary line for maintaining a constant growth rate of 4 per cent a year even under the most favorable assumptions about China's ability to control military expenditure and other forms of government consumption.

What are the possibilities concerning Peking's ability to control personal consumption, to stimulate technological innovation, to keep government consumption for non-defense purposes at a minimum, and to avoid unproductive and unnecessarily large investment projects? What are Peking's prospects with respect to keeping military expenditure down, or utilizing large infusions of foreign credit? The answer to the first question is determined largely by the regime's policy toward economic development and what it considers to be the appropriate economic system for mainland China, as well as by the efficiency of its economic administration and control. The answer to the second question is a function of foreign policy and ideological outlook.

WHITHER CHINESE ECONOMIC POLICY?

During the Cultural Revolution, which preceded the present period of modified détente and rapprochement with Washington, a principal target of the radicals' attack was the "revisionist" economic policy that had characterized the phase of economic recovery following the failure of Mao's "Great Leap Forward." According to the radical Maoists, this policy gave undue emphasis to modern technology, showed not enough faith in the wisdom of the masses, relied too much on material incentive, tried to run the economy by administrative fiat rather than through spontaneous initiative at the grassroots level, and was oblivious to the political benefits of and need for continuing revolution and class struggle. Yet although there may have been excesses in the direction indicated by the denouncers of Liu Shao-ch'i's economic policy, which engineered the recovery from the Great Leap, excesses in the opposite direction were more than once responsible for the country's major economic setbacks. On this, most serious students of the Chinese economy would probably agree. Alternations between revisionist and Maoist policies have produced economic fluctuations in the past. Might such alternations of policy continue in the future, now that succession to Mao is rapidly becoming a real issue?

In his August 24, 1973 report to the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on the revision of the Party Constitution,[7] Wang Hung-wen, the rising new star from Shanghai, who had been groomed by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, an ally of Chiang Ch'ing, stated:

> In order to constantly consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . it is necessary to deepen the socialist revolution in the ideological, political, and economic spheres, to transform all those parts of the superstructure that do not conform to the socialist economic base and carry out great political revolutions, such as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

In this regard, the new Party Constitution contains the statement: "Revolutions like this [i.e., the GPCR] will have to be carried out many times in the future." Paying homage to Mao, Wang repeated the latter's words: "The rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie." Referring more directly to economic policy, Wang said, "We must have faith in the masses, rely on them . . . and strive 'to create a political situation . . . so as to facilitate our socialist revolution and socialist construction, make it easier to overcome difficulties, [and] enable our country to build a modern industry and modern agriculture at a fairly rapid pace. . . .' "

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[7] For the original texts of Wang Hung-wen's and Chou En-lai's reports quoted here, see New China News Agency in English, Peking, August 31, 1973.

Prima facie, one would be tempted to conclude that the new Party Constitution envisages an economic future molded along Maoist lines of radical stripe, even though Wang's reference to growth at a "*fairly* rapid pace" suggests that an unmodified return to the policies of the "Great Leap" period is not intended.

If Wang is the spokesman of Maoist ideologues, one should turn to the "pragmatic" Chou En-lai for a glimpse of the ideas of the bureaucrats and technocrats. But one detects a strong ambivalence in Chou's political report to the Tenth Party Congress. He was adamant in denouncing revisionist ideas that purportedly stressed the sole importance of technology and production. He attributed these ideas to Lin Piao and to the drafters of a Lin version of the Ninth Party Congress' political report. "Prior to the [Ninth] Congress," said Chou, "Lin Piao had produced a draft of a political report in collaboration with Chen Po-ta. They were opposed to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending that the main task after the Ninth Congress was to develop production." This, Chou claimed, was the same Liuist heresy which had thought "the contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward production forces of society" to be "the major contradiction" in mainland China.

Chou echoed Wang's prognostication about continuing revolution, suggesting that there would be periodic revolutionary struggles. In fact, he said, "even after classes have disappeared there will still be contradictions between the superstructure and the economic base and between the relations of production and its production forces." How this idea is to be reconciled with Marxist orthodoxy may pose an interesting problem. In particular, the following words are double-edged: "For a long time to come, there will still be two line struggles within the party . . . and such struggles will occur ten, twenty or thirty times. Lin Piao will appear again, so will persons like Wang Ming, Liu Shao-ch'i, Peng Teh-huai and Kao Kang. This is something independent of man's will." Does the last sentence imply that even Chou may become revisionist in spite of himself, or be accused as such at some future date? For our purpose, a much less speculative conclusion is possible. The interesting point is the obvious lack of a consensus on the PRC's ideological coloring — beyond the point that it is to be socialist and "non-revisionist" — and on the country's future economic policy. There is no such consensus that all elements of the party can take as given for a long period of time ahead.

The ambivalence in Chou's report is magnified by his description of the "current task." The economic policies advanced may be characterized by slogans, such as regarding "agriculture as the foundation" and "industry as the main leading factor"; or summarized as the balance of central control against local initiative; greater coordination; continuation of self-reliance; emphasis on technological development, greater production, lower costs, and faster accumulation; dualistic development (or "walking on two legs"); reliance on the masses, and so on. Yet these slogans are equally descriptive of the policies of the recovery period following the failure of the Great Leap, minus their explicit emphasis on material incentives. They were part and parcel of the policy espoused by Liu Shao-ch'i, who was Mao's heir-apparent before Lin Piao and was the ousted "capitalist-roader" and prime target of the Cultural Revolution. Is Chou espousing a revisionist policy in one breath while denouncing it in another?

Both Chou's and Wang's denunciation of revisionism, their professed common fear of a bourgeois resurgence, and the absence of any mention of material incentive in the two key reports of the Tenth Congress would seem to indicate Peking's rejection, at least for the moment, of a full-scale return to the policies of the 1961-1964 recovery period. The policy imprecisely outlined by Chou at the congress seems to be a compromise between central planning of the Stalinist type, which was characteristic of Peking's First Five-Year Plan, and the basic philosophy underlying the Maoist Great Leap Forward.

Past experience has demonstrated the extremely sensitive balance between these two approaches. The promise of continuing revolution and periodic large-scale political struggles does nothing to improve the chance that this delicate balance will be a stable one. If excesses are to occur as a result of periodic struggles, the unhinging of equilibrium and the power balance at the Politburo level is unlikely to favor steady economic growth. Should economic fluctuations recur, as they have done in the past, our two models of projection would not prevail singly. Rather, one should expect alternations between the low consumption and the high consumption models, resulting in a low rate of economic growth in the long run. In sum, given the political and ideological outlook of Peking's present leaders and the state of their power balance, one cannot anticipate, with any degree of confidence, the

PRC's emergence as an economic power of major importance in the next decade.[8]

THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL BASE OF THE PRC'S DEFENSE POSTURE

Mainland China's economic policy has not changed significantly since the reorientation of Peking's external policy in 1971. One might even date the present economic policy to 1969, when the Cultural Revolution was ended. Both under Lin Piao in 1969-1970 and under Chou En-lai since 1971, it has been subordinated to defense policy, and thus necessarily tailored to the realistic conditions of domestic and external politics. The supreme objective has been, and still is, the acquisition of an adequate nuclear deterrent to the first use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union in either a nuclear or a conventional-cum-nuclear attack. Economic policy has been shaped to support this overall objective. An essential ingredient is not to engage in long-term institutional rearrangements that would entail serious disruptions of the economy. Lack of administrative personnel and planners, in spite of the rehabilitation of some victims of the Cultural Revolution, and the possibility that the rehabilitated may not be properly motivated as a result of their recent personal experience, may have compounded the problem of insufficient unified control in all parts of the country. Hence, China's economy appears to be in a transitional, or interim, phase in which major decisions have been held in abeyance. The Tenth Party Congress notwithstanding, this situation remains unchanged today.

However, it would be a serious mistake to infer that because of the murkiness of its economic future, the PRC will be unable to develop and support the armed posture it has set out to attain, including a spectrum of nuclear weapons. The following points demand careful consideration on our part.

First, in spite of the adverse effects of school and university closings during the Cultural Revolution, the R&D establishment seems to have returned to work.[9] In any case, the military component in the R&D sector was shielded from the rampages of the Red Guards. As the continuation of nuclear weapons testings in

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[8] Although we have not considered here the economic future of a mainland China dominated by regionalism, such a development must not be ruled out, especially in the light of Soviet interests and intentions.

[9] See the paper by Leo Orleans, "China's Science and Technology: Continuity and Innovation," *People's Republic of China . . . , op. cit.*

1967-1968 and the acceleration of their development since 1969 indicate, previously scheduled programs were not disrupted, although there may have been some slippage in time. The apparent delay in the ICBM program may have been partly the result of a deliberate shift of emphasis to IRBM production. The PRC has also been able to pursue its interest in tactical nuclear weapons, it would seem, to undertake tests for smaller nuclear warheads, and to begin production of a new fighter plane.[10]

That China's scientists and engineers had a hard time during the Cultural Revolution, and even long before that; that research is not free; and that politics and ideology have the commanding voice in China — all this is true. No one can tell how science and technology would have fared in the absence of these stifling influences, all other things being equal. Still, the PRC was able to develop its first nuclear device in 1964, only four years after the withdrawal of Soviet support, and the Chinese nuclear weapons program has progressed on a larger scale and faster than some Western observers at first thought possible.[11] Since current policies with respect to research and development and technological innovations are essentially the same as before, their results in both the defense sector and the economy as a whole should be similar.

Second, any attempt to estimate the cost of mainland China's nuclear program through direct conversion on the basis of Western costs is likely to overstate the monetary value. This is a result of the much lower proportion occupied by labor cost in Chinese total cost, as well as possible differences in PRC versus Western practice in treating overhead cost and profit in costing weapons systems. Consequently, one should avoid the common error of assuming that the PRC's potentially poor prospects in overall economic growth will make the attainment of an adequate nuclear deterrent posture — in the first instance, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union — impossible in the 1970's. Political instability at the center and both political and technical problems of command and control, rather than economic cost, would be among the more likely obstacles.

In other words, it is just possible that the PRC will be able to acquire the desired nuclear capability at a cost it can readily bear, perhaps well within the total amount of resources we have allocated to the defense sector (15 per cent of base-year GDP) in the numerical example given earlier. Modernization of the conventional forces may turn out to be far more costly, because of their sheer size. If this is the case, once the PRC has acquired its nuclear shield against one or both of the superpowers, it may wish to re-examine the wisdom of engaging in a prolonged competition with the Soviet Union to augment conventional armament. The acquisition of a sufficient nuclear deterrent against the Soviets' potential first use of nuclear weapons may then give Peking the stronger bargaining position it needs in order to effect a rapprochement with Moscow.

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[10] Cf., for instance, Yuan-li-Wu, *Communist China and the World Balance of Power* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1971).

[11] Nevertheless, this does not mean that the PRC has not tried to exaggerate its accomplishments for U.S. and Soviet benefit, particularly as regards the extent of missile deployment to date.

The point is not that Peking is self-sufficient both technologically and economically, however. On the contrary, selective importation of foreign technology and equipment in order to fill certain critical gaps will prove extremely useful and may greatly accelerate the weapons program. It will also relieve potentially serious shortages in the civilian economy. The new relations the PRC has developed with Washington, its clever manipulation of competition among Japanese, American and other Western businesses, and its selective acceptance of foreign offers of credit constitute the major new factors, unavailable before 1971, that can brighten the prospects for success in its economic as well as R&D programs. Although large-scale acceptance of foreign credit would be inconsistent with the basic policy outlined in the reports by Chou and Wang to the Tenth Congress, the use of credit (or deferred payments, in Peking's preferred terminology) in selected cases is ideologically quite acceptable.

A good illustration of Chinese interest in selected imports is offered by reported PRC inquiries in Japan earlier this year about twenty-four items on the COCOM restricted list — including miniature computers, real-time analyzers, numerical control frequency synthesizers and data recorders.[12] The Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, which supplied this report, and which is most anxious to have the COCOM list removed, also expressed the view that permission to export these items would eventually be obtained. Such exemptions were apparently made several times between the fall of 1972, when Japan began to normalize relations with Peking, and July 1973. On a broader plane, analysis of the commodity composition of Peking's imports since 1969 shows a preponderant emphasis on such items as special steels, nonferrous metals, and special types of machinery and equipment — a careful selection of imports designed to remove bottlenecks. As for the use of deferred payments, recent negotiations for the construction of a large steel mill and a petrochemical complex, by Japan and France respectively, are good examples.

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[12] Kyodo News Service, report in English, Tokyo, July 9, 1973. The COCOM restricted list contains strategic commodities that the United States and its allies have agreed not to export to the communist bloc.

AN ANTI-SOVIET NUCLEAR DETERRENT OR A REGIONAL THREAT?

If the PRC's economic and technological capability can provide an adequate nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and if a minimal deterrent can also be acquired vis-à-vis the United States, would possession of such a deterrent give Peking a freer hand in pursuing its regional objectives? Two important points should be borne in mind.

First, nuclear weapons that can reach Soviet targets from mainland China are also capable of reaching other Asian targets. Second, the farther Chinese IRBM's can reach into European Russia, the greater the damage each of them could inflict, considering the geographical distribution of Soviet industrial and population centers. Hence, for Peking to achieve a given level of damage in retaliation for a Soviet attack, a smaller number of weapons will be needed as their range increases. Eventually, the present program, which is aimed at deterring a Soviet first use of nuclear weapons against the PRC, will also give the Chinese a nuclear force that will be available for regional use. Acquisition of this capability, in the absence of adequate constraints, could then pose a new threat to the Asian countries.

PUZZLES FOR U.S. POLICY

Thus, the sooner the PRC can free itself from its present preoccupation with the Soviet nuclear threat, the sooner it will be in a position to (a) pose a realistic nuclear threat to regional powers, (b) take advantage of its nuclear shield in pursuing the export of revolution by traditional means, and (c) attempt a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. From the U.S. point of view, would these potential disadvantages[13] be sufficiently offset by Peking's greater ability to act as a balancing power against the Soviet Union and fulfill the hypothetical role mentioned at the beginning of this discussion? Would Peking be willing to play this role suitably? That is to say, would China's leaders exercise self-restraint, or would their actions require restraint to be applied from the outside? Would the United States in that case still possess the means to nullify the PRC's regional nuclear capability? If so, would there be an equal measure of credibility about U.S. intentions commensurate with U.S. capability? The last point raises some question about the perception of U.S. policy by other countries between now and then. Not the least important question is whether the Soviet Union would view such developments with equanimity and, if not, what it would be prepared to do in order to forestall them.

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[13] One can, of course, argue that a Sino-Soviet détente would be in the interest of all concerned, *if* one assumes that both powers will be prepared to accept self-restraint to such a degree that no external restraint is necessary.

Since the West, through offers of credit and transfers of technology, may be able to hasten some of the developments envisaged above, will this really be in the U.S. interest? While defending his new policy toward America, Chou En-lai quoted Lenin for the benefit of his audience at the Tenth National Congress of Chinese Communists. When he said "One must learn to distinguish between a man who gives the bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives bandits money and firearms in order to share in the loot," he was obviously thinking of the United States as the "bandits" and the PRC as the man who compromises with the bandits for a good but transitory reason. Chou's views about the United States are expressed even more plainly elsewhere in his August 1973 report. "U.S. imperialism," he remarked, "started to go downhill after its defeat in the war of aggression against Korea. It has openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline; it could not but pull out of Vietnam." Little imagination is needed to visualize the role Chou must have carved out for the United States in his particular perception of the future. Will his view be consistent with that of the United States?[14]

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[14] Space does not permit us to pursue the next logical question, which has to do with safeguards, just in case the optimistic assumptions underlying certain aspects of U.S. policy turn out to be unrealistic. This is discussed in a forthcoming book by this author, *Are We in Asia to Stay? An Analysis of the Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Strategic Interest in the Western Pacific.*

EUROPE: OLD CONFLICTS, NEW RULES

by Pierre Hassner

IN the era of détente and negotiation, of bilateral and multilateral conferences, of Western recognition of the German Democratic Republic and Eastern approaches to the Common Market, it will be obvious to the informed reader that Europe is no longer, if it ever was, a critical conflict arena in the same sense as Viet Nam, or Bangladesh, or the Middle East. One can always — and, to the mind of this writer, rightly — point to the maintenance and increase of the Soviet Union's massive military presence and Moscow's hostile ideological pronouncements. One can warn naive pacifists that the West should not lower its guard lest, after having been lulled by the Soviet Union into a false feeling of security, it should be caught in a defenseless position by an unchanged enemy. But will this shake the complacent reader out of his feeling of *déjà vu*?

The dialogue of the deaf between skepticism about détente and skepticism about the Soviet threat is as old as the Cold War itself. Both sides have cried wolf so often that both can be forgiven if they are unshaken by new evidence that *this* time the Soviets may have a real interest in lasting cooperation or, conversely, that *this* time they may have a real chance of decisively demoralizing a divided West. Yet the contention of this article is that both sides may be partly right.

I

It has been this writer's argument, developed at greater length in other publications,[1] that we have indeed entered a new era, at least in Europe. This new era is not incorrectly described as denoting the end of the Cold War, the acceptance of realities, the era of negotiation and cooperation — but only if one adds in the same breath that the end of the Cold War may mean the beginning of a hot peace. The acceptance of realities, i.e., the end of direct physical or legal assault against them, may mean the unleashing of trends that could seriously challenge the European nations for the first time; the era of negotiation, far from spelling the end of the era of confrontation, may mean the beginning of the real confrontation, that of each society vis-à-vis itself, upon which its confrontation with others ultimately depends. Finally, as Rousseau pointed out, cooperation breeds more conflict than isolation does, especially, one may add, when it takes place between highly asymmetrical societies and regimes.

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[1] In particular, "The New Europe: From Cold War to Hot Peace," *International Journal*, Winter 1971-1972, pp. 1-17, and *Europe in the Age of Negotiation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, The Washington Papers, Vol. I, No. 8, 1973).

The Cold War was characterized by the triumph of an inherently defensive strategy under the cover of a verbal offensive. In other ages — and today in other places — diplomacy has permitted conquests and reversals of alliances. During the Cold War such modifications of the status quo were impossible; the situation was frozen by the confrontation itself. To different degrees, each alliance was held together by the real or supposed threat posed by the enemy. The status quo was upheld by the very fact of not being recognized. Today's watchword, however, is the reverse: "In order to change the status quo, you have to recognize it." In the ambiguity of this formula, which is that of *Ostpolitik* and of détente itself, lies the germ of many conflicts. Disputes over the links between Berlin and the German Federal Republic, or between the exchange of goods and people and ideas, or over defense budgets, are only the first examples. There are conflicts over the nature of the status quo, and over the control and management of changes which, behind the screen of formal recognition of the status quo between states and alliances, may or may not occur in relations between and within societies.

The new phase of détente does not necessarily disturb the balance between societies any more than between alliances, but it does tend to make them more vulnerable to each other. From the moment the reality, or even the legitimacy, of both sides' institutional structures is recognized, the real competition begins, whether intentional or not. It relates to their content, to their comparative degrees of dynamism and unity, to what might be called the balance of will, expectations and influence. The essence of the game is not to conquer, or even actively to subvert the other side. It consists rather in hoping that the other side will be weakened or transformed by its own inner contradictions without bringing down the whole common structure.

This new climate of "hot peace" stands in the same relationship to its predecessor as the Cold War did to hot or violent war: it is still a relationship of conflict, but is removed one stage farther from a direct challenge to the other side's possessions, institutions, regimes, and use of physical force. The challenge and the threat remain, but they come as much from within societies as from outside; they work indirectly and are less explicit in character.

It may be wrong, however, to assume that the farther one gets from war and propaganda the closer he is to peace and reconciliation. In this new milieu of ambiguity, situations may thaw without being solved, isolation may be relinquished in favor of asymmetrical penetration or imbalance rather than reconciliation. There may always be enough social ferment to prevent stabilization through inflexibility, enough rigidity to prevent stabilization through adaptation, enough communication and convergence to prevent stabilization through isolation, enough separation and divergence to prevent stabilization through integration. Perhaps a state of agitated immobility, rather than revolution or integration, is characteristic of the post-Cold War system as it seems to be of the post-industrial society, diplomatic activism being the equivalent of social unrest and both being the expression of the gap between a declining legitimacy and a persisting structure. The essential attribute of this state is neither force nor cooperation but the constant influence of societies upon one another within the framework of a competition whose goals are less and less tangible, whose means are less and less direct, whose consequences are less and less calculable, precisely because they involve activities rather than strategies and because these activities affect what societies *are* as much as what they *do*.

The real race, thus, may be less to increase one's direct power than to decrease one's comparative vulnerability. Military strength and diplomatic maneuver must be seen as part of this more complex and diffuse process, which may call for the manipulation not only of the opponent's weaknesses but of one's own, the encouragement of dissatisfaction and dissent in other societies or the control of contagious explosions within one's own society, whether such forces involve speculative dollars, immigrant workers or emigrant pens.

Within the developed world, at least, the East-West conflict — rather than being viewed as the "relationship of major tension" which provides "protracted conflict" in the light of which all other relationships have to be seen — perhaps should appear as one dimension within a more general common problem: the management and manipulation of generalized but highly unequal and asymmetrical interdependence or mutual influence and penetration. It has been obvious for some time that international economic relations must be managed within a commonly accepted international economic system. Similarly, the meaning of the SALT Treaty on Anti-ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons of May 1972, the agreement for the prevention of nuclear war signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1973, and other developments may be that strategic relations will be regarded increasingly as the management of a common system of security, rather than as part of a hostile confrontation. But this, in turn, can create new tensions and misunderstandings between a powerful and relatively closed elite of security producers and a mass of powerless and distrustful security consumers. Finally, the importance assumed by the issue of broadened East-West human contacts at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the battle in the United States produced by the Jackson Amendment with its linkage of trade and the freedom of Soviet Jews to emigrate, show how social, cultural and economic interaction have become a complex process, full of contradictions and potential conflicts. Such explosive forces, if not controlled, could lead to crisis and regression in East-West relations.

In all of these fields, a common interest in the maintenance of systems of strategic, economic and social interdependence is combined with a constant competition for influence and control. This competition is all the sharper since it involves the structure and legitimacy of societies. And this is where the specific nature of communist regimes and their relations with the rest of the world reasserts itself: the potential for communication afforded by advanced technologies, the differences between the "open" societies of the West and the "closed" societies of the East, touch the heart of the communist mixture of authoritarian centralism and protective self-isolation and undermine the communist claim to universality.

II

The present European system thus reflects the contradictory coexistence between, on the one hand, new and dynamic elements such as the cooperation between the nuclear superpowers, the reassertion, partly in reaction against the latter, of polycentric national or European interests and ambitions, and the contacts, mutual influence and interpenetration of societies under the impact of transnational trends; and, on the other hand, a rigid structure imposed upon the system as a whole by the East-West territorial division and military balance, and upon the societies of the East by the Leninist political structure and ideology.

These contradictions give rise to four types of actual or potential conflicts: the two contradictory dimensions of East-West bipolarity, hostile and cooperative, the polycentric national interests of states, and the transnational crisis and communication of societies. The hypothesis of this article is that the order in which these types of conflicts are listed above corresponds to an order of increasing likelihood and importance; that is, the conflicts of each category will tend to be caused or influenced primarily by those of the next one. In other words, one should avoid focusing exclusively on the great political-military East-West confrontations that have characterized the Cold War, but one should also avoid considering them as having been rendered obsolete by the new aspects of European international relations – for these new aspects carry with them elements of conflict (between the superpowers and the other countries, between national interests, between new forces and established power structures within regimes and alliances) which may either replace classical East-West conflicts or give them a new lease on life.

These classical conflicts themselves may, however, be less obsolete than is often believed. While the idea of an open military attack, especially a massive one, of one alliance against the other is less likely than ever, the comparative absence of military or of militarily-backed diplomatic pressures in Europe has, so far, been directly connected with the existence of a local balance and, even more, with its direct link to the central strategic balance through the physical military presence and commitment of the United States and the likelihood of escalation in case of a limited conflict. Every time this balance or this commitment has seemed in doubt, the Soviets have taken actions designed to test, if not to challenge, the status quo. There is good reason to believe that the first Berlin crisis arose, at least in part, from an intention to test the American commitment in Europe in 1948; there is even more reason to believe that the second Berlin crisis, a decade later, tended to register on the European map the consequences of the real or fictitious change in the balance of power symbolized by Sputnik. Khrushchev said as much, in explicit terms.

If, in the coming years, there is a coincidence between American withdrawals of troops or tactical nuclear weapons and a change in the global strategic balance in favor of the Soviet Union – if, in other words, there is a loss of American strategic superiority (or even an impression of Soviet superiority), an increase in Soviet local superiority, and, above all, a loss in continuity between theater and strategic deterrence — then the political atmosphere of a Western Europe increasingly "decoupled" from the United States is likely to be adversely affected. Possible consequences might be the increased freedom of action of exposed states (especially neutral or nonaligned ones) and a weakening of the psychological security of West Berlin. In that case the problem of keeping or re-establishing the balance would become urgent for a Western Europe faced with a less powerful, less active and less friendly American protector and a more powerful, more active and more persistent Soviet neighbor.

Some Americans and West Europeans argue that the prospect of being exposed to a situation which has often been the subject of speculation but never seriously contemplated would have a beneficial "Dr. Johnson effect" upon Western Europe:[2] the fear of being abandoned would compel the Europeans to create a nuclear deterrent, to forge a political unity, and to pool financial and technological resources. Other observers believe that the West Europeans would more likely try to make up through increased accommodation with the Soviet Union for the diminished security provided by the United States: they would choose prosperity and unconditional détente rather than risk compromising both for the uncertain prospect of deterring an unlikely threat.

In my opinion, a gradual U.S. disengagement must be balanced by a U.S.-supported strengthening of autonomous European defenses linked to NATO. Failing this, a U.S. pullout would have disastrous consequences for West European unity and the East-West balance alike. Some West European countries — for instance, France and Great Britain, if led by their present governments — might choose the defense-oriented reaction; others, certainly the Benelux countries and Denmark, and probably Italy, would choose the road of détente. The Federal Republic, the most vulnerable to the feeling of insecurity and the fears of alienating the Soviet Union or of being accused by its own younger generation of returning to a militarist stance, would be torn between the need for West European defense, the desire to hang on to the remnants of American protection, and the temptation to settle for détente with neutralist overtones. The result would be wavering policies or a bitter domestic polarization.

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[2] If one may paraphrase his well-known statement: "The thought of being hanged tomorrow concentrates the mind wonderfully."

III

A crucial element determining West European responses to changes in the U.S.-Soviet balance of miltiary strength and political engagement would be the likely attitudes of the two superpowers toward alternative West European policies. The Soviet attitude is not difficult to predict. One of the main goals of Soviet policy is to prevent a "militaristic-revanchist" bloc in Western Europe. Moscow increasingly accepts West European economic integration which, along with its many disadvantages, may have for the Kremlin the positive effect of sharpening divisions between Europe and the United States and hastening the latter's disengagement; yet the Soviets adamantly oppose West European political and, even more, military unity which might deprive them of the fruits of these divisions and disengagement. Efforts toward an independent European nuclear deterrent are certain to meet with Soviet concern and Chinese applause.

The reaction of the United States, which is crucial to the choices open to at least two of the main parties, Britain and Germany, is much less easy to predict. America's position toward West European security is torn in three possible directions, or emphases, or priorities, since to some extent all three must inevitably form a part of U.S. policy. The logic of deterrence and the logic of the Atlantic Community require us to compensate for a vanishing U.S. strategic superiority by increased continuity, militarily between strategic and theater deterrence (i.e., between the protection of America's territory and that of its allies), and politically between American and European objectives. This would lead to the renewal of a united, centralized Atlantic Alliance and to an increasing rather than declining American commitment and acceptance of economic restraint and military, including nuclear, risk. Since this is unlikely to be the direction in which the United States will move, some form of increasing strategic differentiation between America and Western Europe is likely to take place. But here again it can go in two different directions.

The logic of the Nixon Doctrine, the five-power world concept, and Henry Kissinger's earlier ideas about *The Troubled Partnership*, leads to regional devolution, and hence to the encouragement of a European deterrent or collaboration between the British and French deterrents. But the logic of SALT and of the bipolar nuclear dialogue with the Soviet Union argues that nuclear weapons are too serious a matter to let smaller allies play with; that a West European deterrent would provoke the USSR without adequately protecting Europe; that it would reduce America's leverage over her European allies while increasing the nuclear risks she seeks to reduce; that it would jeopardize the only real security accessible to Europe and the world, namely, a continuous dialogue between the superpowers in an effort to manage their complex and delicate relationship. Hence, both options open to the West Europeans risk the spiraling of mutual suspicions and recriminations. Choosing détente may lead to decoupling and Finlandization, or to the mutual fear of unilateral accommodation; choosing deterrence may cause the Europeans to appear, in American eyes, as weak but immoral and malevolent spoilers of superpower détente, incapable of ensuring their own security but capable of disrupting the cooperative dialogue that, in a time of parity, serves to supplement the strategic balance as a basis for mutual security.

Changes in the superpower relationship or in the American commitment cannot be evaluated independently from the growing importance of this dimension, which can be presented either as "cooperative bipolarity," "nuclear condominium or complicity," "joint hegemony," or as the beginning of collective security or management in the common interest of mankind. New sources of conflict, either of the East-West variety or pitting the two superpowers against one or several of their allies, can arise from the implementation of universal stabilization agreements relying on superpower cooperation: e.g., the nuclear test ban, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the SALT accords, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, or even, despite their formally multilateral character, the Berlin agreement or an eventual one on mutual troop reductions. Declarations such as that signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in May 1972 or the one in 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war, and institutional mechanisms such as the bilateral standing commission created by the 1972 Moscow agreement, point to the emergence of a new political structure, relying on the cooperation of the superpowers to prevent any conflict from bringing them into mutual confrontation through escalation and from bringing any unilateral advantage to either of them.

IV

While Europe's existing security structure, based on the balance between two alliances, with their respective leaders exercising varying measures of protection and control over their allies, is still in existence, a second vertical structure, based on the joint cooperative surveillance of the area by the United States and the Soviet Union, is emerging and being superimposed upon it. In a way, the second structure supplements the first and should put to rest some of the fears of West Europeans about the deterrence of Soviet power through American commitment. While there may be a decrease in American willingness to take the risk of crossing the nuclear threshold, this loss in deterrence through the threat of escalation is compensated by a decrease in the likelihood of conflict breaking out in the first place: security through the cooperative prevention of conflict tends to become more important as security through the threat of retaliation becomes less likely.

But this means a change both in Europe's strategic situation and in its political autonomy. On the one hand, as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* put it, Soviet guarantees tend to replace American troops, and the counter-guarantees are American rather than European; on the other hand, the consultations to prevent nuclear war and the "mutual advantage" rule cannot, if they are to mean anything, be limited to their explicit object, the prevention of war. They must necessarily apply, at least indirectly and in spirit, and possibly much more seriously than that, to what happens before and after. Obviously consultations to prevent escalation would not stop with the outbreak of conflict; hence, without being a specific or binding "no first use" agreement, the agreement to prevent nuclear war does make the use of nuclear weapons by the United States much less credible and does have a decoupling effect between theater and strategic deterrence. On the other hand, while consultation and cooperation between the superpowers in nuclear matters does not imply a political condominium, cooperation to prevent conflict between third powers erupting in the first place, or otherwise ending up in "unilateral advantage" to one superpower, does mean a political priority of the bipolar concert over other ties, and a preference for the joint management of the status quo. It is an agreement against revolution and, possibly, against peaceful change, to the extent that the latter, by modifying the diplomatic or even the domestic position of a given country or region, affects the balance between the two coalitions and their leaders.

Hence, there is a host of possible conflicts between the perception of the leaders and the interests or the evolution of other countries: conflicts, for instance, between U.S. and European perceptions of what constitutes dangerous or unacceptable Soviet behavior and what responses, involving what risks, should be initiated to deter it; conflicts between the Soviet Union and Germany or Western Europe over the implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty; conflicts which, under universalistic pretenses, would hide rivalries of national economic interests, including the development of a nuclear industry with a potential for producing atomic weapons.

The European fear of a superpower condominium weighted on the Soviet side would seem to be justified, at least in theory, by the general impression that the trend toward the erosion of the bipolar system is as likely to lead to the clash of national interests and the interplay of power inequalities as to a security system really based on universality and reciprocity. Our third type of conflict seems to loom as large behind the second type as behind the first.

Clashes of national interest are obviously, and increasingly, occurring under the surface of collective structures – whether alliance or bipolar. They are likely, however, to continue to be contained below the threshold of violence. In Western Europe national, economic and bureaucratic interests are competing, but the idea of two states using war or the threat of war to further their objectives belongs to the past. In Eastern and Southeastern Europe nationalisms are younger and more exuberant, but even if these states recovered a freedom of action they are deprived of today, it is doubtful that Hungary's or Bulgaria's first thought would be to attack Rumania, Yugoslavia or Greece about Transylvania or Macedonia. Incidentally, since 1914 these provinces have changed hands through the arbitration of great powers as the results of world wars rather than through wars between the small states themselves. The only real danger of war over a territory or a minority is that between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, but the characteristics of this conflict have as much to do with the Middle East as with Europe and its escalatory potential has declined in recent years.

Whatever increased freedom of action the relaxation of the Western alliance has afforded countries like Greece and Turkey, possible conflicts between them still must be seen in the light of the bipolar and hierarchical structure of the continent. Violent conflicts between members of the two opposed alliances are made impossible by the control of their respective leaders and organizations. Conflicts between two small middle powers belonging to the same alliance or between one of them and a nonaligned country are kept within bounds by the same supervisory conditions, which remain more constraining in the East than in the West because a creeping and growing intrabloc nationalism does not prevent the communist alliance from being centrally and hierarchically controlled.

On the other hand, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 shows that a conflict between the Soviet Union and one of its allies can lead to the use of force. The worries the intervention caused at the time, not only in Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia but even in noncommunist neutral neighbors of the Eastern bloc like Finland and Austria, were in marked contrast to the tranquillity among members of the Western alliance. This would tend to show that attacks by a bloc leader against a nonaligned country, while more unlikely, cannot be excluded completely.

But these are conceivable essentially under the effect of contamination from, or reaction to, crises within the nonaligned country itself, or within the great power that threatens it, or within the bloc led by the latter. If Yugoslavia were to be threatened, it would be either because a breakdown of her domestic unity made her a source of instability and a prey for Soviet ambitions, or because she would be implicated in a Soviet intervention, for instance in Rumania, which would overflow from the borders of the bloc.

This goes even more for indirect pressure. The example of Chile would be likely to be replicated in Europe. If the United States or the Western alliance opposed the orientation of a leftist European government they would be likely to count on economic pressures to influence an existing situation of internal disorder, and on indigenous forces rather than military intervention.

V

In Europe, at any rate — pointing up the link between our four types of conflict — it would seem that during the whole history of the Cold War, what appeared as a threat of East against West and vice versa, and eventually really became so, had its origins, more often than not, in domestic difficulties, in particular those of the Soviet Union or those it encountered with its own allies.

It has been suggested by Joseph R. Starobin in a challenging article[3] that the origins of the Cold War lie in the inability of the Soviet camp to solve the problem of unity and diversity without being driven either to look for external successes or to apply, inside the camp, remedies that could not but provoke suspicion and reactions in the outside world. In the two Berlin crises, the role of the Soviet Union's relations with her allies (the conflict with Yugoslavia in one case, the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the crisis of the German Democratic Republic and the conflict with China, on the other) seems to have been decisive, just as it was outside Europe with respect to the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. This should be even more the case in the years ahead.

For this reason it is difficult to share the prevalent optimism about the security of the European continent. This optimism seems to be based on a negative belief (in the highly improbable character of a military attack) and a positive one (in either the final stabilization of spheres of influence or their progressive and harmonious dismantling). While the negative belief is justified, it does not go to the root of the problem. In all probability, the main danger never was that of military attack. Conversely, the most serious sources of conflict in Europe, which have to do with the nature of authority within the Soviet empire and the Soviet regime, seem likely to get worse.

The conflict with China drives the Soviet Union both toward keeping a tighter grip over Eastern Europe and toward pressing a dynamic policy with respect to the West and the South, in order to establish a presence enabling her to encircle China, or at least to avoid being encircled by an alliance between the latter and an emerging Western Europe. The crisis of Eastern Europe, shown by the necessity of using military occupation or the implicit threat of military intervention to maintain Soviet authority, the crisis of Soviet society, as shown by the age of the rulers, the weakness of the economy, the ambiguities and contradictions of political repression, its occasional weakness combined with its brutality, and the simmering national problem, all suggest that the Soviet Union has entered a possibly long legitimacy crisis.

To be sure, it may be a stable crisis: the combination of police or military power, some satisfaction of consumer needs and foreign policy successes, and a rigid and ritualistic ideology, can have considerable staying power, even in the absence of any social or spiritual creativity. Yet the nature of the ruling groups, their bureaucratic rigidity in face of ideological, social and economic problems, the contradictions between party rule and efficiency,

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[3] "Origins of the Cold War: The Communist Dimension," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1969.

between cooperation with the West and ideological unity, would seem to indicate that they have neither the intention of abdicating any of their authority nor the courage or the ability to adapt it to new conditions. It seems that the Soviet Union has made a fundamental decision against autarky in economic and technological matters, and just as fundamental a choice in favor of keeping as much autarky as possible in political and ideological affairs. This leaves it with all the uncertainties of trying to control and centralize a process which by nature has to be diffuse if not pluralistic.

The depth of the dilemma is suggested implicitly by James Billington, when, referring to earlier periods, he writes that

> the consolidation of autocratic power and centralized control under Yvan the Third and Yvan the Fourth, as later under Stalin, involved an almost schizoid process of extensive *technological borrowing* from the West and simultaneously intensified *ideological isolation* from it (including persecution of "cosmopolitan" Jews and the repopulation of westward-oriented Baltic provinces). The agony of the "Time of Troubles" which followed this early period of expansion produced a crisis within a powerful but primitive Moscow, psychologically unable to accept the logic of a Western-style modernization implied in the educational and reform programs of Boris Godunov, the False Dimitry and Vasili Shuisky alike.[4]

By far the most likely prospect, then, seems to be a period of conflict between the forces of authority and change, between isolation and communication, a conflict whose outcome and whose consequences for relations with the outside world are impossible to predict except to the extent that they are likely to belie any vision of the European situation based on the inevitability either of the status quo or progressive and harmonious change.

The problem is raised most acutely in the East because it is there that the incompatibility of the structures of authority and ideological legitimacy with the evolution of societies and popular aspirations is the starkest. But recent years have shown us that the Western stability and consensus supposed to be based on the decline of ideology were not much more solid than the Eastern ones supposed to be based on its triumph. This new contradiction between the instability of industrial or post-industrial societies and the stability of the European bipolar system took a concrete form in 1968, that of a question we might well see re-emerging in the 1970's: what would be the likely reaction of the outside world, and in particular of the two superpowers, should an Eastern country want to stop being communist, should a Western country want to become communist, or should an Eastern, Western or nonaligned country suffer the collapse of domestic power or national unity?

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[4] James Billington, "The Intellectuals," in Allen Kassof, editor, *Prospects for Soviet Society* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).

One can speculate about the international consequences of a Yugoslav crisis brought on by national, social and political divisions exploding after Tito's death; of tensions in other Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Greece; of confrontations between left-wing coalitions and armed forces in Italy or France; of Hungary's domestic reformism or Rumania's acrobatic foreign policy going one step too far and the Soviet response extending to crucial or border countries like East Germany or Yugoslavia, whose fate would necessarily involve the West in a more direct and dangerous way than Czechoslovakia's.

The Third World has always known of this link between the domestic instability of regimes and the varying and undetermined degree of commitment, involvement, control and cooperation of the great powers. Today, advanced industrial societies have acquired some of the characteristics of developing ones. What would be the international consequences of Europe's "Third-Worldization" or "Latin-Americanization?" The fact that these questions can be asked at all leads one to think that Europe may be entering a phase of instability and uncertainty where questions will be raised concerning not only the domestic evolution of different countries but the nature and structure of the two systems and, in particular, the Soviet Union's objectives and America's commitment. In that event the very meaning of notions like sphere of influence, community, bloc or alliance will have to be redefined, as well as that of the nature and legitimacy of domestic regimes.

One may object that these questions are scarcely relevant because in the West they are artificial and in the East they have already elicited a Soviet response. In the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the great victor was the status quo. Although in the matter of France every outside power, certainly including both the United States and the Soviet Union, favored General de Gaulle's victory over the May rebellion, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia met with no serious challenge from other powers.

As compared with the beginning of the Cold War, the solidity of the system today and the preference of the great powers for not rocking the boat are obvious. Yet, there is a contrast with the 1950's and 1960's, for some features of the formative years 1947-1948 have reappeared since 1968.

For instance, regarding the French and Italian communist parties, their aspirations to power and their chances to reach it are being discussed in strikingly similar terms: As in the 1945-1947 period, much speculation in France has been directed to the question of whether or not the communist party wanted to come to power, whether it considered that the situation was not revolutionary or that revolution was not desirable. In Italy, as in 1948, the possibility of the communist party achieving power through parliamentary elections is raised once again and has led to a split in the socialist party. Since 1968, for the first time since the 1950's, the question of the extent to which Yugoslavia could be threatened by the Soviet Union and protected by the United States has been seriously considered. The lack of a clear answer from the United States, combined with the Yugoslav domestic crisis, affects the evolution of the country's domestic and foreign policy alike. In Eastern Europe, while Soviet domination is no longer challenged with any plausibility, the degree of orthodoxy imposed upon various countries, and the intensity of the witch hunt aimed at heretics or potential rebels lead to doubts about future stability. So do the big questions: To what extent is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe strictly conservative; or to what extent does it involve a dynamism or a projection of strength which, willy-nilly, carries an implicit threat toward the Soviet Union's other neighbors and toward Europe in general? To what extent and through what instruments will the United States be present in Europe?

Of course, besides important extra-European elements such as the role of China, many aspects distinguish the two periods. The most central one is that of Germany: a vacuum, a bone of contention and an unknown in 1947, replaced today by two states whose admission to the United Nations symbolizes their mutual acceptance and their respective domestic and international stability. Even here, however, one cannot exclude a polarization in the Federal Republic after Brandt, or a convergence of left-wing nationalisms between the two Germanys which might, for the first time, give a German confederation a chance. Depending on a great number of factors, this possibility could be the occasion either of the most serious Soviet intervention yet, or of the first real attempt to reach the goal not achieved in 1945-1947, namely, a German and European settlement.

While this end result is unlikely in the foreseeable future, as soon as the two Germanys begin talking together and influencing each other, however cautiously or forcefully, we come to questions about their place in a European structure and the reaction of the other powers to their dialogue and this structure. This is one of the implicit problems in MBFR. Although the Soviet Union would welcome an isolated and more or less neutralized West Germany, she certainly does not look forward, there or elsewhere in Europe, to revolutionary developments challenging existing borders. Even in this case, while societies are becoming less stable, a mixture of Holy Alliance (or Brezhnev Doctrine) politics and abstention seems to preserve the international system from the consequences of this instability, at least in the short run.

And yet, even if they really wanted it completely, "the two great systems would find it harder and harder," as André Fontaine put it, "to protect each other against the contagion of their respective ideas."[5] While established national and international structures have so far victoriously resisted the challenge of domestic and transnational forces for change, this challenge seems more dangerous in the long run than that of diplomatic polycentrism, despite the successes of the latter.

VI

We end, then, where we began. The main challenge to European security, the main source of potential conflicts, is the process of détente and cooperation, because it is the main source of change and because by promoting communication between opposing systems it confronts each of them with its own contradictions. Nobody now challenges the existence of the two German states or East and West Berlin, the Common Market and COMECON, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But under the umbrella of this acceptance, there is room for great variations in the realities contained within these formally accepted structures, in their comparative unity, progress and influence upon each other. The Soviet Union may not aim at incorporating West Berlin into the German Democratic Republic, neutralizing the German Federal Republic, breaking up the Common Market, and eliminating the American military presence from Europe. But within existing structures she seeks a West Berlin detached from West Germany, a West Germany detached from the European Community, a Western Europe detached from the United States as much as possible. And for this she counts primarily on the domestic crisis and transformation in Western countries which makes defense and foreign policy, especially when embodied in aged and cumbersome bureaucratic structures, seem costly and irrelevant.

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[5] André Fontaine, *La Guerre Civile Froide* (Paris: Fayard, 1969), p. 50.

Similarly, a positive objective for Western countries in dealing with the East cannot be the overthrow of communist regimes and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, but it can and should be the encouragement of as much autonomy as possible for East European states within that alliance and, even more, of individuals and groups within their respective societies. For the foreseeable future East European countries will remain in the Soviet sphere of influence; the problem is whether that will be an exclusive or a predominant influence, a diplomatic influence imposing restraints upon their foreign policies, or a tyrannical one controlling the domestic life of their societies and their individuals.

In this sense, however misleading and resented the slogan may *sometimes appear, the name of the game in Europe is Finland.* Finlandization can be a term of praise as well as of abuse, a goal to be sought as well as a danger to be avoided. If Finland stands for the combination of a predominantly autonomous domestic regime (with some constraints coming from outside) and an essentially constrained foreign policy (with some freedom of action on matters that raise no objections from the dominant great power), then Finlandization is the most realistic Soviet goal for Western Europe and Western goal for Eastern Europe. For Western Europe it would mean a loss of external independence; for Eastern Europe, a gain in domestic freedom. In both cases, détente and communication may be working in that direction by eroding the ability of Western countries to maintain a military balance, and by submitting communist societies to the "corrupting" economic and cultural influence of the West. Reactions against the trend are always possible — witness Soviet repression of human and cultural contacts with the West, or the possible West European reassertion discussed above. The question: "Who is Finlandizing whom?" remains open. While the Finlandization game, characteristic of the present period, may bring more anxieties than the rigidities of the Cold War, it also brings more hope if handled in a politically conscious way. The Cold War is dead, long live the hot peace.

THE SOCIALIST LEFT IN WEST GERMANY

by Walter F. Hahn

AS Cold War has mellowed into détente in Europe during the past decade, the Federal Republic of Germany has been pivotal in this process of change.

Indeed, to the extent that the Cold War characterized a ubiquitous conflict waged over a broad spectrum of means and intensity, Germany came to represent both the vortex of conflict and its thermometer. Everything pointed to the fact that the Federal Republic beckoned as the major prize of Stalinist and Khrushchevian conflict strategy — as the portal to Soviet ambitions in Western Europe, the key to the unraveling of NATO and the Western Community, and part of the broader "German problem" on whose solution hinged a final settlement of World War II and the future of the tortured European continent. The Cold War became virtually synonymous with crisis over Berlin and confrontation across the dividing line in Germany.

All this seemingly has changed since the advent of the Brandt Government in Bonn in October 1969 and the unfolding of its *Ostpolitik,* which has reaped accommodation with the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other East European countries, as well as the underpinnings of a Four-Power accord over Berlin. This period has witnessed not only a steep climb in Cold War temperatures and the opening of a broader arena of East-West interaction, but also stark changes in the countenance of the "German problem." West Germany is no longer primarily an object of superpower confrontation and great-power politics; rather, the Federal Republic has become more and more an actor to be reckoned with on the European stage. The "German problem" no longer is defined in terms of the question: "What solution can be imposed upon, or can be made palatable to, the Germans?" Progressively the question is: "What are the Germans after?"

In the wake of the initial phase of the Brandt Government's *Ostpolitik,* this question kindles vague uneasiness in the Federal Republic's partner countries. The cause for concern is twofold. First, there is abiding suspicion that the Soviet Union's ostensible embrace of détente policies could represent either a temporary stratagem pending a consolidation of Soviet power and/or the pursuit of time-honored Soviet objectives in Europe by more subtle means. In this view, Soviet leaders may still be bent on wresting West Germany from the Atlantic Alliance en route to a "Finlandization" of Western Europe, but they have substituted persuasion where brusque power failed in the past. The Kremlin's new strategy is seen as endeavoring to entangle the Federal Republic in a tightening web of political accords and economic ties with the East, to gain in the process sharpened levers of Soviet influence in Bonn and – particularly by continuing to dangle the lure of eventual German reunification – to draw West Germany progressively from its moorings in NATO and the European Community toward de facto neutrality.

The uneasiness has been fed by signals of gradual shifts in the internal West German consensus which shaped that country's postwar policies of categorical commitment to NATO and West European integration. One such signal has been the rise, particularly since 1969, of a vociferous left wing in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Like most new radical movements in other countries, the left wing of the SPD represents a motley chorus of strident voices, united basically by harsh opposition to the alleged evils of West German society and of Europe's emerging socio-economic landscape. Yet, there are some common themes propagated by prominent spokesmen. Among the most representative of these spokesmen is Joachim Steffen, the mercurial and assertive chairman of the SPD in Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost *Land* of the Federal Republic.

The ideas of the "Red Jochen," as he is called affectionately by his followers and derisively by his opponents,[1] merit attention on several grounds. For one thing, he has been over the years the most consistent and conspicuous exponent of radical views within the SPD, the acknowledged representative of the left wing in the party's high command, and the "ideological patron" of the Young Socialists or "Jusos," the youth organization of the SPD. Second, Steffen has articulated more clearly than anyone else what might be called his wing's "contextual view" of West German foreign policy, particularly the interrelationship between Bonn's external policies and internal reform. As will be shown, *Ostpolitik* is seen by Steffen not only as an admirable foreign policy per se, but also as a wedge for sweeping social reform in the Federal Republic.

[1] Cf. Kresinger, "Der roteste der roten SPD-Leute," *Die Welt,* April 19, 1972.

STEFFEN'S BACKGROUND

Joachim Steffen was born on September 19, 1922, in Kiel.[2] After graduating from high school, he saw wartime service in the German navy. In 1946 he entered the University of Kiel, where he studied philosophy, psychology and sociology. He extended his stay at the university for several years as assistant to Professor Michael Freund, an academician well known for his Marxist views.

Steffen joined the Social Democratic Party in 1946. In 1954 he rose to chairman of the Young Socialists in Schleswig-Holstein, whereupon in the following year he was punished by the party with "prohibition to speak" (*Redeverbot*) for his frequent criticisms of the national leadership of the SPD. These early difficulties notwithstanding, he entered the Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament in 1956. As late as 1963 he turned down the candidacy for the position of Deputy State Chairman of the SPD because, as he claimed, it was not clear "how far to the left the Party is open to all Socialist forces, to the extent that these stand on the grounds of the Constitution." But he relented two years later, becoming State Chairman of the Schleswig-Holstein SPD in May 1965, and a member of the SPD National Committee in 1968.

Steffen's career has been marked by uninhibited outspokenness. "Steffen's love for the honest word," once commented the conservative *Rheinischer Merkur*, "occasionally causes considerable misgivings among some of his friends in the Party, because he articulates what some in this Party think but do not dare to say in order not to anger the voters and the Allies."[3] He himself seems to take the consequences of his assertiveness in stride. "I offer a splendid target," he said in 1971. "There can be no question that my arts of formulation occasionally make it easy for my opponents to defame me."[4]

"Love for the honest word" has brought him not only a trail of combat with his political opponents, but also frictions with the SPD establishment. Thus, in 1965 he scored the SPD's handling of the electoral campaign, deeming it "at least debatable whether the SPD is a socialist party. I feel as a member of a social reform party that for a hundred years has also had a socialist wing. . . ." In March 1970 he again prompted consternation with a demand for the socialization of newspapers in the Federal Republic — a demand that, incidentally, has since become a stock component of Juso agitations.[5]

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[2] The biographical facts that follow, unless otherwise identified, are taken from "Joachim (Jochen) Steffen, deutscher Journalist and Politiker, SPD," *Mueniziger Archiv*, January 16, 1971.

[3] "Steffens Vergleich," *Rheinischer Merkur*, December 3, 1971.

[4] "Steffen siegt in Husum durch rhetorischen K.O.," *Die Welt*, June 21, 1971.

At the SPD Party Congress in Saarbruecken in 1970 Steffen expressed satisfaction that the SPD was finally, in his view, steering a "course to the left." In June 1970 he sidestepped a minor rebellion against him from the ranks of the Schleswig-Holstein party organization by offering his resignation, which he retracted after receiving a vote of confidence from the party delegates.[6]

Yet, his hardest political test was still to come in the Schleswig-Holstein elections in April 1971, in which he challenged the popular Christian-Democratic candidate, Gerhard Stoltenberg, for the Presidency of the *Land*. The elections merited a national spotlight not only because of the Steffen-Stoltenberg duel, but also because they bore heavily on the test of strength then in progress at the national level between Brandt's slim and threatened majority in the Bundestag and the CDU opposition. The campaign was enlivened by Steffen's standard spate of controversial statements, including one which seemed to equate the American military presence in West Germany with the Warsaw Pact forces that had invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Despite Brandt's personal support of Steffen[7], the SPD was badly beaten in the elections.

In December 1971 Steffen announced his intention eventually to leave his post as leader of the party in Schleswig-Holstein in order to give full time to a job at the national SPD level (still to be created) involving contacts and coordination with other socialist parties in the European Economic Community, and particularly in Scandinavia.[8] It is difficult to discern to what extent this announcement reflected pressure from the national SPD leadership, particularly in light of the 1971 election returns, or Steffen's own predilections. As will be elaborated, combat against the alleged vise of "monopoly capitalism" in the European Economic Community, supposedly directed from the United States, has since become almost an obsession with Steffen.

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[5] "Steffen, Joachim (Jochen)," *Interpress Archiv* (Hamburg), September 1, 1972.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Steffen's statement about the American forces in Germany evoked criticism in the U.S. Congress. On April 18, 1971, Brandt accused the CDU of "serving untrue information and citations to foreigners in order to make electoral-political capital" and emphasized: ". . . No one should mistake the fact that the SPD in its totality stands behind its first man in Schleswig-Holstein." "Willy Brandt: Die ganze SPD steht hinter Steffen," *Die Welt,* April 19, 1971.

[8] *Interpress Archiv, loc. cit.*

Whatever may be Steffen's future political fortunes, however, there seems to be general agreement among political observers in the Federal Republic that the impact of his ideas, which already have shaped the rhetoric of the SPD's left wing, is not likely to wane. As the periodical *Dialog* has put it:

> There is, after all, no question that it is precisely the missionary-utopian quality in Steffen that fascinates the younger generation. Therefore, battles like the one that he lost [in the 1971 election] are likely to be fought a number of times again during the 1970s. The bourgeois-liberal side must know what it has to reckon with. The "Godesberg" social democracy on the other side will not be able to evade the decision either to give up the program that carried it to power or to bring on the ideological debate with its own progeny. The opponents of the "revisionist" SPD leadership will avail themselves of Steffen's categories.[9]

"STEFFEN'S CATEGORIES": THE CLASS SOCIETY

Joachim Steffen indicts the socio-economic structure of the Federal Republic as essentially a "system for the maximization of profits," and its society as still a "class society." This society continues to be cleft into Marxist categories of exploiters and exploited, but with more modern connotations:

> Until the Industrial Revolution, this society was divided into those who could eat their fill and those who could not eat their fill. Today the society is divided into those who own and those who do not own. It is divided into those who are educated and those who are not educated. It is divided into those who control and those who do not control.[10]

Steffen translates this neat Marxist concept of exploiters and exploited facilely into the political arena. He sees the workings of a "modern fascism" in the "exploitation of the existing socio-technical system of domination."[11] He elaborates as follows:

> The danger of today [is posed by] those who want to divide this society into the privileged and into others who are led by the nose. Who calculate that a quarter of the population will consist of a new sub-proletariat. Who do not need any longer the terror of the state, because they unleash terror among the people with the slogan "peace and order." Who build a "society" according to the interests of the upper ten per cent and feed the rest on the garbage from prosperity.[12]

To eliminate any doubt regarding the identity of these enemies, he refers to the "modern SS" in the Federal Republic. "This SS is named [Bavarian CSU leader Franz Josef] Strauss and [publishing magnate Axel] Springer and wants the domination of the European Economic Community by German capital as well as the undisturbed molding of public opinion. And [it wants] both with the finger on the trigger of modern atomic rockets."[13]

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[9] "Der Philosoph, der sich eine Partei hielt," *Dialog*, August 1972, p. 34.

[10] *Welt der Arbeit*, May 1, 1970. Cited in *Kesseltreiben gegen wen? Die Legende einer Kampagne gegen Jochen Steffen* (Berlin: Axel Springer Publishing House, undated), p. 13.

[11] Interview, "Steffen ueber 'Kommunisten' und 'Faschisten,'" *Flensburger Tageblatt*, February 25, 1971.

[12] Joachim Steffen, "Die Schlacht im falschen Saal," *Nordwoche*, January 22, 1971.

Steffen thus gazes at the world through Marxist prisms and discerns the stereotyped dichotomies of class and society and the standard perils. In addition to the tightening tentacles of monopoly capitalism — i.e., "modern fascism" — he sees as the immediate crises of coming years: the growing demands for worker mobility posed by the restructuring of the labor market, the progressive flood to the cities and denuding of the rural regions, the intensification of ecological problems and the widening disparity between "private prosperity and public poverty."[14]

His proposed remedies also have tended to follow a stereotyped pattern, albeit not a notably consistent one. The common denominator is "more power to the state." In order to cope with the growing crisis of its institutions and to avoid "social explosion," the state has to muster a much greater measure of "planning and steering." He terms such a "structural reform of capitalism" the "socialist conception":

> It is the socialist conception that the present economic and social system is determined by a power which is oriented toward the multiplication of capitalist profits, but not toward human requirements. One must use the possibilities which the governmental apparatus offers in such a way that the society of the dependents — and they are, after all, 81 per cent — is restructured in accordance with the latter's interests.[15]

He is vague about the extent of needed "structural reform." At the least, in order to muster the monetary generators of greater government intervention, he urges a "*de facto* socialization of banking and insurance" in the Federal Republic.[16] As mentioned above, on a level that has less to do with governmental revenue-raising and more with the molding of public opinion (which he believes to be in the hands of the "modern fascists"), he has advocated state ownership of all news media. Beyond that, he prescribes "influence" by the state over the production of consumer goods.[17]

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[13] "Der neue Faschismus benoetigt keine KZ," *Konkret*, February 25, 1971.

[14] "Steffen: Der Staat braucht mehr Macht," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, July 15, 1971.

[15] "Eine Strukturreform des Kapitalismus fordern," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, July 13, 1970.

[16] Steffen: Banken und Versicherungen verstaatlichen," *Handelsblatt*, July 15, 1971.

Yet, the observer gains the impression that these proposals, modest by orthodox Marxist standards, are tempered more by mild circumspection than by ideological conviction. Quite frequently in the heat of interview and debate, Steffen's ostensible reformist notions give way to more radical battle cries. Thus, in a debate in October 1971 he called for the "elimination of the capitalist system of the Federal Republic instead of partial reforms," and termed it "blind faith" that the establishment will agree to the necessary changes "voluntarily and without battle."[18]

The innuendo of violence in his prescriptions became quite prominent in his Schleswig-Holstein campaign in 1971. For example, he wrote in January 1971: "He who defends the self-determination of humans in freedom is not free in his choice of allies and cannot shy away from physical combat in the conflict against inhumanity."[19] In an interview on February 25, he warned that "the free forces of the parliamentary democracy will be pulverized if they do not recognize that the forces of inhumanity — communists and fascists — cannot be combated with 'moral weapons' alone."[20]

According to Steffen, the SPD must become the standard-bearer in the inevitable class conflict. He argued in the December 1972 issue of *Die Neue Gesellschaft,* the SPD's theoretical journal:

> The policy of Social Democracy cannot evade this pressure of problems. Above all, it cannot when the Social Democrats compose the leading force in the government. They have practical political evidence of the fact that it is possible, through political-structural changes in the political apparatus (above) and social-structural changes (below) to steer the trend toward a post-capitalist constitution of the state and society and to fill them with socialist contents.[21]

This prescription came at a time when the party had just emerged strengthened from the December 1972 national elections — from a campaign that, according to a number of West German analysts, had given stark testimony to a growing ideologization and polarization of political life in the Federal Republic. Steffen, in an interview published on December 21, drew apparent satisfaction from this polarization: "The campaign of big money has done more for the awakening of class consciousness than the SPD [has done] since 1945." Moreover, he expressed confidence that the SPD was now on the right track because "When a party places its bets on class consciousness or profits from it, it must also know that he who rides a tiger will be eaten if he gets off."[22]

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[17] Interview, "Jochen Steffen: Ein ganz neues SPD-Gefuehl," *Konkret,* December 21, 1972.

[18] "Steffen fordert Beseitigung des kapitalistischen Systems," *Die Welt,* October 25, 1971.

[19] Cited in *Kesseltreiben gegen wen? . . . , op. cit.,* p. 16.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 45.

[21] Jochen Steffen, "Chancen gesellschaftlicher Veraenderung," *Die Neue Gesellschaft,* December 1972, p. 948.

Purpose of Ostpolitik: To Force Reforms in the FRG

The above sketch of Steffen's views of West German society sets an adequate stage for his conceptions of foreign policy generally and *Ostpolitik* in particular. The interesting fact is that, compared with the volume (and decibel) of his outcries against the West German domestic scene, his strictures on foreign policy have been relatively meager over the years – the notable exception being his more recent preoccupation with the European Economic Community. Yet, that is precisely the point: Steffen's overriding concern (and this seems to hold true for the SPD left wing in general) is for the imperatives of "restructuring" the West German society. He views foreign affairs essentially as they relate to these imperatives.

Characteristically, however, Steffen was one of the first SPD politicians to agitate for a shift in policies toward the East. At a special State Congress of the Schleswig-Holstein SPD in January 1966, the State Committee under his leadership introduced the following resolutions:

(1) Strengthened contacts between humans in both parts of Germany. For this purpose the Federal Republic must treat the claim to sole representation [*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*] in such a way that negotiations are enabled with those in power in the eastern part of our divided fatherland.

(2) The West German defense and armament policies must make it clear that they are not intended to serve as instruments of aggressive pressure against the powers of the eastern camp. The Federal Republic therefore should adopt a positive position to a treaty on the nonproliferation of atomic weapons, and should strive toward a relaxation of tensions through military thinning-out in Central Europe.

(3) The Federal Republic must finally make concrete the plan which envisages economic assistance toward the improvement of the infrastructure in Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time, a strengthening of the interzonal trade must be undertaken.[23]

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[22] Interview, *Konkret*, December 21, 1972, *op. cit.*

[23] "Kein Festhalten an gescheiterte Politik," *Die Andere Zeitung*, January 20, 1966.

In defense of these resolutions, Steffen invoked arguments that since have reverberated more widely in defense of the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik*. He charged that NATO and the EEC had proven illusory as instruments toward German reunification. He referred to the "tragic fate" of Viet Nam and emphasized that this war "which threatens the whole world" had special import for the FRG because it was "directed against the self-determination and toward the partition of a people," it augured a transfer of American interests away from Europe to Asia, and it made even more conspicuous the progressively parallel nature of the interests of the two superpowers. In all, he argued, there was an imperative for a new orientation of policy. Steffen urged a "dismantling of the anti-hysteria in both parts of Germany," and demanded a policy "which pays consideration to the security needs of the states and peoples in the eastern camp." He emphasized that West Germany's peaceful intentions are not credible in the context of the FRG's participation in NATO nuclear strategy. "Power politics [*Politik der Staerke*]," he intoned, "are buried today."[24]

But already in these early arguments emerged a strong hint of the real priority embraced by Steffen. As he put it then, "this imperative of a new orientation of foreign policy converges with the imperative to dismantle the social contradictions in the sense of a democratization of our society." The West Germans, he contended, could no longer curse at the communists from a distance; the time had come to compete with them at close range. "In such a debate with communism, political consciousness, educational opportunities and the power relationships in the society as well as justice in our social order will have to be examined and weighed differently than in the past."[25]

The implication was clear: loosened East-West tensions and direct relations between the FRG and the GDR would usher in an active systemic competition between the two German states. And this competition, if it did not lead to a systemic convergence, at the least would shine the spotlight upon the reforms needed in the Federal Republic.

PURPOSE OF OSTPOLITIK: TO REDUCE THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE FRG

The "thinning out" of military forces in Central Europe, which

[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*

was stressed in the 1966 Schleswig-Holstein SPD resolution, has a meaning for Joachim Steffen that transcends the standard motivations addressed to this objective.

It will come as no surprise that he is enamored neither of the United States nor of its role in Europe. In contrast with the ostensibly established fact of a "peaceloving Soviet Union," he sees the United States as only on the promising path toward that status — as "more and more peaceloving."[26] He perceives the shadow of American expansionist capitalism over the European Community and warns that "without a common European social-political strategy by the Socialists and Liberal Left in Europe, there will be no European social policy, and the economic and social development of Europe will become more and more a function of the business interests of international concerns."[27] He regards America as the emanation of the economic and financial blights in the Western world: "The Americans finance their Vietnam war like medieval lords through inflation [*Geldverschlechterung*] and, in so doing, infest the whole monetary system."[28]

According to Steffen, since American interests and policies are propelled essentially by the sinister aims and machinations of monopoly capitalism, American security policies and the American military presence in Europe must be viewed in strictly that light. U.S. forces are stationed in Europe, and particularly in the Federal Republic, not in order to protect Western Europe from aggression, but rather to safeguard and enforce American interests. To that extent, they differ little from Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe. The following passages from an interview in February 1971 are revealing:

Q: Do you consider communism, as it now appears and functions among us, and fascism, as you understand it, as equally great dangers or do you see one as significantly greater than the other? Is the Communist danger the lesser one because it does not dispose over the apparatus of power mentioned by you?

A: I have said as follows: The danger today comes from those who would like to structure the economy strictly according to the principle of maximization of profits.

Q: And this the Communists do not, or do they?

A: . . . What are the actual relationships of power? They are, after all, such that in reality there can be here, under the requirements of the *Deutschland-Vertrag* [the "Germany Treaty" of 1955, which extended full sovereignty to the Federal Republic and enabled its entry into NATO] only that which I term the "modern fascism."

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[26] "Steffen baut auf 'friedliebende' Sowjets," *Die Welt,* November 15, 1971.

[27] Jochen Steffen, "Die EWG und die Linke," *Konkret,* May 18, 1972, p. 47.

[28] Interview, *Konkret,* December 21, 1972, *op. cit.*

Q: Oh, that is a strong word, on which one must first chew three times.

A: You are familiar with the Third Reservation of the Allies [in the "Germany Treaty"] — the assumption of the powers of state in the event of a revolutionary disturbance of the free democratic order. And the allied troops are here.

Q: But not primarily for the assumption of state powers in Case X.

A: For what purpose they are here primarily does not have to interest us in this context. And the difference with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, in terms of the maintenance of power by the leading powers, consists after all only of the fact that in our case the allied troops are here, whereas in Czechoslovakia they had to march in.

Q: Another difference surely consists also of the fact that in our case the allied troops are stationed with the agreement of the majority of the population, whereas the Soviet troops were "summoned" against the will of the population of Czechoslovakia.

A: Absolutely no argument on that. But what has that to do with the problem? If [the then leader of the West German SDS] Dutschke were elected Federal Chancellor — to formulate it graphically — this would in all certainty evoke Reservation Number Three of the Allies.

Q: We do not consider that a certainty.

A: I consider it a certainty.

Q: I do not believe that if [Defense Minister] Schmidt were here, he would share your opinion.

A: I would assert that he would confirm it. . . . Each of the leading powers has treaties with the states in which it is interested, to put them into the position of Hungary [in 1956]. If that is the case, then the Communist danger does not exist here. It [the leading power] can do that at anytime — and we could then come to uprisings during the forementioned structural crises. After all, it cannot be assumed that for example the peasants will always remain . . . only on the side of the "fascists."[29]

This is a sample of Steffen's disjointed rhetoric and use of oversimplified dichotomies. But despite the confusing turns of argument and the improbable scenarios, the basic thrust of his fears (sincere or not) and contentions comes through fairly clearly. Just as Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are the purveyors and enforcers of Soviet interests, including the maintenance of ideological conformity, so are American forces the ultimate sentinels of American capitalist interests in Europe. Their assigned task will be to suppress the socialist revolt in the Federal Republic — a revolt that looms as inevitable unless the needed structural reforms are introduced peacefully by a Socialist government.

Hence, to the extent that *Ostpolitik* can bring about an easing of the American military presence, so much the better.

[29] Interview, *Flensburger Tageblatt,* February 25, 1971, *op. cit.*

OSTPOLITIK AND THE "OPEN FLANK"

With his overweening emphasis on socio-economic reform, Steffen tends to see foreign policy problems as the "open flank" complicating the tasks of domestic "restructuring." Indeed, he argues: "The open flank is turning into an open wound. The domestic-political means of power and control do not get at the foreign-political causes."[30] The task of foreign policy, therefore, is the "securing of the internal process of planning against the foreign-political 'open flank.' Also against effects of the costs of military alliance policy, problems of the trade and payments balance, monetary problems, economic development assistance, etc."[31]

In this context, he perceives two primary purposes in, and benefits from, *Ostpolitik.* First, the objective must be to bring about savings in the military expenditures of the Federal Republic — savings that can be used to finance the necessary internal reforms. He sees this as the overriding task of the Social Democratic leadership in the second Brandt Administration: "There must come [in the 1972-1976 period] the first results in the limitation of troops and armament. Because . . . otherwise we cannot remotely muster the investments that we need."[32]

Second, *Ostpolitik* and détente policies must be continued because they reflect — as Steffen expresses it in his Marxist terminology — "the only humanly thinkable consequences of the changed dialectic regarding the application of force in foreign policy."[33] Moreover, from the vantage point of the Federal Republic's imperatives of internal reform, *Ostpolitik* provides Bonn with the kind of political credibility that can enable it to cope positively with the "open flank." Thus, Steffen reported upon his return from visits to Norway and Denmark in April 1972:

> The debate in the Federal Republic over the ratification of the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw does not make the position of those [in Norway and Denmark] who favor the EEC any easier. In Scandinavia, too, one can buy the products of the Springer Press. Anyone who has not forgotten the two world wars of this century must be frightened. In the Scandinavian countries they have not forgotten.
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> . . . A peaceful Federal Republic is for the Scandinavians, justifiably or not, equivalent with a democratic Federal Republic and with a peaceful and democratic Europe. This is for them the unavoidable premise for

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[30] Steffen, "Chancen gesellschaftlicher Veraenderung," *loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Interview, *Konkret,* December 21, 1972, *op. cit.*
[33] Steffen, "Chancen gesellschaftlicher Veraenderung," *loc. cit.*

> their entry [into the EEC] and for their workers' movement the premise for their efforts for a democratic EEC with socialist perspectives.
>
> Surely we will soon hear about these efforts. That would be the turn away from the "socialist provincialism" in their own countries toward a democratic Europe with socialist perspectives. There [in the EEC] those countries with their strong democratic and social impetus can effect much. In this respect the EEC needs them.[34]

A Socialist Europe

The foregoing was cited at length because it provides an apt transition to the discussion of Steffen's principal preoccupation in recent years: the socialization of the European Economic Community.

Some of his salient notions about the EEC have emerged here and there in the previous description of his views: the fact that he regards the Community as the prey for American monopoly capitalism – a "Europe of American-European concerns" – and the extension on a continental level of the "new fascism" which is suffocating the West German economy and society. At the same time, according to Steffen, the economic integration of the enlarged Community represents the major "open flank." The existence of this flank bars the effective implementation of far-reaching reforms within the national unit, if only because "under the requirements of the EEC and the Western Alliance there are no possibilities for a socialist socio-economic system in a national framework."[35] Moreover, the processes of the EEC have tightened too much to be ripped apart:

> The train of capitalist integration, the Europeanization of capital and the growth of the multinational corporations have gone too far for anyone to jump off. The net of production and the intertwining of capital have become too strong for anyone to be able to tear them apart without sustaining the most serious injuries to the body of economy and society.[36]

The only solution, therefore, is to fight, in cooperation with the progressive forces in the other countries of the EEC, for a socialization of the Community. Furthermore, Steffen sees the chances for socialist victory at the EEC level better than in the national compartments:

> It seems to me decisive that only the construction of the EEC offers until now at least the chance to achieve political domination over the economic forces. And only [the EEC] offers a fair chance to the little

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[34] Jochen Steffen, "Skandinavien und die EWG," *Vorwaerts,* April 20, 1972.

[35] Jochen Steffen, "Flucht in proletarischen Provinzialismus," *Konkret,* October 12, 1972.

[36] *Ibid.*

> people. Socialism begins with both. Anyone who has the chance must use it. If one is to use it, one must begin a policy which liberates the class conflicts in the EEC from their national confines and turns them into European class conflicts. The range of action for the proletariat must be the same as the range of action of capitalism. Otherwise capital will dominate.[37]

Thus, he sounds the summons for his own version of proletarian internationalism. The Left in Europe, he contends, has but one alternative: "either to develop socialism as a European system or to renounce socialism."[38] He calls for a "at first theoretical and then practical union of the organizations of the workers' movement and the groups of the liberal intelligentsia in the EEC — a union that must lead to common practical actions. . . ."[39] This alliance of the European "workers' movement" and "liberal intelligentsia" might include the communist parties of Italy and France if these parties would affirm parliamentary democracy and "dismantle authoritarian structures."[40]

Ironically, for the sake of this socialization of the EEC (in order to open it to "progressive forces," particularly from the Scandinavian countries) he argues also for the political unification of the European Community. In contrast with the aspirations addressed to this goal by convinced "Europeans," however, Steffen views it strictly in the light of the proletariat's march to power. Only by grasping the levers of political power can the oppressed class topple the colossus of economic capitalism. When asked in an interview to project the process of the Community's transition to socialism, he answered readily:

> That will proceed only through further steps in the process of the political integration of the Community. And to that belongs the direct election of the delegates to the European Parliament and the full parliamentary control of the resistance of those who today profit from the uncontrolled distribution of sums in billions.
>
> A change of the Community in this direction seems to be inevitable if we do not want to abdicate the sovereignty of the national states step-by-step to the planning and decision-making courts of the giant Euro-American business concerns.[41]

STEFFEN'S VIEWS IN CONTEXT

To what extent does Joachim Steffen personify the swelling currents of left-wing thought in the West German SPD? As has been suggested, there seems to be nothing resembling a really organized SPD left wing, in the sense of rank-and-file adherence to a central authority or to a single bible of theoretical precepts. Indeed, the precepts are at best misty. What unites the left wing is a sense of opposition to the status quo and all of its alleged socio-economic evils. This status quo also tends to include the present leadership of the Social Democratic Party, which, while preferable to the "new fascists" who dominate the "system" in the Federal Republic, nevertheless is under suspicion of having "sold out." In this context, a uniting emphasis of the left wing is on the "social" or "socialist" in Social Democracy. This is a question of emphasis: it does not necessarily entail a rejection of a democracy. It does imply, however, the perception that the "democratic" in Social Democracy has become a synonym of accommodation by the SPD leadership to "the system."

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[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Steffen, "Die EWG und die Linke," *op. cit.*
[39] Steffen, "Chancen gesellschaftlicher Veraenderung," *op. cit.*, p. 950.
[40] "Schwarz gemahlt," *Dialog*, January 19, 1972.
[41] "Erstickt die EWG an ihren Problemen?," *Morgenpost*, November 18, 1971.

Steffen's rejection of totalitarianism (he sees communists as being to the right of his own position[42]) seems to be sincere. To what degree the strength of this rejection reflects a mainstream of leftist thinking in the SPD is difficult to assess: certainly other self-acknowledged members of the party's Left express more positive sympathy for the socio-economic systems of the East, and evince more faith in a "convergence of systems" in Europe that might yield a happy compromise between the needed "dirigism" of reform and individual freedom. But the common denominator uniting Steffen and other radical voices in the SPD left wing is just as certainly a variety of "pure" Marxism that contends that man cannot be free unless he is economically and socially liberated — a Utopianism that places itself *above* the two contending (and by implication antiquated) systems of society in Europe.

In Steffen, this sense of ideological superiority translates itself into political neutralism at the European level. Since both contending social systems and structures are reprehensible, there can be no real choice between them. Yet, the neutralism is clearly partial in a negative sense: on the assumption that the "peaceloving" Soviet Union has no real interest in extending its tentacles over Western Europe, the more immediate danger is the tightening stranglehold of the "new fascism" over German society — a stranglehold abetted by the kindred capitalist forces in Western Europe and the United States, particularly via the new instrument of the multinational corporation.

This is where Ostpolitik comes primarily into the picture. Inasmuch as the "new fascists" owe a good measure of their power to the confrontation of systems in Europe and to their "finger on the atomic trigger," the elimination of that confrontation will deprive them of that measure of power. Since the alliance policies and the military presence of the United States represent the guardians of American capitalist interests, *Ostpolitik* must do away with that military presence. It must also do away with the national arms burden which withholds from the Socialist state the means of sweeping social reform. To the extent that *Ostpolitik* lowers barriers between East and West and ushers in an active engagement between the two socio-economic systems in Germany, and Europe more generally, it will hasten reform in the Federal Republic.

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[42] Interview, *Flensburger Tageblatt,* February 25, 1971, *op. cit.*

Finally, in Steffen's view, *Ostpolitik* is the psychological entry card for the Federal Republic, and therefore also for its "progressive forces," into the arena of the European Community. As has been noted, this is for Steffen the central arena where the battle for socialism will ultimately be won or lost. In this respect, his predilections mirror fairly accurately the principal target of left-wing forces in the Federal Republic: the ideal of a Socialist Europe from the Atlantic to the Elbe River, and perhaps some day from the Atlantic to the Dnieper.

THE RISE OF THE LEFT IN PERSPECTIVE

Even if Joachim Steffen's views are reasonably representative of the ideological thrust of the SPD left wing, what is the "political currency" of such views? How powerful is the SPD Left, now and prospectively?

There are no easy answers to these questions. Clearly, in gauging the power of left-wing forces in contemporary West Germany as well as elsewhere, one can fall prey to exaggeration — if only because of the relative conspicuousness of such forces and their noisy agitations. In the last national SPD Party Congress in Hannover in April 1973, the expected frontal challenge to Chancellor Brandt by the left wing failed to materialize. Despite more pessimistic prior estimates even by the SPD leadership,[43] the voting patterns in Hannover revealed a "hard-core" left wing of slightly in excess of 30 per cent of the delegates present.[44]

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[43] Willy Brandt, a month before the Party Congress, apparently viewed the threat of the left wing seriously enough to hint that he would resign as Party Chairman if the Congress defeated his programs. (See "Brandt droht Ruecktritt vom Partei-Vorsitz an," *Welt am Sonntag*, March 18, 1973.) Party Vice-Chairman and Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt had projected the strength of the left wing to be around 40 per cent. Television interview, reported in the SPD's press release, "Mitteilung fuer die Presse," February 26, 1973.

Yet, this bare statistic hardly lends comfort. First of all, a figure of 30 per cent in itself mirrors a substantial change in the internal make-up of a party which in 1959 (in its memorable Godesberg Program) staged a formal divorce from Marxism and began the methodical transition to a "bourgeois party" — a transition that was responsible for bringing the SPD into power in 1969. Second, the left wing at Hannover managed to elect to the SPD's governing body several additional representatives, including the national chairman of the Young Socialists. Among the prominent victims from the party's moderate wing to lose their seats on the SPD governing body was Georg Leber, Minister of Defense in the Brandt Government, who had become the favorite target of Party radicals. Third, according to analysts, roughly an additional one-third of the delegates at Hannover tended to vote with the hard-core Left on issues in which the party leadership chose not to assert its authority.[45] The implication was, in other words, that this "swing vote," while sympathetic to salient left-wing causes, remained sensitive to the requisites of political power, and particularly to the goal of forging an absolute majority for the SPD in the 1976 national elections.

Meanwhile, Brandt must balance the forces in his party and his government and weigh the prospects. While he may deflect pressures from the Left with respect to major political "bread-and-butter" issues (especially those with the potential of heightening tensions with the SPD's coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party), he must also make some concessions. These concessions fall primarily in the realm of domestic reforms, but they touch foreign policy as well. Thus, for example, the recent rhetoric by the Brandt Government about the need to transform the European Economic Community into a "social union" (as well as political union) clearly seems to defer to left-wing preoccupations noted above.

Meanwhile, also, the phenomenon of SPD leftism must be evaluated not only on its own merits, but also for its confluence with other currents in the West German scene. These include, also within the SPD, a non-ideological nationalism with strong neutralist overtones, represented at the government level by

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[44] See, for example, Werner Kaltefleiter, "Europe and the Nixon Doctrine: A German Point of View," ORBIS, Spring 1973, p. 90.

[45] *Ibid.* See also Bruno Dechamps, "Abmarsch aus der Mitte," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 16, 1973.

Minister for Special Assignments Egon Bahr, Brandt's principal emissary in the East and the acknowledged "architect of *Ostpolitik.*"[46] They include in more conservative circles a revival of notions that reminds of traditional themes of German *Realpolitik,* and within the business community a longing toward the purportedly vast opportunities that beckon to West German trade and investment in the East. These currents spill into a popular mood that, preoccupied with hanging on to unprecedented prosperity, tends to equate *Ostpolitik* and détente with the lessening of dangers and of the need to render sacrifices for defense.[47]

This emerging confluence of neutralism, nationalism and public euphoria and apathy is not unique to the Federal Republic. In a broader and ominous sense, it reflects a general and growing dilemma which bedevils the members of the Atlantic Alliance as they ply détente while endeavoring to sustain the bulwarks of their security and the bonds of their common interests.

Yet, these trends have starker portent in the Federal Republic. West Germany cannot change the hard geographic fact of its abiding strategic position between two rival systems of society and power in Europe — as the linchpin of the transatlantic alliance and the vital cog in the historic experiment of the emergent European Community. If the trends continue to gnaw at the fundamental postwar consensus in the Federal Republic, the Brandt Government, despite its best intentions, may awaken someday to find itself without the wherewithal for either security or successful détente — that is, a détente that does not culminate in Bonn's inexorable accommodation to the shadow of Soviet power.

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[46] See this author's "West Germany's *Ostpolitik*: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr," Orbis, Winter 1973. This article reported and evaluated an interview with Bahr in 1969, in which the latter had projected a four-phased West German policy that would lead from accommodation with the USSR, the other East European countries and the German Democratic Republic, and American and Soviet force reductions, to the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of a collective security system in Europe. The article provoked controversy in West Germany and debate in the Parliament, in which Bahr did not deny his 1969 projection but endeavored to attribute to it a theoretical character. In an article in November 1973, however, Bahr openly advocated that West Germany, together with its allies, should strive for an "all-European security system." He denied that this was a prescription for German neutrality because "neutrality commonly means non-participation in the event of a conflict," and "I know of no one who has demanded a neutralist all-European security system." See Egon Bahr, "Ist die Bundesrepublik auf dem Weg in den Neutralismus?," *Deutsche Zeitung,* November 9, 1973.

[47] Defense Minister Leber has consistently warned against this growing popular mood which "considers the attempt toward the lowering of confrontation as already a kind of outcome." The latter remark came in an interview reported by *Kommentaruebersicht* (Bonn: Federal Press Office) on April 2, 1973.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: A FULCRUM OF WORLD POWER

by Neville Brown

FASHIONABLE though it may be to discount neo-'jingoism,' the most fundamental objective of Western foreign policy in this nuclear era can be seen as a kind of reversion to the dominant strategic preoccupation of the British during much of the nineteenth century – namely, a solution of the Eastern Question. In essence, the problem posed was how to encourage the political and social progress of various emergent peoples without condoning Russian expansion.[1] Belatedly the eminent geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, was to encapsulate this concern by his formulation of the Heartland thesis.[2] Suffice it to add that the Churchillian metaphor of the continental Elephant versus the maritime Whale would have seemed apposite to many Victorians.

The parallel is especially germane because the core of the Eastern Question always lay in the Eastern Mediterranean and some territories adjacent to it. The specific issue at stake was what our attitude should be toward the Ottoman Empire, given the nationalisms developing among its Balkan subjects plus other disruptive or corrosive influences in Egypt and elsewhere. Could we so modulate our endorsement of change as to prevent the creation of a dangerous power vacuum through what came to be spoken of as a "bag-and-baggage" expulsion of the Ottoman Turks? Had we either the right or the power to behave thus? Might not any attempt to restrain change simply lead in the long run to an even more precipitate bag-and-baggage eviction and so make Russian intrusion all the easier?

William Pitt, who was then the British Prime Minister, expressed his country's concern at Russia's expansion southwestward during the latter's war with Turkey (1789-1792). Yet France was soon to present a much more immediate threat in the form of Napoleon's expedition to the Nile (1798) and the associated attempt to foment unrest in India. A few years later Napoleon was exploring with Czar Alexander the possibility of a combined attack on Turkey and Persia.[3]

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[1] This preoccupation was the theme of a British music hall ditty popular around 1878:

"We don't want to fight but *by jingo* if we do,
We've got the ships; we've got the men; we've got the money too.
We'll show the Russian Czar, the kind of lads we are,
and the Russians shall not have Constantinople."

[2] *Geographical Journal, XXIII,* 1904.

In like manner, Germany sought to use this area as a land-bridge in both world wars, underpinning Turkey in the first great struggle and Italy in the second. But so far as Hitler was concerned, an obsession with the eastern front proper diminished his awareness of the scope for a Near East strategy. Hence, the frustration evinced by Rommel in the North African desert when his theater was denied modest increments of men and resources which, he felt, could have been used far more decisively there than in the Ukraine.

The most singular characteristic, not just of the Mediterranean and its immediate environs but of the whole vast zone bounded roughly by Gibraltar, Venice, Sevastopol, Karachi and Aden, is the remarkable alternation of irregular blocks of land with sea areas that, in every instance, are almost but not quite enclosed. Besides this, the hinterlands of the various land areas tend to be mountain, plateau, or sandy desert. Clearly it is this intricate pattern that has given the various Elephants the chance to menace the Whale.

Conversely, however, the Whale is presented with opportunities to distract and wear down an Elephant. Accordingly, Britain herself evolved a forward strategy against continental European adversaries in the Mediterranean theater on various occasions during her years of maritime ascendancy. Sometimes she concentrated on the western basin and at other times on the eastern. The fact that her record of achievements is a mixed one may enhance its value as a pointer to the dangers and the possibilities, from the standpoint of the Western alliance, inherent in the current confrontation with the Soviet Union.

II

Marlborough was the first British general to use the Mediterranean — in this case the western basin — as an area for diversionary maritime and amphibious activity. He did so during the War of the Spanish Succession. A big and lasting dividend was

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[3] For a concise but authoritative account of eighteenth-century French thinking on this matter, see D. G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 209-212.

Britain's acquisition of Gibraltar in 1704. But the attempt made in 1707 to coordinate allied thrusts throughout the West European theater was an ignominious flop. Likewise, it is probable that important opportunities to foster dissent in southern France and elsewhere were missed during the French Revolutionary Wars at the end of that century.

The retention of Malta after 1815 confirmed that in the Mediterranean as in other waters the era of near-absolute British naval supremacy had begun. On and around that sea it was characterized by an exceptionally large number of limited applications of naval and amphibious power, a circumstance due largely though by no means wholly to the Eastern Question. In classic fashion a naval bombardment in 1816 broke the pirates of Algiers. Toward the close of the next decade a covering force was sent for a while to Lisbon to uphold a constitutional succession in Portugal. Britain's general concern at this time was to protect the smaller and newer nations against some Bourbon and/or Czarist counterrevolution.

In 1827, during the Greek War of Independence, the Royal Navy led a devastating onslaught against the Turkish fleet at Navarino. Yet twelve years later an amphibious expedition was sent to Acre to check a revolt against Turkey by the French-backed Pasha of Egypt. On the one hand, London was anxious not to oblige a renascent Greece to rely overmuch on Russian support. On the other, it was concerned lest Turkey should do so.

Admittedly, some concern about French aspirations was to persist for a while. Garibaldi's movement from Sicily to the adjacent mainland in 1860 was quietly protected from French interference. Britain's establishment of political control over the Nile valley in the two decades following the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 was motivated in part by a desire to exclude the French. Nevertheless, Britain and France banded together in 1853 to check a brazen endeavor by Czar Nicholas to turn the Balkans and Asia Minor into his sphere of influence. The resultant expedition to the Crimea was conducted less than brilliantly but still achieved success against a much larger mass of Muscovite landpower.

Just over twenty years later the old Eastern Question came to a head and was resolved. For a Russian attempt to build a Greater Bulgaria as a forward bastion of pan-Slavism was thwarted in 1878 by the multilateral Treaty of Berlin. Shortly beforehand, Britain had taken over the administration of Cyprus and had given

Turkey a guarantee for her Asiatic territories. But Britain could not hope to extend her sea-based umbrella over the Balkans, which therefore became an unstable power vacuum, ripe for Austrian and German exploitation.

As Churchill and the other members of the "Easterner" school insisted, the proper development by Britain and France of an offensive strategy in the Mediterranean might have shortened the First World War considerably. Instead, the Allies grotesquely mishandled the landings near Gallipoli in the Turkish Straits in 1915, thereby missing a priceless opportunity to cripple Turkey and relieve Russia at one and the same time. Yet even before the melancholy withdrawal of this expedition, the Allies had started to build up another unproductive enclave around Salonika in northern Greece. By 1917 no fewer than 400,000 British and 200,000 other troops were serving there, only a sixth of whom could be regarded as available for whatever opportunities for offensive action might somehow present themselves. Nor is it clear that the overland campaigns against the Turks were truly cost-effective.[4]

In the aftermath of the fall of France in 1940, Churchill was quick to appreciate the need to boost the morale of the British people and to sustain faith in their continued resistance in the United States and elsewhere, not merely by defensive operations over and around the British Isles but by offensive action in the most accessible arena: the Eastern Mediterranean-cum-Near East.

The fruits of such action during the year the British Commonwealth stood virtually alone (June 1940-June 1941) were truly remarkable. Some 450,000 of Mussolini's ill-accoutered and unenthusiastic troops were taken prisoner in East Africa and Libya in campaigns which vividly illustrate the axiom that the safest procedure for the numerically weaker side may be to go over to the attack. Aid to Greece helped to sustain that country's heroic resistance to the Italian would-be invaders, one consequence being that Hitler had to expend several critical weeks prior to his invasion of the USSR in 1941 subjugating her and Yugoslavia. An Axis attempt to blaze a trail of subversion through Syria, Iraq and Persia was thwarted. To cap everything, the Italian navy was seriously battered, first at Taranto and then at Matapan. All in all, one might say that the whole of Mussolini's juggernaut acted as an invaluable foil for Britain in her hour of greatest need.

The Mediterranean continued to figure prominently in the strategic thinking of Winston Churchill and his colleagues even after that year of splendid but nerve-racking isolation was over. No doubt simple patriotism helped to nourish this predilection, a feeling that "John Bull" had lately been living up to a long-held reputation for enterprise in the Mediterranean theater and should be left free to go on doing so. But by the autumn of 1944 Churchill was possessed of a more concrete desire to limit the extension of Soviet influence in the Balkans, as witness his bitter clash with Roosevelt over the deployment of His Majesty's Forces against communist insurgents in Greece that December.

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[4] See John Terraine, *The Great War: 1914-18* (London: Hutchinson, 1965).

Before the closing stages of this European war, however, the main differences of opinion between the British grand strategists and the American had not been about how to react to the resurgence of our Soviet allies; they had concerned the degree of priority to be accorded the "second front" in northwest Europe. Neither side had a monolithic, clear-cut and immutable viewpoint. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that the Americans were less disposed to have time and resources spent on "sideshows" in such sectors as Italy or the Aegean; sometimes, indeed, they attributed the usually less sanguine British assessments of the odds in Normandy to traumatic memories of Dunkirk, Passchendaele, and the like.[5]

Considered overall, the United Kingdom's experience of conflict in the Mediterranean against Russia and the other European land powers suggests that this is a theater in which big dividends may often be secured by the side seizing or creating opportunities with flexibility, imagination and — above all — a good sense of timing. Nor is this truism any less valid now that the military factors in grand strategy are tending to become less important relative to the diplomatic, ideological and economic ones. Quite the contrary, in fact. For the intricate geography of this whole region and its nodal location within the Eastern Hemisphere have ensured for it a turbulent history and, in consequence, some exceedingly confused political and cultural patterns. Nowhere have the relationships between nationalism and religion, statism and regionalism, traditionalism and reform been more complex and ambiguous.

Another way of putting it might be to say that the region has latent within it an unusually high degree of instability. Whether it is valid to divide the modern world geopolitically into "core areas" and "shatter-belts" is open to question.[6] If it is, however, most of the Mediterranean basin is certainly among the latter, and this simple truth is underlined by the close proximity of vast reserves of oil.

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[5] For a broader discussion of British strategy, see the author's contribution to Frank B. Horton, *et al., Comparative Defense Policy,* forthcoming, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

III

Since the end of World War Two, great-power rivalry in this part of the world has largely resolved itself into successive attempts by the USSR to pose the old Eastern Question in new and extended forms and by the West to constrain her. Accordingly the incidence of international confrontations and crises has been much higher in the eastern basin than in the western.

Early in 1946 the Soviet Union suddenly began to take a more active interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. She started to feel her way toward endorsement of a Zionist state. An abortive attempt to become a trustee of the former Italian colony of Libya was followed by a detailed proposal to Turkey seeking a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936 that would further restrict the entry into the Black Sea of warships from other states and provide for joint Turko-Soviet defense of the Dardanelles. These overtures were resisted by Ankara and by the end of the year had ceased. In September the United States had announced that henceforward she would station warships in the Mediterranean permanently.

Meanwhile, the armed struggle between the communists and the royalists had been resumed in Greece. For some months several thousand British troops and a good deal of sterling currency served to stiffen the government effort, but after London announced, in February 1947, that Britain could no longer bear this burden the United States assumed it, in spite of the tensions Greece had caused between the White House and Downing Street back in 1944. Forthwith President Truman enunciated his doctrine that "totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression" were a threat to general peace and hence to American security. He induced Congress to pass a Greco-Turkish aid bill. Five years later Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO, notwithstanding Scandinavian opposition.

In linking Greece to Turkey as subject to the same Soviet threat, Harry Truman and many others were jumping to premature conclusions. Certainly the Greek rebels had been getting aid on a massive scale from the Marxist regimes in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and — in some measure — Albania. But this was not the long arm of the Kremlin at work. Instead, it represented an attempt by Tito in Yugoslavia and Dimitrov in Bulgaria to carve out a new communist state of Macedonia which could join with themselves and maybe other territories in a South Slav federation that might then constitute a bulwark of resistance to undue coercion from any quarter.

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[6] Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a Divided World* (London: Methuen, 1964), affords a useful examination of such concepts.

Tito's unbending defiance of Stalin on this point was a key reason for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948. That, in its turn, led in 1949 to a withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the Greek rebels and hence to their precipitate collapse.

Several times in the last quarter of a century the USSR has induced the Czechs to export arms to distant lands in support of its own geostrategic aims. The first instance was in the summer of 1948 when an inflow of Czech arms helped to sustain the infant Israel's fight for life. Contrariwise, Prague signed an arms deal with President Nasser's regime in Cairo in September 1955, a deal tantamount to a Soviet leap-frog over the northern-tier states of the Baghdad Pact.

Herein lay an immediate cause of the Suez crisis of 1956, and so of a brief but bitter political clash between London and Paris on the one hand and Washington on the other. All the same, some measure of the speed with which a general accord was re-established between the two Anglo-Saxon powers can be seen in the coordinated American and British landings to curb subversion in the Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, in 1958.

Since 1954 Cyprus has been yet another Near Eastern cockpit with ramifications elsewhere. One negative result of the revival of the Hellenic aspiration for *enosis* — the union of Cyprus with Greece — was the demise of the Balkan Pact Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia had signed in 1953. And this was the one attempt Belgrade was to make after 1948 to collaborate in a collective security arrangement.

The early 1960's saw a period of almost eerie calm in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus had just become a republic, albeit one with international guarantees for its Turkish minority. The 1958 union between Egypt and Syria collapsed in 1961. The Palestinian guerrilla movement remained inconsequential. Though Khrushchev obliquely threatened Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, he took no action against her. No

Soviet naval vessels had been stationed anywhere in the Mediterranean since the Albanians had turned the Soviets out of their submarine base at Valona in 1958.

Before long, however, the situation began to deteriorate once more. Several hundred people were killed in intercommunal rioting in Cyprus just before Christmas 1963; a Soviet naval presence was re-established in 1964; and the Palestine Liberation Organization was formed that same year.

In November 1967, what proved to be the temporary withdrawal from Cyprus of General Grivas, the old EOKA terrorist leader, brought about a sharp reduction of the tensions that had been so acute on the island ever since the 1963 riots. Yet neither this event nor the colonels' coup in Athens which preceded it affected the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean as radically as did the Arab-Israel war of that June. Unfounded Soviet assertions, made in both Cairo and Damascus during the second week in May, that Israel was preparing a major blow against Syria, persuaded President Nasser to concentrate his troops en masse across the Sinai. Once this had happened a rapid escalation of emotions made a savage conflict almost inevitable.

Paradoxical though it might seem, the Soviet Union proved able to use the Six-Day War to enhance her influence in the Arab world. This she achieved partly through a wider deployment of her naval power. Four weeks after the cease-fire, Soviet warships paid a goodwill visit to Alexandria and Port Said, and subsequently the buildup of the Soviet navy within this sea area accelerated: in 1966 its summertime strength was twelve units (i.e., warships, submarines and auxiliaries), but four or five years later the fleet numbered around seventy. Among the new ships on rotation were two 19,000-ton carriers — the *Moskva* and the *Leningrad* — each with twenty anti-submarine warfare helicopters on board. Now one or two 40,000-ton carriers are being built, presumably for Mediterranean service first and foremost.

But this force labors under several acute handicaps. One is the problem of access, particularly from the Black Sea home ports. For while the intention at Montreux in 1936 was to favor not only Turkey but also the other littoral powers, even for the latter the provisions of the Montreux Convention are quite restrictive. The transit of their submarines is prohibited under all normal circumstances. On the other hand, they can move warships through singly in either direction when both they and Turkey are at peace, or bring them back to base if they become involved in hostilities. Though eight days' advance notice of such transits should in principle be given, it has come to be accepted that a number of such notifications can be filed and held in reserve.

Naturally, free access through the Straits of Gibraltar obtains in time of peace, but it is doubtful whether even a submerged nuclear submarine could avoid detection by the facilities the Royal Navy has there. Furthermore, what may well prove to be the indefinite closure of the Suez Canal precludes any interchange of units with the squadron the Soviet navy established in the Indian Ocean in 1968. Still, one may question whether this inconvenience counts for much against the broad advantage to the Soviets in having countries like Iran and India thereby kept more remote — both commercially and strategically — from the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic.

Most serious from the USSR's standpoint is the lack of secure bases, either naval or military, around the Eastern Mediterranean littoral. Yugoslavia has regularly refused to make any anchorages available.[7] The replacement of a quasi-feudal monarch in Libya in 1969 by a militantly Islamic radical nationalist was no gain as far as Moscow was concerned. Egypt's ultimatum of August 1972, as a result of which a Soviet military presence that had grown to 20,000 was precipitately reduced to a few hundred, has meant among other things the loss of valuable naval logistic and maritime air support. About 2,500 Soviet military instructors and technicians remained in Syria but the associated naval back-up was limited. Nor is the future of this nexus at present clear.

The dominant American element in the Mediterranean is the Sixth Fleet. Normally this comprises two carrier task forces and an amphibious group with 1,800 marines on board. Each of the former is made up of some two dozen vessels centered around one attack carrier (CVA) of maybe 60,000 tons. As a general rule one of these is in the western basin and the other in the eastern. During the Jordanian civil war of September 1970, however, no fewer than three CVA's plus supporting craft were in the eastern basin. Even so, it might not always be easy for so large an armada to deploy operationally in these comparatively narrow waters.

The great majority of the vessels in the Sixth Fleet at any given time are there only on a six-month rotation; and all this flotilla's specialized logistic support has always come, either directly or else through Rota in Spain, from the eastern seaboard of the United

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[7] *Strategic Survey: 1971* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972).

States. Nevertheless, two airfield facilities have been established in Italy and a third in Crete. Furthermore, a small number of ships are now "home-ported" within the theater, as witness the new arrangement for a CVA in Piraeus. Home-porting entails wives and children being settled in the port selected, thereby permitting the ship in question to extend its stay considerably.[8]

For a general balance-of-power appraisal, we may add to the Sixth Fleet the naval and air arms deployed within the eastern basin by several other members of the Western alliance. No less relevant is the fact that NATO members control a high percentage of the northern littoral and, in addition, have bases on the three major islands: Malta, Crete and Cyprus. Hence the alliance continues to enjoy a pronounced maritime ascendancy within this area. Even so, the USSR may be acquiring a significant capacity to conduct spoiling actions. The level of background noise, the temperature and salinity profiles, and the depth and character of the sea-floor might often favor nuclear-driven attack submarines, of which the Soviet navy already operates thirty-five worldwide. Nor should we forget that the comprehensive and aggressive shadowing of opposing vessels that has so frequently occurred in recent years, not least in the Eastern Mediterranean, could enable either side to reap substantial dividends from a coordinated first strike.

What, then, is the general outlook in regard to the naval-versus-land balance in theaters such as this? Since the dawn of the air age the security of naval forces operating off hostile coastlines has progressively diminished. At present the tendency of surface-to-air missiles to be more effective over the sea than over the land may be arresting this trend. Eventually, however, surface-to-surface missiles emplaced ashore may menace all large surface vessels far out to sea. Already the Swedes have established an instructive precedent with their Rb-08 (range: 135 miles). Fast patrol boats may also harass warships and merchantmen at greater distances from the coast than now.

IV

So far as overland threats to regional security are concerned, one country that appears to be particularly vulnerable is Yugoslavia. In many ways her position is analogous to China's, despite the disparity in size. Both countries have evolved a national road to communism in defiance of the Kremlin; and each has a rich and virile military tradition of popular defense. But either could be faced with a serious leadership crisis following the departure of the Olympian octogenarians who respectively have ruled them for so long. The awkward fact that both Belgrade and Peking lie close to exposed borders also makes it easier for Moscow to exert subtle pressures in certain circumstances.

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[8] See the author's "Home Port at Piraeus: What It Means for the Sixth Fleet," *The New Middle East,* March/April 1972.

However, the Yugoslav situation is further complicated by the multicommunal basis of the state. Thus in 1972 Croat terrorism against the Tito regime took place both inside and outside Yugoslavia's borders, while hundreds of local nationalists were purged from official posts in Croatia and elsewhere. One factor that aggravates the communal situation is the high level of development in the north as compared with the south, a contrast that owes much to the cleavage of the Roman Empire nearly sixteen centuries ago.

Reports of the special session of the North Atlantic Council held in November 1968 – i.e., three months after the Czech invasion – indicate that various spokesmen, among them Dean Rusk, included Yugoslavia within a NATO "grey area" or penumbra of security interest. So it is conceivable that were the USSR ever to invade Yugoslavia, Western air and naval support would be committed to try to aid the Yugoslavs in securing a free area within the mountain fastnesses of their south and west. Faced with a real possibility of an outcome so messy and perhaps interminable, the USSR might well feel disinclined to intervene in the first place.

With respect to the eastward borders of NATO itself, the indigenous forces look quite strong overall in relation to the scale of attack that may be expected, bearing in mind geography and other constraints. The Italian field army includes seven divisions and a number of independent brigades. One division is under national command and stationed near Rome, while several brigades are similarly located in other parts of the country. Otherwise almost every field unit is in the northeast and under the local NATO command. The fortified line of the Tagliamento River, which constitutes the backbone of the defense, flows a mere forty miles to the sea after leaving the Venetian Alps. Here is a far better ratio between troops and space than NATO ever achieves in West Germany.

The Greco-Bulgarian border bestrides mountain chains that are generally three or four thousand feet high; and across these imposing natural defenses runs the Metaxas Line, a system of fortifications initiated before World War Two. Still, a signal weakness of this sector is its lack of depth, the distance to the sea being barely ten miles at one point. In 1941 the ten divisions of the German Twelfth Army, using the Struma valley as their main axis of advance, breached the Metaxas Line within two days and seized Salonika within four. So, back in the 1950's, NATO formulated a contingency plan for a counter-envelopment move by Turkish forces.

The largest of Turkey's three field armies has its headquarters in Istanbul and divisions on both sides of the Straits. The other two have their headquarters in Konya and Erzurum respectively. The latter's prime responsibility is to prepare for a fairly elastic defense of the 250-mile border with the USSR. Quite a high proportion of the dissected plateau this crosses is good defensive country, and over the centuries fortifications have been built extensively to buttress this natural strength.

At present there are twenty-six divisions and twenty-two independent brigades in the Turkish and Greek orders of battle, taken together; their combined muster within a few days of a call for general mobilization would be well over a million men. In each case, however, pronounced deficiencies in some aspects of military hardware must be set against these assets. Forward air defense is a conspicuously weak sphere. So is mechanized mobility. Hence, for example, the Turkish interest in having nuclear landmines available to block invasion routes, an interest which draws sustenance from recollection of how suddenly Kars fell to a Russian attack in February 1916. But it should not be forgotten that NATO has elaborate and well-rehearsed plans for the external reinforcement of its Greco-Turkish flank.[9]

Such developmental stresses as a yawning gulf between urban dynamism and the poverty, isolation and bitterness of the remote countryside mean that the future of constitutional government in both countries is still uncertain. Nor can we yet rule out the possibility of further confrontations between them over Cyprus leading to the disruption of this part of NATO and perhaps to actual war between these two members. True, over the last ten years successive governments in Athens and Ankara have become more and more cautious in this regard. But there is the added complication that Cyprus remains uncomfortably tangential to the Arab-Israel conflict. Back in 1965, for instance, Archbishop

[9] For a fuller discussion of Greco-Turkish defense, see the author's *European Security: 1972-80* (London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1972).

Makarios received quite a large consignment of Soviet heavy-support from Egypt; this year at least one usually reliable source has said Israel has dispatched arms to General Grivas.[10] By this September, moreover, the UN peacekeeping force established in Cyprus in 1964 had been reduced to what all agreed was a minimal level — i.e., 3,200 troops and police, as against 5,800 in 1965. Yet now many of these have been diverted to the Suez front.

Italy, clearly a cornerstone of the Western alliance in the south, is another territory that continues to give cause for concern on political grounds. Recurrently in recent years she has been plagued by *la contestazione general*: an assortment of rising prices, strikes, urban riots, student unrest and acts of terrorism. Therefore, although most of the governments established in the course of the last decade have been coalitions of the Center Left, the possibility of a gravitation to political extremes cannot by any means be excluded. One weakness of Italy is that, like Yugoslavia, she has a chronic development gap between north and south.

V

A wider problem for the Western alliance relates to the effect the emergence and evolution of the EEC will have on the political balance in the Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey are associate members of EEC, and the declared intention is that they should accede to full membership in perhaps twenty years. Additionally, several Mediterranean countries — among them Egypt, Israel and Lebanon — enjoy preferential trade agreements, one of the aims being to contribute to the long-term stability of the region.[11] Whether all this could in time lead to a distinctive Common Market attitude on the Arab-Israel question, such as Prime Minister Heath and others have called for, and how such a development might affect relations between the EEC and the United States, are matters for conjecture.[12] Another moot point is whether the EEC might become too unwieldy were its membership expanded still further through the accession of countries as remote from Brussels as Greece and Turkey.

Following on from these subtle political issues is the question of military reorganization if and when the EEC begins to formulate some kind of collective view on defense. Should Italy then remain within the Southern European Command of NATO? Might not some Italian forces even now be made available for Bavaria, to help offset probable American withdrawals? Should not British ships and aircraft be operating from Italy rather than Malta? How would any European naval squadron relate to the Sixth Fleet? Evidently the fact that the Eastern Mediterranean is on the periphery of the new Europe does not mean that it remains unaffected by the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this bold political experiment. On the contrary, it reflects them with especial clarity.

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[10] John Bulloch, *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), February 4, 1973.

[11] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Possibilities and Limits of a European Communities Foreign Policy," *World Today*, April 1971.

[12] See the author's "European Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality," *The New Middle East*, January 1972.

The outcome of the "Day of Atonement" war suggests that Israel's position as a bastion against Soviet influence will remain secure militarily. Certainly over the years Israel has proved remarkably competent and successful at every level of conflict from full-scale conventional war through selective retaliation to straightforward counterinsurgency and clandestine counterterror. Her overall ascendancy vis-à-vis the Arabs is unlikely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future. Admittedly the widespread trend in favor of ground-to-air defenses is beginning to make itself felt in the Middle East, thereby making Israeli air strikes uncomfortably costly in certain situations. No doubt, too, the qualitative lead the West currently enjoys over the USSR in respect to both aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons will gradually decrease. All the same, the indigenous technological gap between Israel and her Arab neighbors is unlikely to close much. Besides, Israel retains the option of making the nuclear bomb.

When a broader view is taken, however, time would appear not to be on Israel's side, for the longer the status quo is maintained, the more difficult it will be to disentangle her from the occupied territories. Jewish settlement in the latter, Israel's employment of Arabs from them, a variety of piecemeal economic ties, and their rising living standards will create a vast network of interdependence and thus consolidate Israel's rule over a million Arabs, making it impossible for her to remain at once Jewish and democratic. Suffice it to add that, while Arab oil sanctions may well fail of achieving decisive results by themselves, in a sense they do not have to. They may facilitate the process just envisaged simply by giving the Arab states a plausible alternative to definitive peace talks for what could prove a critical few years.

Israel can fairly be described as an associate member of the Western alliance, at least within this theater. More than that, she symbolizes the historic role of the Eastern Mediterranean as a cradle of civilization for the modern Western world. So the fact that she faces this dilemma reinforces the conclusion that it is in its political and economic dimensions that the Eastern Question will be most difficult to answer in the decade or two immediately ahead. Can the Zionist democracy survive the demographic contradiction inherent in its situation since 1967? Will the evolution of the EEC strengthen the Western alliance or will it disrupt it? Will the stresses of differential development tear asunder the "shatter-belt" region with which we are here concerned? The determination to shape events rather than wait upon them, which has so often been needed — and too often been absent — in Mediterranean strategy, is now at a premium in these nonmilitary spheres.

VI

In the last analysis much depends on how hard the Soviet Union presses the Eastern Question. Perhaps her achievement of nuclear parity with the United States will make her less inhibited as regards local probing actions, a correlation that both Maxwell Taylor and Liddell-Hart anticipated nearly fifteen years ago. To some extent, too, she may be egged on by Chinese competition — e.g., in the Balkans or among insurgent movements. Conversely, her current dependence on Western civil technology may restrain her for a while. In the ultimate, however, the biggest influences on Moscow's conduct will be, first, the temptations afforded by instability within the developing world and, second, the extent to which the Soviet Union herself is subject to cumulative internal stresses that she, in neo-Czarist fashion, feels obliged to canalize or sublimate by means of external belligerency. On neither of these scores are some of us sanguine.

Yet surely we can discount the familiar notion that an age-old craving for warm-water ports makes the Eastern Mediterranean-cum-Near East an exception that proves the rule with the USSR, a notion which in its modern version says: "Just because Moscow may constantly be undermining Western interests in that part of the world, this does not mean that the Soviets do not, for example, wish for genuine détente in Europe." Even a cursory survey of Russia's history over the last century or two reveals no exclusive concern with any one arc of her expanding perimeter. Obviously Stalin's hostility to the Greek communist uprising of 1946 does not fit the supposed pattern. Nor does the vigorous thrust toward the warm-water ports of the Pacific coast that characterized the profoundly formative years of the late nineteenth century. Nor do various other episodes in the Far East, including the present menacing buildup around the border with China. Nor are these the only examples that could be cited.

So we can assume that the USSR in, say, 1980 will not look for opportunities for adventurism around the Eastern Mediterranean unless she is conducting a forward strategy of a more comprehensive kind. The idea that this sector plus the Near East is of special interest to her can be traced back to a burgeoning Victorian anxiety about the approaches to India, an anxiety well betokened by the dispatch of Indian army troops to Malta during the crisis of 1878. Sir Halford Mackinder's classic essay on geopolitics is open to serious criticism on both conceptual and empirical grounds. But it remains to his credit that he saw the Eastern Question from a more synoptic standpoint.

THE USSR AND THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

by Uri Ra'anan

MOST observers will agree that the origins, course and outcome of the 1973 "October War" in the Middle East cannot be elucidated without a simultaneous analysis of the Soviet Union's policies and decision-making process. Some will emphasize that the very key to contemporary developments in the region must be sought in the recesses of the Kremlin; few will deny that there is, at any rate, a link between two decades of conflict in the area and Soviet attempts to establish a powerful presence along the southeastern rim of the Mediterranean.

Of course, it may be argued that a new phenomenon, generally described as "détente," has appeared and that, consequently, Soviet actions and motivations must be judged now by criteria that differ entirely from those which applied during the "Cold War." When challenged to produce evidence that the spirit of détente is really present in the Eastern Mediterranean, the protagonists of this view usually will refer to the Brezhnev-Kissinger "Little Summit" of October 1973 and the piece of paper it produced for endorsement by the UN Security Council. A little reflection will show, however, that this retort does not begin to answer the three crucial questions:

(1) What was the Soviet role with regard to the outbreak of the October War, and why did Moscow not only refuse insouciantly to assist early efforts to terminate it, but actually escalated the level of conflict by initiating massive airlifts of weapons to Egypt and Syria?

(2) What caused the subsequent shift in the Kremlin's performance on the international stage, and why was it suddenly in the Soviet interest to bring military operations to a halt — at least for a while?

(3) Why, immediately after succeeding in extracting significant concessions from Dr. Kissinger in Moscow, did the USSR crudely threaten to resort to unilateral military action in the Middle East, in breach of all previous understandings with Washington?

To tackle such questions, especially at a time when the political processes associated with the October War are still in high gear, is a complex task. Perhaps the simplest approach would be both to analyze Soviet decision-making patterns in general and to examine a previous Soviet policy episode toward the Middle East in particular — a period for which, to use election jargon, "all the returns were in" some time prior to the October War. In this way, it may be possible to reconstruct enough of the mold within which Soviet policy has been, and continues to be, shaped to make current Soviet behavior in the Middle East more readily comprehensible.

I

Readers of the Soviet press and other forms of official literature will search in vain for a Kremlin equivalent of "The Pentagon Papers," or the minutes of Washington's "Special Action Group" on the Indo-Pakistani crisis, or some other publication of contemporary, classified documents that may throw light on a superpower's decision-making process. Nor does the Soviet Union's electoral process encourage the regular, peaceful change of administrations, with yesterday's leader retiring unmolested to publish memoirs based on personal papers illuminating policies that were initiated a mere year or two ago and that may still be in effect. No serious historian, for instance, would place quite the same evaluation upon the memoirs of Lyndon B. Johnson and the alleged "Memoirs of Khrushchev" — "smuggled out" of the USSR under suspicious auspices at a time when the ousted Soviet leader was under house-arrest, or dacha-confinement, surrounded by KGB personnel.

Under these circumstances, any attempt to analyze the Soviet decision-making process, not to speak of documenting such analysis, seems to be beset by well-nigh insuperable obstacles. The observer of the Soviet political scene is confronted by an old and well-known dilemma: Either he can confine himself to a mere uncritical and unanalytical narrative, rehashing in chronological order various quotations from articles in the Soviet press or statements by Soviet leaders, thus playing it safe. Or he can undertake, within the limits of his ability and understanding of the subject, a logical reconstruction of the course of events, in which causes and effects are linked coherently and motivations are explained lucidly, and in which he is aided: (a) by a knowledge of events or scraps of significant information that have become accessible to some Western analysts; (b) by a comparison with analogous situations in the past or in similar communist countries; (c) by "leakages" emanating from defectors and dissidents or by "revelations" made in the course of a purge or during an attack on the policies of a deposed leader; (d) by content analysis in depth of spoken and written words originating in the USSR; (e) by some understanding of ideological terms as a Soviet operational code; and (f) by a (hopefully) sophisticated instinct for deciphering and comprehending political processes in the Soviet Union as a special category of general bureaucratic models. If the Western observer chooses this second approach, he leaves himself wide open to charges of having taken a "speculative" rather than "documentary" path and, especially in circles not inured to the difficulties and peculiarities of Soviet and communist studies, he might well become suspect of resorting to methodologies that do not enjoy full academic respectability. It is perhaps largely because of this factor that the number of scholars willing to brave the hazards and perils of "Sovietology" has remained small, indeed has declined somewhat since the 1950's and early 1960's. Another reason for this phenomenon, no doubt, is to be found in the inexorable processes of biology that have decimated the ranks of elderly émigrés and ex-communists who once constituted the core of the profession.

These are some of the considerations that ought to be borne in mind when evaluating this study. They are given not by way of apology but to explain why any attempt at reconstructing the origins and development of Soviet politico-military actions in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1969 to the present cannot avoid a certain speculative flavor. Whether this aspect renders such an attempt less useful than some safe, chronological narrative, amply documented by footnotes that merely point to the obvious and the generally-known, without shedding any light on the motivations and intricate conflicts underlying the Soviet decision-making process, is an entirely different question.

II

One method of attempting to reconstruct the genesis and evolution of the Soviet "forward" policy in the Eastern Mediterranean since 1969 is to review extant beliefs — or myths — concerning this topic and see to what degree, if any, they are plausible, i.e., compatible with the contemporary behavior patterns of the USSR and other regimes in question. The generally and somewhat unquestioningly accepted view of this important issue in international affairs runs more or less along the following lines:

In the spring of 1969, the late President of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, declared that he was unilaterally abrogating the unconditional and unlimited cease-fire between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal which had been imposed by the UN Security Council and accepted by the parties at the end of the Six-Day War of June 1967. Nasser ordered his forces to open a War of Attrition against Israeli forces positioned along the Suez cease-fire line, utilizing massed Egyptian artillery barrages in the classical Soviet style. His aides expressed the conviction that, although both sides would suffer casualties, Israel, with a mere one-tenth of Egypt's population and a much lower national "threshold of pain" concerning loss of life, would soon feel it was being "bled white" and would be forced to retreat unconditionally from the canal. Thus, Egypt could once again occupy the Sinai Peninsula without having to pay any political price in return.

For a while the Egyptian plan appeared to be working. However, the Israelis turned the scales by establishing heavy fortifications along the canal and by using their superior air force as "flying artillery" to destroy the massed Egyptian artillery formations on the far side. As a result, it was the Egyptians who began to suffer serious casualties, but, to the surprise of the Israelis, Nasser persisted with his War of Attrition, even though it was clearly failing to achieve its objectives. Israel, as the satisfied, status-quo power, had much to gain by achieving a reinstatement of the cease-fire along the canal; since Nasser was not deterred from his course by increasingly massive military losses, the Israelis apparently felt that the addition of visible political pressure to the setbacks along the canal (which the regime was able temporarily to hide from the Egyptian masses) might help to change the Egyptian leader's mind. Consequently, by December 1969, the Israeli air force extended its mission from the area of the canal to the interior, flying deep penetration sorties in the vicinity of the Egyptian capital, so that the facts of the military situation could be withheld no longer from the population of Cairo and neighboring cities. It was hoped in Jerusalem that Nasser would now call off his War of Attrition.

Instead, so the widely-accepted version claims, in January 1970 the Egyptian leader suddenly took off on a secret mission to Moscow to appeal to his friends in the Kremlin to rescue him from his plight by dispatching to Egypt Soviet crews for surface-to-air missiles and interceptor pilots in order to defeat the Israeli air force, for which Egyptian anti-aircraft units and pilots had proved no match. Allegedly, the Soviet leaders swiftly acquiesced and, within a couple of weeks – by February 1970 – the first Soviet combat personnel had appeared in the area of the Nile Delta. However, the story continues, the Soviet leaders warned their Egyptian clients at an early date that Soviet contingents and hardware, whether deployed around the cities on the Nile as in the beginning, or pushed to the very banks of the canal as during a subsequent phase, were to be regarded as purely "defensive" and could not be drawn into "offensive" operations.

While Nasser had to submit to this restriction with more or less good grace, the widely-accepted version claims that dissatisfaction began to grow in Cairo after his death, especially since his successor, President Sadat, reportedly suspected the Soviet presence in Egypt of being utilized to extend covert support to rival claimants to the leadership, such as Ali Sabri. Sadat was also frightened by the temporarily successful coup in the Sudan, prematurely supported and acclaimed by the communists, which almost succeeded in replacing a relatively centrist regime with a leftist coalition. It was under these circumstances that the Soviet leadership attempted to create more binding links with the new and somewhat disgruntled Egyptian leadership by means of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty of 1971. Cairo seems to have regarded this treaty as an earnest of Soviet intentions to aid Egypt directly in an offensive amphibious operation across the canal sometime during 1971, and as a Soviet undertaking not to negotiate behind Egypt's back about the Middle East with the United States or any other state. By the spring of 1972, according to this version, the Egyptians had come to realize that the Kremlin was acting in lofty disregard of both these supposed commitments and, what was more, was refusing to deliver certain unspecified "offensive" weapons. After a warning and subsequent ultimatum, the Egyptian President therefore ordered a withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in midsummer of 1972, excepting only certain technical advisers and some Soviet naval contingents along the northwestern coast of the country. The USSR immediately complied.

To put it mildly, this version reflects a somewhat simplistic view of the Soviet leadership, its behavior patterns and decision-making process, and its attitude toward small countries in general and client states in particular; nor is it consonant either with various data that have become available in the meantime or with certain basic requirements of technology and logistics.

It is not at all typical of Soviet behavior, either under the "collective" headed by Brezhnev or its Khrushchevian predecessor, to comply meekly and even abjectly with the peremptory demands of small and weak states, least of all clients dependent on Soviet protection and hardware, especially concerning such "minor" issues as whether and when Soviet military personnel with its accouterment is to come in or leave. Questions of security, particularly military security, are zealously safeguarded as the particular prerogative of the Soviet leadership. Only simpletons are likely to believe that the real reason why the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia in 1968, or for that matter Hungary in 1956, was because Prague or Budapest (or, rather, certain minute, Soviet-suborned elements in those capitals) "invited" the Russians; nor has the Red Army since then seen fit to leave these countries, the ardent desires of the overwhelming majority of Czechoslovaks and Hungarians notwithstanding (and in spite of the official demands and protests of the legitimate and recognized Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments at the time of the respective invasions).

The plain fact of the matter is that Soviet forces come into or evacuate foreign countries in line with decisions made by the *Soviet* leadership and at its initiative, in accordance with its evaluation of the Soviet interest, shaped by the contemporary situation as viewed from Moscow, and influenced considerably by the internal balance of power between competing factions in the Kremlin. For instance, the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia largely because the "interventionists" in Moscow, although apparently originally a minority within the Politbureau, were able to take the wind out of the sails of their opponents (reputedly including such surprising names as Suslov), who expressed their reservations concerning the proposed venture not so much because they were "doves," but because they hoped to inflict a serious setback upon their personal rivals among the "interventionists" by exposing them as irresponsible adventurists. The supporters of bold offensive action reportedly were able to overcome such objections by producing convincing evidence that the leaders of the Czechoslovak forces had decided not to resist, that Washington had no inclination to make a reactive move, near Czechoslovakia or elsewhere, and that no other Western state would take action. The proposed move, therefore, was quite safe and not at all adventuristic; that was the ultimate *reason* for the Kremlin's decision, and it remained merely then to manufacture some *pretext,* preferably plausible, but if necessary as barefaced as an alleged Czech "invitation."

It was a somewhat similar constellation in 1956 that, after some factional jousting in the Kremlin, led to the final Soviet decision to resort to military intervention in Hungary. One of the critical factors in 1956 was not so much the unwillingness of the Hungarian forces to resist as the preparation of what the Red Army regarded as a practically foolproof plan – which, indeed, succeeded – to decapitate the Hungarian resistance by entrapping its naive military leadership into Soviet captivity. Again, in the Cuban case in 1962, as in the subsequent Czechoslovak instance, it is believed that a factional "debate" in the Kremlin, centering on Soviet global considerations rather than anything said or done by Castro, led to the inception of the missile crisis and its outcome. Some elements in the Soviet leadership, reportedly including old Kuusinen, asked whether the emplacement of Soviet military personnel and nuclear-tipped missiles in an island off the U.S. coast could not be put in the category of adventuristic acts, thus implying that the more offensive-minded faction, supported by Khrushchev himself, ought to have its wings clipped. These objections and misgivings were overruled apparently on the basis of (erroneous) Soviet intelligence that Washington was willfully shutting its eyes to Soviet actions in Cuba, partly because of demoralization following the Bay of Pigs, and would therefore take no serious counteraction. In this case, the Kremlin's "interventionist" group turned out to be mistaken, a factor that played no minor part in Moscow's rapid reversal of direction during the crisis and in Khrushchev's subsequent, if somewhat delayed, ouster.

The important point here is that the Kremlin's actions in dispatching and withdrawing military elements in disregard of clients' wishes applied not merely to states immediately adjacent to the USSR and considered part of its continental empire, but also to overseas clients, such as Castro's Cuba. (Indeed, in the Cuban instance, Soviet withdrawal of missiles and their crews took place against Castro's express demands and over his official protests.) What really mattered, in all of these instances, were Soviet interests, defined by Moscow's view of the general situation, as established by the momentary factional balance within the Kremlin.

While there are individual and peculiar factors to be found in each instance, it is significant that on each occasion the *initiative* on whether to send in Soviet military forces, and whether they should stay or leave, emanated from the Kremlin; the wishes of the client either constituted a fraudulently manufactured pretext, such as the Hungarian and Czech "invitations," or were blatantly ignored, as were the protests of Nagy, Dubcek and Castro. (Of course, where the desires of a client coincided conveniently with Soviet plans and decisions, as with Castro's initial enthusiasm for the clandestine importation of Soviet personnel and missiles, the Kremlin was happy to exploit this fact.) The Egyptian case, if the generally current version is accepted, would be practically *sui generis* since the initiative supposedly always came from Cairo, with Moscow merely following suit. On these grounds alone it would warrant skeptical scrutiny. Nor would it be a valid objection that the other instances mentioned are simply nonanalogous precedents, since at least Cuba involved a somewhat difficult, semi-autonomous, overseas client, much like Moscow's friends in the Middle East, rather than a member state of the Warsaw Pact, along the very borders of the USSR.[1]

III

The *modus operandi* of the Soviet leadership in the decision-making process, as evidenced by the instances cited in this article, seems to follow certain patterns. I have attempted elsewhere[2] to explain and describe the functioning of the Soviet bureaucratic model:

> Although factions and factionalism are formally prohibited, political processes, of course, cannot be outlawed by fiat or ukase, even in the U.S.S.R., and there are kaleidoscopic formations and re-formations of alliances and coalitions within the leadership each time a specific decision has to be reached. These factions are not necessarily stable, since they are not specifically issue-oriented — at least not at the very top (groups with

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[1] It is true that even in Eastern Europe there have been instances in which, despite Soviet desires, the dispatch of Soviet military elements has had to be canceled or delayed, e.g., Yugoslavia 1948 and probably 1968, and Rumania 1968. However, the factor that made Moscow hesitate in these cases was not the absence of an "invitation" from the governments of the countries to be entered, but rather the *deterrent* effect created by the prospect of protracted local resistance to the Red Army, consequent possible foreign reaction, and the potential damage to Soviet interests that might be caused by both.

[2] "Some Political Perspectives Concerning the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance," paper presented to the May 1973 Conference on the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Doctrine and Nuclear Multipolarity, held under the auspices of the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The proceedings of the conference, including this paper, will be published by D. C. Heath.

a vested professional bias are to be found slightly lower down the ladder, including, of course, the military services); rather, the leadership reveals a strangely "feudal" pattern, with each top personality "investing" subordinates wherever possible with power and position in return for personal "fealty" and allegiance, and these subordinates similarly distribute whatever privileges they command among their various personal collaborators in return for political support and loyalty, until a veritable "feudal" pyramid of "enfeoffments" is created from one of the top leaders all the way down the ladder to minor local functionaries who may not be in direct touch with him but belong to his "party" through a chain of personal links of allegiance. Sometimes, these links are even reinforced by familial ties, including political marriage to create bonds of blood, in truly "feudal" style. This system strongly influences the *modus operandi* at the very apex of the Soviet leadership. Given a delicate balance of "collectivity" at the top, each one of the main leaders, conscious of the particular power structure he personally commands and which he attempts to preserve and enhance, will attempt temporary coalitions with his colleagues and competitors, above all to prevent the strongest and, therefore, most dangerous among them at any one moment from gaining the degree of overwhelming power, momentum and control which would lead to the total subordination and possible elimination of the weaker members. The actual issues over which these conflicts are fought out are not necessarily of overriding importance to the various competitors, nor are they inevitably tied to a consistent line on specific issues. The real battle concerns personal power and influence rather than a particular political question, but the latter can and does serve a useful tactical purpose in gathering recruits and allies for one group and alienating supporters from another. Moreover, the outcome of a conflict over a specific issue can be of great symbolic and psychological impact in demonstrating which factional alliance is gaining and which is declining. Thus it is almost axiomatic that the advocacy of a proposal by one group will lead to some measure of opposition by various of its rivals and adversaries. There is reason to believe, however, that such opposition rarely takes the form of outright confrontation or rebuff, but rather is expressed by way of carefully worded reservations and caveats, for the record.* On at least three occasions (the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and, as hopefully will be demonstrated, the dispatch of Soviet pilots and ground crews to Egypt), and probably on several others, it seems that a proposal supported by the number one leader in the "collective" favoring military or semi-military action of a potentially risky nature, has led to the expression of such reservations by other members of the leadership, not necessarily because they were more "dovish," but because they felt that they had been given an opportunity for clipping the wings of the *"primus inter pares"* or even for removing him altogether, should the venture misfire and he could then be accused of "adventurism" — one of the most damning of pejoratives in the Bolshevik dictionary. In such circumstances, the various opposing elements have always been delighted to use as ammunition and to maximize the spectre both of potential local resistance to the direct involvement of Soviet forces and of conceivable U.S. counteraction as a reason for suggesting caution and thus implying imprudence on the part of those advocating a forward thrust or offensive action. It is not so much that, in such cases, the "moderate" groups in the Kremlin would warn of the likelihood of U.S. counter-intervention, but rather that they would put the onus of proof on the advocates of a Soviet politico-military offensive move to demonstrate that U.S. reaction was definitely precluded. In other words, they would expect to be shown that the odds were at least 99 to 1 or higher that America would remain passive. A 5-10% chance of U.S. action would, under these circumstances, be regarded as prohibitively high — certainly high enough to smear the more militant Kremlin group with the tag of "adventurism."

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*There is evidence to the effect that this is the traditional way in which communist leaders express their opposition to proposals advanced by rival factions; a prominent member of Imre Nagy's entourage, who was able to reach the West, has described such scenes, and similar evidence has been received from leading émigrés from other communist countries, as well as from various leaks and revelations.

The detailed considerations presented here suggest that the Soviet leadership does apparently operate within a general and consistent framework, especially where major security questions are concerned, such as the dispatch of military forces and hardware to foreign countries and their subsequent withdrawal. The salient points of the Soviet *modus operandi* as outlined so far are: (1) In all the cases examined, the Kremlin was "acting," not "reacting," i.e., it always took the initiative and never awaited "invitations" or "demands" from client states. (2) In all instances under review, the Soviet decision-making process appears to have been far from monolithic; on the contrary, it seems to have proceeded invariably against a background of factional infighting within the Kremlin which influenced, indeed shaped, the conditions that had to be met before a final policy was adopted.

The generally accepted version of the Soviet military entry into and exit from Egypt, 1969-1972, is strangely inconsonant with both of these saliences of the general Soviet pattern of decision-making; the Kremlin's role as portrayed in that story would render Soviet relations with Egypt a most special, even unique, case, negating all that we know or have been able to gather about the Soviet *modus operandi* on military and security questions. On these grounds alone, the 1969-1972 story, as presented earlier, must be regarded as highly suspect. Moveover, this version is also contradicted with regard to its basic chronology by sporadic but significant data that gradually have become available. These include, for instance, an approach by Soviet military personalities to the Kremlin with suggestions that Soviet military elements be dispatched to take over a portion of actual combat duties in Egypt, and a subsequent expression of support for this proposal at a

Warsaw Pact gathering — both occurring *well before* the Israeli deep penetration raids and Nasser's subsequent secret visit to Moscow in which he allegedly originated the proposal and "invited" Soviet units to come and help him combat the Israelis.

Another consideration that renders the current version highly implausible concerns logistics and technology: Nasser supposedly dropped from the skies in January 1970 to surprise his hosts in Moscow with his "invitation," and by February 1970, a mere couple of weeks or so later, Soviet combat units and their sophisticated electronic gear had appeared in Egypt. It seems most unlikely that as complex, hazardous and difficult an enterprise as the Soviet buildup in Egypt, in the face of a hot war with a skillful and daring adversary like the Israelis, a long distance from the Soviet homeland, connected by a slender lifeline that might be cut at any time by a hostile U.S. Sixth Fleet, could have been conceived, planned *ab initio* in all its mass of details — especially considering Egyptian conditions — and actually implemented in a matter of a few weeks.[3]

IV

These various considerations and data, as well as other evidence that has been sifted in the West, sketch a rather different story, which, if interpreted correctly, sheds interesting light on policy processes within the Kremlin and suggests suitable Western counterploys.

In the summer of 1969, after Nasser's War of Attrition along the Suez Canal had been proceeding for some months — but long before Israeli deep penetration air raids of December 1969 and Nasser's Moscow visit of January 1970 — Soviet advisers to the

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[3] As for Cairo's complaints that the USSR allegedly reneged on commitments to deliver certain "offensive" weapons to Egypt, it is difficult to find an item to which this could apply seriously. Prior to the events of midsummer 1972, the Kremlin had sent to Egypt one of the Warsaw Pact's main battle tanks, the T-62, the latest all-weather versions of the MiG-21, practically the entire SAM series (2, 3, 4, 6), the TU-16B, with a sophisticated air-to-surface missile, and other modern weapons. All of these items were emplaced in Egypt, even if some were still operated by Soviet personnel. Both the SAM's and the interceptors, although tactically "defensive," were "offensive" in the Egyptian strategic context. The War of Attrition was intended to enable the Egyptians to launch an offensive across the Suez Canal; the Israeli air force was neutralizing the War of Attrition; the Soviet SAM's and interceptors were intended to neutralize the Israeli air force and, by so doing, enable the War of Attrition to succeed in its offensive aims. Under these conditions, none of the Soviet hardware mentioned could be considered "defensive." The only item of significance coveted by Cairo and not delivered by the USSR, although available there, was a tactical nuclear delivery system, the warheads of which, as is well known, Moscow refused to hand over even to its most reliable Warsaw Pact allies. The Egyptians hardly could have expected that they would be given such a weapon or have voiced genuine grievance at its non-delivery.

Egyptian forces apparently communicated to their superiors in Moscow their serious misgivings regarding the chances of the Egyptian venture's success. If they did express their concern in this manner, they may have done so for two reasons: (1) Because of their unlimited access to and influence on all aspects of Egyptian military activities, from the planning to the operational stage, they were uniquely situated to observe the fundamental weaknesses of their clients, including a lack of improvisation, adaptability and initiative, at a much earlier stage of the War of Attrition than other experts, even the Israelis on the other side of the canal. (2) Expecting a renewed Egyptian defeat, they were probably in no mood to take a share of the blame once again. In 1956 and in 1967, the alleged shortcomings and unsuitability of Soviet weapons and advice had been used repeatedly as an alibi for the failure of Egyptian commanders, and it may well be that, on occasion, even some of their superiors in Moscow were inclined to reprimand the military advisers for not having done a better job with their Egyptian charges. It seems likely that, on this occasion, Soviet officers in Egypt were determined to forestall such a development, by going on record in good time with predictions of a new setback, plus an analysis of the real causes for their pessimism.

In any case, there are reasons to believe that in the summer of 1969, several top Soviet military figures managed to obtain an invitation to appear before the Kremlin leadership (in all probability before a subcommittee of the Politbureau dealing with military and security affairs) and there conveyed the information that yet another defeat in the Middle East seemed in the offing. It appears that they urged the political leadership to avoid a repetition of the debacles-by-proxy Soviet prestige had suffered through Nasser's military failures of 1956 and 1967, when, as in 1969, Egyptian troops were known by the whole world to have been armed and trained by the USSR. Consequently, Soviet military representatives are believed to have suggested two options to their civilian colleagues: (1) Sever all military links with Egypt, publicly, so that the next military setback would be Nasser's alone. (2) Come in directly, in a combat capacity, at least with Soviet crews for sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and Soviet interceptor pilots, to bolster the Egyptian forces in their weakest sector, thereby averting defeat. In all likelihood, this second, rather hazardous alternative was proposed as a carefully planned and supervised probing operation, with Soviet elements first being installed in the Nile Delta, then gradually and carefully being pushed eastward toward the Suez Canal; if they were able successfully and without untoward reactions to ensconce themselves on the banks of the canal, thus establishing Soviet-Egyptian air supremacy over the canal, its far side and the adjoining edge of Sinai, they might even assist in an Egyptian amphibious operation across the canal to capture the Sinai Peninsula. Apparently, the Soviet military leaders recommended option (2) as their own preference and as the best way of furthering Soviet prestige and influence.

We do not know the precise composition of this Soviet military delegation. However, it seems likely that it included some three or four high-ranking officers, in all probability Defense Minister Grechko and/or Chief of Staff Zakharov, a representative of P.V.O. Strany (the Air Defense Forces, from the ranks of which the proposed Soviet elements in Egypt were largely to be drawn and, as it turned out, their commander was also to be chosen), and, almost inevitably, Admiral Gorshkov, who had been intimately involved in Soviet-Egyptian relations and Eastern Mediterranean affairs for at least four to five years prior to this development. There is no way of ascertaining whether the recommendation of this group was unanimous and, if not, who favored which approach. However, the arm of the services least likely to favor Soviet Mediterranean ventures and most inclined to regard them as a wasteful diversion of resources that would have minimal effect on the really decisive military arenas, namely, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, apparently remained unrepresented on this occasion.

Those present, if the guiding assumptions are correct, probably backed the interventionist recommendation with varying degrees of warmth and for somewhat different reasons: (1) Both Grechko and Gorshkov had become linked rather closely with the fortunes of Soviet policy toward Egypt, including (certainly in Gorshkov's case) the fateful decision after the Six-Day War not to abandon Nasser, but to resupply him massively with Soviet hardware, using the Soviet navy as a protective screen for the operation. Both men had emerged as vociferous protagonists of a new emphasis on the *political* task of the armed forces, namely, "extending Soviet prestige and influence" — i.e., utilizing these forces, by means well short of nuclear war or the danger thereof, for missions that would create a wide periphery of Soviet protectorates and client states in key areas overseas, especially the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Neither officer, therefore, could afford to watch with equanimity yet another Egyptian defeat (and vicarious blow to

Soviet prestige in the area), or the complete abandonment of existing Soviet policies and politico-military investments in Egypt.

(2) In Gorshkov's case, the Soviet navy required air cover and other essential services from Egyptian shore-based facilities, at least until a new Soviet aircraft carrier (or carriers) could be launched from Black Sea shipyards in a building program apparently approved in principle before the War of Attrition. While Egypt increasingly had made such facilities available to the USSR during previous years, Soviet advisers seemingly had become convinced of Egypt's incapacity to provide adequate air cover and defense for these valuable establishments, which would be unacceptably vulnerable to air attack and, therefore, useless to the Soviet navy, unless protected by sophisticated Soviet military equipment operated by *Soviet* crews. At least as an interim measure, therefore, Gorshkov apparently favored the new project, even if, most probably, he regretted the fact that it would place the Soviet presence in Egypt primarily under the supervision of P.V.O. Strany.

(3) With regard to P.V.O. Strany, it may be surmised that its representative regarded the interventionist recommendation with mixed feelings, welcoming the proposed ascendancy of this arm of the Soviet services in a new arena and, more importantly, rejoicing that a hot war "realistic proving grounds" would be provided in Egypt for testing the efficacy of sophisticated Soviet electronic and other equipment and personnel in battle conditions against high-quality Western aircraft, at a safe distance from the Soviet homeland and without having to depend on Chinese "good will." On the other hand, P.V.O. Strany must have felt great reluctance to emplace valuable equipment in an area where it would be protected *on the ground* against eager pro-Western hands only by the Egyptian army.

In any case, whatever the precise considerations of the various military representatives may have been, it is clear that their recommendations were not accepted by the civilian leadership without further evaluation. Several months elapsed before the appearance of the first sign (from the data now available) that the Kremlin had reached a general decision, at least in principle, favoring the military recommendation to build up a Soviet combat capability in Egypt, including interceptor pilots and crews for sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. At a meeting of members of the Warsaw Pact, sometime in November 1969 (i.e., four to five months after the military recommendation was made, one month prior to the Israeli deep penetration raids, two months before Nasser's secret Moscow visit, and three months before the first Soviet combat elements actually appeared in Egypt), Soviet representatives mentioned the plan to their allies, possibly because it was originally intended to stage this operation as a Warsaw Pact rather than purely Soviet action, perhaps by including some symbolic East European contingents.[4]

The reason for this prolonged delay in reaching a decision was almost certainly factional dissension within the Soviet civilian leadership concerning the wisdom of accepting the military recommendation. Diligent studies have been made elsewhere of perceptible differences of emphasis and approach toward Egypt and the Middle East in general on the part of certain Soviet organs and some figures in the leadership; they leave little doubt that this issue and related Middle East problems have continued throughout the whole of the period, and up until now, to be a subject of contention within the Kremlin. On the basis of the detailed considerations and analogies presented earlier in this article, as well as the more directly related analyses mentioned above, it is possible to reconstruct the general form and much of the content of this factional dispute, with a reasonably educated guess as to who some of the protagonists[5] may have been:

The opponents of a potentially risky further Soviet involvement in the Middle East are unlikely to have expressed their antagonism boldly, in frank confrontation with the more interventionist group, especially if, as seems almost certain, the military recommendation from the very beginning, or from an early stage, enjoyed the support of the *primus inter pares*, Brezhnev himself. As explained earlier, such behavior would not be considered proper "form" among communist leaders in the USSR or elsewhere; instead, as various precedents indicate, opposition of this kind usually is expressed by way of caveats, warnings, misgivings, or even polite requests for the fulfillment of certain conditions (sometimes specifically written into the record), rather than through a futile attempt to veto a proposal supported by the number one member of the "collective leadership."

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[4] An abortive move in this direction appears to have been made subsequently.

[5] Throughout this reconstruction of developments in Moscow, such terms as "interventionists" and "anti-interventionists," "forward" faction and "moderates," will be employed merely as convenient shorthand to describe the protagonists in the "debate," rather than to imply that there are permanent "hawks" or "doves" in the Kremlin. As we have noted, the various factions in the leadership are perfectly capable of changing sides, of adopting and dropping various issues, as tactical considerations may require; with some exceptions, these issues are exploited as convenient tactical weapons in a struggle for power, rather than regarded as platforms to which the respective factions must be wedded eternally.

As indicated by the succession of developments that will be analyzed and that apparently had to take place before the interventionist group in the Kremlin could gather sufficient support – or produce sufficiently convincing replies to the misgivings expressed by its more cautious opponents – for the actual dispatch of Soviet combatants, it would seem not too fanciful to speculate that the anti-interventionists made the following points: They would not, of course, stand in Brezhnev's way, if he was really convinced that the military recommendations were appropriate and wise under current conditions. However, for the record (and they would appreciate it if this appeared in the minutes for future reference) they would like to express these caveats and misgivings:

(1) Could one really assume that, because of severe constraints on the U.S. administration, the Viet Nam syndrome, neo-isolationism, and the like, the White House would simply stand by and watch Soviet combat personnel being introduced into a key East-West contest area like the Middle East? Could one ignore the fact that the Soviet buildup would take place in the midst of a hot war, for the specific purpose of helping Egypt to overcome an adversary like the Israelis, who had repeatedly proven the quality of their armed forces as well as their utter determination if threatened with extinction, and who undoubtedly would regard Soviet intervention as a threat to their survival and would react with desperate measures? Would this not confront the USSR with another "Finland," with all the ignominy that memory recalled, and would it not require a Soviet buildup of some 150,000 Russians in Egypt rather than 20,000, if a victory over Israel really was to be achieved? Would these Soviet troops then not constitute a veritable hostage to fortune, at the mercy of NATO, linked to the far-off Soviet homeland by a slender lifeline passing through NATO territory (Turkey), a line practically begging to be cut by superior NATO elements in the Mediterranean? Was the onus not on those comrades advocating such a venture to demonstrate convincingly that the eventualities mentioned were not merely unlikely but practically out of the question? Was not even a 5 per cent chance of a total confrontation with the United States over the Suez area prohibitively high, nay suicidal? Should there not be some practical proof that the chances were less than one in a hundred?

(2) If, to avoid such contingencies, the Soviet buildup were of

relatively modest proportions, how would that help Egypt to win? And if it did not achieve that objective, would it not arouse Arab feelings of frustration, disappointment and ingratitude toward the USSR rather than scoring a Soviet triumph in the Arab world? What kind of leadership, regime, state, army and society did Egypt have, anyway, to warrant such intimate linking of her fortunes with those of the USSR? Everyone knew how fickle Nasser was and how he had quarreled with Khrushchev; moreover, had not Soviet doctors reported that he was a very sick man? Who would his successors be and how reliable were they? Was it not a typically Middle East habit to play off the various great powers against one another? Would Egypt not continue playing this game, even with Soviet combat elements emplaced there and would this not endanger them? Was not the whole policy of buttressing military dictatorships in the Middle East unprincipled, since it led to the deliberate sacrifice of the local communist parties and their future? How many times did the Egyptian army have to be defeated and lose its Soviet equipment, including sophisticated items abandoned and captured intact by the adversary, thus exposing them to eager NATO eyes, and how many times would the USSR have to replace such equipment? Was this not a case of "throwing good money after bad"? Would the proposed Soviet move really make a decisive difference in this situation? If it did, it would have to be of such proportions as to invite U.S. counter-intervention which was unacceptable, and if it did not, remaining within more modest parameters, would not its vulnerability outweigh its utility? In any case, under these circumstances, was not the onus on those comrades favoring the venture first to produce the necessary conditions to ensure that Egypt now could be relied upon, that it would act in accordance with Soviet desires, and that it would respond favorably to various essential Soviet demands?

Content analyses and various data indicate that the above points reflect the general lines of contention within the Kremlin concerning Middle East policy during this period, and it is not of primary importance whether or not these precise arguments were voiced at one particular session of the top Soviet leadership. It does seem reasonably likely, however, that caveats and conditions of this kind were advanced by the supporters of a more cautious and anti-interventionist line in the Middle East, as part of an ongoing debate in the Kremlin after military representatives had submitted their recommendations. It may also be presumed that support for a forward policy was not strong enough initially to sweep aside these serious objections and that the protracted delay in reaching a final decision was due to attempts by the interventionists to meet some of their opponents' conditions, and, by so doing, take the wind out of their sails.

V

The most important of these conditions concerned the United States and its possible reactions, should Soviet combat personnel be sent to Egypt and, in its gradual probe toward the Suez Canal and Sinai, clash with the Israelis while providing an umbrella for an Egyptian operation to breach Israeli canal lines. The interesting fact is that, sometime in October 1969, the U.S. State Department, unknowingly, acted in a way that appeared to provide an answer to this vital question — an answer seeming to sustain the contention of the Soviet interventionists that the proposed venture was quite safe and to undermine the argument of their more cautious opponents that U.S. inaction could not be taken for granted and that Moscow should therefore refrain from the dispatch of combat personnel.

Late in 1969 Secretary of State Rogers delivered a policy address on the Middle East in which he presented a detailed blueprint for an Arab-Israeli settlement, subsequently known as the Rogers Plan. In the section concerning Israel and Egypt, he called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula, all the way back to the pre-1948 Egyptian-Palestinian frontier. It is now known that this section of the Rogers Plan was the result of prolonged, secret U.S.-Soviet contact (covering the very months when the Soviet military recommendation to send combat personnel to the area was the subject of prolonged argument in the Kremlin) and that Washington submitted it secretly, as its final official offer to the USSR, in *October,* some *six weeks before* the Secretary of State delivered his speech. It is most unlikely that the State Department was aware, at that time, of the "debate" in the Kremlin or of the way in which Moscow was bound to interpret the U.S. offer within the context of that "debate." However, there can be little doubt that the Soviet interventionist group waved the U.S. proposal triumphantly in the air, so to speak, as constituting the evidence its more cautious opponents had requested — that Washington did *not* regard the Suez Canal as the demarcation line between the Western and Eastern spheres and would, therefore, *not* regard clashes there as requiring any U.S. reaction. On the contrary, Washington seemed to be ready to concede both Suez and Sinai to the Eastern sphere, at least vicariously via the USSR's friend and client, Egypt. Consequently, the dispatch of Soviet combat personnel to Egypt and the gradual probe toward the canal, and possibly beyond it, was not at all "adventuristic" as the more cautious elements in the Kremlin had intimated. (This, no doubt, was the reason why Moscow initially encouraged the United States to go ahead with the Rogers Plan, although the USSR subsequently reneged because Arab leaders believed even better conditions could be extracted from Washington.) At any rate, it was probably not coincidental that in November 1969, a bare week or two after the U.S. plan was submitted to Moscow, Soviet representatives informed their Warsaw Pact allies that the recommendation for combat intervention in Egypt had become Soviet policy — in other words, that the Soviet leadership had finally decided in favor of this move and that the forward faction in the Kremlin had overcome the objections of its more moderate opponents. The chronology strongly suggests a cause-and-effect relationship between the transmission of the Rogers Plan in October and the signs in November that a decision in principle had been reached.

At this point, no doubt, planning and essential preparations for the complex logistic and other aspects of the operation were under way in the Soviet Union, and it remained only to meet some of the caveats and misgivings of the Kremlin "opposition" concerning Egypt's future conduct and reliability. With this aim in mind, the Soviet leadership was surely pleased to take advantage of Nasser's military and political plight at the end of 1969, when his War of Attrition had turned against him, by suggesting that, if he came to Moscow, he might find the USSR willing to rescue him. This is a far more likely explanation of his secret Moscow visit in January 1970 than the version that he decided, on his own initiative, to fly suddenly to the Soviet capital and ask for help. First, it would have been quite sufficient to transmit a personal letter via the Soviet ambassador; and in the second place no one, including friends and clients, drops in uninvited on the Kremlin. The reason why Soviet leaders may have preferred to bring the Egyptian President secretly to Moscow was to confront him, almost alone, with the full, united and awesome pressure of the Kremlin, at a time when he was in dire need of Soviet help.

It seems highly likely that Nasser — almost certainly unaware that the USSR, independently of his requests, had decided in principle to send combat elements to Egypt — was presented with a Soviet "offer" of military forces, contingent on certain undertakings from the Egyptian side. Some such understanding was presumably reached during the Moscow visit, whether formally or informally, dealing with Egypt's future policies vis-à-vis the USSR and the United States, and with special military security provisions concerning not only the Soviet combat elements to be dispatched shortly to Egypt but also the facilities already granted there to Soviet naval and air units patrolling the Mediterranean. In this way the interventionists in the Kremlin apparently were able to meet at least some of the conditions their opponents had laid down for any Soviet combat role in Egypt. By the time Nasser returned home, Moscow's planning and preparations for the new Soviet military presence in Egypt were well advanced, having proceeded for at least three months; consequently, the first Soviet combat elements arrived within a comparatively short period, by February 1970.

VI

What happened between February 1970, when the "forward" group in the Kremlin seemed to have won all of its internal battles against opponents of Soviet intervention, and July 1972, when everything apparently turned sour and Soviet combat elements were suddenly withdrawn, amid public signs of conflict between Cairo and Moscow?

The simple fact is that the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin were proven, during this period, to have been right in almost all of their contentions.[6]

The United States and Israel

Precisely as the more cautious group of Soviet leaders had feared, the United States, despite appearances during February-September 1970 to the contrary, turned out to be far from a "paper tiger." After prolonged indecision following the first establishment of the Soviet combat crews in the Nile valley, which lasted even for a short while after these crews pushed forward toward the banks of the Suez Canal, the Nixon-Kissinger team suddenly implemented its new policy of "planned U.S. unpredictability" by pouring sophisticated planes, electronic equipment, drones and artillery into Israel to balance the new factor on the other side of the canal. This left little doubt about U.S.

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[6] The events described here are not presented in chronological order, but rather are grouped according to topic.

unwillingness to permit a Soviet combat role in assisting Egypt to cross the canal and confounded earlier Soviet expectations.

If Moscow still harbored any uncertainty about U.S. determination in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was rapidly dispelled by the reaction of the White House to Soviet behavior during the Jordanian civil war. While King Hussein and his Arab Legion were taking action against the extremist elements that had almost seized power in Jordan, Syrian armor, organized, trained and perhaps even accompanied by Soviet military experts, poured across the Jordanian frontier to assist the king's adversaries. The U.S. Sixth Fleet rapidly moved in the general direction of the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli coast, and Washington signaled Moscow that, unless Syrian armor were withdrawn immediately, not only might there be action by Sixth Fleet aircraft, but the U.S. government would prove quite understanding if Israel decided to unleash its air force to prevent a hostile Syria from establishing a puppet regime in Jordan. Moscow apparently understood the message, since the Syrians immediately turned around and retreated across the frontier.

The United States had thus shown that it was a far more formidable adversary in the region than the Kremlin's forward group had believed in 1969, and the Soviet anti-interventionists were proven equally correct with regard to the possible complications and dangers of tangling with the Israelis. When Soviet interceptor and missile elements first appeared in the Nile Delta, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan warned that Israel was prepared to accept the *fait accompli* only as long as these elements did not move much closer to the canal bank. This was apparently misconstrued in Moscow as evidence that the Israelis were shrinking away from confrontation. Consequently, Soviet interceptor crews, speaking Russian over open communication channels (as a warning to the Israelis that they were not dealing with Egyptians), were sent to fly missions over the canal. To the amazement of the Kremlin interventionist faction, the Israelis promptly ambushed these Soviet pilots and their advanced MiG-21 planes and shot down four or five of them. This was but an earnest of Israeli determination when confronted by a real threat, precisely as the more cautious Kremlin group is believed to have warned in the summer of 1969.

The scenario ascribed to the Soviet anti-interventionist faction thus turned out to be all too real: a Soviet combat buildup of the relatively modest proportions first planned would fail to frighten off the Israelis, but would constitute enough of a threat to provoke some fairly desperate measures on their part. Therefore, if the Soviet intervention was to have worthwhile results, it would require a massive Soviet buildup in Egypt. However, the U.S. government had also demonstrated that it was far less impotent and far more unpredictable than the Kremlin interventionists had originally believed, so that a really large-scale Soviet influx into the area might provoke Washington into cutting the slender lifeline linking the Soviet presence in Egypt to its home base via NATO territory. Under these circumstances, it was evident that Soviet combat elements in Egypt could not become engaged in an offensive across the Suez Canal, i.e., could not really help the USSR's client militarily, but, at most, could assist Egypt in exerting politico-psychological pressure upon Israel and the United States.

Egypt

With regard to Egypt, too, the more pessimistic, anti-interventionist Soviet view was gradually borne out by events. President Nasser died and, with him, whatever mutual understanding may have been reached during his Moscow visit. A struggle for succession broke out in Cairo, during which both contending parties expected Soviet support and were angry when the Kremlin adopted a cautious, neutralist course — President Sadat because he regarded himself as Nasser's legitimate successor, and Ali Sabri because he saw himself as politically closer to the USSR. After winning, Sadat showed his displeasure with Moscow for its attitude during the struggle and for the communist role during the upheaval in neighboring Sudan, by resorting to the old game of playing off the great powers against each other. He appeared unwilling to implement the commitments Moscow believed it had extracted from his predecessor in January 1970.

It was to reinforce these commitments and to place Soviet-Egyptian relations on a more permanent footing, irrespective of internal changes in Cairo, that Soviet President Podgorny suddenly appeared in the Egyptian capital in the spring of 1971, pulled out of his pocket a prepared text, and told the Egyptians that they would have to sign on the dotted line if they expected sustained Soviet support. Sadat did sign what became known as the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship, but each side chose to interpret it differently. The Egyptian President claimed subsequently that he understood the USSR to have promised certain "offensive" weapons and Soviet direct combat support during a crossing of the canal. The Soviet leaders apparently retorted that the Soviet Union had delivered all of the offensive weapons it could spare and that Egypt was capable of absorbing and utilizing; as for direct combat support in an offensive across the canal, the Kremlin, following its chastening experiences with unexpected U.S. and Israeli toughness, must have informed Cairo that direct involvement of Soviet military elements in such a crossing was now out of the question.

As long as this Soviet decision remained unknown in the West, as Sadat understood it would remain, the continued Soviet military presence in Egypt was still useful to him, since it constituted a politico-psychological means of pressure on both the United States and Israel. However, even this aspect lost its utility when, in the spring of 1972, the Soviet leadership, which had already decided in principle not to intervene directly in the Eastern Mediterranean, felt that it might as well "sell" this decision to Washington in return for certain American concessions. During the Moscow Summit of 1972, therefore, the Kremlin as much as told the U.S. President that it was prepared to abstain from such interventionist action — as a special "favor" to its guests, of course — if in return it obtained some *quid pro quo.* Both sides left the summit with a clear impression that such a deal had been made.

From the Egyptian point of view, the Soviet military presence became useless at this point: if both the United States and Israel *knew* that the Soviet forces would not engage in combat, their presence could not be exploited even as a politico-psychological threat; moreover, Sadat was bound to, and did, regard Soviet behavior at the summit as a breach of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, which had been interpreted by both parties as an undertaking not to make deals about each other's vital interests behind each other's backs. The Soviet leadership was aware of this aspect, but was unconcerned inasmuch as it was quite prepared to withdraw its combat elements now that their utility was exhausted and the original plans for their employment had been proven infeasible.

Beyond doubt developments involving the United States, Israel and Egypt had demonstrated that the misgivings and warnings apparently voiced by the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin during the 1969 debate (and duly recorded, in all likelihood, in various official minutes), had been amply warranted. As a result, sometime in 1971-1972, the original supporters of the forward move in the Eastern Mediterranean must have lost strength, until the Kremlin's decision was finally reversed. This undoubtedly became clear to the Egyptians sometime after the Moscow Summit in spring 1972, and Sadat was merely "saving face" when he anticipated the obvious next Soviet move by asking Soviet combat elements to leave. They left, not because they had been requested to go, but because the Kremlin must have decided weeks earlier that this should be done in the near future.

VII

In a tentative and speculative way, partly by means of content analysis,[7] an attempt can be made to establish some of the protagonists in the Kremlin debate.

There is little doubt that Brezhnev originally favored intervention, and although he reversed himself when it became tactically necessary, he probably did so reluctantly and apparently under pressure. Shelest seems to have supported him, although it is not clear whether he participated in the original "debate." (His subsequent purge was due to other causes.) Suslov appears to have been skeptical about the proposed military move, and is believed to have had consistent reservations about Soviet support for Third World military dictatorships, since it has usually (and especially in Egypt) entailed Soviet sacrifice of the local communist parties — Suslov's own "constituents." (Suslov's aide, Ponomarev, has made no bones about his feelings on this matter.) Podgorny seems to have joined the anti-interventionists at times when the whole venture appeared to be going sour, although he may not have been consistent throughout the whole period. Shelepin may or may not have participated in the original "debate," but he seems to have been sniping fairly persistently at Brezhnev's Middle East policy, if the organ *Trud* is an indicator of his views. Shelepin's rivalry with Brezhnev is no secret; he had been prominent in the conduct of Soviet Middle East policy in 1964-1965 and then had been demoted gradually on all sectors by Brezhnev. There are no indications concerning the views of other members of the leadership.

Brezhnev's own part in this affair seems to demonstrate that he is far from being a "dove" or a consistent supporter of détente, as it has become fashionable in the West to claim. He may have reversed himself in time not to suffer serious political damage, but the episode certainly did not prove helpful to his career and ambitions. Given his well-known persistence, it should have been clear that he would not accept this reversal as the final word, but would attempt to achieve his goals in the region in less direct and overt, and therefore less risky, ways.

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[7] Unfortunately, documentation here would be far too bulky, requiring lengthy and tedious interpretation. Moreover, much of this particular type of content analysis has been done by others.

In retrospect, it would seem that he found an opening for the pursuit of a new, slightly more circumspect, but nevertheless forward and offensive policy, in the Soviet-U.S. "deal" made at the 1972 Moscow Summit (which found expression in the joint statement published by the superpowers at the conclusion of the summit). Brezhnev could, and probably did, tell his colleagues in the months following the summit that all the United States had a right to expect after the 1972 meeting was that, in the Middle East, Soviet forces would not be used directly in a combat capacity. He knew, of course (since he and other Soviet officials had done their best to foster American illusions by discreet nods and smiles on appropriate occasions), that his U.S. guests had left Moscow with the distinct impression that Soviet promises not to take unilateral advantage of crisis situations in regions of conflict implied much more. To be precise, Washington now believed that Moscow would not only refrain from direct Soviet combat intervention in areas like the Eastern Mediterranean rim, but would (1) ensure that other communist states did likewise; (2) discourage the USSR's Arab clients from resorting to force, by curtailing rather than escalating Soviet arms deliveries, as well as by employing the required amount of diplomatic pressure; (3) inform the United States immediately of any evidence that these clients were bent upon war, Soviet efforts notwithstanding; and (4) collaborate promptly with Washington, both directly and in the UN Security Council, to prevent, or immediately terminate, armed incursions against neighboring states by these Soviet clients.

However, Brezhnev presumably argued in the Kremlin that, given an appropriate occasion such as a U.S. crisis, domestic or other, it would be entirely possible for Moscow to ignore the outer parameters of Washington's understanding of the 1972 summit deal; as long as direct Soviet combat intervention did not actually take place in the Middle East, the U.S. administration probably would be too eager to salvage something from its cherished new achievement of détente to permit itself or others to admit that the USSR was violating most of the spirit and some of the letter of the 1972 superpower "declaration of intent."

It appears that Brezhnev and his forward faction assuaged the misgivings in the Soviet leadership by pointing out the following: (1) A major concession already had been made to the "moderates" in the Kremlin by assuring the U.S. government that the USSR would eschew direct intervention and by actually withdrawing sizeable Soviet combat elements from Egypt. (2) The proposal now was merely to return to Moscow's pre-1969-1972 Middle East policy, but to pursue it with greater efficiency, refinement and sophistication so as to recoup Soviet prestige in that part of the world.

Brezhnev's new plan, as submitted to his colleagues, seems to have consisted of these interconnected elements:

(1) A further Soviet buildup of the forces of the "progressive" Arab regimes — Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria — starting in the fall of 1972 and escalating gradually during the subsequent year. They would be supplied with highly sophisticated weapons which the USSR had been unable to spare previously and which would extend even to items not previously given to noncommunist states, but they would be accompanied this time by intensive training of the most thorough kind.

(2) As extra insurance against renewed failure or incompetence on the part of the Middle East recipients, some of the most complex new hardware would be handled in combat not by Arab or Soviet or Warsaw Pact personnel, but by military elements from other communist countries, whose death or capture would not involve a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

(3) Most remaining Soviet military advisers would be withdrawn in a demonstrative fashion once the USSR's Middle East clients were ready for combat and had decided to proceed to war, as an "alibi" to convince Washington that Moscow at least had not defaulted on its basic commitment to eschew direct combat involvement.

(4) Moscow's clients then would go into offensive deployment, exploiting an occasion when the United States was distracted by a domestic or other crisis, and the Israelis would be forced to mobilize their citizen army, a costly operation that they could not sustain for long or repeat continuously.

(5) Once the Israelis had mobilized, their opponents would back off, but would return to offensive dispositions as soon as the Israeli alert was called off, and the whole maneuver would be replayed until the Israelis, because of economic drain or because

their vigilance gradually had become dulled, were caught responding tardily.

(6) Moscow's clients would thus, at the least, achieve a tactical surprise which, if it did not suffice for them to gain a final and decisive victory, would probably be enough to drag Israel into a relatively long, defensive struggle, the attrition of which might prove too much for a small state.

(7) To ensure its clients "longer breath" than Israel during such an attrition period, the USSR would rapidly launch a massive air-and-sea lift to its Middle East friends.

(8) As long as fighting favored its clients sufficiently for them to seize and hold ground, and to recoup prestige, the USSR would sabotage U.S. efforts, at the UN and elsewhere, to terminate the bloodshed.

(9) The moment the war turned against its clients, the Kremlin would insist on an immediate cease-fire in place, and would embarrass Washington into agreeing to it by suddenly offering at least partial support for the kind of proposals Washington undoubtedly would have made earlier, at the outbreak of war.

(10) If the Israelis demurred at being thus robbed of the fruits of victory and insisted that the invading forces be thrown back at least to the pre-conflict lines, Soviet leaders could always dramatically go through the motions of preparing the dispatch of an intervention force to the area; at this point Washington no doubt would attempt to deter Moscow, but at the same time would be only too eager to avoid an actual confrontation and, as a "compromise," would agree jointly with the USSR to impose a cease-fire upon the combatants.

(11) Such a naked demonstration of Soviet determination and might would have the additional advantage of making Cairo and Damascus say "thank you, Moscow" rather than "thank you, Moscow and Washington" for being rescued in time. Moscow's clients would end up with some symbolically important territorial gains and would have caused Israel painful losses, and Soviet prestige would be triumphantly restored — all this without real danger of nuclear confrontation with the United States, since Soviet combat forces would not actually be involved. Above all, Washington, frightened by this dramatic orchestration of the Arab-Soviet claim that the Middle East really was a "tinderbox," would pressure Israel into a basically pro-Arab settlement to avoid further dangers. This would constitute substantial proof that it paid to be a client of Moscow rather than of Washington.

It is not too difficult, ex post facto, to reconstruct these basic elements of Brezhnev's scenario, and it appears unlikely that his Kremlin opponents could have mustered as much political ammunition against it as they did against the far more risky and adventurous intervention plan Brezhnev initiated in 1969-1970.

VIII

Various parts of this scheme were, indeed, implemented during the year or so that preceded the "October War" and during subsequent weeks:

(1) The four "progressive" Soviet Middle East clients, whose forces and weapons were to be wholly or partially committed against Israel, received during this rather brief period of twelve or thirteen months the following weapons: some 450-500 additional medium, heavy and amphibious tanks (including a sizeable number of the T-62, the main Warsaw Pact tank never previously[8] sent outside the bloc); more than 100 additional self-propelled guns; some 1,400 additional armored personnel carriers; about 1,200 additional medium and heavy field guns and howitzers; several hundred additional anti-aircraft guns; at least 150 additional surface-to-surface missiles (including FROG 3 and FROG 7, and, for the first time outside the Warsaw Pact, the Samlet and SCUD); some 30-35 additional naval units (including more Komar and Osa missile boats); some 350-400 additional warplanes (including Tu-22 bombers, sent for the first time to countries outside the Warsaw Pact, more Tu-16 bombers, a sophisticated version of the MiG-21,[9] additional Su-7, some large transport planes and many new helicopters, including Mi-6 and Mi-8); and, finally, enough additional SAM's to equip some 35-40 new SAM sites (not only more SAM-2 and SAM-3, but at least 120 of the mobile and highly sophisticated SAM-6 batteries,[10] as well as the SAM-7 Strela, which can be employed by infantry against warplanes, and which had never previously been handed over to noncommunist forces). These deliveries did not taper off, but escalated as October 1973 approached; for instance, the Tu-22

[8] Except for a small advance shipment dispatched to Egypt for training purposes earlier in 1972.

[9] These aircraft had been entrusted only to Soviet combat personnel prior to July 1972 and were then withdrawn; but subsequently they were dispatched back to Egypt, although the lack of properly trained Egyptian pilots required that they be flown in many instances by North Koreans.

[10] Of the SAM-6 there had been a much smaller number, entrusted only to Soviet combat personnel, in Egypt prior to July 1972; later large quantities were dispatched to Egypt and Syria, although their operation was usually supervised by North Vietnamese.

bombers and massive supplies of SAM-6, as well as surface-to-surface missiles, arrived just weeks before the outbreak of the war. Moreover, major Soviet resupplies of munitions arrived by sea at the very onset of hostilities; in view of the length of the sea journey, this indicates Soviet collusion at least two weeks before the war. Thus, there can be little doubt that the USSR was not only aware of the projected date of military operations, but approved and supported them, rather than attempting to restrain its clients.

(2) The most complex and sophisticated of the Soviet systems were handed over some weeks prior to hostilities to non-Warsaw Pact communist personnel — North Korean, in the case of the latest versions of the MiG-21, and North Vietnamese (trained during the air defense of Hanoi and Haiphong), in the case of some SAM-3 and many of the SAM-6 batteries. It is inconceivable that this could have occurred without Soviet approval, indeed without the Kremlin's active help and initiative.

(3) It was after this development that some of the Soviet advisers were flown out of the Middle East, rather openly and visibly, for political reasons that have already been explained, but reinforcing the evidence that the USSR knew precisely of the projected time of hostilities.

(4, 5, 6) Once its clients went into offensive deployment, Moscow not only did nothing to dissuade them, but did its best to help confuse foreign intelligence into believing that mere political and psychological maneuvers, rather than military operations, were contemplated.

(7) Almost immediately after the outbreak of fighting, the USSR prepared and then implemented its massive air-and-sea lift of arms and supplies to its clients, days before the United States responded by reinforcing the rapidly diminishing Israeli supplies.

(8) As long as Egyptian forces were advancing across the canal into Sinai and the Syrians into the Golan Heights, Moscow insouciantly sabotaged all U.S. attempts to activate the UN Security Council and rebuffed other U.S. approaches to bring hostilities to an end.

(9) Once it was apparent that the Israelis had regained the initiative and were about to crush their adversaries, the Kremlin summoned Secretary Kissinger to Moscow to initiate joint Soviet-U.S. moves to stop the Israeli army before it could complete its

task and while a remnant still remained of the original Egyptian bridgeheads east of the Suez Canal.[11]

(10) The resulting UN Security Council cease-fire order was followed, under the circumstances, by entirely forseeable chaos, since it came at the climax of a military campaign rather than after its natural culmination. Hurried attempts to achieve last-minute advantages were bound to cause escalation rather than diminution of fighting. The Egyptian Third Army, encircled at the southeastern end of the Suez Canal, and equipped apparently with highly sophisticated and sensitive Soviet weapons, accompanied perhaps by supervisory personnel from communist countries, tried desperately to break out, while the Israelis attempted to strengthen their ring of encirclement. It was this situation that Moscow utilized for one of its most dramatic maneuvers. A few days after the Moscow "Little Summit" and the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution at the Security Council, the USSR placed six of its seven airborne divisions on emergency alert and dispatched a crudely threatening note to Washington, which warned the U.S. government to pressure Israel into permitting the trapped Egyptians on the Israeli side of the Suez Canal to reopen their link with

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[11] As part of this agreement, and to reward, as it were, the sudden Soviet willingness to "cooperate," the United States was persuaded to approve the imposition, through the UN Security Council, of an almost immediate cease-fire "in place" — despite the fact that the combatants were almost inextricably intertwined, with several enclaves east and west of the Suez Canal; that there was no immediate way of separating them; that there was a glaring lack of reference to any machinery for establishing just where "in place" was. Indeed, all the elements ensuring further bloodshed and dispute were present. Thus, the invading force, at least on the Suez Canal front, was awarded some of the territory it had seized in the initial days of the war. Moreover, the U.S. government consented to the omission in the proposed new Security Council resolution of any mention of an exchange of prisoners of war, despite the fact that the Israelis had always insisted that this be an integral part of the cessation of hostilities, and that Kissinger himself had made a final political settlement concerning Viet Nam hinge almost entirely on this question.

Finally, Washington accepted a text with some Soviet overtones regarding essential elements of a political settlement to follow the cease-fire. UN Resolution 242, of November 1967, with all its famous ambiguities, had been specifically declared by its original authors, Britain's Lord Caradon and America's Arthur Goldberg, to be a skeleton of general principles that was not self-implementable but could lead to a settlement only if the parties directly concerned negotiated the essential details, which had been intentionally omitted or left vague. Yet, the 1973 Moscow "Little Summit" produced a Security Council resolution which, in addition to a prompt cease-fire, called for "immediate implementation" of Resolution 242, a patently infeasible undertaking. Negotiations between the parties "under appropriate auspices" were mentioned in a subsequent paragraph of the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution of October 1973, but without explicitly linking these negotiations to the "implementation" of the November 1967 resolution. If that resolution indeed were "implemented," there would be nothing left to negotiate about; if, on the other hand, it could not be "implemented" without negotiations, the latter obviously had to *precede* "implementation." The U.S.-Soviet agreement was worded in a way that was more likely to prevent than to further a final resolution of the conflict.

Egyptian forces west of the canal — otherwise, Soviet troops would have no choice but to come in and crush Israel. This was an obvious psychological maneuver. Had Moscow seriously intended to move in, there would have been no preliminary note and no other visible signals, until Soviet units actually descended from the skies. The note produced the expected U.S. counterploy of a stern reply and an American military counteralert. However, it also led to the equally expected U.S. attempt to salvage some remnant of détente by offering Moscow compromises in the form of considerable American pressure on the Israelis to permit vital supplies to pass to the surrounded Egyptians, as well as American acceptance of a renewed UN Emergency Force[12] that, late in October 1973, could serve only as a screen behind which the retreating Egyptians could find shelter and reconsolidate their forces, instead of confronting their Israeli adversaries in truly direct and untrammeled negotiations, free of preconditions.

(11) Brezhnev clearly expected the result to be a major recouping of Soviet prestige, which had been seriously weakened in 1967 and again in 1972, and a strengthening of his own power and prestige within the Kremlin "collective," where the developments of 1969-1972 had proved less than helpful to him. The Arab world seemed bound to regard new U.S. concessions (to all appearances at the expense of America's friends and, perhaps, her own security interests) as a sign of Western weakness, since they followed in the wake of a dramatic Soviet threat. Moscow had persistently told its Middle East friends ever since 1967 that, if only they proved patient and followed the Soviet lead, they would find that the USSR would not only aid them directly to restore their self-confidence, but would successfully pressure the United States and, through it, the Israelis, into far-reaching concessions.

IX

At the end of October 1973, it appeared that Brezhnev's calculations might be paying off, although time alone would tell. If by some chance his forward policy in the Middle East should prove a failure once more, his more cautious and non-interventionist rivals in the Kremlin, disparate though their factions and motivations might be, could be expected to combine to clip his wings and lead Soviet policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean, at least temporarily, into quieter and less disturbing channels. In that eventuality, the West might well discover that it had "bet on the wrong horse" in the Kremlin. However, the forward faction in Moscow, as of now, must be generally satisfied with the results of its policies. Given the record of that faction, including Brezhnev, as analyzed in this article, this development should give rise to serious misgivings in the West, rather than engendering premature feelings of relief.[13]

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[12] The UNEF had been anathema to the Israelis ever since its pitiful performance in withdrawing precipitously in May 1967 at Egypt's request, and thus rendering hostilities inevitable.

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[13] The author is well aware of the "speculative" flavor of portions of his reconstruction of developments, but he believes the exercise is useful nonetheless, at least by posing serious questions that previously have been by-passed or overlooked, and, hopefully, by shedding some light on the general nature of the Soviet policy and decision-making process.

IRAN, THE ARABS AND THE PERSIAN GULF*

by Alvin J. Cottrell

IN the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Iran is the country that has come to the fore as the strongest local power. In order to understand the full implications of Iran's position, it is necessary to take a brief look at the evolution of Iranian foreign, military and economic policies over the past decade.

The traditional preoccupation of Iranian .foreign policy has been with securing freedom from Russian encroachments in the north. In the nineteenth century, Britain saw Persia as an important bastion to the defense of the Indian empire, and sought to aid Iran in its determination to resist pressure from Russia. Although the Tsarist government was overthrown in 1917, the major parameters of Russian policy toward Iran did not change much under the new Soviet regime. In 1939, when secret talks took place between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, one of Moscow's avowed aims was the creation of an outlet to the sea in the general direction of the Persian Gulf. The first serious post-World War II threat to Iran came from Moscow's attempt to create, in the aftermath of that war, the so-called autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Although these schemes failed, they acted as warnings to the Shah and his ministers that the Soviet Union had not yet relinquished previous territorial ambitions.

It was with such memories in mind that Iran decided to accept military assistance from the United States in 1948; and in 1955 the Shah announced Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact (later to become CENTO).

THAW IN IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

In the late 1960's, however, a significant change began to take place in Iranian foreign policy. Tempting economic incentives and a lessening of the hostility in Soviet propaganda produced a thaw in Iranian relations with the USSR. On the Iranian side, several factors encouraged this change. The Shah felt a growing self-confidence as a result of his domestic reforms and the support

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*Portions of this article were adopted from Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, *Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972).

he believed they had established. This assurance led him to exercise a greater initiative in foreign affairs. But Iranian policy remained wary of Soviet designs, and he was careful to draw a distinction, in many of his public speeches, between his aim of securing "good neighbor relations" with the USSR and maintaining unwavering opposition to communism, which seeks to destroy his rule.

The Shah believed the CENTO treaties still provided some kind of guarantee against a serious Soviet threat, but he remained worried that the CENTO structure might be of little use to Iran if local conflicts arose. His faith in the alliance had been shaken when the CENTO powers had not come to Pakistan's aid in 1965, at the time of its war with India, and as a consequence he had been inhibited from going to Pakistan's assistance with weapons provided to Iran under the U.S. military assistance programs. He was also alarmed by Washington's speedy recognition of the republican regime in Yemen, and because economic aid for Iran had not risen to the levels he had expected. In short, during the 1960's the Shah began to realize that although the defense of Iran was assured in the face of any overriding Soviet threat, local disputes which could seriously affect its interests might not generate the necessary Western support. Iran had therefore better be able to defend its own interests. To this end any reduction in Iranian-Soviet tension would be welcomed insofar as it gave Teheran greater freedom for diplomatic maneuver and initiatives elsewhere.

The growing fear of Iran's relative isolation and lack of ability to deal with local disputes was exacerbated by awareness that its increasing oil interests needed to be protected with respect to both the exploitation of resources and their unimpeded export. Oil from the provinces of southwestern Iran and from potential offshore fields had to be transported through the Persian Gulf, for unlike Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran had no pipeline leading to a Mediterranean terminal. By the mid-1960's, the Iranian government's foreign policy had begun to move away from its earlier and overwhelming preoccupation with the Soviet threat to the north and was tending to look more and more at threats to Iranian interests in the south, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

IRAN'S GROWING INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

It is almost a truism of international politics to say that as soon as a state gains interests in an area, threats to these interests, either real or mythical, tend to grow at a rapid rate. This was certainly true of Iran's expanding interests in the Persian Gulf. When viewed from Teheran, the Gulf was important both as a source of oil and as the only available channel for its export, and it was two progressive changes in the oil industry that caused Iran's involvement in the Gulf to increase sharply in the early 1960's.

The first of these was the development of the offshore fields. The existence of these resources had long been known, but the technology necessary for their exploitation did not become available until the late 1950's; the first explorations in Iranian waters began in 1957. The second major factor that caused the Iranian government to look at the Gulf with greater interest was the construction of the immense oil-exporting terminal on Kharg Island, a Persian possession some thirty miles from the Iranian mainland. This port had been developed because from Iran's standpoint the old oil terminal at Abadan suffered from two serious defects: the shallowness of the approach channel, the Shatt-al-Arab, and the fact that the approaches were under Iraqi control. For both economic and strategic reasons, Iran had needed to free itself from dependence on Abadan as a port.

Furthermore, while the Iranian government had begun to discount the immediate danger of a direct Soviet threat by the early 1960's, another potential enemy appeared in the form of President Nasser. The Shah saw the Egyptian President's prestige as adding dangerously to the menace presented by the radical doctrines of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. The scale of Egyptian activity in Yemen, together with the possibility of a British withdrawal from Aden, raised the specter of the establishment of Egyptian forces on the southern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula, whence infiltration and subversion could be carried into Muscat and Oman before threatening the Arab countries of the Gulf itself. If these fears were realized, Egypt would be in a position to threaten Iran's economic lifeline seriously.

In response, and against the background of reduced confidence in CENTO, the Shah declared in March 1965 that Iran's military preparations would henceforth be focused on the Persian Gulf. The joint American-Iranian military exercise of April 1964 (Operation Delaware) had only partially reassured him of sustained U.S. interest in the Gulf; and in the autumn of 1965, the Iranian Parliament passed a bill to strengthen the armed forces at a cost of some $400 million. A large part of this sum — and of later allocations — was devoted to the creation of an effective Iranian navy. Indeed, that force was the first in the world to acquire a squadron of hovercraft for patrol purposes. A new naval base at Bandar Abbas was also begun. To build up the air arm, in 1968 the Shah began negotiations for the F-4. About eight squadrons are now on delivery. In all, he will buy about 164 F-4's from the United States. In addition, Iran has about 140 F-5's (of the much advanced D and E categories), and during his visit to Washington this year it became known that the Shah was negotiating for the F-14. He will eventually possess an air force of about 250 to 300 first-rate combat aircraft. He has also contracted to buy nearly 900 Chieftain tanks from Britain.

This important increase in Iran's defense capability was accompanied by major changes in the organization of the military forces. In the spring of 1967, the government announced that a new Third Army Corps, complete with paratroop units, would be created and based in Iran's major southern city, Shiraz. At the same time, the headquarters of the Second Army Corps would be withdrawn from Turbat-i Haydari, near the Soviet border in northeastern Iran, to Teheran. In November 1970, the striking power of these augmented Iranian forces was demonstrated in a major military exercise held near the island of Beni Farur, a Persian possession in the Gulf. The maneuvers, which involved units from all three services, were praised in the Teheran press as showing that Iran's military planning had begun to bear fruit and that the country would be in a position to exercise undisputed sovereignty in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. Such claims were substantiated by rapid seizure of the Tumb Islands at the end of November 1971. Iran is now undoubtedly the strongest local power in the Gulf.

It is important to note here that the increasing Iranian concern with the Gulf was manifested well before the announcement of British withdrawal was made in January 1968. The Shah had recognized that the earlier British decision to withdraw from the Aden Protectorate would lead inexorably to a similar decision in regard to the Persian Gulf. By anticipating British policy he was able to take vital steps to prepare Iranian defenses for the tasks they would be called upon to perform after the British left. The foresight of the Iranian government in appraising the growing value of the Gulf and preparing to safeguard its interests in the area gave Teheran an authoritative voice in the negotiations relating to territorial and other disputes that have taken place over the last three years.

THE SITUATION IN THE GULF

Since Britain's formal military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in November 1971, attention has inevitably focused on the latent and extant conflicts, disputes and rivalries in the region. Only two outstanding disputes had been settled when the British left. The Iranian government in 1970, after careful and extended negotiation, gave up its long-standing claim to Bahrain, and Bahrain became independent. Another Iranian territorial claim, to the three islets (the Tumbs and Abu Musa) located near the entrance to the twenty-six-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, was also settled — by a combination of British, Arab and Iranian diplomatic negotiations in the case of Abu Musa, and by Iranian military action in the case of the Tumbs. Iran thus assumed complete control over the Tumbs, and for all intents and purposes has control of Abu Musa, although Sharjah retains sovereign rights over the islet.

What has been sorely needed, especially by the mini-states, i.e., the former Trucial Sheikhdoms of the southern Gulf plus Qatar and Bahrain, is a respite from strife and conflict in order to permit the resolution of many of the remaining threats to security in the area. The one development that could contribute most to providing such a respite would be closer political and military cooperation between the principal powers of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, their cooperation has so far been minimal. The long history of Arab-Persian mistrust and hostility cannot be completely bridged by the important common bond of monarchical rule, though this has inspired more cordial relations and does act as some sort of inhibition on the behavior of both rulers in pursuit of their aims. State-to-state cooperation has fluctuated on an *ad hoc* basis, and is largely a function of mutual concern over radical Arabism such as is represented by Iraq. There is a possibility that Iran will be drawn into an intra-Arab conflict, but thus far there has been little effective consultation on such issues between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In the area as a whole, the list of interstate troubles is long. For example, Qatar and Bahrain have poor relations; Ras al-Khaimah claims part of the Musandum Peninsula, Sharjah has claims on Fujairah.[1] There is, too, the serious potential conflict posed by continuing Iraqi claims on Kuwait, which have only recently been asserted once again by force and with Soviet backing. It should be noted that Iraq needs additional territory in order to build a deep-water tanker terminal. Fao, built in the 1960's, has a working draft of only thirty-five feet, and Khar al-Amya's is only fifty feet. These facilities therefore are limited to tankers of 100,000 tons. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute, however, also derives from Iraq's resentment of Iranian paramountcy in the Gulf. Owing to its short coastline (forty miles), Iraq has much difficulty in seeking a position of prime influence among the Gulf states. Iraqi claims to Kuwait territory could clearly lead to open war between Iran and Iraq. The Shah, it will be recalled, offered forces to Kuwait when the latest flare-up occurred. His offer was turned down this time, but this may not be so in the future; in the event of a major Iraqi attack Iran might intervene without Kuwait's approval.

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[1] When fighting between Sharjah and Fujairah erupted in June 1972, twenty-two were reported killed.

There are also many dormant and even as yet *unknown* disputes and claims in regard to the median lines in the seabed of the northern Gulf, where drilling will almost certainly uncover further oil reserves to complicate relations among Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. As it is now, Kuwaiti dhows must travel to the sea by way of Iraq inland waterways. The serious dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab in which Iran and Iraq are involved is certainly magnified by the political divergence between the two regimes — Iraq an Arab socialist state; Iran an absolute monarchy, Moslem but not Arab. The hostility between Teheran and Baghdad would be deepened if the entire Arab side of the Gulf changed to an Iraqi-style form of government — and to bring about such a transformation is Iraq's aim, whatever her ability to achieve it.

Iraqi-Iranian relations have been generally bad since 1958, when Colonel Kassem overthrew the Iraqi monarchy of King Feisal and introduced the first and so far the only nontraditional regime in the Gulf. They have improved somewhat within the last few months as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Iraq grudgingly asked Iran for a resumption of diplomatic relations so that she might feel free to send troops from the Iraqi-Iranian border to help the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war. By accommodating the Iraqis, the Shah to that extent sided with the Arabs. But given the goals and policies of both countries, the "détente" may not last long. If a traditional ruler were to be deposed or threatened in the region of the Trucial Coast or Oman itself, the Shah would most likely intervene openly. Undoubtedly in this case he would hope for Saudi Arabian military cooperation in a quick "clean-up" operation, since any long-term involvement would not be in his interest. Still, there are no armed forces in the area that could successfully oppose a full-scale Iranian military intervention. Such an intervention probably would be welcomed by any sheikh threatened by radical Arab forces, although under present conditions no sheikh is likely to say so publicly.

INTERNAL INSTABILITY FACTORS

The chances for the success of the Union of Arab Emirates are at best slim. This is in large measure due to the marked asymmetries prevailing among the seven sheikhdoms. Abu Dhabi, and to a lesser extent Dubai, are rich, and they are in the process of rapid political transformation. Other, smaller sheikhdoms such as Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al Qawain are poor and likely to remain so. Sharjah used to derive its principal revenues from the British military presence. Fortunately, the loss of this source of revenue will be compensated for by the joint Sharjah-Iranian financial settlement reached in the fall of 1971 – the agreement that permitted Iran to maintain a military presence on the island of Abu Musa, while the island itself remains under Sharjah's sovereignty. The wealthier emirates are already investing their financial resources outside the Union and the poorer states have little leverage under the present Union constitution. Still, the federation has a loose structure. There is a minimum of *formal* machinery, and so long as Abu Dhabi and Dubai agree to cooperate, danger that it will fall apart is diminished.

The greatest local source of future instability is likely to derive from the failure of the two most important Gulf states – Saudi Arabia and Iran – to agree on fundamental political issues. Indeed, the recent Arab-Israeli war has moved Saudi Arabia closer to the socialist Arab camp, much of which is strongly antimonarchical. Their failure to work closely together may weaken the emirates further, and thus initiate the changes that could make the area ripe for subversion and conflict. The new states of the Persian Gulf face many problems. For one thing, there are still ancient feuds in the area, such as the one that erupted in the sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Qatar in 1972. There are also acute social problems, especially in Bahrain, where serious strikes and riots occurred in March 1972, organized by the trade unions with the assistance and support of Baghdad.

When the limited oil resources in Bahrain are exhausted and industries are built, an environment for subversion will automatically have been created. Although it has gone relatively unnoticed, Bahrain may be the Gulf's greatest potential source of radicalization. It is by far the most literate mini-state, with the longest experience of modern economic development, and already has an organized and, by local standards, articulate labor movement. These conditions, combined with low oil income and limited opportunities for future growth, suggest that Bahrain bears watching.

In addition, there are many immigrants in the Gulf, among them numerous Palestinians in Kuwait. The enormous oil revenues of these mini-states, especially Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, which have the highest per capita income in the world, naturally attract insurgent movements such as the Palestinian ones. In all of the states of the Union of Arab Emirates — but chiefly in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the two key Trucial Sheikhdoms — there are sizeable communities of Iranians, Palestinian Arabs, Pakistanis and Indians. For the time being these ethnic elements seem to be content with their lot. There is always the danger, however, that they may become disaffected, and hence pose a serious internal security problem for the limited police forces in the mini-states.

The political structure of the area is thus characterized by a multiplicity of traditional regimes, mostly newly independent, which preside over the greatest oil reserves in the world and which — by and large — are ill-equipped to protect them. The Arab side of the Gulf appears to be the weaker half, fragmented into a number of states and rulers. It would inevitably succumb to political upheaval if Saudi Arabia failed to make a peaceful transition to a new monarch after Faisal leaves the scene. None of the smaller sheikhdoms is likely to survive a political shock such as a change in Saudi Arabia from kingship to a republic established by military coup.

There is also the possibility of the territorial disintegration of Saudi Arabia into the Hejaz, the Central Desert, the Nedj and the Hasa (where the oil fields are). But in any case a change in the character of Saudi leadership is likely to be destabilizing. If the governments in this area were to lose their traditional, i.e., royal, type of rule, this could bring about an even closer linkage between events in the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict — i.e., even stronger and more intimate ties on the Arab side than were developed during the fourth Arab-Israeli war, when Saudi Arabia agreed to cut oil exports to the United States and Hussein of Jordan supported the Arab cause with troops.

Under traditional rule, the oil-rich states will probably seek to maintain good political and commercial relations with the large industrial powers. But if a change in their leadership occurred, the revolutionary regimes taking over might seek to punish the West even more severely, and especially the United States, for its continued support of Israel by not only refusing to step up the production of oil, but permanently embargoing export of all oil to the United States. Even under King Faisal, and prior to the latest Arab-Israeli hostilities, Saudi Arabia had informed the United States that it would not increase production unless it saw important changes in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Israel. During and since the conflict it actually cut oil production by about 27 per cent. This change of attitude is due in no small measure to the pressure exerted upon the Saudis by the Palestinian guerrilla movements and other socialist Arab states. That Saudi Arabia was amenable to their arguments indicates the growing influence of these radical forces aimed at replacing traditional rule in the Arab world, and especially in the Persian Gulf. It should not be assumed, however, that if the United States discontinued its support for Israel, efforts to replace the present rulers with revolutionary leaderships would cease. The revolutionary movements oppose the rule of kings and sheikhs in any case. This would continue to be so even if the Arab-Israeli dispute were settled.

At both ends of Arabia a number of revolutionary movements already exist, based in Iraq and to the south, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In addition, since 1968, when Britain withdrew from the Aden Protectorate, a movement known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) has come into existence, its forerunner, the Dhofar Liberation Front, having been formed in 1965. PFLOAG has been active in Dhofar, the westernmost province of Oman, and this is one place where the common bond of kingship or traditional rule in opposition to radical Arabism has induced some cooperation between King Faisal and the Shah.

THE THREAT AS SEEN BY IRAN

The question often asked is, "What threat is Iran arming so massively to counter?" It is also frequently pointed out that Iraq is in no way a sufficient threat to justify the magnitude of Iran's armament program. Iraq is, however, only part of the threat as seen from Teheran. In the Iranian view the kind of rule Iraq represents is the real danger, because if it is not resisted it could spread on the Arabian side of the Gulf.

The Gulf is truly the most uniquely ruled area in the world, for of a total of fourteen states — counting the sheikhdoms individually — only one country backing onto the Gulf is nonroyal or quasi-royal in form of government, and that, of course, is Iraq. The overthrow of the kingship there in 1958 has thus far been the only break in the ring of traditional or royal rule around the littoral of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, as the only nontraditionally ruled state in the Gulf, Iraq has supported those elements and movements in the region that seek to overthrow kingly or sheikhly rule. Thus while Iraq proper is its principal antagonist, Teheran sees the source of future conflict in the Gulf in terms of swift changes in political leadership on the Arabian side which would transform the entire area by imposing a form of rule more in line with that represented by Baghdad. The Iranians are well aware that kingship is the common bond on both sides of the Gulf, transcending in some measure long-standing historical differences and mistrust, especially in the case of the two most important Gulf states — Saudi Arabia and Iran. If the difficulties and antagonisms smoldering between Iran and Iraq since 1958 can be taken as any measure of what we may expect if royal rule is eliminated from the Arabian side of the Gulf, the potential for open conflict would appear to be great.

In sum, as far as the local powers are concerned, Teheran perceives the real sources of future conflict in the Gulf to be those encouraging a rapid change in the type of rule on the Arabian littoral. A change of rule in Saudi Arabia from kingship to military control or some form of radical socialist Arab rule could immediately begin this process, for, barring intervention by another state or states, it seems evident that no form of traditional leadership could survive Saudi Arabia's change from monarchical rule to a government such as that in Syria or Iraq. This is especially true with regard to the mini-states in the southern Gulf, such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar or Bahrain.

On the basis of discussions with the Shah of Iran, I believe he conceives of the military capability he is developing largely as a deterrent to the efforts of nontraditional Arab elements or states in the region to alter the character of rule in the Gulf. But, should the deterrent fail, he undoubtedly would intervene if he thought it necessary — and certainly if he were asked to do so, for example, by one of the ruling sheikhs of the southern Gulf. Although his offer of troops to Kuwait at the time of that country's recent clash with Iraq was declined, such an offer would hardly be turned down if a Gulf state's territorial integrity was in imminent jeopardy.

In fact, the Shah might well determine that he would have to intervene with or without the agreement of a local ruler if he believed the threat was of such a magnitude as to threaten the security and stability of the entire Gulf. This possibility has led some to question whether he is not seeking more territory. His words last May were to this effect: "What do I need more territory for? All I am concerned about is the security of my country, and Iran's security is intimately related to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region."

IRAN, THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE GULF

Finally, a few words should be said about Iran's views of the superpowers and the Gulf. From an analysis of Iran's own assessment of the superpowers' role in this part of the world, I would conclude that the Iranians believe the United States and the Soviet Union, in reaching their general détente, have virtually excluded the Persian Gulf from this agreement as an area of competition, if not of overt confrontation. Iran is confident that her superior military power will enable her to deal with direct threats to her security as well as security elsewhere in the Gulf, provided no superpower intervenes on behalf of her foes, e.g., the USSR on the side of Iraq. Thus she would hope that the policies and presence of the United States and the Soviet Union would tend to deter each other and leave the resolution of Gulf problems in the hands of the Gulf states — Iran being the paramount local power. In this connection it should be noted that in consequence of the current Arab-Israeli fighting the ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Esa, has given Washington the required one-year notice that it must take its Middle East force (two combatant ships and a command vessel) out of Bahrain if the United States continues its support of Israel. The United States in turn has dispatched a carrier task force of six combatant vessels to the Indian Ocean to demonstrate its stake in the security and stability of the area, and there is at present no indication when they may leave.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has reclaimed the front pages as the key concern of world statesmen and governments, after a period of relative dormancy that shifted emphasis to the region east of Suez, i.e., the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula area. But the potential and real contentions that exist in the Gulf and are becoming more and more closely linked, when considered against the developing energy crisis, portend future struggles of perhaps even greater import than those which have taken place in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights.

SOUTH ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS

by Norman D. Palmer

DESPITE all the talk of peace and cooperation, Asia today is a troubled continent, full of discord and strife. At least three levels of conflict are painfully obvious: (1) great-power rivalry and confrontation, engaged in variously in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast and East Asia, but perhaps most dangerous on the Sino-Soviet border; (2) hostilities among Asian states, of which the Arab-Israeli war and the recent Indo-Pakistan war are tragic examples; and (3) turmoil within states, which has been responsible for a variety of forms of civil conflict, from the military-political-psychological struggle in Viet Nam, the clash between the western and eastern parts of Pakistan, and the current political test of wills in Korea, to the insurgency and subversive movements in India, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and still other Asian states.

The first kind of conflict is ominous, no matter where it is carried on, for it involves the risk of major war and untold misery and destruction. The second and third types can usually be contained, unless the great powers become directly involved. If great powers unite to seek a resolution of interstate or internal conflicts, or at least to effect a noticeable reduction of military operations and incendiary situations, their intervention may contribute to a lessening of tensions. Unfortunately, however, they seem usually to be on opposite sides in these conflicts, with the result that their support heightens the danger of escalation. This has been the case in most of Asia's troublespots.

In South Asia the three powers most directly and extensively involved in situations of confrontation and conflict — with some variations in the direction of cooperation — are the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Their activities have not been as obtrusive as the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the Middle East, or the U.S. military, political and economic intervention to rescue South Viet Nam and the less direct but still significant Soviet and Chinese support for North Viet Nam — and certainly not as dangerous as the smoldering Sino-Soviet dispute. But perhaps it is in South Asia that the three powers have engaged in the most direct rivalry and their confrontation has been the most complex and bewildering.

> The quest for influence on the part of external forces clearly bears on the area's problems. South Asia's geographic location on the southern border of the Sino-Soviet land mass, its close proximity to other areas where Great Power interests are particularly compelling and the basic fact that over a fifth of the world's population lives within its boundaries have invited outside interest and involvement. All the traditional weapons of peacetime diplomacy are in use on the subcontinent.[1]

In South Asia, as elsewhere, the policies the three powers have followed have been derivative ones, related to larger interests and objectives. In a sense, therefore, they could be said to have had no South Asian policies as such. To understand the course of their activities and approaches in the area, one must first look at the overall policies of these countries whose interests are at least continental, as in the case of China, or, for the United States and the Soviet Union, global in scope.

GREAT-POWER OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA

A major objective of each of the three powers in South Asia seems to be to counteract the moves and lessen the influence of the others. They obviously have certain interests in common, mainly to keep their encounters within manageable limits and to avoid becoming so involved in the internal affairs and conflicts that they will lose their freedom of maneuver and compromise their larger interests. While they are active in a great variety of ways, they do not want to become enmeshed in the affairs of the subcontinent. Yet each seems determined that neither of the others shall exercise any predominant influence. This position was clearly stated by President Nixon in his foreign affairs message of 1971, when he declared that American policy in South Asia was "to bring our activity into a stable balance with that of the other major powers with interests in the area." "We have a deep interest," he continued, "in insuring that the subcontinent does not become a focus of great power conflict. . . . We will try to keep our activities in balance with those of other major powers concerned . . . . no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence and . . . each can serve its own interests and the interests of South Asia best by conducting its activities in the region accordingly."[2]

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[1] From the statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, March 20, 1973, in *United States Interests in and Policies toward South Asia,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March 12, 15, 20 and 27, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 83.

Occasionally two of the major powers will appear to be on the same side in South Asian conflicts, in loose coalition against the other, as happened during the 1971 crisis when the United States and China, for different reasons and without real collaboration, generally took a pro-Pakistan position, whereas the USSR openly and strongly supported India. Occasionally, also, all three will appear to be following parallel policies, although for different reasons, as in the extension of substantial amounts of economic and/or military aid to one or more South Asian countries.

In a number of instances, on various issues and in many parts of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the dawning period of détente, have through tacit understandings or behind-the-scenes contacts worked together to prevent the escalation of particular disputes. This happened most notably in South Asia during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, when the superpowers used bilateral and multilateral channels of diplomacy to bring pressure on both contestants to end the fighting and resort to negotiations, and when the United States encouraged the successful efforts of Prime Minister Kosygin to bring the contending parties together at Tashkent and reach an agreement. Apparently the United States and the USSR made similar efforts during the Indo-Pakistan war at the end of 1971, even though during this critical period they took opposite sides. Both are in a sense status-quo powers as far as South Asia is concerned. They seem to be interested in the preservation of political stability and in peaceful change in the area, and to be apprehensive of any developments that might turn the subcontinent into an international conflict arena. For this reason, no doubt, both followed cautious and what they believed to be constructive and mediatory policies in the 1971 crisis, although their efforts were not successful in these respects and were often otherwise interpreted.

China, on the other hand, has tried to project a revolutionary image in South Asia, in keeping with its pose as a champion of national liberation movements everywhere. For all its vitriolic and radical propaganda, however, its policies have generally been pragmatic and cautious. In several key instances, as in the civil war in Pakistan in 1971 and in the 1971 insurgency in Ceylon, it has supported the government in power against the "liberation" movements.

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[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* a Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 111, 113-114.

China fears that Soviet moves in India, as elsewhere along its borders, are designed primarily to encircle and checkmate the People's Republic. Peking interpreted in this light the Soviet position during the Indo-Chinese border war of late 1962, the Brezhnev proposal of 1969 for a system of collective security in Asia, and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971. In the early stages of the rift between the two communist giants South Asia did not seem to be a critical area of competition. According to Chinese sources, however, "Sino-Soviet differences came out in the open for the first time in September, 1959, with Soviet support for India in the Sino-Indian border dispute" and were exacerbated on at least two other occasions because of divergent positions on South Asian military conflicts.

> The second escalation came in 1962-63 following Soviet support for India during the Sino-Indian border war. And the third was reached after the Soviets and the Chinese Government took diametrically opposite positions during the India-Pakistan war of 1965. It is over and in South Asia — on the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet frontiers and in the war between India and Pakistan — that the gathering tensions and strains in Moscow-Peking relations [have] exploded in near-physical clashes. The corrosive acid of course came from several other issues and conflicting interests, but the litmus was provided by what we may call the Indian Question.[3]

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA

The United States and the Soviet Union have been involved in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent in various ways since World War II, but more particularly since the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent states in 1947. China has had dealings in the area ever since the proclamation of the People's Republic in October 1949. The significant American and Soviet bids for influence, however, date from the mid-1950's, those of the Chinese from the early 1960's.[4]

Since the expansion of Soviet and American interests came during the period of the Cold War, it is not surprising that it was prompted by Cold War considerations and created an adversary relationship in South Asia, as elsewhere. The main instruments of policy for both countries were economic and to some extent military aid programs, as well as more extensive diplomatic and economic relations. The American economic assistance program began on an emergency basis in 1951, because of the wheat famine in India, and soon became a major program of aid to both India and Pakistan. Then in 1954, during the Dulles era, the United States became involved in military aid and alliance programs with Pakistan. This development fitted in nicely with Secretary Dulles' global objectives but created special complications for the United States in its relations with India — which under its nonalignment policy indignantly spurned U.S. offers of military aid and other associations — and was of course strongly criticized by the Soviet Union.

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[3] Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 36.

[4] For general reviews of the relations of the great powers with the countries of South Asia see William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Norman D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Policy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); Sen Gupta, *op. cit.;* Zafar Imam, *World Powers in South and South East Asia* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1972); Balwant Bhaneja, *The Politics of Triangle: The Alignment Patterns in South Asia, 1961-71* (Delhi: Research Publications, 1973); and Harish Kapur, *The Embattled Triangle: Moscow-Peking-New Delhi* (Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1973).

Pakistan and the United States signed a mutual defense assistance agreement in May 1954, and this was supplemented by aides-mémoire in 1954, 1960, 1961 and 1962. Pakistan also entered into SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) in 1955. For some years, as "America's most allied ally" in Asia, this country placed great reliance on the American connection, which brought it a powerful friend, economic and military aid, and enhanced international status. But the alliance was an unnatural one at best, since the two states had different positions, interests and objectives. These differences became more apparent in the early 1960's, as preoccupation with military alliances — "pactomania" — and the Cold War generally waned and as Pakistan became increasingly disillusioned by the limitations and reservations of the United States' policy toward its "most allied ally," especially because the Americans were at the same time giving an even greater amount of aid and attention to its huge rival in the subcontinent, India.

Pakistan's commitment to the United States, and its reservations concerning U.S. policies and motivations, were frankly expressed by its President, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, in a memorable address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in July 1961.[5] Thereafter U.S.-Pakistan relations became noticeably cooler. Another consequence was that Pakistan lost interest in SEATO and CENTO[6] — which seemed to involve it in dangerous

[5] See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

[6] Pakistan officially withdrew from SEATO in 1972, and its participation in CENTO has been quite limited for some years.

commitments serving the ends of other countries more than its own, and which gave it no extra protection against India — and turned increasingly toward the People's Republic of China, while trying at all times to retain some contacts with *both* superpowers. However, relations with Washington improved markedly during the 1971 crisis in South Asia, when the United States tended to "tilt toward Pakistan," to use Dr. Kissinger's rather unfortunate expression. They have continued to be friendly since Z. A. Bhutto, who in the past was openly critical of the United States and pro-Chinese in his views, became President of Pakistan in December 1971, but they have never regained the spirit of the late 1950's.

The ups and downs in Indo-American relations have roughly paralleled those in Indo-Pakistan relations, in reverse order, and to some extent the same can be said of India's relations with the Soviet Union and China. During the first ambassadorship of Chester Bowles, one of India's favorite Americans, in 1951-1953, Indo-American relations became really extensive and cordial. India had not then developed close relations with the new Chinese communist regime, and was in fact puzzled by some of the policies and statements emanating from Peking, notably regarding Tibet. Later in the 1950's, as Dulles' policies prevailed in the United States and the U.S. government entered into military arrangements with and gave military aid to Pakistan, Indo-American relations lost their warmth. It was not a coincidence that at the same time Indo-Soviet relations became extensive and those with the PRC so euphoric that the period was often characterized as the *Hindi-Chini bhai bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers) era.

That Indo-American relations had again improved was symbolized by President Eisenhower's enthusiastic reception in India in late 1959. They reached a high point in the fall of 1962 and thereafter, when the United States rushed emergency military assistance to India after the outbreak of the border war with China and agreed to provide further military aid over the next few years. On the whole the Kennedy years, 1961-1963, marked a good phase in the relationship. President Kennedy was known to be a friend, and he appointed other friends of India to facilitate his administration's relations with that country.[7]

There followed a dip to the plateau of formally correct relations, with considerable resentment and criticism on both sides, and considerable apathy and indifference in official American circles. The shadow of Viet Nam clouded the Indo-U.S. horizon, as it did all aspects of American foreign and domestic policies. Indian spokesmen, including Mrs. Gandhi herself, were among the most vocal critics of America's Viet Nam policy, which did nothing to commend India in the already jaundiced eyes of Presidents Johnson and Nixon. As a result of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the United States suspended all military and economic aid to both contestants. Economic aid was renewed after a few months, but it has been gradually diminishing ever since. Military aid has been denied for the past eight years, although limited amounts of "non-lethal" equipment were made available to Pakistan on two or three occasions under highly controversial circumstances.

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[7] These included Chester Bowles, who served as Under Secretary of State, then as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, then as Ambassador to India (for the second time); Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, who preceded Bowles as Ambassador to India.

During the 1971 South Asian crisis, the United States took an obvious, if rather mild, pro-Pakistan position — which it continued even during the harsh repression by Pakistani troops in East Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistan war. Since then both American and Indian spokesmen have repeatedly professed their desire and intention to place relations on a better basis, but in actuality they have remained cool and have been limited rather than extended in most respects, apparently because of the deliberate policy of the Indian government and the indifference of the American. As the South Asian correspondent of the *New York Times* observed in September 1973, "Relations between the United States and India in recent years have rested somewhere between tortured and angry, exacerbated by numerous political as well as emotional elements."[8]

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH ASIA

The relations of the Soviet Union with the countries of South Asia have also been characterized by distinct ups and downs. Soviet spokesmen were generally critical of the leaders of the Indian independence movement, including Gandhi and Nehru, and of the Indian National Congress, and this criticism continued, with some variations and mutations, for the first few years after India's independence. They were equally critical of the Muslim League and of Pakistan, but they gave little attention to this "truncated" and religiously-impregnated country until it entered into its military associations with the United States in 1954. From that time until the 1960's the Soviets made Pakistan an object of some of their most vitriolic propaganda attacks, dismissing it as an "American stooge."

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[8] Bernard Weinraub, "A Friendly Hand But No Arms," *New York Times*, September 16, 1973. Weinraub was reporting from Rawalpindi on the eve of Prime Minister Bhutto's official visit to the United States.

In the mid-1950's, shortly after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union embarked on a multifaceted program designed to counter the activities of the United States and other Western powers and to enhance its own influence in the underdeveloped countries, especially around its periphery. This took the form of a series of highly coordinated and orchestrated "offensives" with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and propaganda aspects,[9] and, as the major underdeveloped country along the borders of the USSR, India was a central target. In consequence, relations between India and the Soviet Union became much closer and more extensive, at a time when India's relations with the United States were deteriorating and her approach to China (before the Sino-Soviet split) was gaining at least surface cordiality. The new era in the Indo-Soviet association was symbolized by the highly-publicized visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India in November and December 1955.

When the Indo-Chinese border war erupted in late 1962, Indians were somewhat confused by the ambivalent position adopted by the Soviet Union, but on the whole they were impressed by the Soviets' willingness to criticize a communist "brother" and to continue economic and military aid to their Indian "friends." Subsequently Moscow appeared to temper its support of India on all issues relating to intraregional disputes, including the Kashmir question, by observing a more balanced position. This was evidenced by the Soviet role in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, when, instead of backing India, the USSR urged both sides to stop the fighting and to settle their differences by negotiations. In the role of mediator, it offered its "good offices" and invited the leaders of India and Pakistan to meet on "Soviet soil" to seek a settlement. The result was the famous Tashkent conference in January 1966, at which President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, with considerable prompting from Prime Minister Kosygin, reached a historic agreement. This was officially welcomed — and at the same time widely criticized — in both India and Pakistan.

Thereafter Moscow seemed to persevere in maintaining cordial relations with India without committing itself too closely to that country, and concurrently developing somewhat broader ties with Pakistan. The shift created some apprehensions and doubts in India, especially in 1968 when rumors of fairly extensive Soviet military assistance to Pakistan turned out to be substantially true. India's "special relationship" seemed to have disappeared, and an era of more detached and impartial Soviet policy seemed to have begun.

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[9] See Edward Taborsky, *Communist Penetration of the Third World* (New York: Robert Speller, 1973).

But a new "special relationship" soon emerged, dramatized and consolidated during the 1971 crisis when the Soviet Union gave unqualified support to India in its opposition to Pakistan and to the people of East Pakistan who were fighting against the Pakistani troops. The high point of the new relationship came in August 1971 with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty was a great boost to Indian morale at a time when the country needed definite assurance of support against possible hostile moves by China in the event that Indian initiatives on behalf of the "freedom fighters" in East Pakistan developed into a full-fledged war. It was also useful to Moscow in its campaign to checkmate China and to obtain at least verbal interest in the Brezhnev proposal for a system of collective security in Asia. Thus it seemed at once to promote Indian interests and objectives in South Asia and Soviet interests and objectives in Asia generally.

Following the conclusion of the treaty, the already substantial Soviet presence and influence in India became even more obvious. At the same time the Soviet Union was establishing special ties with the new state of Bangladesh — it had, after all, been the only great power to support the resistance movement in East Pakistan — and was showing an interest in developing its contacts in what was left of Pakistan. This dual interest in Bangladesh and Pakistan, in addition to the "special relationship" with India, was indicated by the visits of both Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Z. A. Bhutto to the USSR in 1972.

CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA

India welcomed the victory of the Chinese communists and the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and its spokesmen often expressed the confident expectation that Asia's two largest states would cooperate in all areas of mutual interest and play an increasingly important role in the new era of independence and Asian awakening. Some of China's early moves, especially the dispatch of Chinese troops into Tibet in 1950 and Peking's brusque response to the Indian protests made bilaterally and in the United Nations General Assembly came as a shock, but the belief in cooperative relations between the two Asian neighbors persisted, overcoming doubts and reservations even on the part of Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders. The Sino-Indian treaty regarding Tibet, concluded in 1954, for the first time in a major agreement incorporated the famous *panchsheel* or *panch shila,* the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and endorsement of the *panchsheel* was emphasized in the joint communiqué marking the end of Chou En-lai's visit to India in June of the same year. These developments ushered in the *Hindi-Chini bhai bhai* period, which was characterized from the Indian side by an almost euphoric admiration of the new China, and on both sides by frequent diplomatic and cultural exchanges and professions of undying friendship.

The vision of a friendly China working hand in hand with India was rudely shattered in 1959, however, by the ruthless measures taken by the Chinese to put down the uprising in Tibet, whence the Dalai Lama and thousands of his followers fled to Indian asylum. These traumatic events were followed by open differences with China regarding the McMahon Line and other boundaries, the building by the Chinese of a road across the Aksai Chin section of Ladakh, in territory which India claimed, clashes between Indian and Chinese border patrols, and other causes of friction previously withheld from public knowledge. More serious border clashes followed, and the exchanges between Nehru and Chou En-lai became sharper.

In consequence, India and China have been involved since 1959 in a hostile confrontation situation, in a physical sense along India's Himalayan frontiers and in a political, diplomatic and propaganda sense on a wide range of issues. The peak of hostility came in October-November 1962, when they became involved in a border war in the North East Frontier Agency and in Ladakh. India suffered humiliating reverses in this war, and was forced to turn to outside powers, notably the United States and Britain, for military, economic and other forms of emergency assistance, in spite of its frequent criticism of these "imperialist" powers and its long-standing policy of "nonalignment."

In the meantime China, which had paid little attention to Pakistan except to denounce it continuously for its military ties with the United States and other "imperialist" states, showed an interest in developing relations with that country. This interest was cordially reciprocated, since Pakistan was becoming disillusioned with the United States and disturbed by the extensive Soviet support of India. In 1963 the two governments concluded a much-publicized border agreement and several other agreements. Since then Peking has developed stronger ties with Pakistan while continuing to spurn Indian feelers for the "normalization" of relations and a reversal of the present position of hostility.

China has openly supported Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and most other issues in dispute between the subcontinental powers. During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 it strongly backed Pakistan, while the United States and the Soviet Union were trying to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Chinese moves along India's borders seemed designed to take some of the pressure off Pakistan, complicate Indian military operations, and raise the specter of China entering the war. During the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971 Peking made no concrete moves to distract and alarm India, as it had in 1965, but it gave Pakistan complete verbal support and some economic and military assistance. In spite of its claims to support national liberation movements, it thus sided with the government that was attempting to suppress the major movement of this kind of the century. Since the emergence of Bangladesh, China has shown no interest in cultivating good relations with the new state, which it apparently regards as being under the control of inept bourgeois leaders who are hardly more than wards or stooges of India and the Soviet Union.

GREAT-POWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1971 CRISIS

The divergent positions taken by the great powers, and the new order that has emerged in the area as a result of the traumatic developments of 1971, have given South Asia, and especially India, a new importance in Asian and world affairs and have dramatized the dangerously conflictual great-power relationships bearing on that part of the world.[10] All three external powers followed rather cautious policies to avoid too deep an involvement in the crisis and the war which followed. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union cautioned India to exercise restraint and to shun war with Pakistan if at all possible, and that behind the scenes the United States encouraged Soviet initiatives in this direction.

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[10] See Norman D. Palmer, "The New Order in South Asia," ORBIS, Winter 1972, pp. 1109-1121.

One could argue, of course, that Moscow's policies, reinforced by the Indo-Soviet treaty, gave India the green light to take a hard line toward Pakistan and an increasingly "unneutral" position toward that country's civil war. President Nixon insists that his "tilt toward Pakistan" was justified as a means of influencing the Yahya Khan government to impose less brutal measures of repression in East Pakistan, and of saving the imprisoned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from execution. He also insists that his moves in the course of the sixteen-day war were helpful in bringing the conflict to a speedy end – even though his direction of a tough U.S. line toward India in the United Nations Security Council and his dispatch to the Bay of Bengal of a Seventh Fleet task force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, *Enterprise*, thoroughly alarmed the Indians. Many of those alienated have since asserted that they now regard the United States as a security threat to India.

The crisis revealed that the United States and China were in a weak strategic, political, and perhaps moral position to give any really significant assistance to Pakistan, whereas the Soviet Union ran little risk in giving substantial political support and concrete aid to India. As Stanley Hoffmann observed in 1972,

> In the Indo-Pakistan war of December, 1971, the United States, China and Pakistan did not "balance" India and Russia. Neither America nor China was ready to commit forces, and a verbal "tilting" toward Pakistan aimed at safeguarding our rapprochement with Peking and at warning Moscow, merely underlined Moscow's successful exploitation of India's desire to dismantle Pakistan and strengthened unnecessarily the bonds between Moscow and Delhi. The traditional balance-of-power mechanism, while enforcing self-restraint upon ambitions, depended on the opposite of self-restraint — the readiness of great powers to use force. If the risks are too great or the stakes too low, the balance cannot operate.[11]

Although this balance-of-power approach is probably tangential to an analysis of the external pressures and internal dynamics at work in South Asia in 1971, it does throw light on the limitations under which the United States and China were placed in their rather ineffectual efforts to promote their own interests in that situation.

The 1971 conflict was critical not so much because it was marked by civil war in the world's eighth most populous nation, or even because the civil war spilled over into India and involved the world's second most populous nation, but because it drew the world's three major powers into a conflictual relationship. In the words of Professor G. W. Choudhury:

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[11] Stanley Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1972, p. 630.

> The civil war in Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh were mainly due to internal political developments and the irresponsible role of the ruling elite and the two major political parties in Pakistan. Yet the tragic events of 1971 involved the three major powers — USA, USSR, and China — and India directly or indirectly in the crisis. The Indo-Pakistan conflict in Bangladesh was not merely a regional conflict between the two countries — it was not only another phase in the long religious conflict between the Muslims and the Hindus, not only a moral conflict between Pakistan's vicious suppression of the Bangladesh rebels and India's calculated military aggression to dismember the Pakistani state. Back of all this, there was a power struggle between China and the Soviet Union, a strategic struggle between Moscow and Washington. The war in Bangladesh, though begun as an internal East-West Pakistan conflict, turned into a wider one involving the five most populous countries in the world — China, Russia, the United States, India and Pakistan.[12]

Although his observations may exaggerate the external dimensions of the 1971 war, they underscore the valid point that it was not merely an intraregional conflict but one that concerned the great powers and thus raised the specter of a wider conflagration.

Undoubtedly the Soviet Union emerged from the crisis with enhanced prestige and influence, especially in India but also in Asia as a whole. The United States and China were the losers as far as great-power influence in South Asia is concerned. Possibly they can regain much of this if they make special efforts to improve their relations with India and to establish friendly relations with Bangladesh, which needs all the friends it can get in its efforts at nation-building, if not survival. The United States has taken some steps in these directions, but China has not. Neither country seems to be greatly interested in its South Asian image these days. China still leans toward bolstering Pakistan as a counterweight to Soviet — and perhaps also American — influence in the subcontinent.

As long as India and Bangladesh are so strongly under Soviet influence, Peking will probably not make the effort to establish better relations with either of the "bourgeois" regimes now in power. It seems to take the longer view that both countries will experience more serious internal disturbances and liberation movements, under leadership sympathetic to China, which it can support and perhaps even direct. Although Washington gives indifferent attention to South Asia, it has shown some interest in improving relations with India. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have advocated the continuance of economic aid to that country, on a diminishing scale, in the face of strong Congressional opposition. The Nixon Administration extended recognition to Bangladesh within a reasonably decent time, but no American ambassador has yet been sent to Dacca, and despite the special interest in Pakistan, several months passed before Henry Byroade was named as successor to Ambassador Joseph Farland, who left Pakistan in April 1972.

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[12] G. W. Choudhury, in unpublished précis of a book entitled *The Last Days of United Pakistan: Emergence of Bangladesh* (forthcoming).

GREAT-POWER INVOLVEMENT IN CEYLON AND NEPAL

Just as the civil war in Pakistan had begun in full fury, a group of young radicals in Ceylon, disgruntled by the alleged failure of Mrs. Bandaranaike's government to fulfill its election pledges, staged an uprising which for a few hours threatened to bring down the government and even to overturn the political system. When Ceylon's relatively small police and military units had difficulty in dealing with the insurgency, largely because they lacked equipment and weapons, Mrs. Bandaranaike cast aside her nonalignment scruples and appealed for outside aid. This was immediately forthcoming, in limited amounts, from a strange assortment of countries, including the United States, the USSR, China, the subcontinental contenders India and Pakistan, Britain, Yugoslavia and Egypt. All three great powers appeared to favor the perpetuation of Mrs. Bandaranaike's regime and the Ceylonese political system as it then existed. This stand may be more surprising on the part of China than of the superpowers, for China was supposed to be a supporter of national liberation movements and the young Ceylonese insurgents, who were dubbed "Che Guevarists" by the press (they were not called "Maoists" or "neo-Maoists," perhaps because of Ceylon's special relations with China), seemed to be making many "Maoist" demands. But China strongly backed Mrs. Bandaranaike, and Chou En-lai himself openly denounced the "Che Guevarists." In this case, therefore, the three great powers were on the same side, along with other countries that have seldom found themselves in the same company; yet their response reflected neither cooperation nor collusion, only a temporary mutuality of interests.

All three great powers also figure as competitors in Nepal, which is a particularly interesting conflict arena. Nepal has been trying to play what might be called a Himalayan balance-of-power game, designed to reduce, or at least offset, its heavy dependence on India without succumbing to China's influence. The United States and the Soviet Union have therefore been welcome so long as they maintain a low and discreet posture and do not transfer their overall rivalries too vigorously to the Himalayan kingdom. The superpowers provide a great deal of economic assistance to Nepal, and help, if only in a peripheral way, to counteract both Indian and Chinese pressures.

THE GREAT POWERS IN SOUTH ASIA: RELATIVE INFLUENCE

At the present time the position of the outside powers in South Asia can be summarized succinctly. All three are deeply involved in the area, in various relationships with the indigenous states and in various postures of confrontation — and occasionally limited cooperation — among themselves. The Soviet Union is clearly the most influential and the most favored of the three in India. The United States has lost a great deal of prestige, but it is still extensively involved in India and there are some signs of improvement in official Indo-American relations, after a period of stress and strain. India's relations with China have been hostile since 1959, and there are no indications that the Chinese are ready to respond favorably to Indian overtures for a rapprochement. Hence, William Barnds has observed, "As long as India faces Chinese hostility and American indifference, New Delhi will have little option but to rely heavily upon the Soviet Union, and Moscow will endeavor to exploit this state of affairs."[13]

With the Pakistanis, China is clearly the most favored nation. In the 1950's the United States enjoyed this position. Still, U.S.-Pakistan relations have tended to become closer in recent months, after several years of limited contacts and divergent ways. While the Soviet Union cannot qualify as a favorite in Pakistan, because of its close association with India, it is apparent that Moscow is interested in maintaining some ties with the Pakistanis in order to counter the influence of China and the United States and to avoid putting all of its South Asian eggs in the Indian basket, with an eye to Asian and global strategy. Pakistan needs the superpowers as well as China, and seems to realize that it is not in a position to demand any changes in their policies as a price for friendly relations. This point was well expressed by one of the country's ablest political commentators, Z. A. Suleri:

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[13] William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1972, p. 31.

> We can no more deter Moscow from the pursuit of its global strategy than we were able to do with Washington. And as expressions of indignation proved futile with America in 1962, so they would now with Russia. Yet the irony of it is that national interests demand that we do nothing to mar beyond repair our relations with either.[14]

Maintaining good relations with all three powers has been no less than a feat of diplomatic legerdemain.

In Bangladesh the presence and influence of the Soviet Union are strong, and of the United States much less but growing. The Chinese presence is nonexistent, and whatever influence Peking has is marginal, or perhaps potential. Moscow benefited greatly from its support of the East Pakistan resistance movement and of Indian actions in the 1971 crisis. In a sense, as one Bangladesh official observed to this author, "We inherited the Russians along with the Indians." As anti-Indian feeling grows, and Bangladesh nurtures an increasingly assertive nationalism, the Soviet Union will have to act discreetly to preserve its influence, but at the moment it is thriving.

Through reasonably prompt recognition of the new state, and through an extensive program of economic assistance, the United States has been able to gain some acceptance in Bangladesh, in spite of its support of Pakistan all during the crisis and its callous and inexcusable failure (in Bangalee eyes) to speak out against the Pakistani excesses in the East, but for some time to come the U.S. role in Bangladesh affairs will be limited. This will be particularly the case if more radical forces gain the upper hand in that new state or if the United States continues to give only peripheral attention to the South Asian area.

SOUTH ASIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GREAT POWERS

No matter what the immediate state of their relations with particular countries, all of the South Asian countries share a deep-seated suspicion and concern regarding the activities and intentions of *all* great powers. This stems in part from the colonial past, but it is continually being sharpened by great-power rivalries that often seem to affect them adversely. The South Asian states are desirous of developing positions of greater independence in all respects. They want to avoid, or at least minimize, interference in their affairs. They fear that the powers will try to exploit their internal weaknesses and divisions and their intraregional conflicts. They do not want to become an arena of great-power rivalry and conflict. They believe the major powers are seeking to keep them subordinate and dependent for their own ends. Mrs. Gandhi frequently voices this particular fear, and she does not exempt the Soviet Union from her charges, although she refrains from mentioning that country by name. At a rally in Kutch on January 3, 1972, for example, she flatly asserted: "The leaders of Asian countries should realize that the big powers do not want Asian nations to become stronger and are trying to weaken them instead."

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[14] *Pakistan Times,* February 18, 1968.

India, the dominant regional power in South Asia, is particularly concerned with enhancing its independence, its freedom of maneuver and its international status. It feels keenly that the great powers either do not recognize its new position or are deliberately refusing to accord it due recognition so as to keep it in a subordinate role. Its security problems in the subcontinent have been greatly reduced by the break-up of Pakistan, but it is alarmed by its relative weakness vis-à-vis a hostile China, since China is rapidly gaining a substantial nuclear capability and is also developing intermediate-range and, reportedly, intercontinental ballistic missiles. India feels, no doubt rightly, that in the event of another conflict with China it could not count on either or both of the superpowers to guarantee it against a Chinese nuclear attack.

For all these reasons India has refused to adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is keeping its options open as far as going nuclear is concerned. There is strong sentiment in the country for the development of a nuclear capability, which is technically possible even though the financial — and perhaps also the political and psychological — costs might be most difficult to bear. If India does go nuclear, even in a minimal way, this action may increase the levels of tension in South Asia. Indians who advocate the nuclear path argue that the effects will be generally constructive, or that this is a path India *must* take, whatever the costs and risks.

Three citations from the Indian and Pakistani press will illustrate the South Asians' abiding suspicion of the great powers. "The real threat to Asia," asserted the *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta) of April 18, 1972, "is posed not by any of the nations in the subcontinent — not even China armed with nuclear teeth or Japan, Asia's economic Colossus, certainly not by the gentle giant that India is — but by the superpowers, the chief of which is the United States." But while exempting China from its strictures, this journal maintained: "For ensuring peace in the continent it is essential that it should be insulated against big power influence.

Also, the integrity, independence and sovereignty of all nations must be protected."

A few weeks later *The Times of India* voiced a parallel concern, with reference to all the great powers. After admitting that the countries of the Third World had "by and large benefited" from the "unrestrained competition between America, Russia and China," the newspaper speculated on the probable effects the new era in great-power relationships might have on the Third World countries. It was troubled because "the three great powers have shown that they are more than willing to subordinate the interests of their friends and allies as well as their ideological differences to the requirements of better relations among themselves." This is one of the reasons why the less powerful states of the world seem at times to be as apprehensive of the consequences of great-power collaboration as they have been of great-power conflicts and hostile behavior. An editorial in the *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) of May 22, 1972 commented thus on the summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972:

> It is time the super Powers adjusted themselves to the new global realities — military, political and economic. . . . What is needed now is not any division of the world into spheres of influence or reversion to the old balance-of-power theory, but a new system in which the rights of the big and small Powers are readjusted on the principle of equality of nations, respect for national sovereignty and positive co-existence between the strong and the weak, and between the "haves" and "have-nots" of the international community.

Building the kind of "new system" the *Pakistan Times* envisioned will call for an unprecedented degree of statesmanship and a genuine desire for a "more stable structure of peace," to use President Nixon's words, on the part of the major powers, and for more positive contributions and a greater degree of cooperation on the part of all other states. In this task the regional powers, like the great powers, will have a special responsibility. Indeed, as one of India's ablest students of international affairs has written: ". . . for those who are concerned with the problem of erecting a structure of stable peace in the world, the question that needs urgent attention is a redetermination of the role and status of the regional powers in the international political system."[15] This is an aspect of contemporary international relations that has not yet received sufficient attention.

[15] Sisir Gupta, "The Great Powers and the Sub-continent: A New Phase?," *The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Journal,* April 1972, p. 462.

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN: THE SOUTH ASIAN VIEW

The changing situation in the Indian Ocean, and especially the competitive presence of the superpowers' naval units, is a source of growing concern to India and Sri Lanka, and also to Pakistan. Sri Lanka and India are leading exponents of the demand that the Indian Ocean should be an area of peace, not a zone of confrontation. They ask the great powers to keep their fleets, and certainly their nuclear-armed vessels, out of the area, and to forgo building bases or developing other special facilities anywhere in the region. Mrs. Bandaranaike spoke vigorously on this theme at the conference of nonaligned states in Lusaka in September 1970, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in Singapore in January 1971, and in an address to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971. Mrs. Gandhi has made the same demands in many addresses at home and abroad, and in private discussions with leaders of some of the big powers.

Since 1968 the Soviet Union has maintained a continuing naval presence of small size in the Indian Ocean, has sent a number of task forces on goodwill visits to various Asian and African states bordering on the ocean, has developed port facilities in South Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, and has helped India to enlarge its navy by providing it with technical assistance, ships and equipment, a major Indian effort being the construction of a large naval base at Visakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal. There have been rumors that the Soviets have been given base rights in all of the South Asian states on the Indian Ocean, but these remain unsubstantiated, and have been strongly denied.

The United States has no permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean area, except for three small ships based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf; but it does have special port, communications and other rights in Australia and Ethiopia, and it is developing an "austere" communication and port facility, plus an airstrip, on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago.

Britain continues to be interested in the Indian Ocean situation, in spite of its decision to effect a wholesale withdrawal from east of Suez. France has shown an increasing interest in the area, although it has not so far been actively represented by naval units. Japan is concerned mainly because of the problem of protecting its sea lanes to the Persian Gulf, from which it obtains nearly 90 per cent of its vital oil; in all probability, as Japan assumes a more active role in Asian/Pacific affairs it will also become more of a factor in the Indian Ocean basin.

China is not in a position to send naval forces to the Indian Ocean, even if it wished to do so, but it has already established fairly extensive contacts with at least one state bordering on the ocean, namely Tanzania, and it will probably be increasingly concerned with the activities of the superpowers in the area. Peking has missile and nuclear experts in Tanzania, perhaps preparing for a test of the first Chinese ICBM's. If the test is made in that area, from missile sites in Sinkiang, the ICBM's will be fired over India, which will further alarm the Indians and increase pressures for them to develop their own nuclear and missile capabilities.

Although the Soviet Union is the most active power in the Indian Ocean today, and the only one to maintain a continuing naval presence in those waters, the South Asian states seem to be more concerned about American operations and intentions in the area than about Soviet moves. Since they cannot achieve their main objective of keeping the big powers out, they wish the latter's activities would be kept at a low level to avert dangerous rivalries in the oceans about them as well as in the subcontinent itself.

GREAT-POWER INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA: FUTURE SCENARIOS

The deep and continuing involvement of the three major powers in the affairs of South Asia has made that area a critical conflict arena, even though it has been spared an escalation of their tensions to the military level. The two superpowers and China are in the delicate process of working out different patterns of relations among themselves in the new era of multipolarity. South Asia, where all three are directly involved, is obviously one of the theaters in which these new relations will come into play. The lineup during the 1971 crisis, when the United States and China supported one regional contestant and the Soviet Union the other, is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the evolving relationship. Much attention has been given to the rapport developing between the United States and China, but the continuing, if halting and often stalemated, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on major issues of international importance are of equal and probably greater significance. Among all three powers the pattern, in South Asia as elsewhere, will almost certainly continue to be more conflictual than cooperative – at best, what Marshall Shulman has called a "limited adversary relationship." This point was well made in an analysis of the South Asian crisis by a Middle East expert:

> What will the new pattern of relationships between the three big powers be? Although the dramatic American change of policy toward China and the way in which the Americans and Chinese reacted to the Indo-Pakistan war gave the superficial impression of a Sino-American front, the shared or at least coincidental interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the containment of China are still strong and important and probably supersede — at least in the short-term future — any shared interests that may exist between China and America. It can be expected therefore that, rather than there being an understanding between America and China on Asian problems, these two powers plus the U.S.S.R. will manoeuvre and attempt to contain each other's power. In this game the three big powers will take turns in creating shifting *ad hoc* alliances among themselves in which two will take, in turns, the same side directed at the third and in which, again in the short run, Russia and the United States will find themselves usually on the same side.[16]

South Asia has suffered through a wide variety of recurring conflicts within states, the spill-over effects of these internal conflicts on neighboring states, and serious intraregional conflicts, especially between India and Pakistan, in the background of which the external powers have hovered. The indigenous states can help to keep the area from becoming a critical conflict arena by putting their own houses in order, by avoiding intraregional strife, and by playing a constructive and cooperative role in Asian and world affairs. The great powers can contribute to the same end by *not* making South Asia a focal point of their rivalries and by *not* attempting to exploit internal and intraregional animosities and weaknesses for their own immediate ends.

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[16] Yair Evron, "War in the Indian Sub-continent," *New Middle East*, January 1972, p. 15.

JAPAN: RESURGENT POWER

by Gaston J. Sigur

ON various occasions in modern times, the word "Japan" has conjured up different visions to the Westerner. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Japan was equated with exotic. Its people were looked upon as unspoiled and lovely, akin to Puccini's leading lady, Madame Butterfly. American missionaries tended to spread this view, echoing the words of their earliest predecessor, the great Jesuit, Francis Xavier, who wrote in the mid-sixteenth century during his stay in Japan, "These people are the delight of my heart." However, Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 brought a different image to the Western eye — a picture of a people capable of bearing great hardship and sustaining heavy human loss for *Yamato Damashii* (the Spirit of Japan) and their emperor. Continued Japanese expansionism in Asia, coupled with attempts to build an industrial and military capacity on a par with that of major Western countries and, finally, the Japanese decision to challenge the United States and Great Britain in East Asia, led the West to assess Japan as a major power in every sense of the term. She had large military forces, a substantial and growing industrial complex, economic strength, a stable social and political environment, and a government and people with strong nationalist feelings capable of going to the ultimate in defense of what they deemed to be the national interest.

The defeat of Japan in World War II changed this assessment, as reality demanded, but in the 1970's world statesmen once again see Japan as one of the great world powers. While she lacks the continental base that some strategic thinkers consider necessary for the attainment of superpower status, she already is a global economic power and is exerting increasing influence in multilateral and bilateral political and diplomatic councils. She has the financial means and know-how to develop a conventional military force equal to any now in existence and a nuclear capability of major proportions. However, this military potential will remain merely that unless and until the Japanese take the decision to alter the present policy of maintaining only a modest self-defense force kept relatively stationary in numbers but with new and improved weaponry added to its arsenal over the years. Given the nation's economic and technological strength, such a change in direction, if decided upon, could result in a militarily powerful Japan in only a few years' time. Thus, Japan's present and potential power makes her a much sought after ally, partner, investor, and/or aid dispenser.

UNITED STATES POLICY AND JAPAN

For the United States, Japan is an indispensable ally and partner. American policy in Asia is based on the Japan-United States alliance. Without the assurance of a friendly, understanding and supportive government in Tokyo it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Washington to pursue its policy in Asia of assisting noncommunist societies in their efforts to maintain independence. Too often Americans tend to think that the alliance is a one-way street, with the United States committing itself to defend Japan's basic security while Japan gives little in return or, worse than that, simply gets richer as a result. But, even though Japan has benefited perhaps more than the United States from the close association — particularly if one recalls her devastated state at the time the Security Treaty was signed in 1952 — it can still be strongly argued that the United States' need for such ties is also great.

This is true because the United States has been committed in the past and is committed now to fulfilling a major role in Asia. Every Chief Executive since President McKinley has enunciated a policy of involvement in Asia's affairs. This has ranged from Theodore Roosevelt's successful efforts to re-establish peace in Asia by mediating an end to the Russo-Japanese War, to combat in the Second World War, Korea and Viet Nam, and, today, to the Nixon Doctrine which promises continued U.S. involvement and aid to Asian nations desirous of helping themselves to maintain their independence. In his latest report to Congress on foreign affairs, President Nixon stated clearly the American resolve to honor commitments and live up to responsibilities in Asia. He said, "The United States will continue to be a major power in Asia and to make its essential contribution to the creation of a stable framework of peace."[1] The key word in this sentence is "essential," for without a positive U.S. contribution peace and stability would probably have little meaning for the two-thirds of the world's population living in Asia.

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[1] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace.* A report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, May 3, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 113.

For the United States to maintain its position in Asia, it is of basic importance that Japan accept the American role. Until quite recently, Washington's posture toward Japan was essentially a negative one, the idea being to pursue a policy that would best assist the continuation of a government in Tokyo clearly determined to retain the alliance. Some have stated that the Security Treaty between the two countries remains valid today only because it serves "as a deterrent against domestic extremism."[2] This view is based on the belief that the broadening relations of both the United States and Japan with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have decreased the chances of armed conflict or armed blackmail to the point where a military alliance structure is no longer required. Thus, the U.S. bases in Japan are to be used by the United States at the behest of the Japanese government in the event of a domestic threat arising from extremist forces bent on the violent overthrow of constitutional authority. But this view is out of date. While it is correct to point out that the Security Treaty served, until 1960, in part as an instrument to be used if Japan was threatened by extremist insurrection, its purpose now is wholly to meet an external threat. If one looks realistically at the world situation, it is difficult not to perceive that such a threat exists. The United States' policy toward Japan is based on just such a perception.

As long as the Soviet Union and China continue to build up their conventional military strength and add to their nuclear arsenals, neither the United States nor Japan can afford the euphoria of thinking that they no longer have reason to fear the communist giants. Massive power in the hands of governments that can change policies overnight without worrying about public opinion is obviously of concern to those persistently called "enemies" by those governments' propaganda organs. Even if, as some wistfully hope, the leaders of these totalitarian states no longer fully subscribe to the propaganda released in their names, the leadership that will come to power in the not so distant future may openly subscribe to it and turn from a tactical policy of détente to a policy of confrontation. The United States and Japan must be prepared for such a turn if or when it occurs.

Although today the Soviet Union and China appear to be aim-ing their weapons — psychological, political and military — at one another, this too could change. A change may be unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out. Certainly some form of reconciliation between these formerly "fraternal" socialist states is possible in the coming years.[3] To paraphrase the Biblical injunction, "What Marxism-Leninism has joined together, let no man, be he Mao Tse-tung or Nikita Khrushchev, put asunder." The pull of ideology while weak at present could once again become a major force, given a new set of actors on the stage in Moscow and, particularly, in Peking.

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[2] Koji Nakamura, "Credibility Gap Widens," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 9, 1973, p. 19.

A military alliance between Washington and Tokyo is therefore a matter of prudent necessity. The United States has stated repeatedly and with simple straightforwardness that it will defend Japan against outside aggression. No American leader of either major political party has ever suggested that the United States would renege on, or should withdraw from, this commitment. The American feeling is that Japan should, within its constitutional limits, share the defense burden. As former Secretary of State William Rogers remarked in Tokyo in July 1973, it is up to Japan to define what its constitutional limits are. The process of seeking such a definition is going on today both within and outside of the Japanese government.

As this endeavor to find a consensus within Japanese society regarding Japan's defense position takes place, Washington has firmly indicated to Tokyo that security matters cannot be separated from economic considerations. American officials have affirmed on numerous occasions that the United States has every intention of fulfilling its security obligations to Japan. But, according to the U.S. government's point of view, the U.S.-Japan alliance is similar to an engine with various gears — economic, political, security, educational, cultural — all of which must mesh together if the engine is to run efficiently. The Security Treaty is therefore only a part, albeit a crucial part, of the whole sweep of America's relations with Japan.

In the economic sphere, the United States has been gravely concerned over the imbalance of trade. The decrease in the trade surplus from $3.2 million in 1972 to an estimated $2.5 million in 1973 is most welcome, for it indicates that positive actions are being taken by the Japanese government to meet the U.S. concern. Additionally, the Japanese have drastically reduced the items on their so-called import quota list and have substantially liberalized the regulations relating to foreign investment in Japan. The upward revaluation of the yen by some 25 per cent has been another step taken to help the United States in its time of economic difficulties. While Washington has pursued economic policies which seemed at first glance to be detrimental to Japan's interests, these policies have had little effect in slowing down Japan's phenomenal economic growth. The United States continues to recognize that there is little profit in strengthening its own economy at the expense of principal allies.

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[3] Michimasa Irie, "For Those Who Do Not Like America," *Shinjo Koron*, June 1973.

In the political arena, it has seemed that the United States has recently adopted a go-it-alone stance in opening relations with the PRC and broadening those with the Soviet Union. Japan has too often learned of American moves after the fact. While Japan's distress at not being consulted before President Nixon's summit meetings with leaders in Peking and Moscow is a matter of concern to all those who wish to see a broadened and strengthened alliance between the United States and Japan, it should be pointed out that on no occasion has the United States joined with either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China in policies which would jeopardize the national interests of Japan or Western Europe. On the contrary, the United States has stood firmly by its commitments to its allies, and there is nothing to indicate that this firmness will be abandoned in the future. As Japan adopts more independent policies vis-à-vis China and the USSR, the United States, from its side, should ask not that Japan get clearance beforehand for whatever agreements she reaches with these two nations, but only that the accords reached do not in any way negate the Japan-U.S. alliance structure. To ensure that the Japanese-American alliance remains intact, a continuing exchange of views between the principals is necessary as they carry on negotiations with Peking and Moscow. Agreements with the major communist states will mean little and may actually be detrimental if the alliance is breached.

In line with this reasoning, one of the most significant American policy initiatives in recent years was outlined in a speech given by President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs (now the Secretary of State), Dr. Henry Kissinger, to a New York audience in the spring of 1973.[4] Dr. Kissinger proposed the development of a new Atlantic Charter which would include Japan. Should this proposal become a reality, it would tend to stabilize our increasingly complex international situation and greatly enhance the position of strength from which the United States, Japan and Western Europe will act in dealing with the Soviet Union and China.

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[4] *New York Times*, April 24, 1973.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

Since the re-establishment of Japan's independence in 1952, the Soviet Union has exhibited hostility toward its Asian neighbor. The Soviet view has been that the Japanese government is basically an adjunct to that of the United States, its foreign policy set by the latter's leadership. A principal goal of Soviet policy toward Japan has been, and presently is, to use whatever influence it can to weaken and eventually split the U.S.-Japan alliance. A second goal is to discourage the development of close ties between China and Japan. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union hopes to acquire as much Japanese assistance as possible, on the best terms possible, to develop the vast natural resource potential of Siberia. In order to achieve these objectives, the Soviet government alters its tactics as time and circumstances require.

Until the late 1950's, Moscow took a harsh line toward Japan. Its propaganda organs persistently attacked the Japanese government as a "lackey" of the United States and tool of the American "imperialists." The Soviet Union refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 with Japan, but nonetheless later agreed to establish diplomatic ties and normalize relations. Soviet cultural troupes began to visit Japan and similar Japanese groups paid return visits to Moscow and other Russian cities. Trade between the two countries came to assume more significance. In the political area, the Soviets seemed to place their hopes on an eventual coalition of left-wing forces, under Communist Party leadership, coming to power in Japan, either through victory at the polls or as a result of violent actions taken in the streets. While maintaining correct relations on the governmental level, the Soviet Union carried out cultural, trade and other relations through organizations and individuals in Japan basically friendly to the communist cause and to Moscow.

However, even before the riotous events of 1960, when the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was due for revision, Soviet tactics began to undergo a change. Moscow started to soft-pedal its close ties with Japanese leftist forces and to express its desire for better government-to-government relations. As the Sino-Soviet split deepened during the decade of the 1960's, the Soviets gradually moved in the direction of détente toward Japan, as they did also toward Western Europe and the United States. The purpose of this policy would appear to be twofold: (1) to deal with the Soviet-Chinese confrontation as developments may warrant from the Soviet perspective; and (2) to improve the political setting, which will in turn allow for economic agreements between the USSR and Japan leading to Japanese assistance in the development of Siberia.

Soviet tactics have been a mixture of threats and cajolery. On one occasion propaganda organs will deal at length with the so-called remilitarization of Japan. They will concentrate on Japanese "imperialist" designs in Asia, and, indeed, on a global scale, warning the "peace-loving" countries of the world to beware. At another time, these same outlets will emphasize the need for cooperation among states with differing political, social and economic systems, singling out Japanese-Soviet relations as a major case in point. One month, statements by Soviet leaders seem to imply that they are ready to reach a compromise on the territorial issue that has so far stood in the way of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, that is, resolution of the rightful ownership of the northern islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri. The next month, a selected Soviet leader will be quoted as saying that there can be no discussion of these islands and their ownership, because Soviet possession is already legally and historically determined. On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Union invited Prime Minister Tanaka to visit Moscow and agreed to an August 1973 date. In early June, the Soviet ambassador to Tokyo, Oleg Troyanovsky, peremptorily informed the Japanese government that the Prime Minister's visit would have to be postponed. The date was then set for October 1973. By using the "carrot and stick" approach and by disseminating deliberately contradictory public statements, Moscow hopes to keep Japanese leaders off balance and the Japanese public confused. But always the Soviet Union avows her own peaceful intentions and her desire for détente. If détente does not work, she proclaims, it will be the fault of Japan, not of the Soviet Union.

Moscow is particularly urging Japan to support the Soviet plan for an Asian collective security system. The Soviet concept is based on Moscow's desire to contain China and put an end to the various multilateral and bilateral security arrangements now in existence among noncommunist nations in the area.[5] Up to now, the Soviets have given no indication, in public at least, of what they would be willing to concede to Japan for going along with the security proposition.

In the economic field, the USSR is pushing efforts to entice the Japanese businessman to assist with Siberian development. Most recently interest has centered on extraction of the oil resources in the Tumen area of Siberia and building an oil pipeline from that site to the Vladivostok region on the sea. Japanese money and technological expertise would be utilized to provide the Soviet Union with an energy resource for the industrialization of Siberia and for the buildup of military forces in the Soviet Asian territories and the Pacific Ocean. Peking has mounted a campaign to dissuade the Japanese from participating in this project, which if completed would strongly increase the potential of the large Soviet forces already in place on the Soviet-China border. Within Japan, opposition has arisen from those military analysts who see a greatly enlarged capability of the Soviet Pacific fleet as a danger to Japan's sea lifeline. To offset these arguments the Soviets dangle before the Japanese the prospect of a major new supply of oil, so essential to their economic well-being and continued prosperity and growth. The Soviet Union asks for Japan's trust, promising that within a few years she will be able to get a goodly percentage of her oil requirements from the Tumen fields.

As Moscow promotes its policy of "peaceful coexistence," it is making good use of what one Japanese intellectual has called the "let's not miss the bus" attitude shown by some Japanese leaders. The USSR appears to be saying that now that the United States, West Germany and other of her adversaries are reaching agreements with her, Japan must do the same or find herself incongruously typifying a kind of nineteenth-century "splendid isolationism" in a twentieth-century multipower world.

POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TOWARD JAPAN

From 1952, when she regained her independence, until September 1972, Japan recognized the Republic of China government on Taiwan as the sole official government of China. Despite this diplomatic stance, however, relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan developed in the cultural, economic

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[5] One of the most detailed explanations of the Soviet plan was contained in a Radio Moscow commentary entitled "Collective Security in Asia," broadcast on July 22, 23 and 24, 1973. In this series the commentator attacked "imperialistic blocs" such as ANZUS, SEATO and ASPAC and, while denying that the Soviet scheme was directed against the PRC, expressed opposition to Chinese attempts to create "discord among Asian countries."

and trade spheres. Cultural exchanges, arranged through procommunist Japanese cultural organizations, were broken off for a time in the late 1950's but resumed in the 1960's. Trade grew slowly and until recently was handled by Japanese companies under leftist control. The Tokyo government's official policy was to separate economics from politics in its relations with Peking. In the meantime, a growing number of Japanese traveled to mainland China, including politicians of all parties, scholars and newspapermen, as well as businessmen. Though Japan did not recognize the Peking regime, she had more varied and broader relations with Peking than did any other noncommunist country.

With the change in the United States' policy toward the PRC, it was inevitable that Japan would also move in the direction of closer ties with Peking. While for Washington closer ties might mean only visits by key officials and the simple beginnings of an exchange of persons, for the Japanese these kinds of relations were already well-established. Japan therefore took the next step, granting official recognition to the People's Republic of China as the government of China and breaking diplomatically with the Republic of China, though maintaining and even broadening trade relations with Taiwan.

The basic policy of the PRC toward Japan is in many respects similar to that of the other major communist power, the Soviet Union. China also looks on Japan as having been little more than a follower of the United States in foreign affairs. She would certainly like to see a weakening and final split in the U.S.-Japan alliance, for an increasingly powerful Japan cooperating with the United States in Asia and in the global arena will work against any actions China is taking or plans to take in furthering left-wing revolutionary movements in other societies and countries. Communist China will, at the same time, do everything possible to forestall a strengthening of Soviet-Japanese relations. And, again, like the Soviet Union, she will try to interest Japanese business in her economic development plans.

The tactics used in pursuing her policy toward Japan have resembled those of the Soviet Union. She has on occasion taken a bombastic stand, accusing Japan of being a "running dog of United States imperialism." In 1960, Peking mounted a heavy propaganda attack against the government of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and his efforts to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Chinese barrages against Kishi and his program, while certainly not decisive, contributed to the demonstrations and riots in Tokyo which led to the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Japan, and though the Security Treaty revision was approved by the Diet, the Prime Minister was forced to resign.

Until the spring of 1972, China concentrated heavily in its anti-Japanese propaganda on the so-called remilitarization of Japan. Dire warnings emanated from Peking constantly about the dangers posed to all "peace-loving" peoples of the world by Japan's return to militarization. They stated that Tokyo's rearmament posture was already a threat to peace. However, by May 1972 these attacks had been muted and little has since been heard on the subject. The People's Republic has dropped its invective toward Japan and now uses words of calm and reason instead. During his visit to Japan in April and May 1973, as head of a large mission, Liao Cheng-chih repeatedly stated that China and Japan should work together for peace and stability in Asia and warned the Japanese to be on the lookout for Soviet perfidy and treachery. The Chinese have also gone to considerable lengths to woo the Mitsubishi industries. Previously, Mitsubishi had been the arch-criminal, as a major manufacturer in heavy industry.

In political terms, the People's Republic has already received a major plum from the Japanese in Tokyo's severing of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China government on Taiwan. By recognizing the Peking regime, the Japanese have added to its stature both internationally and in Japan. Recognition allows the People's Republic much more freedom of action within Japan. Because in the minds of most Japanese, Maoism has been associated with violence used to attain political ends, Peking is now doing its best to dispel this image. It is presenting a peace-loving front to the Japanese people in the hope of mellowing their attitude not only toward mainland China but also toward leftist forces in Japan. For whatever its public statements, Peking has not relinquished its policy of taking whatever moves it can to influence Japanese politics in the direction of a coalition government under the aegis of extreme left politicians.

In the economic arena, Peking gives the impression of wanting increased but not dominant relations with Japan. The Japanese have long dreamed of a vast, almost bottomless, Chinese market, but the Mao-Chou leadership gives no indication of satisfying the large Japanese appetite. On the contrary, while expressing an interest in additional trade and in the acquisition of Japanese technology in selected areas, the Chinese make it clear that Japan will not be permitted to monopolize these fields. China will not allow itself to become dependent on the Japanese for its economic well-being and industrial development; this fact is central to Peking's attitude toward Japan.

The PRC's policy toward its great island neighbor can be summed up, therefore, as one motivated by both ideological and balance-of-power reasoning. Ideologically, the Peking leadership will work toward effecting a leftward political reorientation of the Japanese government that will move Japan toward closer Chinese ties. But with balance of power in mind, Peking disavows any threat to the Liberal-Democratic government in Tokyo and announces that it is willing to work together with that government to foster better relations between the two countries and to preserve peace in Asia. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the instability of the regime, the People's Republic may adopt what appears to be benign policies toward Japan. However, the Communist Chinese have never renounced the goal of giving aid and support to those forces in other countries, outside the communist sphere, which are promoting communist revolutionary movements. That Japan serves, and can more and more serve, as a counter to these movements is a fact Peking fully understands. This adds another dimension to the PRC's efforts to weaken Japanese political, economic and security positions at home and abroad — continuing efforts that in the future will assume various forms, some threatening, some conciliatory, as the moment and the circumstances demand.

THE JAPANESE RESPONSE

Following the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the Japanese accelerated the re-evaluation of their international affairs and, in particular, their position vis-à-vis the United States. The goals set forth in the doctrine, together with actions taken by the American government to move toward more normal relations with Peking and to work for limited agreements with the Soviet Union on arms control, troop reductions in Europe, economic cooperation and more meaningful cultural exchanges, led some Japanese officials and commentators to question the credibility of the United States' commitment to its allies in Asia and Western Europe. This, despite the assurance of the Nixon Administration that it fully intended to honor its bilateral and multilateral alliances.

Some Japanese seemed to believe that while the United States would maintain its security guarantees regarding Western Europe, it would try to withdraw, over a period of time, from similar pledges to Asian states. Discussion of the U.S. position began to appear in Japanese periodicals and newspapers following President Nixon's Guam statement in 1969 and became an absorbing issue after the announcement of Kissinger's visit to Peking in July 1971. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and America's promise to go to the aid of a Japan under outside attack inevitably came into question, yet the more pertinent, long-range concern had to do with Japan's view of herself as a major power — for there was now little doubt that she was a major power, not only in Asian but in global terms.

By the late summer of 1973 the Japanese government appeared to have decided on an essential element in its foreign policy for the years immediately ahead. This was that the alliance with the United States is fundamental to Japan's international posture. In an article in the July issue of the magazine *Seikai Orai,* former Foreign Minister and present State Minister and Director General of the Economic Planning Agency, Zentaro Kosaka, said that the basic line of Japan's diplomacy is Japanese-American cooperation. He added that so-called equidistance diplomacy is simply not possible. The word "cooperation" used to describe the relationship is the key because it implies that the alliance has changed in character from one of elder brother-younger brother makeup to one composed of equals. The result of this change has been to strengthen the alliance and to ensure its continuance. President Nixon spoke in a similar vein in welcoming Prime Minister Tanaka to Washington in late July 1973. The President said that the Tanaka visit was "the beginning of a new relationship, which I would describe as that of equal partnership, not only in the Pacific, but in the world."[6]

However, it is one thing to state a general principle and another to follow through and implement specific, mutually beneficial programs. The area of specifics is the measurement of a true alliance.

Politically and ideologically, the United States and Japan have much in common. Both are free societies and intend to maintain their freedom. The Japanese ambassador in Washington, Takeshi Yasukawa, affirmed that "the national interest of Japan can be defined briefly as the defense of a peaceful and democratic Japan."[7] The fact that both countries can subscribe to this definition for themselves and agree that they must cooperate in order to achieve their shared objective is a fundamental reason for the Japan-U.S. alliance structure. The two nations face powerful totalitarian communist states with the military capacity to threaten massive destruction should they become inclined to do so and believe that they have the strength for it. Recognition of this common danger offers the Liberal-Democratic leadership of Japan no credible alternative at this time to the alliance with the United States. The motivation is for Japan to sustain a free and democratic society against threats which may arise from outside her borders.

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[6] *Washington Post,* August 1, 1973.
[7] *Sankei* (Tokyo), June 16, 1973.

At the same time, the Liberal-Conservative government has to be concerned with attacks on Japan's parliamentary democracy from strong forces within the country, in particular from the growing Communist Party. Although the Communist Party is seeking to gain control through parliamentary means and hopes eventually to become the dominant party in a coalition government, it is only realistic to conclude that a "dictatorship of the proletariat" would shortly follow any communist victory at the polls. An extreme leftist government would almost certainly destroy parliamentary democracy in Japan, break the U.S.-Japan alliance, and leave Japan in an untenable position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China.

Since the major Japanese newspapers criticize the government almost daily for its close ties with the United States, the government relies on the good sense of the Japanese electorate, which customarily defines its own interests and then makes its decision known in the voting booth. This reliance has so far been well placed for a variety of reasons. Primarily, the average Japanese voter tends to be conservative in his thoughts and views. Internationally, the resentment remaining in Asian countries which suffered under Japanese occupation during World War II is abating and the Japanese, though not necessarily liked, are respected for their economic strength and their political stability by neighbors who need their financial assistance to implement development plans. Socially, the Japanese have accepted changes over the years necessary for the functioning of an advanced industrial state, yet have nevertheless been able to retain much of their cultural heritage and style of living. Though numerous Japanese writers question the success of this effort to have the best of two worlds, it is difficult not to conclude that the position of the Japanese people, both as individuals and as a nation, is today an enviable one. It seems also true, if elections are any guide, that most Japanese adhere to the view that while this position of affluence and success has been achieved by the Japanese themselves, it has been accomplished in an alliance relationship with the United States. These two determinants go together.

The special ties with the United States are seen by Japanese leaders as allowing for the expansion of relations with China and the USSR.[8] In referring to the development of the Soviet Tumen oil fields, for example, Prime Minister Tanaka postulated the desirability of Japan-U.S. cooperation in any arrangement decided upon. The basic point is that in dealing with the two great communist powers both Japan and the United States must deal from strength. If the alliance is maintained and deepened, Japan will be able to reach economic and political agreements with the PRC and the Soviet Union which will not compromise her independence or foster reliance on either giant neighbor. This is particularly pertinent with reference to the economic area and Japan's trade and technology-export policies.

While the determination to retain and deepen ties with the United States has never been seriously questioned by the Liberal-Democratic Party government, there is a recognition that such ties are dependent on the partners' increased understanding of each other's problems and needs, facilitated by constant frank discussion at all levels of the public and private sectors. In the broad sense, it must be understood that the United States and Japan need one another economically, politically, and for mutual security. It must also be understood that action taken in a narrower sense — such as over textiles or soy beans — can have great impact on all aspects of relations between the two countries.

As Japan continues to define her international posture, she is required to place emphasis on security matters. Without security, after all, it is impossible to speak meaningfully of political, diplomatic or economic objectives and goals. The Japanese people and their leaders have so far decided that Japan must possess a self-defense force armed with conventional weapons, capable of holding an aggressor until U.S. strength can be brought to bear. The dispatch of Japanese armed forces from the confines of the four main islands and the Ryukyus is forbidden. The concept of self-defense is construed, therefore, as meaning that military action

[8] Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, in a discussion on foreign policy on May 19, 1973, over Station JOCX-TV in Tokyo, registered his agreement that only with firm U.S. relations behind it can Japan seek rapprochement with Peking and Moscow.

for defense must take place only on Japanese shores or in Japanese waters; at least, an aggressor must begin an attack on those shores or in those waters before a limited or expanded counterattack can begin. The pacifist feeling still prevalent in the forty-and-over age group in Japan strongly supports this circumscription of the use of the nation's military forces. However, it remains to be seen what changes in attitude would occur if Japanese interests were seriously threatened in areas outside of Japan. The requirement for oil, for instance, may lead the Japanese to greater concern over possible threats to their vital sea lanes. In seeking to increase their contributions to the totality of the Japan-U.S. alliance, they will certainly give continuing consideration to ways of cooperating more fully with the United States in security matters, in accordance with Japanese constitutional limitations and requirements.

The current leadership has given no public indication that its policy toward the establishment and use of military forces is any different from that of previous postwar Japanese governments. It might be useful, however, to remember that our world is a world of change, and that opinions change as circumstances seem to dictate.[9] As the opening words of the medieval Japanese classic, *The Tales of the Heike,* remind us, "In the sound of the bell of the Gion Temple echoes the impermanence of all things." One fact appears central at this juncture as the Japanese consider the resolution to these and other questions of pressing national need. However the questions are resolved, it will be done within the frame of a Japan-United States alliance. This Japanese posture is the key to an understanding of the true balance-of-power picture in Asia and the world as a whole.

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[9] It is interesting to speculate that an altering of defense concepts could come about from a variety of causes, not simply because of a possible threat to Japan's immediate national interests. If the United Nations Charter is revised and Japan becomes a permanent member of the Security Council — a long-overdue action — this would undoubtedly increase her sense of responsibility toward the implementation of UN resolutions. She would need to rethink her present position of not allowing the armed forces to leave the home area for military purposes. The United Nations might request the use of Japanese forces at some world troublespot and the Japanese would find it hard to refuse.

PERON'S RETURN, ALLENDE'S FALL AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

by David C. Jordan

SOVIET-controlled communism is the means for bringing a state within the political orbit of the Soviet Union or for getting another state to serve Soviet interests.[1] In this sense of servants of Soviet imperialism communists had an important role in the return of Juan D. Perón and the fall of Salvador Allende. Both Argentina and Chile are part of the Soviet grand design for Latin America, in which Moscow has two major strategic interests: (1) to erode the land base of the United States' sea power and (2) to build up the land base for worldwide Soviet sea power. This is a long-term strategy; the Soviet Union does not expect to be successful immediately. Nonetheless the Kremlin pursues this goal in Latin America by both peaceful and violent means, as the politics of Perón's return and of Allende's ouster and suicide illustrate.

PERON'S RETURN

Perón began to prepare for his return to Argentina the day he stepped on the Paraguayan gunboat that carried him to exile in September 1955. When the complete story of the organization and methods he employed to engineer his return is written, it should be a classic study of politics.

Among the remote antecedents of his return undoubtedly were his demonstration of a continued hold on a large number of the Argentine people, his shrewd and successful effort at turning the Church from opposition to cooperation toward his followers and himself, his exploitation of Marxist theories of insurgency to his own advantage, his creative talent in political organization, and his ability to make governing Argentina unpleasant if not impossible for anyone other than himself. In the eighteen-year period of his exile no government arose that was sufficiently talented or successful to eclipse his mystique.

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[1] This special definition of communism is given because I believe Marxism should be distinguished from communism so that those who justify the legitimate exercise of power on the basis of class conflict may be kept separate from those who share that view but directly serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

The more immediate reasons for Perón's return were his mastery of the electoral system (under which for the first time he, his lieutenants and his followers suffered no outright proscription either before or after the election in March 1973) and the acquiescence of the Argentine armed forces to his return despite their probably unabated dislike for his past behavior.

The electoral system for the March 1973 elections had been designed to hinder the feared return of a Peronist government, or at least to maximize the chances of forcing Perón and his following into compromises with groups essentially resistant to his influence. Because no group was thought to command a majority of the Argentine electorate, a "ballotage" or *segunda vuelta* was provided for. Under this system a second vote was required if no party received an outright majority, and only the top two parties (or three if the third party had 15 per cent of the vote) would be allowed to run on the second ballot.

It has been reported that before the elections were held, an agreement was reached among Perón, the military rulers of Argentina and the leaders of the Radical Party (the second major political force in the country and a generally middle-class party). In the alleged agreement, because the Peronists were expected to gain a plurality, though with only a slight margin over the Radicals, and to lose to the Radicals in the ballotage, it was mutually determined that the new government should have a "nationalist-popular-military" orientation made possible by Peronists of the conservative-nationalist-Catholic wing integrating with the Radicals for the ballotage. Consequently, the Radicals prepared a platform more nationalistic than Perón's, on the theory that in the ballotage the anti-Peronists would have nowhere else to go and that the platform would facilitate cooperation between many Peronists and Radicals during the ballotage and in the next Radical government. Again, allegedly, this arrangement would simplify both Perón's and the military's problems. Perón would be in a much better position to manage the divisions within his own movement by soon opposing the new government and thereby keeping his revolutionary image, and the military would be satisfied since the Radicals would be far more likely than the Peronists to have a political orientation acceptable to them.

There are a number of reasons for discounting this interpretation, at least in part. In the early stages of returning the nation to elections and institutional regularity, Perón may have tacitly given the impression of such an arrangement. But during his visit to Argentina in November 1972 he might have read his reception as indicating that he had substantial support from Argentina's middle classes, and as a result constructed his moderate stalking-horse ticket of Cámpora-Lima for the middle class, installed the brother of the man who assassinated one of the generals (Aramburu) who ousted him in 1955 as Secretary General of his movement for the Left, and urged the CGT (the labor organization that supports him) to keep a low profile during the campaign in order to enhance his appeal to other sectors. In February 1973 the military's public opinion polls are supposed to have confirmed for the first time that Perón's candidate, Hector Cámpora, might win the March election outright, and that prospect is said to have touched off consideration as to whether or not the elections should be held.

Perón proceeded to form a political coalition — the Frente Justicialista de Liberación, FREJULI — and attracted a number of parties for ideological, opportunistic and other reasons. In addition the coalition was successful in appropriating much of the nation's most popular ideological tradition. The key to electoral victory in Argentina, since the election of Radical Party presidential candidate Hipólito Irigoyen in 1916, has been to mobilize voters in the nationalist-populist tradition against voters favoring the conservative-liberal line: a political-ideological division splitting the nation across class and regional lines and containing within each division left, moderate and right wings.

The Radical Party has traditionally competed with Perón for the majority of the electorate subscribing to the nationalist-populist line, but the Radicals were partially neutralized in their campaign effort because the Minister of the Interior in the military government was an important Radical Party figure and FREJULI propaganda succeeded with apparent justification in creating the image (a) that the General Lanusse-led armed forces were firmly in the conservative-liberal camp and (b) that the Radical Party would continue Lanusse's widely discredited government whereas FREJULI would represent a change.

Balbín's Radicals forfeited the many charges to be made against the military government, namely, that it could be held responsible for riots (especially the Córdobazo), inflation, unemployment, increase in the foreign debt and bankruptcies, a rise in delinquency, political assassinations (on the popular theory that "violence from above justifies violence from below"), kidnapings, robberies, devaluation of the peso, armed repression, and the excessive number of retired military personnel on the public payroll in municipality and provincial governments. FREJULI made all these charges; the Radicals did not. With the Radicals neither attacking the military government nor taking up the anti-Peronist banner for the obvious reason that they may have been led to expect the support of both the military and Perón in the ballotage, FREJULI captured the votes of those hostile to the military and the status quo while those who were most anti-Peronist voted for the conservative-liberal parties; the Radicals, left with only their hard-core following, found themselves incapable of matching the appeal of the Peronist-dominated front.

Hector J. Cámpora, Perón's choice as standard-bearer for FREJULI, who campaigned on the slogan "Cámpora to government, Perón to power," garnered 49.56 per cent of the vote, a result so stunning that General Lanusse declared him the virtual winner[2] and the Radicals decided not to contest him for the Presidency in the ballotage even though technically under the electoral laws they had every right to do so. Although 5,900,000 people voted for FREJULI, slightly over six million did not; and the FREJULI tally of 36.62 per cent of the vote in the federal capital, where more than 1,700,000 votes were cast, was its worst showing in the nation.[3]

The ballotage confirmed nearly everywhere the magnitude of the Peronist-dominated FREJULI victory. In the National Congress FREJULI gained an absolute majority in the Senate (forty-five seats) and the House (145 seats), and in both chambers is only a few votes short of a two-thirds majority. The Radicals, FREJULI's nearest rivals, have only twelve seats in the Senate and fifty-one in the House.

For eighteen years the Argentine military had been saying that the people did not have the right to elect whomever they wanted if their choice was someone who was a criminal, immoral and undemocratic. Argentina's Juan D. Perón had been accused, among other things, of robbery and statutory rape, of authorizing the burning of churches, and of denying political opponents their civil liberties and their right to mount campaigns free from government-aided harassment and intimidation.[4] Obviously, by the time Cámpora resigned from the Presidency two months later, on July 13, 1973, and Perón appeared certain to win the office outright in an election scheduled for September 23, the armed forces had reversed their long-standing opposition to his return.

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[2] Lanusse termed the victory a *virtual dictamen de las urnas.*

[3] The main opposition to Perón was divided among the nation's four conservative-liberal groupings (Manrique's Alianza Popular Federalista garnering 14.9 per cent of the vote, Ezequiel Martinez's Alianza Republicana Federal 2.9 per cent, Julio Chamizo's Nueva Fuerza 1.97 per cent, and Ghioldi's tiny Democratic Socialists 0.91 per cent) and one nationalist-populist party, the Radicals, with 21.29 per cent of the vote. The most important party to the left of FREJULI in the nationalist-populist line that went pro-Peronist in the ballotage, Alende's Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, accounted for 7.43 per cent of the vote. Two other extremely minor parties, Socialista de los Trabajadores and Frente de Izquierda Popular, had respective showings of 0.62 and 0.41 per cent.

There were probably two main reasons for the military acquiescing in Perón's return despite their continuing disapproval of much of his earlier rule. The years of government since Perón's fall had not brought the political settlement or lessening of tensions they had fervently desired. The deteriorating economic situation, urban terrorism and the assassination of General Aramburu led General Lanusse to return the nation to electoral politics, conciliate the Peronists, appease the unions and placate the state enterprises.[5] Many military leaders had come to believe that the nation could not develop economically without a political solution, and because of past failures they were now willing to experiment once again with Perón. In light of Brazil's dramatic economic development, this turnabout in behalf of the nation's economy was considered critical to the national interest.

Another factor was the military's expectation that Perón's well-known anti-Americanism would not go so far as to swing Argentina into the communist bloc and lead the nation to communism or economic ruin. For Perón the Nixon Doctrine heralded the end of the bipolar world and signaled the rise, at the very least, of the multipolar economic world. This situation favors a spectacular increase in the European economic presence in Latin America and in Perón's view should allow Argentina to practice anti-Americanism without aligning with the Soviet Union and without fearing any successful U.S. economic retaliation. Acceptance of Perón's anti-Americanism can thus help the military to regain its popular image without the nation losing access to capital and other resources in the noncommunist world. In this century, the Argentine military, particularly the army, has favored European partners over the United States when the alternative was feasible.

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[4] Among the studies listing and exploring the charges against Perón are *Libro Negro de la Segunda Tiranía* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Integración, 1958) and E. F. Sanchez Zinney, *El Culto de la Infamía*, two volumes (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos Stilcograf S. R. L. General Manuel A. Rodríguez 2548, 1958).

[5] For a discussion of Lanusse's praxis of conciliation see David C. Jordan, "Argentina's Bureaucratic Oligarchies," *Current History*, February 1972, pp. 75 and 113-115. The clue to his change in outlook was undoubtedly Aramburu's murder. Lanusse was associated with the Benjamin Menendez-led revolt against Perón in 1951 and, when it failed, spent the rest of the Perón era in prison. (Incidentally, an excellent recent account of that uprising appears in *Primera Plana Año IX*, No. 452, September 28, 1971, pp. 32-39.) It is probable that Lanusse revealed his changed views during his funeral oration for Aramburu. At that time he said:

"He [Aramburu] has fallen in the field of honor in a battle in which the future of the Republic and its fundamental institutions were at stake. His sacrifice has not been in vain. The reaction of the Argentine people to his tragic demise already allows us to announce the final triumph of the great majority which, distraught by his death, ratifies its decision to return the nation to the route of progress and democracy, as the best tribute to a man who was the victim of hate, [and] has entered into immortality as the symbol of the union of the Argentine people."

His tribute ended with these words: "My general, our colleague and leader of yesterday, our friend, today Commander-in-Chief of our beloved Army, we say farewell, making public our pledge: We will fulfill our duty; you may rest in peace."

To follow this pledge, Lanusse would have to conciliate the Peronists and return the nation to electoral politics, as Aramburu had apparently begun to do before his death. The full text of Lanusse's address may be found in *La Prensa*, July 19, 1970, p. 12.

The military may also believe that, as an aging seventy-eight-year-old, Perón is not apt to violate constitutional standards dangerously and could, by avoiding extremes, allow the nation to reach a political settlement. The process may produce Yankee baiting, strong-arm measures, some attacks on the free press and the like, but the military undoubtedly hopes that in the end the nation will be pacified. Nonetheless, a future coup d'état is not out of the question. Should concern about the outcome of the present situation cause the military to think that the process is not working out within tolerable limits, the armed forces may abandon their spectator role.

Thus far, Perón has performed about as the military expected. As he moved from the politics of the return to power to the politics of governing, he was basing more and more of his rule on the nation's principal factors of established power: the military, the Church, the unions, state and private business, the provincial and municipal governments, and the middle class. But in the period between Cámpora's inauguration on May 25, 1973 and Perón's assumption of the Presidency on October 12, he was mixing the politics of gaining office with the politics of holding it. Regarding this activity, he has said, "I have two hands, a right one and a left; I use them both."

This period of extremely complicated politics involved Perón in a number of intricate matters: amnesty for political prisoners, economic policy, the ouster of Cámpora, the rule of Lastiri, nationalistic rhetoric and domestic popularity for himself and the military, his election, and the need for restrictions on the Soviet-controlled communist Left and extremist youth.

Prior to the March 11, 1973 elections the nation's top military leaders signed a document of five resolutions guaranteeing that the military would protect the Argentine people from tyranny. One of the resolutions was a promise not to permit convicted terrorists to be freed. Throughout the campaign FREJULI called for amnesty for all political prisoners. Peronist youth groups forced the release of some 400 political prisoners within twenty-four hours of Cámpora's inauguration and by May 26 all political prisoners, including a number of known guerrillas, were freed. On May 27 Congress passed an amnesty law and repealed all existing repressive legislation, making the amnesty constitutional. Common criminals thought the amnesty law should apply to them, and apparently the inhabitants of one lunatic asylum thought the same. The military did nothing.

Reportedly, the military had been informed as early as April 1973 that the price for a sensible economic policy which could attract foreign capital was an amnesty for political prisoners. Whether or not this report is true, the Cámpora Government immediately began an attack on inflation, and after the March elections Perón made public remarks about his interest in and support of private enterprise. Serious students of inflation argue that it taxes the weakest economic groups in the nation, that it can radicalize the most reasonable wage earner as he watches his salary increases vanish as a result of rising prices, that it can madden consumers of public utilities as they pay more and more for ever deteriorating services, and that if it persists for a long time, as it has in Argentina, it leads people to resist stable currency solutions because they do not understand how to behave economically in a sound money environment. Price controls to repress inflation did go into effect under Cámpora and the initial results were to stop the inflationary expectations of many people.

There is some reason to believe that Perón planned to oust Cámpora all along if he gained the Presidency in the March elections. A former Congressional leader during Perón's earlier days of power, Cámpora had characterized himself as Perón's "most obsequious servant." When Cámpora visited Spain shortly after his inauguration, Perón humbled him, publicly forcing Cámpora to visit him at his house, wherewith Cámpora offered Perón the symbols of his office. Many thought Perón decided then that Cámpora must go, with only the timing in doubt.

But a number of other reasons contributed to that decision being taken earlier rather than later. Perón was badly impressed by the arrangements for his return held at Ezeiza, the international airport outside Buenos Aires. While a huge crowd estimated at nearly two million gathered to welcome him back, shooting broke out between rival Peronist groups and members of the extreme communist Left and nearly a hundred people were killed. (Official estimates were thirty killed, but Buenos Aires doctors reported the death toll nearer to a hundred.) The commanders-in-chief of the armed forces may well have saved Perón's life by having him land at an air force base, Morón, and much of his improving relations with the military date from this event.

Other factors motivating Perón to sack Cámpora were his displeasure with the influence of Cámpora's sons, who put a friend of theirs in the Interior Ministry, and his dislike of the handling of the May 25 inauguration, which included banners identifying Peronism with socialism and such mobbing of the armed forces as to prevent them from marching during the inauguration ceremonies. Perón apparently also disapproved of the seizure of the prisons by Peronist youth, the socialist rhetoric of senior government officials, secessionist (from the Peronist movement) sentiments expressed by some FREJULI deputies, and the first drafts of the new investment law. In any case Cámpora went and Raúl Lastiri, president of the Chamber of Deputies, was sworn in as President of the Republic on Friday, July 13.

Peronist youth interpreted this change as something of a right-wing coup. They knew that organized labor, which they consider reactionary, was cool toward Cámpora and they knew that two of Perón's advisers, José Gelbard and José López Rega, opposed Cámpora, too. Peronist youth leaders are extremely hostile to López Rega, one having characterized him as "the visible leader of dependence and as a traitor to the movement." Their aim, in contrast, was to build up Cámpora as the champion of the Left. At the same time, with the installation of Lastiri, Perón seemed to be moving gradually against the Left and the procedure by which he installed Lastiri was no doubt making people other than the extremists reflect on what constitutionalism would be like under him. The resignation of the President and the Vice President, and the disappearance of the provisional President of the Senate so that the President of the House could assume presidential power, seemed a somewhat magical effort to save constitutional appearances. When added to the amnesty law, the attendance by government officials at a so-called Third World conference, and the proclamation of the Perón husband and wife presidential ticket, this move regarding the presidency, although within constitutional bounds, suggested an unusual sense of constitutional propriety.

The new commander-in-chief of the army, Jorge Raúl Carcagno, embraced Peronist anti-Americanism in an obvious effort to make the military more popular, and the military also attempted some joint projects with the Peronist youth in order to improve its image with them. The Max Krebs affair was another opportunity for Perón to take a position against American "interference," as the incident was interpreted, when Krebs, the U.S. deputy chief of mission, presented in writing to Minister of the Economy Gelbard his critique of Argentina's proposed foreign investment law. Although some believe that this was a Machiavellian U.S. effort to help Perón, others are aware that Perón considers Americans to have "the mentality of stupid children."[6]

On September 23, Perón received nearly 62 per cent of the vote as he finished the electoral phase of his return and concluded the constitutional institutionalization of his rule.[7] In the interval between his election and his formal inauguration he authorized further activity to remove the communists from his government and movement and improved his relations with the nation's established power centers.

COMMUNISM AND PERÓN

In April 1960, the then hard-line anti-Peronist army commander-in-chief, Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero, announced that military intelligence had discovered large-scale subversive communist and Peronist activities and had uncovered documents establishing Perón's complicity in these operations. The charge was made that this communist-Peronist organization was responsible for more than 1,500 terrorist acts since June 1958. The Peronist leaders in charge of terrorist activities were Alberto Campo and former general Miguel Angel Iñíguez. Major-General Iñíguez had been one of the two field commanders sent to crush General Eduardo Lonardi's Córdoba uprising of September 1955 which led to the ouster of Perón. According to Toranzo Montero, the goal of the terrorists was to provoke military repression, on which they hoped to capitalize by calling for general insurrection and civil war and, finally, Perón's return. In late July 1960 a Fidelista-Peronista alliance was brought to light when the government seized the diplomatic pouch of Cuba's Ambassador to Argentina, Américo Cruz Fernández, and found that it contained Peronist propaganda along with Perón's letters and plans for an uprising. This is the period when Perón's official representative, John W. Cooke, was based in Cuba and when Cooke made a strong effort to have Perón redefine his movement on the basis of Marxist-Leninist interpretations of historical development. After Argentine President Frondizi was forced to break relations with Cuba on February 8, 1962, it appeared that communist and Peronist terrorism took different but parallel lines. Peronist terrorism was designed to bring back Perón, communist terrorism to take power by force and impose a Marxist-Leninist system.

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[6] Juan D. Perón, *Correspondencia, Perón-Cooke,* Vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Papiro, 1972), p. 12.

[7] The totals were: Perón 61.85 per cent; the Radical ticket of Balbín and de la Rua, 24.34 per cent; the liberal candidate, Manrique, 12.11 per cent; and the minor left-wing labor ticket of Coral and Paez, 1.57 per cent.

Until 1968 the communist strategy was largely pushed by Castro's Cuba. From Mao it derived its respect for existing conditions and hostility to mechanistic behavior, and from Regis Debray and "Che" Guevara it derived its emphasis on tactics over strategy (the need to create strategy from tactics), its requirement that the leader come from the militants, and its considerable effort to destroy the ideology of its adversaries.

This subversive style emanating from Cuba then came under Soviet control. The great Soviet pressure on Cuba at the beginning of 1968 produced a secret agreement at the end of that year which obligated the Cuban intelligence and espionage organization, the DGI (Dirección General de Inteligencia Cubana) to coordinate its foreign revolutionary activities with the KGB. That Cuban subversion now operates under the Soviet veto resulted from essentially economic reasons: the Kremlin threatened to cut off all economic aid unless Castro stopped criticizing the Soviet Union and ceased initiating his worldwide guerrilla activities without consulting Moscow. The rules were laid down more firmly when Raúl Castro visited the USSR in April and May 1970 and returned with the recommendation that Castro cut his army by eighty thousand men and use the money saved to reorganize the DGI. Compliance has meant that the tie-in of the Cuban economy to that of the Soviet Union will extend well into the twenty-first century. Excluding arms sales, Cuba owes the Soviet Union $3 billion, with payments to begin in 1986 and continue thereafter for twenty-five years.

The organization and development of communist subversion in its present phase in Argentina began in 1967 with Cuban efforts to recruit Argentines for the guerrilla campaign in Bolivia. Some 180 Argentines went to Cuba for the first OLAS (Organization for Latin American Solidarity) conference held in Havana in July and August 1967. Many received guerrilla instruction there and some intellectuals received directions on how to conduct undercover activities in the press.

In 1968 Cuba installed the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Salta and other provinces in the north of Argentina. Its members were under orders to provide logistic support for the Bolivian guerrilla movement led by Guido "Inti" Peredo, but when the rural movement failed, this group turned to urban conflict and divided into three sections: 1, 2 and 8. Section 1 became ERP (the People's Revolutionary Army), Section 2 formed FAR (the Armed Revolutionary Forces) and Section 8 joined or infiltrated the Montoneros, the most famous of the Peronist terrorist groups or "special formations." These fulminators by the beginning of 1973 considered themselves in an active period of revolution (*praxis revolucionaria*) and not followers of the *vía pacífica,* the peaceful means of installing communism allegedly supported by the Soviet Union. As urban revolutionaries they had three types of organizations: cells of the masses, designed to deal with political questions; cells of combat, designed to carry out armed operations; and cells of propaganda, designed to implement ideological objectives.

Meanwhile a youth group (Federación Juvenil Comunista) of the Moscow-dominated Partido Comunista Argentino split off to form the Maoist-oriented Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR), and some of these young people organized the terrorist group, FAL (the Armed Liberation Forces).

ERP is probably the most famous of the communist armed terrorist groups. Officially it is supposed to be the armed wing of the Revolutionary Party of Workers which has its headquarters in Paris.[8] Its members are generally drawn from the Argentine middle class. FAR's leaders are believed to have argued prior to Perón's return that they should join with FAP (the Peronist Armed Forces, one of the "special formations") in the revolutionary fight in Argentina. They wish to install their Marxist regime by force, along the lines of the Córdobazo riot of 1969, and see the capture of Peronism as the road to power: *la toma del poder por el peronismo.*[9]

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[8] Among ERP activities were: May 1971, the kidnaping of Consul Stanley Sylvester; September 1971, occupation of the Villa Urquiza prison in Tucuman, where five guards were killed and fourteen prisoners freed; January 1972, robbery of the Development Bank; March 1972, assassination of Abel R. Agarotti, commander of the national police; March 1972, kidnaping and later assassination of the Argentine head of Fiat, Oberdon Sallustro; March 1972, assassination of General Juan Carlos Sanchez in cooperation with FAR; February 1973, attack on communications Battalion 141 in Córdoba; April 1973, kidnaping of Admiral Francisco A. Aleman, later released; April 1973, assassination of Admiral Hermes Quijada.

FAL, whose origin, as noted, differs from that of ERP and FAR, is composed of three sectors completely independent of each other: the classic sector, the largest, which proposes to clash with Peronism and eventually join ERP; the populist sector, which proposes to integrate with Peronist groups, acts under the name "America in Arms – FAL" and cooperates frequently with GOR (the Revolutionary Worker Group); and the center sector, which has adopted the slogan "América Libre" and seeks to unite FAL and to cooperate with Uruguay's Tupamaros.[10]

The Montoneros are reputed to be one of the revolutionary Peronist terrorist formations. A number of people from revolutionary Catholic backgrounds are members but the group has been heavily infiltrated by internationally controlled communists. Its ideological orientation has oscillated between supporting FREJULI, attempting to push FREJULI in a more radical line, and joining ERP, FAR and FAL. Its first action was the kidnap slaying of General Aramburu on May 29, 1970.[11]

These groups have made it clear that they intend to continue their activities even with Perón elected President. Their objectives are to pressure the elected government to follow their programs, to continue armed operations against selected targets (probably foreign businesses and military-owned enterprises), capture the

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[9] FAR's record includes: July 1970, occupation of the small town of Garin; April 1971, assault on a military truck in Pilar and assassination of First Lieutenant Azua; April 1972, occupation and flight from Rawson prison in cooperation with ERP; December 1972, kidnaping of industrialist Ronald Grove; December 1972, assassination of Admiral Berisso; January 1973, assassination of labor leaders Moreno and Deheza.

[10] FAL has been responsible for: April 1969, minor assault on the military base, Campo de Mayo; December 1969, attempt to burn a vehicle of the Seventh Regiment in La Plata; March 1970, kidnaping of Paraguayan Consul Gualdermar Sanchez; November 1970, assassination of policeman Sandoval; October 1971, kidnaping of industrialist Vazquez Iglesias; August 1972, attempt to assassinate General Nadal; February 1973, kidnaping of industrialist Norman Lee of Coca Cola; April 1973, kidnaping of Vice President of Kodak Argentina, Anthony Da Cruz.

[11] Further activities were: July 1970, occupation of La Calera in Córdoba; March 1972, assassination of political leader Roberto Uzal; September 1972, kidnaping of industrialist Juan Van De Panne; December 1972, attempt to assassinate labor leader and ex-candidate for FREJULI Vice Presidency, Luis Guerrero; April 1973, assassination of Colonel Iribarren.

Peronist base, attract workers and students, support subversive groups in neighboring countries, but not to attack the police "while they remain neutral."

There is no doubt that some of the Peronist "special formations" cooperated with the communist extremists and that many of their leaders were at the least infected with Marxist ideas. For example, on September 7, 1973 the Peronist youth (Juventud Peronista, or JP) organized a reunion commemorating the death of Aramburu's killers: Fernando Luis Abal Medina and Carlos Ramus. As may be recalled, Fernando's brother, Juan Manuel Abal Medina, was Secretary General of Perón's Justicialistas. On the occasion, FAR and Montoneros were abundantly represented, several national deputies attended, and a Third World priest gave the benediction. All of the Peronist youth stated again that the "special formations" were under Perón's orders. On the next day Perón met with many of the youth leaders and in a few days it was made known that Peronist youth were to be reorganized so that they could respond to him more effectively. There are seven regional youth divisions, and it is proposed that they will elect representatives to Perón's Consejo Superior.

On September 25, two days after Perón's election, José Ignacio Rucci, head of the nation's labor organization (CGT) and close confidant of Perón was shot, allegedly by ERP terrorists.[12] On the following day the Peronist youth leader, Enrique Grinberg, was killed. Rucci was assassinated one day after the government outlawed ERP and within two days of the appointment of Iñíguez as chief of the federal police with orders to end guerrilla activity. Iñiguez, who has been involved with the terrorist youth since 1960, called many in and reportedly told them, "Look, boys, the war is over; now you must collaborate with the government of the people." When some of them protested, he retorted: "If you continue what you have been doing we will turn against you." Iñíguez has organized a special police team on the order of the infamous death squadron in Brazil and apparently plans to eliminate some two thousand extremists. For now, the problem in Argentina is reduced to Peronism versus communism, with liberal and other opponents silent.

ALLENDE'S FALL

There are many reasons for Allende's fall in the coup d'état of September 11, 1973 in Chile. The major underlying factors were the breakdown of the economy, Allende's alienation of the nation's largest political party, the Christian Democrats, the growing dissatisfaction of the Church, his defiance of constitutional practices, the widespread belief that he maintained himself in power through electoral fraud, and the undermining of the military as an institution. When the military struck it probably acted with majority support and its intervention may well have forestalled civil war with its inevitable toll of death and destruction.

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[12] There are reports that ERP has denied responsibility but they are not convincing.

In the early stages Allende's economic policy looked as though it might be successful, at least until he could use the plebiscite to sweep away constitutional checks on his power. But he waited too long, and the economy went sour before he could use the letter of the law to destroy the spirit of "bourgeois constitutionalism." As a result of the price policy to control inflation, factories closed and bankruptcies increased. Foreign reserves dwindled rapidly until there was a net deficit.[13] The ability of the nation to regain some foreign exchange holdings through copper exports after the nationalization of the U.S.-owned copper mines on the "Day of National Destiny," July 12, 1971, tended to decline for a number of reasons. World prices for copper plummeted from a 1970 high of sixty cents a pound to forty-eight and forty-nine cents in 1971, while Chilean production costs amounted to nearly fifty cents a pound, though some producers' costs were lower. Moreover, when the copper situation seemed to have improved for a while, a copper strike broke out in April 1973 and lasted for three months, depriving Allende of critically needed foreign exchange.

Food scarcities became more and more of a problem and the importation of food increased remarkably. In December 1971 there was a march of housewives in Santiago to protest the lack of food. In February 1972 President Allende announced that he would not hesitate to order food rationing if it became necessary "to ensure the future of the people and the progress of Chile." He noted that food imports cost the country more than $190 million a year, or 18 per cent of the nation's current export earnings. When the subsidy on food was ended that same month, prices on bread, milk, sugar, oil and tea rose by as much as 25 to 30 per cent. As the situation deteriorated further, some 1,560,000 tons of foodstuffs landed in Chilean ports in 1972 and expectations were that some 2,300,000 tons would be needed in 1973, even though Chile is only supposed to have port facilities to handle 1,880,000 tons. In 1973, until Allende's fall, Chile imported one bushel for every two bushels of wheat and rice consumed, and two bushels for every three of corn and sugar consumed. Two of every three liters of eating oil were imported. Yet, though food rationing became necessary, no rational scheme was developed. The illegal organization JAP (Juntas de Abastacimiento y Precios—Supply and Price Boards) took charge and provided special cards for people in groups of 1,500, who received meat and other foodstuffs upon presentation of their JAP-issued card. Cardholders were expected to turn out for mass meetings, demonstrations and parades when asked. Noncompliance meant loss of the card.

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[13] When President Frei left office, Chile had between 400 and 500 million dollars in foreign exchange reserves. By 1972 there was a negative balance of $28 million in Chile's hard currency reserves, and the government's new *White Book* on the Allende overthrow indicates that the Chilean negative balance is close to $450 million.

The principal reason for the food crisis was the government's agrarian reform law, under which the peasants did not gain ownership of the land. In 1973 farming was down 30 per cent below 1972 and there were fears that there might not be enough seed for some of next year's crops. In addition, it was proposed that the maximum holding of eighty hectares for the remaining independent farmers be reduced to forty hectares.

Chile's inflation became the world's highest — some 340 per cent in the twelve months prior to the September coup, though former President Frei maintained that the figure was really nearer 600 per cent. Because of the continuing conflict with the United States over compensation for nationalized American-owned companies, Chile had difficulty in finding international credit and in paying the nation's debt service account on nearly $2 billion in foreign loans.

On August 9, 1973, the provincial presidents of the Christian Democratic Party urged the party's national leadership to request the resignation of Salvador Allende. The official declaration stated: "In face of the total crisis that Chile experiences, the best democratic solution is to return power to the people, which implies of course the resignation of the President of the Nation and of both Houses of the Congress."[14] The total crisis involved growing political and economic anarchy, the clash between the executive and legislative branches of government, the attack of the executive on the Supreme Court and, perhaps most important to the Christian Democrats and the Church, the government's increasing effort to influence education. Even in 1971 Bishop Francisco Valdes Subercaseaux of Osorm had criticized the government for "hidden attacks" on the Church and religion and for planning an education "which methodically attempts to exclude the notion of a Supreme Being from the mentality of the Chilean people."[15]

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[14] *La Prensa,* September 11, 1973, p. 1.

The effort to form a single educational system – the proposed National Unified School – brought the government bitter opposition not only from the Christian Democrats but also from student groups and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, including Chile's prominent left-leaning prelate, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henrique.[16] Allende temporarily bowed to the pressure but the fact that he did not withdraw the proposal completely and merely postponed it pending further study kept concern alive.

The Christian Democrats and the Church were also agitated over Chile's television controversy. Of Santiago's three television stations, two are completely state controlled but one belongs to the Catholic University. When Allende was elected to the Presidency by the Chilean Congress (because he did not have an absolute majority of the popular vote), he obtained supporting Christian Democratic votes in Congress by signing a statute of constitutional guarantees which, *inter alia,* implicitly gave the Catholic University the right to own, manage and extend its television operations. Nonetheless, the Allende-controlled central bank denied the station credit to pay its foreign debts (the normal practice) and a serious scandal developed over interference with its transmissions, which included a mysterious murder and other so far unexplained events.

As a leader of the allegedly moderate wing of the Socialist Party, Allende needed, and should have invited, the toleration of the Christian Democrats. Nothing did more damage to his relations with them and with the Church than his perceived interference in the Catholic University's TV network and his proposal of a National Unified School system.

Another underlying factor in Allende's fall was the obstruction of the nation's constitutional practices and the concern that he kept himself in power by fraudulent means. Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, in his perceptive piece "Revolución en Papel Sellado," made this observation:

> The Statute of Guarantees, drawn up hurriedly between the Christian

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[15] *The Times of the Americas*, September 15, 1971, p. 8.

[16] The idea of the unified program was to educate all school children as model socialists. The forerunner of this effort to install a "socialist conscience" was a plan called "Operation Grasshopper" whose objective was "a matter of destroying — as the grasshoppers destroy the crops — the base of the bourgeois capitalist system and its cultural domination which maintains a fictitious scheme of self-support."

> Democrats and the Popular Union in October 1970, attempted . . . to protect the flanks of Chilean democracy, because all believed that Marxism was going to take control of the police, to disarm the armed forces, to install revolutionary de facto courts, to openly suppress political liberties. Nonetheless, the true weak flank of the democracy was the group of discretionary powers available to the rulers and these had never been used [before] to destroy the political and social system but to help it advance.[17]

The list of Allende's abuses in Chilean eyes was impressive. For example, with the exception of the nationalization of American-owned companies, the expropriation of domestic, privately owned interests was done without Congressional consent under the laws providing the ground rules for expropriations. The executive handled expropriations by decree, citing laws passed years ago which had fallen into disuse and employing emergency measures used in other social contexts to handle labor and other disputes.[18] A document from the Socialist Party's Central Committee insisted that the economic base of the nation's anti-Marxist political forces "must be destroyed"[19] and urged workers to seize factories whose expropriation Congress had blocked. In April 1972 Allende vetoed the anti-expropriation constitutional amendment. His critics believed that if all the credit institutions and the ninety-one private corporations which accounted for 55 per cent of national production were nationalized, as Allende proposed, the economic base for any non-Marxist opposition within the system would no longer exist. It was for this reason that Congress proposed the constitutional amendment to block executive takeovers of private enterprises through "implied, inherent and discretionary" powers without Congressional approval; the amendment's retroactive provision would also have invalidated many of Allende's earlier seizures. Bitterly opposed, likewise, was Allende's crippling tax on property and on stock shares, which meant that stockholders would have to pay in two years more than the actual value of their holdings.

Besides the conflict between the executive and the Congress, the nation's traditional constitutional practice with respect to relations with the courts was violated. The attack was particularly directed toward the Supreme Court and so-called bourgeois justice. Arturo Fontaine A. wrote: "The famous attacks by the official news apparatus against 'bourgeois' justice [were in reaction] to the ambition of the judges to exercise their authority, and to protect the rights of the citizens."[20] In early 1971 Allende had proposed his "neighborhood courts" but the protest was so strong, he withdrew the proposal. After the March 1973 elections had abated his fear of impeachment, he pushed once again for "popular courts." These were designed to try all accusations any informer might care to make against his political or personal enemies. Those not supporting the government saw the popular courts essentially as a plan to terrorize the opposition.

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[17] In *Visión Critica de Chile* (Santiago: Ediciones Portada, 1972), p. 90.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[19] *New York Times,* March 19, 1972, p. 17.

Another provocative proposal was the "people's assembly" bill. This initiative required all judges to serve only six years on the bench and, by forcing the presently sitting judges to resign, would have permitted Allende to reshape the high court. Many Chileans felt that Allende was attacking the Supreme Court and undermining the nation's system of justice by crude political pressure. To many more the democratic process of choosing leaders did not mean that those leaders had received *carte blanche* to govern the country as they saw fit, unrestrained by antecedent and enforceable rules of law. It was shocking that the Allende regime in less than three years had transformed the nation from a lawful polity to one inured to violence, assault, assassination and ideological views of law and justice.

The results of the Congressional elections also contributed to Allende's fall, although they at first indicated a gain for him and his supporters. Prior to the March 4, 1973 election the opposition parties undoubtedly hoped to garner a popular vote sufficient to give them a two-thirds majority in Congress so that they could impeach Allende constitutionally. In October 1972 there had been a serious strike of independent truck drivers, protesting the government's economic policies, and unrest had been growing rapidly over food shortages resulting from the disruption caused by the government's agrarian reform. Consequently the two principal opposition parties, the Christian Democrats and the National Party, joined together in a Democratic Confederation and made a bid for an unprecedented two-thirds majority. Allende campaigned for his political life, his visits to various key provinces in a helicopter costing the government $1,800,000. This effort was considered necessary even though the government controlled all the large industries, had nationalized the banking sector, owned half of the cultivated lands as a result of the agrarian reform designed to do away with the *latifundia*, and, in effect, dominated an enormous portion of the nation's economic and political machinery.

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[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

The opposition to some degree played into Allende's hands by hoping for such a lopsided victory, for his forces would be able to claim that any vote for them above their former Presidential margin was a vindication. Under the "new math" they could "win" with a minority of the vote. Yet when Allende's government first installed its program and gained extensive control of the economy and the communications media, few observers would have given the opposition good odds in regard to maintaining control of the Congress and keeping the majority of the electorate behind them.

The election returns gave Allende 43.7 per cent versus 56.3 per cent for the opposition. Sergio Onofre Jarpa, leader of the National Party who became a Senator-elect from Santiago, charged:

> The results of the elections have been falsified in various provinces. We are in the presence of a scandalous electoral fraud organized by the subsecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, a communist, which has as its objective to hide the defeat of the government and the categorical triumph of the Democratic Confederation.[21]

Under Chile's electoral system each province elects five Senators no matter what its population, and one Deputy for every 30,000 inhabitants. The opposition elected three important Senators in the province of Santiago: Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Eduardo Frei, former President of the nation, and José Musalem, like Frei a Christian Democrat and one of the severest critics of the government. The government parties grouped together in the Unidad Popular claimed to have elected the other two Senators representing Santiago Province, a socialist and a communist. The opposition claimed that at least one of these seats belonged to them.

The fraud issue did not die out. In late July Chile's House of Deputies began to investigate charges of massive governmental fraud in the March elections and forced the Minister of the Interior, Carlos Briones, to announce that the government was going to proceed with its own investigation. The House gave the Commission of Inquiry sixty days to complete its task. Professor Jaime del Valle of the Catholic University of Santiago had made the charge that forced the investigation; his research indicated that between 200,000 and 300,000 persons had voted fraudulently by using different identity cards to achieve double inscription. This massive fraudulent vote — of nearly 8 per cent of the electorate —

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[21] *La Prensa,* March 17, 1973, p. 4.

obviously was considered decisive in preventing the opposition from gaining its hoped for two-thirds control of Congress.

In this context Allende's claim of victory was provocative. Despite the "new math" it seemed incontestable that the majority of the Chilean electorate had voted against Marxism and the Allende Government. Allende's cabinet resigned after the elections and issued the rather ambiguous statement that the results "demonstrated an important vote of the political groups that supported the government program" and this was a good occasion to reorganize the cabinet. Included in the resigning cabinet were three commanders of the armed forces who were all replaced by civilians.

The military had been essential to Allende staying in office for as long as he did, yet despite the fact that they rescued his government at least three times, he permitted the undermining of the military as an institution. Faced with a major strike in October 1972, Allende had announced that the nation was on "the border of civil war." The commander-in-chief of the army, General Carlos Prats, and the senior commanders of the navy and air force came to his rescue and agreed to serve in his cabinet, thereby giving it a more moderate and conciliatory image. Without the military presence, which continued until after the elections, some observers believe that his government might have collapsed or that Chile might have been plunged into prolonged and bloody civil war. Again on June 29, 1973, when a small military uprising occurred, the military chiefs joined together to defend the Allende administration. Finally, as tensions rose to a new high, on August 9 General Prats agreed to join the cabinet again, along with the commanders of the air force and navy. Allende himself said that "this was the last opportunity to avoid civil war." Just under two weeks later, on August 23, Prats resigned from the cabinet and from his post as commander-in-chief of the army. His colleagues in the other services likewise resigned. Prats considered the situation so serious that he felt he must resign from his command in order to keep the army united.

There was no doubt that Allende knew of the attempt to subvert the armed forces and that he decided not to stop it. The military was becoming more and more hostile to him because of the government's apparent effort to send militant communist organizers into the armed forces as recruits. *El Mercurio* charged the Communist Party with carrying out a vast plan to infiltrate the armed forces by means of young Marxists of military service age. Documents revealing part of the plan were found in the possession of a Chilean law student who belonged to the junior section of the Communist Party. As early as July 7, 1973 there were charges from the opposition that Allende was creating paramilitary forces to parallel the armed forces. In subsequent weeks the military's concern about subversion and penetration grew, stimulated by searches for arms caches and the discovery of subversive literature: "Soldier, do not die for the owners; live fighting beside the people; disobey *golpista* officers." The communist-controlled MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) called on soldiers and sailors to enter into collective bargaining with their officers. On August 8, the navy suppressed mutinies provoked by MIR on two of its ships. After the September 11 overthrow of Allende, the junta's Minister of the Interior, General Bonilla, pointed out in a news conference that one of the main factors in the coup was Allende's effort to destroy the institutionality of the armed forces through a campaign to have troops disobey and be disrespectful of their officers.

The events triggering the coup were the persisting atmosphere of violence, the continuing strikes, particularly of the independent truck drivers, the rejection of appeals for new elections to resolve the crisis, and the discovery of a massive plan to assassinate leaders of the armed forces, the opposition and newspaper people during the Independence Day celebration to be held on September 18, 1973.

Assassinations of prominent people by both the Right and the Left occurred throughout Allende's rule. The former Interior Minister in the Frei Government, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, was killed early in the regime, as was Allende's naval attaché, Arturo Araya, toward the end. Allende called the assassination of Araya "a typical fascist action of Fatherland and Liberty," an ultra-right-wing group. The president of the military commission investigating the crime said, however, that no judgment of guilt could be made "until the court had reached its final verdict." Other groups attributed the deed to the extreme Left, allegedly to a cell that included three Cubans. The attack by Allende followers on Christian Democrat party headquarters on April 28, 1973, during which one Christian Democrat was killed and others wounded, did not quiet spirits. In one week in late August 1973 seven deaths were reported, all attributed to left- and right-wing extremists. The truck drivers' strike, which had begun on July 25, also hurt Allende badly. The drivers were adamant in their search for guarantees that their livelihood would not be taken away, and they were still on strike when the coup occurred.

In the months immediately prior to the coup there were a number of appeals to Allende to resign and hold new elections in order to resolve the crisis. In early August the Medical College of Chile censured him, claiming that his government "had destroyed the rule of law," and on August 26 Allende's medical colleagues called on him to resign. Among other things, the doctors charged that public health was in grave danger, as the nation's hospitals were critically short of oxygen, vaccines, milk, food and surgical instruments. They were joined in their call for resignation by many other professional organizations, including the College of Engineers, the Confederation of University Colleges and the Civic Workers Front of Valparaiso, as well as Catholic University student groups.

As was mentioned above, the provincial presidents of the Christian Democratic Party urged Allende's resignation early in August, and Christian Democrats were still demanding that he resign as late as a day before the coup. The President of the Christian Democratic Party, Patricio Aylwin, affirmed that his party made every effort up to the last minute to save institutional regularity but failed.

General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, Commander of the Chilean Air Force and a member of the junta installed after Allende's fall, told reporters that the decision to sack Allende was finally made on Sunday, September 9. Apparently at one point Allende had promised the military that he would resign and then had reneged. This decision was interpreted as his commitment to Plan "Zeta" or "Jakarta," the conspiracy to assassinate opposition and military leaders. Not only were the military convinced that Allende was preparing a presidential coup, but opposition leaders were as well. Aylwin disclosed to the press: "The best proof is the enormous amount of arms illegal Marxist militias had, which formed a veritable parallel army with firepower equivalent to twelve regular regiments and with the active presence of more than ten thousand foreign extremists."[22] As General Leigh Guzmán said, "the major problem for the Junta was to have to oust a constitutional government"; this obstacle disappeared with proof of Plan "Zeta."[23]

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[22] *La Prensa,* September 17, 1973, p. 1.

[23] Further proof of the plot came from investigating the archives of the Ministry of the Interior.

COMMUNISM AND ALLENDE

Allende had a long and close association with Castro and the Cuban communists. He attended the OLAS (Organization for Latin American Solidarity) Conference in Havana in 1967. He agreed to be the official OLAS representative in Santiago. From early in his regime he was close to Chile's MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). No less an authority than Regis Debray has told us:

> It is worth stressing that the MIR has also put its own secret services at the disposition of the popular government and of the comrade president — who has publicly thanked them for it — and those services are remarkably efficient, for they have contributed to the prediction, revelation and sometimes prevention of various of the subversive operations conducted by [the forces of] reaction with foreign assistance.[24]

MIR acquired great influence with Allende because it detected the right-wing conspiracy to assassinate Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider in order to prevent Congress from electing Allende President in October 1970. This and other assistance to the regime helped some of its members to become part of Allende's unofficial guard.

As a result of the Soviet pressure on Cuba in 1968, the KGB took over the financing and training of MIR's terrorists and guerrillas while the DLN (National Liberation Directorate) remained subordinate to the DGI (Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate). There was some rivalry between the two secret services, with the DLN trying to outdo MIR. For example, the DLN made arrangements to train extremists of the Socialist Party in North Korea and Havana.

Allende also developed cordial relations with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin lent Santiago some $55 million and obtained in return the right to construct a fishing port on the Gulf of Arauco: the port of Colcura, some 600 kilometers south of Santiago. The agreement between Chile and the USSR was signed on December 7, 1972. Although Article 72 of the Chilean Constitution requires Congress to approve treaties, Allende ignored this provision, calling the agreement "an understanding between comrades" (*arreglo entre compañeros*). On May 9, 1973 Opposition Senator Pedro Ibáñez Ojeda criticized the agreement in detail. Not only was there no increase in the Chilean consumption of fish as a result of the agreement, he said, but also it was known that the Gulf of

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[24] Regis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 49.

Arauco was not rich in edible fish. Nonetheless, when construction of the port of Colcura was officially begun on February 2, 1973, the inauguration ceremonies were attended by Allende, Chilean land minister Humberto Martones, the Soviet Ambassador to Chile, Alexander Basoz, and the Soviet fishing minister, Alexei Ihkov.

The Soviet Union has a long history of constructing naval bases under the guise of fishing ports; such "fishing ports" are located in Egypt, Bangladesh, India and Cuba. Since all the technicians constructing the port were Soviet, Senator Ibáñez charged Allende with having granted "territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and helping in the construction of a naval base disguised as a fishing port." In addition, the Senator maintained that the Soviet base was extremely close to the command center of the second Chilean naval zone, and that Allende was apparently at the service of the "dictates of Soviet imperialism."

Although the Gulf of Arauco is not rich in commercial fish, it is strategically located to command the Magellan Straits. In wartime, were the Panama Canal to be destroyed, the passage between the two oceans through the Straits of Magellan would achieve fundamental strategic importance. Even in peacetime, if the United States should lose control of the Panama Canal and the Soviet Union could gain influence over the Panamanian government as well as command of the Magellan Straits, exciting vistas would open up for diplomatic pressure. Too, the "fishing port" has great significance for modern strategic deterrence and contemporary submarine warfare. Such a base expands the utility of Moscow's non-nuclear-powered submarine fleet because its facilities for refueling and other resupplying make more of these boats available for Pacific Ocean duty, and it is useful even to the Kremlin's nuclear-powered submarines by providing their crews a base for rest and recreation.

MIR's activists attempted to infiltrate the navy and touched off two mutinies. When the armed forces exhorted Allende to permit them to crack down on subversives and terrorists, he chose to antagonize the military rather than the supporters of his own coalition. Allende was always soft on terrorists. He amnestied all pro-Castro terrorists on November 12, 1970, only a few days after his inauguration, and many of these rejoined MIR. He also granted haven to escaped terrorists from elsewhere in Latin America. All along, he and his communist supporters accepted other paths to power. The prominent Communist Party Senator, Luis Corvalàn, in his *Informe al Plano del Comité Central del Partido Comunista* on March 28, 1973, said:

> It would simplify the problem if we could say the way to achieve our objectives is only a question of votes. No. Never have we considered the route of the Chilean revolution as exclusively the electoral way. It is the road of constant confrontations, of severe class warfare, and of which the fundamental is the mobilization, the combativeness of the masses and the growth of revolutionary consciousness.

In another work, *Camino de Victoria* (1971), Corvalán counseled how to exploit the legal and constitutional system to "gain power without elections."

When the Christian Democrats in late July 1973 called on Allende to respect the constitution and the nation's laws, to end the seizure of industries by government supporters, and to permit the armed forces to disarm all subversive groups, they met resistance from the revolutionary wing of the Socialist Party as well as from the communists. Carlos Altamirano Orrego, the Secretary General of the Socialist Party, leader of the hard-line Socialists (*termocéfalos*), and a favorite of MIR, opposed any dialogue between the opposition and Allende. Altamirano was credited with far more influence in the Socialist Party than the leader of its moderate wing, Senator Aniceto Rodríguez, who in comparison has been characterized as a bishop *in partibus infidelium*. From the start the radicals within his own party weakened any efforts Allende might have made to reach a compromise settlement. Altamirano's pathological hatred of the opposition was revealed after the murder of Araya, when he charged responsibility for the crime to the President of the Senate, Eduardo Frei, the President of the National Party, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the Director of *El Mercurio,* René Silva Espejo, and the subdirector of the same paper, Arturo Fontaine Aldunate.

Clearly Allende ended up accepting the militant revolutionary line and endorsing Plan "Zeta." The military asserted that their revolt was triggered by information that Allende had authorized this plot to assassinate the senior officers of the armed forces together with leaders of and journalists identified with the opposition parties, planned for September 18, 1973. Eduardo Frei, in an interview with the Spanish paper *ABC*, also justified the coup on the grounds that Allende was preparing for a civil war by arming a "parallel" army of some thirty thousand. For now, since the coup, the army has been tracking down these extremists and Chile's normal competitive party system is quiescent.

Communist Conflict Tactics

The communist drive for power in Latin America pursues both violent and pacific routes. Violent action is in the hands of armed guerrilla organizations directed by the KGB, usually through Havana although other instruction centers exist as well. It is now clear that both Perón in Buenos Aires and the military junta in Santiago will be opposed by at least some of these guerrilla organizations. The two terrorist organizations openly opposing the junta and Perón are, repectively, MIR and ERP. Both have publicly announced that they are in close cooperation with each other and with the Tupamaros, the famous Uruguayan guerrilla group, in the struggle against "imperialism and capitalism." At the present time, ERP seems to be in the best shape as it is just beginning to feel the brunt of a full-scale attack, but all three may be expected to follow similar tactics: to seek labor allies, develop recruits among military conscripts, infiltrate popular organizations, and undertake dramatic and imaginative armed operations against politically "safe" targets – i.e., foreign businesses, the armed forces, and hostile labor leaders.

The peaceful path to power will be followed in different ways in both Chile and Argentina. In Chile the official communist position will probably be along the lines recently developed in Ecuador. The Soviet Union suffered two setbacks in Ecuador. The first came with the fall of José María Velasco Ibarra's government, which the Soviets were infiltrating and influencing through a group led by Manuel Araujo. The second defeat came when the current military government headed by Guillermo Rodríguez Lara failed to take the so-called progressive Peruvian path. As a result, the Kremlin invited Ecuador's leading communist, Pedro Saad, to Moscow, where he met with Boris Ponomarev, Central Committee secretary in charge of relations with communist parties, and Elena I. Kuskova, who is responsible for the Soviet Union's relations with the communist parties of Latin America. The new line that was hammered out called for a particular type of "popular front" tactic, whereby the communists were to cooperate with other parties and to call for new elections. The new front, which in Ecuador includes, besides the Communist Party, the Conservative, Liberal and Socialist parties, operates under the name "Front for the Restoration of Democracy" and is designed to bring back into power an elected government dependent on communist support. Such a tactic seems extremely likely for Chile. It would probably split the Christian Democratic

Party and hopefully, from a communist point of view, revert the country to extreme partisan politics before economic and political healing has proceeded very far.

Perón represents another sort of problem for the communists. They supported him in the September election but they are not by themselves a significant force. However, Perón is seventy-eight and their tactics must call for an eye on the clock. One would expect communist moves on the political and labor fronts in preparation for Perón's death or incapacity. On the political front FIP, the leftist Popular Front, may be a good target to watch. FIP put up a separate Perón ticket and gained 7.4 per cent of the vote. Its leader, Jorge Abelardo Ramos, insists that this sector of Peronism supports the "Socialist Fatherland" thesis and not the "Justicialist" one. This may be one of the wedges used to try to define Peronism in Marxist-Leninist terms so that the communists will inherit Perón's followers when he is gone.

On the labor front the communists are already entrenched in some unions. Particularly in Córdoba there are Moscow-line communists whose leader is Tosco. In July of this year Tosco said "Córdoba will be the capital of a socialist motherland," seeming to indicate that it would be the center of a Viet Cong-like movement dividing Argentina into a socialist north and a Peronist south. No doubt the effort to supersede Peronism with communism will be a continuing one. Despite the fact that Perón is anti-communist, it does not follow that he will be pro-American or even pursue policies which will ultimately prevent communism from advancing in Argentina. Meanwhile the United States seems to have no conscious policy either for dealing with Perón or for facing an Argentina without Perón.

It is possible that the communists do not understand the strength of a populist-syndicalist state such as Argentina. Syndicalism is used here to describe organized monopoly associations that exert their power to advance their sectoral interests at the expense (sometimes) of the general interest. Populism in Argentina pushes for collectivism, which justifies statist control of the economy. Under the pressure of communism, and with the decline of liberal capitalism, this populist-syndicalist state may be sufficiently authoritarian to be successful and to endure long after Perón leaves the scene.

The military-dominated government, too, seems to be a typical Latin American response to the increasing political threat from communism and the decreasing capabilities of liberal capitalism.

The presence of military or military-dominated regimes in Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil and now Chile is not a mere accident. Some have arisen and others have been consolidated in reaction to the major communist offensive begun at least in 1968, but probably much earlier. They are in no small part a defense against active communist imperialism in Latin America.

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ'S THOUGHT IN RETROSPECT

by Amaury de Riencourt

ROBERT Strausz-Hupé belongs to a small, highly important and perhaps vanishing breed — the gifted European-born immigrant to the United States who turns to good intellectual account his life experiences. As such, his prime role in life has been to form part of the cultural bridge spanning the Atlantic, without which the two shores of the ocean would drift away from each other spiritually, as they are wont to do even so from time to time. His major concern has been the political strengthening and progressive integration of the Atlantic Community, geographical kernel of Western civilization.

For this task he was well prepared. His roots were in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, where men of diverse nationalities, tongues, ethnic origins, customs and religious beliefs were trained from birth to get along with one another in a cosmopolitan multinational state, to live and let live with tolerance for all kinds of national and communal idiosyncrasies. To this ancestral background can be traced his justified dislike for narrowminded nationalism and the fetish of national self-determination: he sees the whole rather than details, the forest rather than the trees. Being by temper a curious scholar rather than a fanatic prophet ("no man possessed of a sense of measure will waste his time on utopian pursuits"[1]), being at once too intelligent to believe passionately in any existing ideology, yet too little motivated by inner fire to develop a new one ("Mine is not the stuff seers and prophets are made of . . . I have never found one great truth"[2]), his outstanding function has been that of mediator between Europe and America.

Basically conservative by inclination and skeptical of self-avowed "progressive" thought, Strausz-Hupé soon saw through the sham of revolution's intrinsic utopian "goodness":

> Perhaps it was the memories of my mid-European youth that shaped my views on bold social experiments, for in my most impressionable years I

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[1] *In My Time* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 77.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

> had had my fill of revolutions. At any rate, I disliked revolutionary politics and even more those who eulogize, from the safe shelter of the academic tower, the destruction, in the name of social justice, of old orders.[3]

At another time he had said, "Revolution, far from being the hard-won victory of 'dynamic social forces' over a resistant and oppressive order, is the culminating point of social disintegration. It is a negative process. This is one reason, perhaps the sole reason, why the new order invariably belies the revolutionary promise."[4]

Dislike for utopian revolution partakes of dislike for its usual outcome — dictatorship of the right or the left and, in our century, totalitarianism. Fascism and national socialism having been ground to dust in World War II, Strausz-Hupé confronted, during his academic career in the United States, essentially the perceived dangers of left-wing totalitarianism. Quite naturally, his theory of international relations evolved within a value structure that affirmed democratic ideals and rejected totalitarian Marxism in all its manifestations.

Strausz-Hupé's European roots had been torn up by the frightful inflation that ravaged Europe in the wake of the First World War and ruined his family. When financial disaster struck, there was no real incentive for him to remain close to those torn-up roots and, impelled by an inborn wanderlust, he decided to seek his destiny elsewhere.

During those unsettled years, moving between the United States and Europe among various professional pursuits, he had time and opportunity to muse over the nature and spirit of Western society and civilization as a whole. By nature something of a would-be romantic, forced by circumstances to become a realist, he was, as were many young German-speaking men, much struck by Oswald Spengler, whose prophetic themes are alluded to repeatedly in *The Zone of Indifference*. He could no more accept the whole Spenglerian vision than he could the Marxist; but in his writings he often toys with Spenglerian doomsday views. He fully understands the cultural predicament of the West:

> The end of the West's spiritual history which is now encompassed in the tidal wave of secularism marks the fading of a vision. . . . Now the link between the human and the divine has been broken. The skepticism produced by this schism paralyzes the creative powers . . . of Western society and forbodes the destruction of Western civilization.[5]

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[4] *Power and Community* (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 92.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

This was undoubtedly written in sorrow, since Strausz-Hupé himself appears to have succumbed to that skepticism. Quite clearly, however, he was invigorated by the greater optimism and dynamism of the United States.

German-speaking people are among those Europeans who seem to Americanize most quickly, and Strausz-Hupé was no exception. Without in any way shedding his European personality, he quickly acquired a new American one, and from the mid-1930's on the two have coexisted in uneasy but on the whole fruitful association in his life-style and intellect. Reviewing his first-rate autobiography, *In My Time, Time* magazine labeled his overall views "the politics of nostalgia."[6] This is not entirely true. He appreciates the values and standards of the past, acknowledges the loss of the coherent perspective afforded by Western culture at its apogee, and perceives the de-souling of Europe triggered by World War I, as well as the rise of the mass-man so brilliantly described by Ortega y Gasset. But this European nostalgia, based on an impeccable analysis of historical trends, has long ago been superseded by a less sentimental and more constructive American outlook conjuring in him the blurred vision of a better world to come, or at least a tolerable one — if Western man comes to grips with himself, looking toward the future without forgetting the past. This was, in many ways, the projection of his own attempt, through realistic and unsentimental introspection, to understand his nature without doing what so many European immigrants had done in the past, that is, obliterate their European background.

II

Strausz-Hupé's first interest in international affairs was to attempt to rouse American public opinion to the dangers of German national socialism. Conservatism by no means implies reaction, and it was from his firm belief in the vital necessity of freedom for the individual that he drew his conviction that Hitler had to be defeated at all costs, and that this could be achieved only by joint action on the part of *all* Western democracies, entailing the armed intervention of the United States at the earliest possible time. In his autobiography, he correctly points out that "If Hitler was as dangerous as the men of the left quite rightly thought him to be . . . then surely the Western democracies should have girded their loins and forced a showdown, the sooner the better."[7] The perceived imperative of not avoiding a "showdown" when necessary pervaded his later strictures against totalitarian communism.

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[6] *Time,* December 24, 1965.
[7] *In My Time,* p. 7.

In this, he was not entirely alone, of course. However, in the early postwar years he found himself out of accord with most Western intellectuals, if not with American public opinion: "The last war was the last war which even the bulk of the Western intelligentsia wanted to fight – for the right and the good against the unjust and evil. . . . Today the intellectual who does not bow to survival ethics must be willing to forgo the warming assurance of companionship."[8] Indeed, as soon as Germany's defeat appeared inevitable, he became one of the first to see and proclaim the full dimensions of the new threat from the East. For his pains, he incurred the unpopularity that usually attaches to the realist, as well as the feeling of isolation and alienation springing from the hostility of one's peers. Although most intellectuals have, for their own professional reasons, an abiding faith in the preservation of freedom of thought and expression, the conservative intellectual is a rarity. But in the postwar years, as far as "Western Progressive Thought" was concerned, he observed: ". . . to want to fight *now* for the good against evil, or even to differentiate sharply between good and evil, is to betray the trust of the intellectual."[9]

Strausz-Hupé's anti-communism did not bear too many subtle shades. His dislike for all forms of Marxism was perhaps unconsciously increased by a feeling of envy for the communists' dynamically successful blend of intellectual theory and violent action, contrasted with the absence of ideological underpinning in the West: "The more I learned about the ease with which the communists defeated their opponents, superior in material resources and at least equal in courage, the more I became convinced that the most significant feature of communism is the linkage between theory and action."[10]

Strausz-Hupé dislikes concentration of power in any shape or form, and abhorred the Marxist doctrine that backed the gory Stalinist dictatorship; Khrushchev's belated denunciation of Stalinism proved him to be far more correct in his assessment than most postwar liberal intellectuals had been. His antipathy for concentration of power and tyranny was strengthened by the natural way in which modern technology increases this concentration without seeming to. At times, in his *Power and Community*, for instance, he sounds almost like Herbert Marcuse in his *One Dimensional Man.* Except for the fact that one refers to Soviet dictatorship and the other to the potential abuse of technology within Western society, their views often appear to coincide, however superficially. Strausz-Hupé claims that

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

> The modern serfdom is as abject as man's lot under the older form of despotism. But there is a difference: in the past, slaves knew themselves to be slaves. The day is near when improved Pavlovian techniques will teach them how to forget, to "adjust" and to rejoice in their chains.[11]

Marcuse asserts:

> The fact that the vast majority of the population accepts, and is made to accept, the society does not render it less irrational and less reprehensible. The distinction between true and false consciousness, real and immediate interest is still meaningful. . . . In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves. . . . As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to the question cannot be taken as their own.[12]

Which of them wrote that in the modern state dissenters can be "bought off, affluence being a far more effective killer of the dream than the concentration camp. . . ."?[13] Even in his dislike for what has become known as the "consumer society," Strausz-Hupé comes fairly close to New Left grievances: "All that mutual interdependence and the frantic rush for commodities have produced so far is an alarming increase throughout the world of envy and greed. Neither the West nor the rest of the world can establish a new order of life by smothering . . . political tensions in a flood of cheap goods."[14]

He distrusts concentration of power yet recognizes that, when backed by a traditional form of authority or a clearly expressed popular mandate, it is sometimes indispensable to the orderly process of government. What he distrusts is the modern thirst for power, inasmuch as most of the traditional safeguards, the moral and religious limitations have collapsed, now that the nation-state has been almost deified and an amoral form of socio-political Darwinism prevails in the world. The problem today is often too much power without true moral authority to sustain or restrain it.

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[11] *Power and Community,* p. 108.

[12] Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (London: Routledge, 1964), pp. xiii, 6.

[13] *Power and Community,* p. 97.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 87.

III

Strausz-Hupé's geopolitical views can be conveniently grouped under two headings: the nature of the enemy, and the defense of the West as a whole.

Nature of the Enemy

As already pointed out, he became convinced that communism's most striking feature is its uniting of theory and action. It is in the nature of such an enemy that he will engage the West in a "protracted conflict," in "space over a sustained period of time,"[15] which can last through generations. The communist doctrine of protracted conflict emphasizes economy of force — for instance, assisting North Viet Nam with a massive infusion of weapons and supplies, but refraining from using Soviet troops since the North Vietnamese can do the job themselves. In such a way, the cost-effectiveness calculation of the communists compels the West to expend maximum resources to counter their least-cost, least-risk probes of Western positions. Communist psycho-military warfare entails great spatial, temporal and substantive flexibility, without ever losing sight of its ultimate goal, namely, erosion of the non-communist resistance to communist hegemony. Strausz-Hupé quite rightly emphasizes the profound transformation effected by Lenin when he converted an abstract doctrine of class conflict into a new doctrine of conflict between contending nations in an evolving post-Marx "era of imperialism." Between two such vast entities as the Western and communist worlds, no single event can be absolutely decisive, but cumulatively, every event, conference and battle can contribute toward turning the tide, one way or the other.

In face of this challenge, the West appears unable to present a united and decisive response, since it has no clear doctrine of its own and no overall philosophy except its visceral dedication to freedom and the rule of law. The communists cleverly exploit this lack of ultimate Western purpose by using conferences and negotiations, not to reach lasting settlements, but to consolidate their gains; their general purpose in negotiating is to fragment the West and disrupt Western unity. This is frequently an easy task, considering the West's legalistic tendency to carry out its agreements to the letter. Strausz-Hupé concludes that these circumstances are in need of change. The West should insist on true reciprocity in negotiations so that they do not turn out to be bargaining sessions over Western assets, and it should employ the negotiation table as a tool of diplomacy to further Western security, not merely achieve temporary surcease from struggle at the cost of security.

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[15] "Protracted Conflict: A New Look at Communist Strategy," ORBIS, Spring 1958, p. 13.

Given communism's success in expanding its territorial domain, it is not difficult to foresee the broad outline of Soviet strategy, the constants of Moscow's long-term policy: to paralyze the United States' ability and willingness to challenge Soviet initiatives because of its dread of nuclear warfare; to foster the dislocation of the Western alliance, as embodied in NATO, through encouragement of international stresses; and to perpetuate post-colonial anti-Western agitation in the Third World, thus depriving the West of increasingly needed raw materials and profitable commercial markets. The Soviet Union aims ultimately at achieving complete military superiority over the West, and, in the meantime, at weakening it by political-psychological warfare which exploits the West's centrifugal forces. Observers today might conclude that this policy has scored success by inducing the United States to accept strategic parity, and perhaps even inferiority, in SALT I, and that currently the Soviets are essaying to exacerbate the West's internal stresses through divisive tactics at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

With great cunning, communists seek to exploit American reluctance to use nuclear weaponry and to trap American leaders into responding to a given challenge, notably in the shape of "wars of liberation" in the Third World along strictly conventional lines, thus bleeding the United States white and preventing it from exerting pressure where it would yield important results — that is, at the source of communist power in Soviet Russia.

> The Communist territory is the "peace zone," while the non-communist territory is the "war zone." Within the "war zone" the communists are free to apply whatever conflict techniques they deem suitable — without having to fear a proportionate response against their own base.[16]

The single-minded communist quest for global power can be countered by the West only if the Western nations reorganize themselves so as to present a united front against the expanding empire.

Defense of the West

To this end, Strausz-Hupé advocates much greater Western uni-

[16] "On the Southeast Asian Confrontation," *Air Force Magazine*, May 1968.

ty than has been achieved so far. European unification is an essential component of the overall Atlantic unity required and must go far beyond the Common Market's mere pooling of economic interests, into some form of political integration that would leave plenty of scope for national autonomy. Next, the West must move decisively toward some form of Atlantic federation and loose political integration, such as NATO has achieved for military purposes. In order to reach this goal, he has never tired of warning American leaders that they should not concentrate all powers of decision in their own hands but should find some way of sharing it with their European counterparts. Failure to do so, coupled with some doubts as to the United States' ultimate willingness to risk nuclear holocaust in defense of Europe, contributed to France's defection from NATO's integrated defense structure – although not from the alliance itself. The Western alliance should be led cooperatively and decision-making should be federalized, replacing the unilateral power of decision enjoyed at present by Washington; in turn, this would help the Atlantic Alliance to achieve a greater degree of political cohesion and unity of purpose than prevails under present arrangements.

In keeping with this requirement of greater Western integration, Strausz-Hupé suggested that a new American attitude should discard the overwrought fear of nuclear weaponry which, apparently, the communists do not share.[17] True enough, the Eisenhower Administration relied for a time on a doctrine of "massive retaliation," and lately the Nixon Administration has emphasized machines and technology, de-emphasizing the use of American manpower and conventional forces in favor of long-range, strategic nuclear weapons. But fear of letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle paralyzes the American will to use tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the American policy of deterrence no longer seems credible to the communist powers. The Europeans themselves begin to have doubts about the worth of the American nuclear umbrella. One may add that this distrust increases as the two superpowers come closer together in what the rest of the world – the People's Republic of China included – begins to see as a tacit nuclear alliance.

Quite naturally, Strausz-Hupé contends that increased emphasis by the United States on the mutuality of interests in the Atlantic Community is an essential precondition to a successful attempt at détente. "The most pressing problem of the Western Alliance is not how to halt the arms race, desirable as might be the reduction of armament budgets and the danger of accidental war, but how to achieve political cohesion and confront the Soviets with unity of purpose."[18] Failing this, Moscow can more easily play off one Western state against another and accelerate a mood of neutralism in the Old Continent,[19] leading perhaps to what is now being called the "Finlandization" of Western Europe, yet leaving the eastern part of the continent under the Soviet heel. Deprived of Western Europe's considerable resources, which would then be at the Kremlin's disposal, the United States would find itself isolated and highly vulnerable. In other words, the United States' strategic frontier is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, along the Iron Curtain, because the defense of Western Europe is vital for America's own security.[20]

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[17] "Nuclear Blackmail and Limited War," *Yale Review*, December 1958.

Finally, the West's defensive and piecemeal response to the communist strategy of protracted conflict promises continual attrition of Western positions of strength. Instead, U.S. foreign policy should seize the initiative and politically and psychologically "carry the battle to the vital sectors of communist defense."[21] Western weakness is not technological but psychological; what is lacking is the will to foresee, to lay down long-term policies and change rear-guard defense into a front-line political offensive that would carry the fight into the heart of Marxist defense lines.

> The West has neither a doctrine of protracted conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of the Free World, in trying to combat the communists, should become more like them.[22]

IV

One may or may not agree with Strausz-Hupé's view of the contemporary world, as it might be inferred from the body of his writings, most of which were completed during the more combative days of the Cold War – the 1950's and early 1960's. But it is hard to disagree with his emphasis on the urgent need to institutionalize some form of Western unification. Certainly, if wisdom suggests that the Common Market move beyond mere economic integration toward some federal form of political union, the same applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to the West as a whole. The Atlantic is a bridge, not a barrier: Western nations share a common cultural inheritance and believe in democratic freedom; their economies are closely interconnected. The recent monetary chaos, amounting to virtual financial warfare, vividly demonstrates that the West forms a de facto economic unit whose parts are bound together by trade, mutual investments and free movement of capital. This unit should long ago have been institutionalized in the shape of some confederal structure, implying a partial surrender of national sovereignty to supranational organisms which would, in turn, be entitled to discipline the various nation-states making up the system.

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[18] "Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance," in James E. Dougherty and John F. Lehman, editors, *The Prospects for Arms Control* (New York: Macfadden Bartell, 1965), p. 248.

[19] "Stability of English and French Foreign Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* July 1957.

[20] "The World Without NATO," ORBIS, Spring 1966.

[21] "Protracted Conflict . . . ," ORBIS, *op. cit.,* p. 35.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 36.

The need for greater Western unity and integration is one thing. But one may disagree with some of Strausz-Hupé's views on the real nature of the enemy — i.e., international communism — and what appears to be his overestimation of its unity of purpose and relentless pursuit of missionary activity in behalf of Marxism-Leninism. There is much evidence that national-imperial motivations have proven stronger than the purely ideological ones in relations between Peking and Moscow. Failure to recognize the strictly Russian or Chinese nature of their national imperialisms might signify a failure to appreciate the chasm that has opened between the two communist giants.

It is interesting to contrast Strausz-Hupé's conclusions following his visit to China after the war in 1945 and those he held a decade later. In his autobiography he writes that, upon returning from China, he summed up his findings:

> At considerable cost, the Communist bid for domination could be defeated in China. The Soviets were as deeply involved in China as was the United States. At no better time and place could the United States call upon the Soviets to "put up or shut up." . . . The prize, were the Soviets to turn down the challenge as they surely would, was not only a non-communist China but also a free hand for the West in shaping the New Order. Certainly, anybody could see that the Communists' subjugation of five hundred million Chinese would alter decisively the balance of world power, thus largely canceling out America's gains from victory over Japan. If Japan's defeat had been worth a full-scale war, then the defense of China was surely worth the intervention of two American divisions on the side of Chiang and, if need be, an even larger force.[23]

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[23] *In My Time,* p. 266.

In retrospect, we know that it would have taken quite a few American divisions to alter the shape of things to come in such a densely populated and sprawling country as China.

The historical record shows that Stalin became alarmed at Mao's independence and attempted to restrain him from conquering the whole of China, and Stalin's successors have become increasingly worried by the emergence of a united China. If one thing is clear now, it is that Mao's victory was a far greater disaster for the Soviet Union than it was for the United States. Actually, the existence of a militarily strong Communist China is today an essential component of the United States' leverage on the USSR — compensating, to some extent, for the Soviets' rapid rise to nuclear parity in recent years.

Strausz-Hupé was not unaware that a Communist China could have positive consequences for the West as well. As early as 1956, in his *Power and Community*, he expressed the view that "It is doubtful, for example, that the rise of Communist China lies in Russia's 'national interest' and outweighs, by the inconveniences it causes the Western democracies, those it will later cause Russia."[24]

Indeed, he can be said to have foreseen this development when he wrote of the emerging Sino-Soviet schism in 1962: "In history, the wielder of the balance achieved his objectives more successfully by supporting the weaker side regardless of ideological divergence or mutual antipathies. The weaker side proves, as a rule, more willing to pay a higher price for help — by making not only diplomatic but even ideological concessions."[25] The tendency to see the communist threat as consistent, monolithic and global may have delayed timely exploitation by the United States of the irresistible centrifugal trends within the so-called Sino-Soviet bloc, but Strausz-Hupé's appreciation for the potentiality of such a course should be recognized.

One of the end-products of an overemphasis on the unitary and global nature of a monolithic communist danger was the traumatic war in Viet Nam. If only U.S. intervention in Viet Nam had resulted in a tightening of the bonds linking together the various members of the Atlantic Community — as Strausz-Hupé fervently desired — it could have been viewed as having been beneficial. But, quite the contrary, it drove a wedge between Europe and America and disrupted their relations: Europeans were never able to understand the United States' obsession with the Far East, coupled with its atavistic tendencies toward isolation from European affairs, which are, after all, of much greater importance to America's interests and security than Asian circumstances. Strausz-Hupé himself pointed to this in 1952 in *The Zone of Indifference*:

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[24] *Power and Community*, p. 58.
[25] "The Sino-Soviet Tangle and U.S. Policy," ORBIS, Spring 1962, p. 37.

> If the United States, mistaking the place where the issue was met for the place where it arose, should abandon the primacy of Europe to the expediency of Asiatic strategy, it will play the game of Soviet strategy. The objective of Soviet strategy is the control of the industrial regions of Europe.[26]

The war in Viet Nam, as it was actually conducted by the Johnson Administration, belatedly proved Strausz-Hupé right in that most of the bloodshed and destruction could have been avoided if the Soviet Union had been confronted *directly*, rather than allowed to operate by proxy. President Johnson's policy of "gradualism" turned out to be disastrous and probably marked a watershed in American strategic thinking. It is always better to go for the jugular right away — if one has the means to do so. But this entails military superiority, backed by unity of purpose and moral strength. Politics is the art of the possible, and most Westerners appear to lack the stomach for a decisive confrontation with their communist opponents — as the 1968 rape of Czechoslovakia proved conclusively.

The opponents of the West have not always been correctly identified. The real enemy is far more likely to be the Soviet Union's national rather than ideological interests, that is, the safeguarding and enhancement of the Russian empire in the Baltic countries, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Central Europe, or China's imperial interests in Central Asia, Outer Mongolia and part of what is at present Soviet Siberia. Marxist proselytism, although by no means negligible, appears to be quite subordinate, in Moscow as in Peking, to specifically national-imperial aims which include, whenever possible, control over satellites.

At the same time, and because of this imperialistic bias of the big communist powers, dynamic communist states of lesser stature, such as East Germany and North Korea, will attempt to exploit a noncommunist nation's problems (North Korea in Ceylon and Mexico in the late 1960's, East Germany in France in May-June 1968) against Moscow or Peking or both, in order to gain some leverage on the giants which constantly attempt to "satellize" them. Moreover, the Third World harbors some deep antagonisms toward the West that have nothing to do with communist propaganda. Often the new countries display just as keen a distrust of communism as most Westerners do, because they view Marxism as a purely *Western* heresy, having nothing to do with their own cultures, situations and atavisms. This is the case in a great deal of Africa, in the Arab and more generally the Muslim world, and to some extent even in India. Anti-Westernism is a deep-seated phenomenon, a profound feeling springing from the residues of dying cultures. It is by no means monopolized, or even exploitable, by bona fide Marxists. The complex nature of this reality has rarely been taken into account by geopoliticians who frequently prefer to draw a black-and-white picture instead of presenting the various shades existing in the real world.

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[26] *The Zone of Indifference* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952), p. 4.

V

Strausz-Hupé took a leave of absence from the University of Pennsylvania in 1969 to become the U.S. Ambassador to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). After a year and a half in that post, he was sent to Brussels as U.S. Ambassador to Belgium. We can be sure that he will carry on the effort, from within the establishment, for greater cooperation among the various Western powers on both sides of the Atlantic. This is no easy task. In a slow, almost imperceptible way, Western society has been changing beyond recognition in the past quarter of a century. Some may applaud this change, some may disapprove of it; it is all a matter of taste. What is certain is that the plain outlines and sharp edges of the immediate postwar years have disappeared. In the aftermath of World War II, the world was simpler, even for those who refused to go into combat against an evil that was externalized and objectified as Stalinism and its communist offshoots. Now the world has become, for all to see, amazingly more complex.

The Republican administration in which Strausz-Hupé serves has made peace with Communist China, and has begun a warm, if still cautious, collaboration with Soviet Russia. Gone is the convenient dichotomy between freedom-loving democracies and warmongering communist powers. Now the very *reactionary* nature of the Soviet regime appeals to a new breed of Western conservatism, traumatized by the rise of the anarchistic New Left within its midst (often its own children) in the 1960's. With American banks and corporations opening branch offices in Moscow, now it is the Sakharovs and the Solzhenitsyns who are the voices of moral conscience, while an increasing number of

Western capitalists discount the evils of communism. This seeming anomaly is consistent with Strausz-Hupé's persistent warnings against the excessive materialism that has spread through the West in past decades, and the amoral conception of politics which is so intellectually popular.[27]

What seems clear in this rapidly evolving situation is that, temporarily at least, Western unity has been shattered. The Washington-Moscow axis is viewed with increasing suspicion in Europe, and is driving the Europeans, willy-nilly, toward some form of tacit understanding with China, their natural ally in a common defense against the Soviet Union. The true test of Western solidarity will come in the field of monetary and economic matters over the next couple of years. But since the global, consistent, homogeneous and unitary communist threat has evaporated, a great deal of the psychological underpinning of the Atlantic Alliance has disappeared. Europe has not come into being as a political entity, in spite of the recent expansion of the Common Market. In fact, the West is in greater disarray than it has been since World War II, and there is no more urgent task than to repair the damage done to its cohesion. Can Strausz-Hupé work effectively from within the administration toward that end, or will it be another case, in his own words written several years ago, of his life being "a long struggle between political engagements and a deepening sense of futility"?[28]

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[27] "Social Values and Politics: The Uninvited Guests," *The Review of Politics*, January 1968.

[28] *In My Time*, p. 161.

Books Received

I. Politics, History, Economics

Aftermath of Colonialism. Edited by Nancy L. Hoepli. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1973. 206 pp. n.p. A selection of forty-five articles and excerpts from longer works dealing with emergent states in the context of world politics. Readings treat of the search for identity by newly created states; the difficulties of national cohesion, political stability and economic modernization; and the issues arising from the independence of former colonies, such as anti-imperialism, "people's wars" and relations with the West.

An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries, 1963-1972. By C. L. Sulzberger. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 828 pp. $12.95. Sulzberger's impressions together with his diaries and memoirs form the basis of this third and final volume of his autobiography. The author reports on his encounters with the international statesmen of the last decade and suggests that we are living in an era where "people have opinions but no knowledge and leaders are made in the image of the masses." Marked by an absence of vigorous, new ideas, it is an age of mediocrity where today's leaders are efficient and competent, but not charismatic. Unlike Churchill, de Gaulle or Roosevelt, they are simply "men of man's dimension."

The Future of the International Legal Order: Volume IV, The Structure of the International Environment. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. 637 pp. $17.50 ($9.50, paper). This anthology of fifteen articles by seventeen specialists in international law, organization and politics focuses on the increasingly salient problems of population growth, pollution, and resource allocation in the global community. These problems are examined from legal and institutional perspectives, and the contributors recommend modifications in existing organizations and approaches to enable the international community to deal with them. Contributors include the editors, Joseph Nye, Harold Lasswell, and Harold and Margaret Sprout.

Geography and Politics in a World Divided. (Second edition.) By Saul B. Cohen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 334 pp. $3.95 (paper). A thoughtful application of political geography to the contemporary international milieu. Cohen's approach divides the world into two "geostrategic regions" (roughly comparable to the Atlantic Community and the Soviet bloc) for analytic purposes, and each of these areas is subdivided into major-power "core areas" and "geopolitical regions." In addition, the author delimits two "Shatterbelts" in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which serve as buffer zones between the geostrategic regions and as potential areas of conflict among major-power "cores." Finally, he sets forth the requirements for a global geopolitical equilibrium.

How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament. By James E. Dougherty. New York: Crane, Russak, for the National Strategy Information Center, 1973. 202 pp. $5.95 (paper). This study provides an introduction to the subject of arms control and disarmament. Early chapters summarize the causes of war, distinguish among the various kinds of disarmament and arms control, and trace the historical record of disarmament negotiations to World War II. Special consideration is given to the policies of the major powers in this field. Dr. Dougherty then turns to more limited forms of arms control evidenced in recent years by the Test Ban Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the SALT agreements. He concludes that while these steps represent important achievements in the area of arms control, they have not resulted in any significant arms reductions, nor have they delved into the problem of the control and limitation of offensive nuclear weaponry.

Peace and War. Edited by Charles R. Beitz and Theodore Herman. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973. 435 pp. $11.95 ($4.95, paper). These essays investigate the fundamental assumptions underlying the world political system. The first part considers the moral dimension of modern war, the second section focuses on various proposals to bring about permanent world peace. Contributors include Henry A. Kissinger, Thomas C. Schelling, Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Herbert F. York.

Regional Politics and World Order. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973. 475 pp. $12.00 ($5.95, paper). A collection of articles focusing on the character and prospects of regionalism as a factor in world affairs. The volume aims to introduce the student to the variety of methodological, ideological and geographical orientations toward regionalism, and the editors raise questions regarding the positive and negative implications of regionalism on the future of the international order.

Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications. By Morton A. Kaplan and others. Chicago: University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, 1973. 157 pp. n.p. (paper). In addition to the introduction and two essays written by Dr. Kaplan, the Director of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar of the University of Chicago, this volume contains papers by Philip Green, critic of the "deadly logic" of deterrence theory; Paul Ramsey, Professor of Religion at Princeton University and noted theorist of the "just war" in the Christian tradition; and Paul Wolfowitz, Yale political scientist. The debate is carried on from at least three quite different perspectives, varying from analytic models in games theory to political/moral philosophy to theology. The discussion ranges from the connections that link science and politics, as well as strategy and morals, to the meaning of "rational decision-making" in the nuclear age, to the relative political effectiveness and ethical value of strategic nuclear deterrence, minimum deterrence and surrender. Professor Kaplan has provoked a stimulating exchange of views, and has brought these together in a small volume which will be useful to moralists, strategists and teachers.

The Task of Universities in a Changing World. Edited by Stephen D. Kertesz. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. 503 pp. $15.00. This anthology, conceptualized at a time when the universities of the Western world were under violent assault, reflects some of the rhetoric and thought modes of that era of siege. Contributors write about the identity crisis of higher education, the frustrating debate over goals, higher education and public policy, the role of the humanities and scientific social science in human development at home and abroad, the environmental crisis and the university, and the problems and prospects of universities in specific regions and countries. Despite a few sweeping clichés of dubious validity which are unavoidable when contemporary educators congregate (e.g., "the university has failed to relate to society" or "the nation-state has become obsolete"), most of the three dozen essays are thoughtful, eloquent and well worth the reading time.

II. UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective. By Henry S. Albinski. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 440 pp. $12.95. A comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian politics, written by a professional political scientist with personal and research experience in both countries, this book investigates societal conditions and public values, the milieu of organized politics, public policy processes, the behavior of elites, and the operation of such institutions as cabinets, parliaments, and the governments of provinces or states.

Fear in the Air: Broadcasting and the First Amendment. By Henry S. Ashmore. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. 180 pp. $6.95. The author's thesis is that the dangers to First Amendment freedoms come not so much from the personal or political orientations of men in power but instead are the result of significant changes in communications technology and social structure. Ashmore notes that electronic mass media, unlike print journalism, has become national in scope with near-instantaneous nationwide transmission; and that the licensing powers and responsibilities of government impinge upon the electronic media more than they did upon print journalism in earlier eras. He spells out the inadequacies of present regulation by the Federal Communications Commission and of the alternative of self-regulation bounded only by marketplace considerations. He reviews recent and current proposals for some sort of nongovernmental national news council, and examines the British Press Council which, without concurrent legal sanctions, makes public those news reporting improprieties adjudged to have occurred in the British communications system.

National Strategy in a Decade of Change. Edited by William R. Kintner and Richard B. Foster. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1973. 298 pp. $15.00. A report on a symposium sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Stanford Research Institute, this volume probes the programmatic aspects of the Nixon Doctrine. A consistent theme woven through all the articles is that fundamental alterations in the international milieu are compelling the United States to assess the nature of the new environment and devise a new national strategy. Contributors include General André Beaufre, Walter Laqueur, Jun Tsunoda, Robert Bowie, Robert J. Alexander, Leo Cherne, and the editors.

This Vast External Realm. By Dean Acheson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. 298 pp. $9.95. A collection of articles and speeches by Dean Acheson selected to illustrate those principles he believed crucial to the successful conduct of foreign policy. Among the topics discussed are the evolution of U.S. early postwar policy, his reflections on dealing with Russia, the value and danger of summitry, ethics in international relations, and institutional problems relating to foreign policy formulation, including the eclipse of the State Department.

Toward a Wiser Colossus: Reviewing and Recasting United States Foreign Policy. Edited by James A. Stegenga. Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1972. 147 pp. $2.25 (paper). Six authoritative examinations of the state of U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970's. Both the general conduct and thrust of American foreign policy and its more specific application in different regions are subjected to critical analysis. Contributors George Ball, Denis Healey, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Irving L. Horowitz, Allen S. Whiting, and Hans J. Morgenthau emphasize the need for this country carefully to reappraise its obligations and options in the developing international system.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

The Churches and Politics in Germany. By Frederic Spotts. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973. 419 pp. $15.00. A scholarly study of the role played by the Protestant and Catholic churches in the political life of West Germany since World War II, written by a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. The author treats in considerable and well-documented detail the problems faced by the churches during the period of occupation and denazification; the political ethics of the two main branches of Christianity; the legal relationship between church and state, especially in respect to the schools; and the posture of the churches toward the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties. Of particular interest is Spotts' treatment of ecclesiastical attitudes toward German reunification, rearmament, conscription, nuclear weapons and *Ostpolitik*.

Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy. By J. W. Bruegel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 334 pp. $14.95. An analysis of Czech-German relations from 1918 until Munich viewed from both the Czechoslovak perspective and the international vantage point. Dr. Bruegel describes the difficulties created by the existence of the German minority in Czechoslovakia after 1918 and examines British foreign policy, British appeasement of Hitler, and the Munich crisis. Particular emphasis is placed on the part played by Chamberlain in British policy.

European Capital Markets. By Bruno H. Solnik. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1973. 114 pp. $12.50. This volume describes a theoretical foundation for the analysis of international portfolio investment and the efficiency of competitive capital markets in allocating the risk of return from investment among individuals across the world. The author contends that, because international trade, investment and speculation lend great importance to domestic economies, the international dimension of investing in capital markets cannot be neglected.

The European Community: A Superpower in the Making. By Johan Galtung. New York: Humanities Press, 1973. 195 pp. $10.50. This book analyzes the global importance of the European Community and assesses its future possibilities as one of the new world power centers. Galtung argues that, despite its modern appearance, the European Community is a bureaucratic continuation of the colonial policy of divide and rule. In contrast to current and dominant provincial notions of international policy and economics, his view is based on the larger perspective of the international system. His thesis is that a new superpower is emerging which is attempting to create a world with its center in Europe and a Europe with its center in the West. Thus, he interprets the Common Market as being more than an economic trading center; it is a vehicle for Western Europe to attain world power.

Spy in the Vatican, 1941-1945. By Branko Bokun. New York: Praeger, 1973. 259 pp. $7.95. An enlightening account of the author's intriguing experiences in wartime Rome and his attempts to seek Vatican intervention in Yugoslavia.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. By Branko Lazitch, with Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 458 pp. $15.00. This volume contains 716 biographies of the comintern's personnel. Included are not only those individuals who comprised the comintern's directorate, but also those who spoke at the comintern congresses from 1919 to 1935; delegates to the enlarged plenary meetings of the executive committee from 1922 to 1933; members of the comintern apparatus; leaders of the international organizations, and graduates of the four principal comintern schools. The data forming the basis of the biographies came from both official communist literature and from the authors' research as well as their personal contacts.

Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929. Volume I, Part II. By E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 1023 pp. $12.50. This study of Soviet economic policy from 1926 to 1929 has as its central theme the transition from the guided market economy of the liberal New Economic Policy begun in 1921 to direct economic planning and control. Among the specific subjects treated are the land and its relationship to the peasant, agricultural cooperatives, the organization of state industry, and foreign trade. The volume concludes with a study of the development of the planning mechanism that culminated in the adoption of the first Five Year Plan at the Fifth Union Congress of Soviets in the spring of 1929.

Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970. By William C. Fletcher. London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973. 179 pp. £3.50. Starting from the premise that religion is not a major factor in Soviet foreign policy (because religion in a Marxist-Leninist state is an ideological anomaly), the Director of Slavic and Soviet Area Studies at the University of Kansas shows that it has been an effective adjunct to Soviet efforts to influence public opinion throughout the world. The author traces Soviet efforts to use religious organizations to consolidate communist hegemony in Eastern Europe and to advance the communist cause through the international peace movement. Special attention is paid to the Prague Christian Peace Conference and to Soviet policies toward Islam, Buddhism, Roman Catholicism and the World Council of Churches.

The Russian Scientist. By Albert Parry. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 196 pp. $5.95. A study of the development of Russian science, chronicled through capsule biographies of seven of Russia's greatest scientific minds: Lomonosov, Lobachevsky, Mendeleyev, Mechnikov, Pavlov, Tsiolkovsky and Kapitsa. The final thirty pages of the text are devoted to an assessment of modern Soviet science academies and the hardships Soviet scientists experience in working within the constraints of a brittle ideology. The book also contains a bibliography of Russian and English sources and features many photographs and drawings.

The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations. By Harish Kapur. New York: Humanities Press, 1972. 124 pp. $10.50. Dr. Kapur's case study of Indian-Soviet relations from the Bolshevik revolution to the present examines the historical framework, fluctuations in the Soviet approach to New Delhi, changing Moscow-Peking-Delhi relations, and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The volume is designed as a study of the broader Soviet approach to the emerging nations, and other nations are occasionally mentioned in various contexts.

V. MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano. By Alan Feinstein. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973. 299 pp. $9.95. An interpretive biography of Aminu Kano, a Hausa-Fulani patrician turned reformer, from his early struggles in the 1940's against the oppression of the emirates of Northern Nigeria and the British to his role in the Nigerian civil war.

Arms and African Development: Proceedings of the First Pan-African Citizens' Conference. Edited by Frederick S. Arkhurst. New York: Praeger, 1972. 158 pp. $13.50. Various specialists discuss the role of the military in African development and show how disarmament can be a spur to development. The impact of the racial situation in South Africa is examined and a special section is given over to the topic of science, technology and African development. A summary of the proceedings is provided in a brief chapter.

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. Volume III, Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen and Libya. By George M. Haddad. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973. 454 pp. $12.50. Continuing his detailed study of the military and revolution in the Middle East, Dr. Haddad now adds two chapters on Egypt, one each on the Sudan, Yemen and Libya, and concludes by analyzing the motives, patterns and results of Arab military rule since 1952. The book contains many notes and bibliographic references in English and Arabic. The section on the Yemen provides one of the few analyses in English of Yemeni politics written in the past five years.

A Socioeconomic Profile of South Africa. By William Redman Duggan. New York: Praeger, 1973. 181 pp. $15.00. A survey of the social, economic and political problems that South Africa currently faces and of South Africa's relations with other countries.

The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. Edited by M. Confino and S. Shamir. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973. 441 pp. $21.50. Twenty essays by notable Israeli, European and American scholars on Soviet policy in the Middle East are arranged topically in the following sections: the making of Soviet foreign policy; the Soviet posture in the Middle East; policy, strategy and ideology; the Soviet Union, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict; economic considerations; trends in Middle Eastern politics; communism in Egypt and the Sudan; and communism in the Fertile Crescent. Authors include Richard Pipes, Alexander Dallin, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Laqueur, Yaakov Ro'i, Yigal Allon, J. C. Hurewitz, Abraham S. Becker, Leonard Binder and P. J. Vatikiotis.

VI. East and South Asia

Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan. By Kalim Siddiqui. New York: Praeger, 1972. 217 pp. $9.00. Dr. Siddiqui evaluates contemporary events in Pakistan, with special attention to the sources of the conflict that produced the civil war resulting in the creation of Bangladesh. He attacks Pakistan leaders for having "betrayed the people in a way no ruling or dominant class among the Muslims *has ever done before," and investigates the role of religion in the crisis.* The book contains an index of pertinent documents and a chronology of events from February 1969 through January 1972.

Japan's Foreign Policy. By F. C. Langdon. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1973. 231 pp. $9.00. This study of Japanese foreign policy concentrates on the period since 1960 when the U.S.-Japanese security treaty was revised. This event is treated in detail, including an examination of the arguments concerning the treaty as well as an analysis of the decision-making process. The author appraises the three main pillars of Japanese foreign policy: national prosperity, national security and recognition as a world power. He also assesses the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on Japanese foreign policy.

Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China. By Donald E. MacInnis. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 392 pp. $7.95 ($3.95, paper). This volume contains a representative selection of published materials pertaining to religious policy and practice in the People's Republic of China since 1949. Nearly all of the 116 documents and excerpts reproduced here first appeared in the Chinese press. Although the Chinese Communist Party has never reversed its officially stated policy of "freedom of religious belief," most of the selections illustrate the ideological intolerance of religion as the "opiate of the people" and the instrument of reaction, superstition, feudal oppression and foreign imperialist aggression which led to the total suppression of religious practice throughout China by the Red Guards in 1966. This is a valuable documentary source for the student of China, of religion in the modern world, of communist orthodoxy and of modern totalitarianism.

BOOKS RECEIVED

U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan. By William M. Bueler. Boulder, Col.: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971. 143 pp. $5.95. A history of U.S. relations with Taiwan from Truman to Nixon, and an analysis of the problem the U.S. commitment to Taiwan poses for U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. Researched and written before the announcement in July 1971 that President Nixon would visit Peking, the book contains U.S. policy options as they appeared at the time. The author devotes considerable space to an examination of the prospects for an independent Taiwanese state and the implications of such a development for U.S. policy.

U.S.-China Relations. By Laurence W. Levine. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. 92 pp. $5.95. These essays, written in 1969-1971, probe the past and future of U.S.-Chinese relations. A brief summary of China's modern history is followed by an in-depth analysis of President Nixon's decision to normalize U.S.-Chinese relations. The author believes that one major factor contributing to the President's decision was the prospect of new trade possibilities for the United States: "America and China complement each other economically; they will not compete."

Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. By Richard H. Minear. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. 229 pp. $7.95. Minear examines the trial records and other primary sources relating to the International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo during the period 1946-1948 in which Tojo and twenty-seven other wartime Japanese leaders were tried for "crimes against peace" and "crimes against humanity." His thesis is that the judgments were improper because Japan launched its World War II attack as much for reasons of defense against encirclement as for reasons of aggression, and, moreover, the trials represented retroactive application of standards of international law which were not prevalent prior to 1945. Furthermore, the author contends that the legal procedures at the trials were prejudicial to a fair verdict. He thus views the trials as "a kind of morality play" representing a "victor's justice."

Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969? Compiled by Robert Goralski. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973. 208 pp. $5.75. Three debates on the circumstances attending the end of American military involvement in the Viet Nam war form the substance of this volume. Participants Morton Kaplan, Abram Chayes, G. Warren Nutter, Paul C. Warnke, John P. Roche and Clayton Fritchey examine the relative advantages and disadvantages which accrued from an American disengagement in 1973 rather than at some earlier point. The basic rationale behind the Indochina policies of the last three administrations, as well as the basis for a continued American presence in Indochina, are thoroughly analyzed from widely divergent viewpoints.

VII. LATIN AMERICA

Civil Strife in Latin America: A Legal History of U. S. Involvement. By William Everett Kane. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, for the American Society of International Law, 1972. 240 pp. $10.00. Mr. Kane, a practicing attorney, examines the reasons for U.S. intervention in civil strife in Latin America during the past twenty years despite the renunciation of the right of intervention stated in the Charter of the Organization of American States. He stresses that strategy rather than economic needs has dictated U.S. intervention policies.

Inflation and Economic Development in Brazil, 1946-1963. By Raouf Kahil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 357 pp. $35.25. This work examines the relationship between the rapid rate of Brazil's economic development and the inflation that accompanied it during the years 1945-1963. Kahil argues that the inflation cannot be understood entirely by reference to such correlates as monetary expansion, budgetary deficits and labor costs, but must take into account the fundamental structural weaknesses of the Brazilian economy during this period: wasteful agricultural practices, low propensity to save, oligopolistic organization of industry, and export dependence on a few major commodities. His study is an important contribution to an understanding of the observable phenomenon of inflation in rapidly developing economies.

Latin American Political Parties. By Robert J. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1973. 537 pp. $28.50. This comprehensive analysis of the nature and organization of, and ideological and pragmatic differences among, Latin American political parties also provides valuable summaries of the historical development of many important parties. Dr. Alexander, Professor of Economics and Political Science at Rutgers University, divides his study into sections dealing with types of parties: Personalist and Traditional, Socialist, National Revolutionary, Christian Democratic, Totalitarian, and miscellaneous parties (including the Peronista party).

Latin American Prospects for the 1970s: What Kinds of Revolutions? Edited by David H. Pollock and Arch R. M. Ritter. New York: Praeger, 1973. 337 pp. $18.50. This volume is the end product of a 1970 conference on revolution in Latin America held at Carleton University, Ottawa. Fifteen Latin American specialists examine such topics as ideologies of modernization; obstacles to development, the crucial issue of unemployment, and planning for full employment; cultural imperialism and "disestablishing" education; the emerging role of the military as national modernizers and managers; the Catholic Church in politics; tradition and change in literature and society in Spanish America; and guerrilla movements. There are in-depth case studies of the current situation in Brazil, Peru and Cuba; of Peru's economic and demographic problems; of development prospects in the Commonwealth Caribbean; and of direct foreign investment and industrial entrepreneurship in Central America.

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Zeitschrift der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

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Jahresabonnement 1974 (24 Folgen): DM 98.—zuzüglich Porto. Probehefte kostenlos

VERLAG FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK GmbH
53 BONN 1, Stockenstrasse 1-5, Postfach 643

Monographs and Reports Received

Can Congress Control Spending? By William Proxmire, with Al Ullman, John W. Byrnes, Paul W. McCracken, Charles L. Schultze. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Town Hall Meeting Series, 1973. 61 pp. n.p.

Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954-1972. By Paul Bridle. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, October 1973. 28 pp. 60 cents.

The Economy of South Vietnam: A New Beginning. Edited by Patrick M. Boarman. Los Angeles: Pepperdine University, Center for International Business, 1973. 130 pp. n.p.

An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations. By Kemal Karpat. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 39, July 1973. 116 pp. $4.00.

The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure. By Ron Huisken. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 10, August 1973. 34 pp. No charge.

Nuclear Politics: America, France, and Britain. By Wynfred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, The Washington Papers, Vol. I, No. 9, 1973. 84 pp. $2.50.

The Origins of MIRV. By Herbert York. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 9, August 1973. 24 pp. No charge.

Our National Security. By K. Subrahmanyam. New Delhi, India: Economic & Scientific Research Foundation, Monograph No. 3, December 1972. 65 pp. $5.00.

Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education. By Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, AEI Domestic Affairs Study No. 16, August 1973. 124 pp. $1.75.

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Prix de l'abonnement (1973):

France	56 F
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Publiée tous les deux mois

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